Britain’s Imperial Policies Essay Example
Britain’s Imperial Policies Essay Example

Britain’s Imperial Policies Essay Example

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  • Published: September 5, 2017
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There has been much historiography concerning the development of the Cold War and its impact on British imperial policy. The Second World War had drained the nation's wealth tremendously and a led to a geopolitical transformation where instead of Germany challenging the British Empire; the Soviet Union was now challenging America for global dominance. However, Britain refused to accept the permanent nature of this post-war shift in the global balance of power and John Kent argues that 'policy makers were fully aware of the decline in British power produced by the war, but believed that such a decline could be reversed'1.

In order to achieve this objective, British imperial policy was centred on cooperation with America and non-compromise with the Soviet Union. Although the idea of a 'third force' emerged where Britain would lead

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a united Western Europe, and use the vast resources of Africa in order to bridge the dollar gap and become independent of American dominance, this idea was unrealistic and discarded in favour of cooperation with America.

Despite the economic threat that the superpower posed and the anti-colonial views held, Britain regarded America as a friendly power which was essential to her recovery and to the maintenance of the Empire. The Soviet Union on the other hand was considered as much more dangerous and the problem of containing Soviet influence in the post-war years was of prime importance. In March 1946 at Fulton Prime Minister Churchill stated 'they will not be removed by closing our eyes to them... y mere waiting to see what happens nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement2'. In areas of vital interest to Britain such a

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the East Mediterranean and the Middle East Britain was intent on maintaining exclusive influence and refused to succumb to Soviet demands. Deighton states that Britain wanted the best of both worlds with her own sphere of vital influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Eastern without accepting an exclusive Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe3.

This was due to the geographical proximity of counties such as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to Greece, Turkey and the Aegean and Black Seas and the fear of an extension of Soviet influence which could reorganise the whole of Europe into a Soviet-led bloc. The development of the Cold War certainly influenced British imperial policy with increased importance placed on Anglo-American solidarity and a hard line against growing Soviet and Communist influence. Although Prime Minister Richard Attlee feared aggravating the Russians through non-compromise, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin declined to appease the Soviets.

Bevin believed that a domino effect would ensue where compromise would simply encourage further demands. The Cold War threatened to cast a shadow Britain's global influence and prestige. The imperial policies pursued in the years up to 1952 were intended to prevent further erosion of her great power status and reverse the nation's decline. The Middle East and East Mediterranean were areas of vital British interest due to Soviet power being much closer and Soviet influence more likely to grow as a result of the advance of the Soviet armies.

In the years after the war Britain held a severely non-compromising position in this region due to a combination of political, economic and strategic reasons. The Middle East was an important source of oil, an export market and a replacement for food

supplies after Indian independence was granted in 1947. In strategic terms Indian independence also enhanced the importance of the Middle East due to Egypt replacing India as the main garrison between herself and Singapore.

Moreover many of the Soviet Union's vital centres were out of range from the United Kingdom, making the Middle East bases essential so that effective air action could be taken against the Soviet Union's important industrial and oil producing areas of Southern Russia and Caucasus. The importance of the Suez Canal was evident through Britain's refusal to renew the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. After the humiliating evacuation of Abadan Britain was determined to hold on to the Suez and prevent it from becoming an allied base subject to international control.

Although there was initial acceptance of withdrawal from Egypt in 1946, this was reversed in March 1947 and made withdrawal from the troubled Palestinian mandate more acceptable. As well as the free passage of Soviet warships and joint Russian-Turkish bases in the Straights, the Potsdam conference also revealed that the Soviets were seeking a position in Libya though the acquisition of trusteeship over Tripolitania. Britain wanted to obtain responsibility of Cyrenaica in the east as the region was deemed necessary for the protection of British air routes and air bases.

Furthermore, if the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty could not be revised, then it would become a very useful facility for stationing troops. Britain held reservations because Tripolitania would give Russians control of an area from which they could cut Mediterranean communications and it would strengthen the case for Soviet bases in the Straits. Britain was successful in its policy of excluding Russia from the ex-Italian colony

as until 1951 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were held under British administration. The crisis in Iran in 1946 also helped strengthen Britain's Middle-Eastern position.

