Navajo Code Talkers Essay Example

community. He also had previous military experience from his service in World War I. Recognizing the military's requirement for an unbreakable code, Johnston suggested employing the Navajo language for encrypted radio transmissions in February 1942 (Santella 2004, 66).

According to his explanations, the Navajos had a distinct manner of speaking their language in comparison to other Native American tribes. It is important to note that only a few anthropologists focused their studies on this language. Even during the 1930s, when German visitors visited Indian communities, not much attention was given to the Navajo language. Adding to its complexity, the structure of the language proved challenging. Each syllable in Navajo conveys its own meaning, emphasizing the need for accurate pronunciation to prevent misunderstandings. Additionally, speakers must also take into account their tone of voice for effective understanding.

The smallest mistake in tone or pronunciation can completely change the meaning of a sentence, making the Navajo language an ideal tool for coding secret messages. To enhance the code, Johnston suggested using a code based on the Navajo language itself rather than the language itself. By 1942, there were over 50,000 Navajo people (Townsend 2000, 145), making the U.S. Marines Corps confident in their ability to recruit enough Navajos. Initially, recruited Native Americans had no idea that they would become Code Talkers.

After successfully demonstrating their fluency in spoken and written English and completing boot camp, a group of 29 Navajos received crucial information. These recruits excelled in primary tests and were then sent to Camp Elliott, California. Their time there was dedicated to enhancing their skills in radio communications and electronics (Kawano 1990, 73). They underwent training on message transmission,

pole claiming, and wire-laying. It was only upon successfully completing this training that they discovered their role as code talkers.

However, the information was kept a secret and not shared with their families, even though Indians were only allowed to participate in the code construction after receiving training. The challenge initially was that the Navajo language lacked translations for English military terms and phrases, making it difficult to transfer military terminology into Navajo. Nonetheless, it was understood that the code needed to be both unbreakable and simple due to the high importance of quickly transmitting and translating messages during combat. Lengthy phrases could be perceived as ineffective and inefficient.

The Navajos decided to select words related to nature, birds, and everyday Navajo life in order to prevent confusion (Townsend 2000, 146). In general, there were two communication methods. As stated by Townsend (2000, 147), the first method involved a "words for alphabet" system. This method was used to encode certain terms that couldn't be easily substituted with a single word. It was impractical to assign an Indian word to any arbitrary Pacific island. According to the alphabet method, each English alphabet letter was replaced with an Indian word.

For instance, Tarawa Island was encoded as “turkey-ant-rabbit-ant-weasel-ant”. In Navajo, this would be pronounced as “Than-zie, wol-la-chee, gah, wol-lo-chee, gloe-ih, wol-la-chee”. To enhance code security and avoid repetition, diverse terms were used to represent certain English letters. This resulted in the creation of 44 words for English letters by code talkers. Frequently repeated consonants and vowels were given different variations. Another method involved predetermined terms representing geographic locations, military terminology, or special commands (Townsend 2000, 148).

The names given to nations

were based on nature, common ideas, or stereotypes. Countries were assigned coded names based on these stereotypes. Germany was referred to as "iron hat", Japan as "slant-eye", and the United States as "our mother". Military terms and instructions were represented by symbolic words and phrases. For instance, an airplane was called a "bird", a fighter plane became a "hummingbird", and fortification was named a "cliff dwelling". However, developing the code was not the only difficulty for code talkers.

The application of code talking was a significant challenge for radiomen. Both experienced white radio operators and untrained Navajos found it difficult to comprehend the transmission of the code talking, perceiving the phrases as nonsensical. It was necessary for the Navajos to learn the code in order to prevent the enemy from obtaining a code-book. Additionally, they needed to acquire the skill of rapidly and accurately relaying messages. Admission into the service for the Navajos required the ability to transmit a three-line message in under 20 seconds (Santella 2004, 87).

One difficulty faced with the Navajo language was its reliance on tones and expressions rather than specific words and phrases. Different tribes could pronounce the same word using different tones and expressions, making it important for Code Talkers to use consistent tones and expressions to ensure accurate communication. The speed and accuracy of message transmission was vital, as even the slightest error could pose a great danger to troops. Initially, field leaders were skeptical of the Navajo Code Talkers, but they soon proved their effectiveness by delivering error-free messages. Typically, code talkers worked in pairs, with one sending and one receiving the message. During World War II, there were

approximately 375 to 420 Navajos serving as code talkers (Jevec and Potter 2001, 270). According to Santella (2004, 114), the Code Talkers greatly improved transmission speed, increasing it by a hundred times compared to traditional methods. While traditional code machines took four hours to transmit a message, the Navajo Code Talkers reduced that time to just three minutes. Overall, the use of the Navajo code proved highly effective in improving the situation of marine forces in the Pacific.+

Until 1969, the role of Navajo code talkers in World War II remained undisclosed (Santell 2004, 117). The US military was uncertain about their future need for code talkers, leading to their secrecy. It was only on December 21, 2000, that legislation honoring the code talkers was signed into law (Hudson 2001). However, the code talker system could not be implemented throughout the entire US military due to an inefficient Indian recruitment system (Townsend 2000, 150).

The army recruited tribes solely based on their native language, overlooking factors like dialect variation, population size, and acculturation levels. Moreover, they expected all Indians to be trained as easily and quickly as the Navajos, which was unrealistic. Unlike the Marine Corps that utilized Navajos who shared a common culture, concepts, and language, the army combined Comanches, Cherokees, and Choctaws. As a result of multiple failures in the program, it was ultimately terminated.

The army's recruitment methods were not criticized; instead, blame was placed on Indians for their slow learning abilities. However, the Navajo code talkers greatly contributed to America's success in the Second World War. The effectiveness of these coders can be attributed to the close cooperation between the Marine Corps and the

Navajos. The Marines selected the Navajos based on shared language, population figures, and culture. Furthermore, the Navajos demonstrated patriotism for the United States and had the opportunity to embrace their ethnic identity with pride.

The Navajo language was ideal for creating an uncomplicated and secure code, as it was unwritten. However, there were a few challenges. Firstly, the language lacked military terms and instructions. Secondly, the meaning of words relied on tone and expression rather than specific words or phrases. The success of the Navajo Code Talkers was a result of careful selection, training, and development. However, the recruitment system utilized by the Marine Corps differed from that of the army.

The Navajo code talkers remained a unique formation of the Second World War (Hudson, 2001; Jevec and Potter, 2001; Kawano, 1990; Santella, 2004; Townsend, 2000).