Origins of World War 1 Essay Example
Origins of World War 1 Essay Example

Origins of World War 1 Essay Example

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  • Pages: 5 (1226 words)
  • Published: October 4, 2017
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The outbreak of World War I has been attributed to chain-ganging, a concept that attempts to explain the war's onset. However, is this explanation convincing? Are there alternative explanations that are more compelling and if so, why? The First World War was a total war, resulting in over 10 million casualties and involving more than 40 states. Even after a century, scholars continue to seek an understanding of this catastrophic event (Hooch 2011: 9). Numerous theories have emerged to explain the outbreak of the war. In this analysis, I will examine various explanations with a focus on Christensen and Sender's chain-ganging theory while comparing it to other approaches. Nevertheless, I contend that the chain-ganging theory lacks persuasiveness for several reasons. Firstly, some assumptions underlying the theory are questionable. Secondly, the evidence presented by the authors can be interpreted differently and does not necessarily

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support their intended explanation for why the war broke out. Consequently, theories such as coordinated action, misconception, and the security dilemma may present more compelling arguments. Introduced by Christensen and Snyder based on Waltz' balance-of-power theory in International Politics Theory , 'chain-ganging', is widely accepted among realist scholars as an explanation for World War I's outbreak (Source).Waltz argues that in multipart systems, individual states aim to attract and maintain allies as a means of securing themselves and avoiding military defeat. This approach necessitates states adjusting their tactics and forces based on the objectives and fears of their partners, resulting in a vicious cycle. Christensen and Snyder expand upon Waltz's security dilemma theory by incorporating variables like technology and geography to explain offensive or defensive advantages that influence states' behavior within an alliance.

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They describe chain-ganging as the phenomenon where different nations act similarly due to alliances, aligning themselves unconditionally with reckless allies who are deemed crucial for maintaining balance. They support this with Waltz's illustration from World War 1: if Austria-Hungary attacked, Germany had to do the same, while France attacking meant Russia had to follow suit (Waltz 1979 cited in Christensen and Snyder 1990: 141). However, Tierney raises questions concerning the chain-ganging theory. He challenges two primary assumptions - firstly, the belief that fear of defection is the main driver behind chain-ganging; secondly, the idea that countries blindly trust their allies for support in armed conflicts (Tierney 2011:288-290). Tierney argues that tight alliances often result in defection due to conflicting interests between states and potential negative consequences such as high transaction costs and loss of reputation.In addition, Tierney critiques the notion that alliance dynamics are limited to chain-ganging and proposes three alternative scenarios: chain-ganging with varying interests, restraint where one ally holds back the other from engaging in war, and coordinated action. Both allies within the alliance have identical interests and act independently with their own strategies (Tierney 2011: 287-288). It is believed that the outbreak of World War I was a coordinated action, as Austria-Hungary and Germany favored war, particularly demonstrated through Germany's unconditional support for its ally (Tierney 2011:299-301). According to Tierney (2011:291), the issuance of blank checks signifies convergence of interest and coordinated aggression rather than chain-ganging. However, Christensen and Snyder argue that Austria-Hungary's actions compelled Germany into unintended actions, supporting their theory of chain-ganging (1990:141). If we consider the theory of chain-ganging as an explanation for why wars escalate on a continent-wide

scale, especially in conflict-driven environments emphasized by Christensen and Snyder in later work (2011:305-306), it provides an intriguing perspective on the dynamics of 1914 instead of being an explanatory theory for the onset of war.

From my viewpoint, Tierney critiques Christensen and Snyder's arguments while highlighting gaps in their reasoning.However, Tierney's categorization of countries as 'hawks' or 'doves' based on their inclination towards war or peace oversimplifies the issue. I believe that a state's position can change from being a hawk to a dove, or vice versa, as its interests in war or peace evolve over time. In my opinion, any state in a multi-party system has the potential to become a hawk if there are clear benefits to be gained, as international powers constantly compete for dominance.

The foreign policy direction of the United States is often subject to discussion due to its lack of clarity. Germany was perceived as favoring peace before taking advantage of favorable circumstances to attack France in 1919. It is also questioned why both Germany and Austria-Hungary needed an event like the assassination of the archduke to initiate war if they already had broader war-related interests. Furthermore, why did nothing occur earlier if 1914 was supposedly the right time for war? (Tierney 2011: 298).

Another theory proposed by scholars to explain the outbreak of World War I is the misconception and security dilemma. Van Vera (1985) argues that conflicts leading up to the war were rooted in various prevailing misconceptions at that time.The text discusses various misconceptions that undermined cooperation and fostered aggression in the pre-war period. These included beliefs in offensive strategies, overestimation of hostility from neighboring states, European leaders imagining

a bandwagon world, exaggeration of the economic and social benefits of territorial expansion, and the perception that war promoted domestic tranquility.

Serves (1978) introduces the concept of the security dilemma, which explains that when a state enhances its own security, it inadvertently reduces the security of other states. This pursuit of security can lead to aggressive actions and create an arms race situation like that between Britain and Germany before World War l. Additionally, if launching a preemptive strike is perceived as providing a defensive advantage, it can trigger war.

Combining these theories, Snyder and Christensen (1990) propose using the security dilemma as a variable to predict whether chain-ganging or buck-passing will occur. This approach relies on clear historical evidence rather than assumptions about how states may react based on their allies' behavior.

The existence of misconceptions in the pre-war period is supported by literature. For example, General Alfred von Schlemiels emphasized Germany's offensive strategy with his statement "attack is the best defense" (Van Vera 1985: 83).The arms race between Germany and Britain provides clear evidence of the security dilemma and the misconception of hostility from other states. Germany's development of a powerful army caused Britain to mistakenly perceive it as an offensive weapon aimed at them (Dervish 1978: 170). However, it is important to critique this perspective by acknowledging that states can initiate war for reasons beyond just security and survival. Greed and ambition can also serve as triggers. In my analysis of various explanatory theories regarding the start of World War I, I explore these perspectives. Initially, I introduce the theory of chain ganging, which suggests that wars in Europe escalated due to alliance dynamics. Nonetheless,

further examination reveals that this theory lacks a deeper understanding of alliance behavior. Historical evidence demonstrates that both chain-ganging and restraint can influence alliance dynamics. While chain-ganging attempts to explain war escalation in Europe, it fails to provide an explanation for the onset of World War I. Instead, theories like coordinated action, misconception, and the security dilemma offer more compelling explanations. These theories acknowledge the intricate web of variables that can contribute to war, including factors like coordinated actions, misunderstandings, and the inherent challenges associated with maintaining security.It is important to grasp the different theories and factors that contribute to the start of war, such as in the case of World War 1. Thus, it would be incorrect to solely attribute the beginning of this conflict to chain-ganging.

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