The crisis centred on the continued Soviet occupation of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and the refusal to withdraw troops, prompting America to urge the Iranians to renew their complaint to the Security Council. America took the lead in opposition to Soviet imperialism by promising limited military credits to Iran and renewing several important wartime advisory missions. This helped to bring about Russian evacuation and prevented the Soviets from attempting to carve out its own sphere of influence in the Middle East.

Therefore to an extent the event did mark a victory for British imperial policy. However, historians such as Fawcett argue that the crisis in fact marked the beginning of a decline in British power and influence in Iran4. Britain had called for greater American commitment to Iran but had to accept a replacement with America becoming the leading foreign power in the country. Britain's advice to leave the oil door open was ignored as was the wish for an Irano-Soviet oil agreement.

Regarding proceedings in Iran, Taylor states 'the necessity for bringing in the USA seemed overwhelming, so much so that Britain was even willing to forgo her sphere of influence'5. The Iranian crisis showed that Britain was willing to allow greater foreign intervention in aspects of her imperial affairs in order to placate the Soviet threat. Britain saw collective defence as the best way to share the burden of commitment in the Middle East as after 1947 she no longer had access to the Indian imperial armies for control and security of

the Suez Canal.

Britain proposed a Middle East Defence Organisation or MEDO, but this proposal was ultimately discarded with a lack of support either from America or from Middle Eastern countries due to Britain's inability to give up her leadership position. Egypt also refused to become part of any multilateral arrangement in which foreign troops remained in her country. Despite the breakdown of a collective defence pact Britain had too much to lose by retreating from the Middle-East and was determined to hold on to its position as the main foreign power in the region.

The political implications of a retreat or internationalization were considerable and Britain's great power status would undoubtedly suffer damage as she would be perceived to be surmounting to Russian wishes. Such a move would also create a thaw in Anglo-American relations and heighten the possibility of another war by dividing the world into an American and a Soviet bloc. The Soviet threat to the region helped fortify Britain's desire to hold on her position in the region and to follow an imperial policy which permitted Britain an exclusive base in the Suez whereas Russia was denied her own exclusive sphere of influence.

The Soviet foreign secretary Vyacheslav Molotov did not agree with the notion that Britain was entitled to exclusive influence in the Suez whereas Russia was refused a similar base in the Straits. Britain placed tremendous value on Greece and Turkey as they both bordered on the Aegean Sea which was strategically significant for the maintenance of British naval dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was also bisected by the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and this was an important

maritime link which connected two seas.

Taylor stresses the importance of the region and argues that Britain wanted to continue to use Turkey as a neutral buffer zone between the Axis power and the Middle-East in order to prevent an increase in Russian influence and penetration6. There was fear amongst Foreign Office officials such as Gladwyn Jebb that any concessions made would lead to political control over Greece and Turkey and to the establishment of pro-Soviet governments such as those installed in Romania and Bulgaria.

If Russia had a base in the East Mediterranean and it would be seen as bringing Russian influence to the borders of the Middle East which would lower British prestige and encourage Arab unrest. The rapid Russian military advance in the east during the war posed a security threat to Greece and led to Bulgarian troops occupying Greek territory. Although after the Moscow conference in 1944 Russia did put pressure on the Bulgarians to withdraw their forces there remained an uncertainty of Soviet intentions after the war.

To combat this uncertainty in the Spring of 1945 the British removed the Plastiras government and installed a more conservative regime under Voulgaris. The British also refused to support American proposals for a tripartite economic mission to Greece, as they did not want any Soviet involvement in the country. Britain was able to acquire American support in the East Mediterranean through the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 which granted $400 million in military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece.

This formed part of the American policy of containment where the Truman administration was prepared to send any money, equipment or military force to countries threatened by

the communist government. Kent asserts that the underlying British imperial policy in the Cold War years was to defend her 'general global standing by a policy of no concessions to Russian wishes... and if necessary encourage American support for the defence of those interests where they were threatened by the Soviet Union'7.

