Having assessed Source A, it is clear that Sir Anthony Eden harbored an unfavorable view of Colonel Nasser and had justifications for his opposition towards him.
Eden believed that the canal was not essential to Egypt. He accused Nasser of being self-centered and taking control of the canal for his personal gain. Eden had to confront Nasser because he believed that Britain's access to vital resources, including oil, machinery, and transportation, would be severely impacted. In his attempt to support his argument against Nasser and push for war, Eden aimed to expose any factors that could be beneficial to his cause.
In an attempt to portray Nasser as inconsiderate, Eden accuses him of taking over an international company without consultation or consent. He clarifies that the issue at hand is not with Egypt, but specifically with Colonel Nasser. T
...his statement serves to shape the public perception of the conflict as a war against the colonel rather than the people of Egypt.
Eden distinguishes the ongoing situation from the recently ended Second World War. He expresses his desire for a peaceful resolution, but highlights Colonel Nasser's conduct of a vicious propaganda campaign against Britain, making peace impossible. Eden characterizes Nasser's behavior as that of a dictatorship, citing the hazards of appeasing Hitler.
In this passage, the author explains that using appeasement as a tactic in the current situation, as was done during World War 2, would not be effective. It is presumed that the British desire peace based on recent events and outcomes. The author asserts that Eden made his statements to convince the populace that following their plan would prevent a repeat of the war. Sources B an
C are examined for their usefulness in understanding Egyptian public opinion during the Suez Crisis. Source B provides an overall impression of Nasser having support from his country, as evidenced by his smiling and raised arms which suggest he is happy and possibly celebrating something.
The image portrays Colonel Nasser, who appears to be elevated above others, possibly standing on people's shoulders. This may signify approval from the Egyptian people. Additionally, the individuals in the vicinity are removing their hats as a sign of respect towards Nasser. Although this source provides useful insight, some factors undermine its reliability. The crowd seems relatively small, indicating that the support may be limited. Moreover, the unclear picture quality prevents us from discerning the message on the right banner in the image.
The picture may not be from the stated date and may have been used as propaganda against the British people. The Egyptian people in the picture are supportive, while Source C appears to mock Eden. Eden seems to threaten an Egyptian sailor, possibly Nasser, by saying "If you don't give it back, I'll shoot". The statement does not specify who will be shot, but the picture suggests that Eden will shoot himself.
The main idea conveyed is the lack of control that Eden has over the situation and his helplessness. The Egyptian sailor, in contrast, appears care-free and content with a clear smile on his face. His relaxed sitting position emphasizes this feeling. Meanwhile, Eden's body language portrays a sharp contrast with the sailor's, indicating his anxiety and discomfort with the gun to his head and one leg lifted in the air. Despite the humorous nature of this source,
it holds significant truth.
Although there are limitations to considering the opposite perspective of this source, such as the fact that the newspaper it was published in is not named and it could be part of Nasser's propaganda campaign (similar to Source B), both sources indicate that Nasser was favored by his people and had outsmarted the British government. Moving on to the analysis of Sources D, E, and F, one must determine whether public opinion in Britain supported Eden's decision to utilize military action against Egypt. This can be explored further through examining the sources themselves, as well as taking into account one's own knowledge on the subject.
The impression given by Source D is that the British people were supportive of Eden and against Nasser. Although Eden is not mentioned, Nasser is portrayed as a malevolent dictator, similar to Hitler. Referring to him as "the boss leader of Egypt" reinforces this negative view of him as an oppressive ruler. The words "crude and dangerous" further emphasize his intimidating nature. Finally, the last sentence makes a comparison to Hitler's suicide and the devastation it wrought on Berlin.
According to my interpretation, this statement implies that if we engage in war, we can emerge triumphant like the British did in the past. However, it fails to acknowledge the consequences of war. In fact, England concluded the war in a deteriorated state.
Out of the three sources, only this one backs up Eden's concept. Source E is a photograph with a distinct viewpoint. In England, individuals appeared unwilling for a conflict. The image showcases a protest against Eden's proposal to assault Egypt's military bases in Suez. The signs
that read "No war over Suez" and "Eden must go" convey a feeling that war is unnecessary and unwanted.
Prime Minister Eden was not in a secure position, therefore risking being voted out if he continued with his plans. His limited actions could be seen as precarious, as he faced disagreement from many people. The abundance of opposing opinions suggests that the majority of the British population preferred peace over war with Egypt. Similarly, Source F shares this sentiment but presents it differently.
The reliability of a source is based on the reasons for going to war. In this case, it is believed that there are no justifiable reasons for war. The source is considered fairly reliable as it includes the publication date and name of the newspaper it appeared in. As evidenced by the statement "what right have we to assume that Nasser will close the Suez Canal," the military action is based solely on assumptions.
Within this article, there exists a statement that offers protection to Nasser by negating any attempt he may have had to acquire the canal. Eden's claim of Nasser's propaganda plan becomes contradictory due to this. Additionally, the author portrays a clear anti-Eden sentiment through the use of the phrase "is quite immoral." Ultimately, it seems that most individuals did not support Eden's proposal.
Out of the three sources, Source D is the only one that supports Eden's decision. However, this decision was not popular with the people of his country. Sources G and H examine Britain's motives for military action against Egypt. Although both sources are against Nasser, Source G disagrees slightly with Selwyn Lloyd's points.
Sir Anthony Eden and
Mr Lloyd have differing opinions on their primary objectives. Eden claims that "we do not disagree about our primary objective" in his letter, but Lloyd argues in Source H that there may have been some mistaken judgments in carrying out their policies, suggesting a misunderstanding in objectives. This is further evident as both sources reveal that Eden and Lloyd have set two different primary objectives. According to Source G, the main aim is "to undo what Nasser has done and set up an international regime for the canal," while Source H states that the initial aim is "preventing a general outbreak of war in the Middle East." Despite this, Eden's main objective includes bringing the Suez canal back under some form of international control, which is also mentioned as the third objective in Selwyn Lloyd's book.