Regarding the organisation of the post-war world, one option available to Britain was a 'spheres of influence' deal where Russia effectively gained control of Eastern and Central Europe in return for not impinging on British or American interests in other areas of the world. Alternatively Britain would be granted a say in Eastern Europe in return for allowing Russia to play its full part in security arrangements in all parts of the world. Whilst neither option appealed to Bevin due to the potential danger, Prime Minster Attlee stressed the merits of an imperial retreat and held an internationalist position.

Attlee believed that the advent of air power meant that neither the Mediterranean Sea routes nor the Middle East oilfields could be defended by mere physical presence any longer. He proposed that imperial links should be instead be maintained more cheaply round the Cape, through the Panama Canal or across Africa. Bevin strongly disagreed with this approach and believed that it was crucial for Britain to strengthen her global influence rather than weaken it at time when the Soviet Union was growing daily in economic and military terms.

Bevin saw an exclusive sphere of influence for Britain as a matter of life and death. Britain' imperial strategy in Eastern Europe was difficult as although the aim was to contain Russian influence as much as possible, she was

more concerned with the reconstruction and consolidation of Western Europe. However, Britain refused to allow the Soviets an exclusive position in the East Europe in case of an extension of Soviet influence towards the Straits and the Mediterranean. Russian dominance over Bulgaria raised concerns as this would enable her to impose her authority in the Straits.

British imperial policy in the region was based heavily Britain's strategic interests rather on democratic principles. Eastern Europe was in close proximity to British imperial interest in the East Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the fear was of Russia organising the whole of Europe into a Soviet led bloc. For example Britain could not abandon Greece and maintained her military presence to thwart Soviet encroachment. The fact that during the war Soviet troops were positioned in Bulgaria which itself held Greek territories such as Thrace and Macedonia meant that Britain had to stand firm.

As mentioned, Britain was able to maintain her position in Greece and prevent communist takeover with Bulgarian troops forced to evacuate. Polish aspirations were also important and Britain supported the reestablishment of Poland as a fully sovereign and independent state. Yalta was a success for Britain due to Stalin's surprising acceptance of the 'Declaration on Liberated Europe' where it was agreed that Britain and America could influence the process by which provisional and then permanent governments would be established in Poland and other areas of vital interest to the Soviets.

However this proved to be a disappointment as Russia did not abide by her agreements and later that year at the Potsdam Conference Stalin requested recognition of the provisional governments of Romania and Bulgaria. Britain and America

both refused this as the governments there were not considered sufficiently representative of the democratic parties. Britain desired a major voice in the discussions on the Romanian and Bulgarian governments while hoping to deny the Soviets a voice in her own affairs. She refused to male any piecemeal concessions as the establishment of puppet governments would only bolster Soviet power and influence.

For example Britain abandoned the Percentages Agreement of October 1944 which consisted of British acceptance of substantially larger Soviet interests in Romania and Hungary in return for recognition of British interest in Greece. Yet despite British efforts to minimise Russian dominance Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania did all fall within the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II and became communist nations. This was disappointing especially in the case of Bulgaria which Britain saw as a vital independent buffer state.

Nonetheless Britain was able to protect her chief interests and the internal communist coup in Czechoslovkia in Febraury 1948 helped prepare the way for the signing of the multilateral Brussels Pact the following month. This heightened security and enhanced protection of British interests. Although the Treaty failed to promote economic ties between Europe and Africa, it was successful as it mounted European anti-Soviet opposition and was a direct precursor to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which America commited herself to.

An good example of Anglo-American solidarity in Europe was in resposne to the Soviet blockade of Germany. The blockade was first real confrontation of the Cold War and was carried out in response to intentions at the London Conference to integrate Germany into a reconstructed Western Europe. The blockade was successfully countered in May 1949

though airlifts and helped strengthen the anti-Soviet Western alliance. The development of the Cold War did cause Britain to consider the benfits of a closer allegiance and union with Western Europe as there was the danger of weak divided Europe being exploited by the Soviet Union.

In a Cabinet Memorandum in March 1948 Bevin proposed for Britain to lead a grouping comprising of France and the lesser Western European powers together with the dominions8. It was hoped that this would strengthen Britain's international position and help eliminate dependence on America. After the war Britain's dollar reserves were in short supply and a possible solution was to practice a strict economy of imports from hard currency areas. Britain looked to colonial Africa as a crucial source in attaining economic self-sufficiency.

In a Colonial Office minute Andrew Cohen considered the advantages of closer Anglo-French co-ordination in Africa such as easing United Nations international pressure on British colonial policy and reaping the full benefits of American Marshall Aid9. Bevin was concerned by Britain's dependency on America was keen both to discover what raw materials the African colonies contained. Unlike the Middle Eastern states an advantage of the African colonies was that export could easily be controlled by the British and increased colonial exports would not therefore produce a sterling area deficit by pulling in imports.

After a tour of the continent at the end 0f 1947, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Bernard Montgomery accentuated the immense potential in Africa, declaring that it contained everything Britain needed in terms of minerals, labour, food and raw materials10. However despite a degree of optimism, the idea of a European customs union was opposed

by the Board of Trade as it was felt that the extent of private industry throughout Europe was too great for detailed coordination. It was also seen as vital to avoid commitments that would cut across Britain's general export policies and harm economic relations with the Dominions.

The British Treasury believed that there was little use in closer European economic cooperation as the main exports in France for example were wine and silk which were luxury items unhelpful to British economic recovery. The British Empire and America seemed to offer more valuable export markets and complementary trading relations. The strength of the Communist Party in France together with the Levant crisis meant Anglo-French cooperation was doubtful and in terms of bridging the dollar gap, the colonies of the other European colonial powers all had a dollar deficit except the Belgian Congo.

France itself had a sizeable sterling deficit meaning Britain would be under pressure to provide loans. The Colonial Office also held serious reservations about development in Africa due to infertile land, lack of efficient native labour and technical personnel and inadequate capital equipment in the colonies. Shortages of consumer goods made it even clearer that an instant African solution to Britain's worries was unlikely. Thus the aim of creating a 'Third Force' out of Britain's European and imperial strategies was unrealistic and impractical.

From the autumn of 1948 until the balance of payments crisis and sterling devaluation in 1949 there was increased scepticism about the advantages of European economic cooperation and the 'Third Force' idea was rejected in the spring of 1949, one month after the signing of NATO. The preservation of Britain's prestige and status as

a world power was fundamental for the Foreign Office. As this could not be achieved through independence from the Americans and a Third Force, British imperial policy was instead shaped on an acceptance that it would have to be done through a continued Atlantic alliance and dependence on the United States.

What can be said with certainty is that the Cold War helped maintain an imperial strategy that avoided acceptance of the permanent nature of the post-war shift in the global balance of power. The Second World War had resulted in a major dislocation of both Britain's economy, she was a declining power in 1945 and thus her ability to act independently on the post-war stage was closely tied to the ability to involve and control America.

It was believed that cooperation rather than competition with America would enable economic recovery and the preservation of the Commonwealth and Empire. The overriding aim was the reestablishment of Britain as a world power equal to and independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to achieve this Britain's imperial policies were influenced with greater acceptance of a subordinate position in an American-dominated alliance.

For example greater American authority and responsibility was granted in traditional British spheres of influence, for example in Greece, Turkey and Iran. Linked to the emphasis on an American alliance and the drive to sustain Britain's own world role was the need to avert the Soviet threat. Soviet encroachment on British interests would harm Britain's great power status and Bevin refused to make any concessions regarding vital interests in the East Mediterranean and Middle East, although recognition was given to Russian dominance in

East Europe.

Prime Minister Attlee had opposed the maintenance of commitments which exceeded Britain's manpower or financial resources and talked of the 'necessity of cutting our coat according to our cloth11'. Although this was done to an extent with greater American involvement and retreat from India and Palestine, the intention of the British Foreign Office throughout the Cold War period remained to hold on to her vital interests and strengthen rather than forfeit Britain's global standing.

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