Both men coincided on the idea that there were multiple objectives. Sir Eden's letter quotes "but this is not all," and Source H presents three distinct objectives. References to Hitler and Nasser comparisons appear in both sources. Eden notes that Nasser's path is "unpleasantly familiar," while the word "menace" brings to mind Hitler instantly.
In Source G, Eden makes an effort to portray America and Britain as a united entity, stating his desire to establish an international regime for the canal and create a less hostile environment for the west. By utilizing the phrase "international regime" and referring to "the west", he aims to garner Eisenhower's support by emphasizing the closeness between England and America. Additionally, this choice of language presents the letter as more mindful of global opinion rather than being self-serving on Eden's part. Conversely, Lloyd employs the
phrase "national interest" which implies that Eden is primarily concerned with personal gain.
In the text, Eden refers to Mussolini as being an ally of Hitler and a less severe version of him. Source G also suggests a comparison between Nasser and Mussolini. Although Eden does not view Nasser as a Hitler figure, he still believes Mussolini poses a significant threat. It is essential to note that Source G is a letter asking for assistance from America and its resources.
According to Selwyn Lloyd's book, Eden is portrayed as someone who might not be telling the whole truth and is saying what he believes Eisenhower wants to hear. Additionally, Eden's concerns may be more focused on his own interests and the fear of another devastating war like the one that occurred in the 1930s, which had significant negative impacts on Britain, including economic problems.
These two sources seem cohesive, but upon closer inspection, it's apparent that Selwyn Lloyd and the other source have conflicting opinions. The statement "Britain was humiliated by international opinion and made to look foolish" is supported by the sources. In my opinion, Britain was indeed humiliated as a result of global opposition towards Eden's proposals. The majority of people worldwide disagreed with both Britain's ideas and actions.
In my opinion, it is crucial to acknowledge that different sources may offer differing viewpoints. Further examination of this issue is necessary. Source A, which comprises solely of Eden's comments, might not present a thorough outlook on global opinions. Since Eden aims to gain public support through this TV appearance, his standpoint could be prejudiced. Although it is reasonable for Eden to hold resentment towards Nasser, his fury
is apparent in this source and he seems to endorse military intervention.
The statements "He cannot be trusted" and "We remember the cost of giving into Hitler" demonstrate that he may be perceived as a war-hungry individual, which is not aligned with the desires of the people. This creates a conflict between the British public and Eden's government. A photograph in source B reveals that the public opinion towards Colonel Nasser is favorable and supportive. The people's happiness indicates their opposition towards the British government and Eden himself.
This source, although its picture quality is poor, depicts clear support for Nasser among the people. Colonel Nasser's confident smile indicates his secure position in his conflict with Britain and France, as well as his satisfaction with the public's acceptance. Source C, a cartoon drawn by an Egyptian, may be biased, but it does reflect some truth. It portrays the international opinion of Eden as being powerless in relation to Nasser and lacking authority.
The image depicts Eden threatening to shoot himself if Egypt does not return the Suez Canal, highlighting Britain's humiliation and Sir Anthony Eden's embarrassment. Source D, a British newspaper, provides a patriotic viewpoint rather than an international one, potentially creating bias in the perspective.
The British public disliked Nasser, drawing a comparison to Hitler who was also hated. The phrases "Boss leader," and "Big Shot," highlight how many British people saw him as a bully and overpowering. The source, a photograph from a London demonstration, presents a British perspective, similar to the previous source.
Source F provides two letters from the public expressing strong opposition to the potential attack by Eden on Egypt. The source also highlights the
desire among British citizens to remove Eden from his position as prime minister, as demonstrated through a banner stating "Eden must go!". This clear display of disapproval likely embarrassed both Eden and his political party.
These letters provide a true perspective from British individuals, strongly criticizing Eden's behavior. The initial letter denounces Eden's hasty judgments, questioning the basis for assuming that Nasser will shut down the Suez Canal. Similarly, the second letter argues that waging war against Egypt is highly unethical and contrary to moral principles.
Both source A and G criticize Eden's use of force and express disapproval from the British community. Source G, a letter from Sir Anthony Eden to the American president, also lacks information on public opinion. It mainly seeks support and clarification of objectives with the statement "I do not think that we disagree about our primary objective."
The words "I do not think" indicate uncertainty and show that Eisenhower has not approved any action. This is crucial because Britain requires the support of influential superpower America. Eden likens Nasser to historical figures Hitler and Mussolini, stating that "Nasser has embarked on a course which is unpleasantly familiar," and "The removal of Nasser - must also rank amongst our objectives." These remarks suggest the possibility of war, which was not desired by the public according to source E, making public opinion likely against Eden.
The most reliable resource for obtaining global perspectives is source H, which emphasizes the government's decision-making without considering public opinion. Consequently, this disregard of consultation led to a negative reaction from the public towards Eden. According to Selwyn Lloyd, Eden believed that his actions were justified without
seeking input from the people; however, had he done so, he could have made an improved choice.
The absence of consultation or consideration was, in my view, the primary cause for public outrage. The United Nations mandated the withdrawal of troops from the Suez region during the Suez Crisis. In addition to this international organization's involvement, I think that Dwight D. Eisenhower and the USA also had a noteworthy impact on the decision to pull out troops.
The United States exerted pressure on Britain and France to stop fighting due to the rise in oil prices and the canal blockage. The Suez crisis caused a decline in Britain's global superpower status, resulting in strained relations with other nations. Consequently, many opine that Britain is not as influential as it was 60-70 years ago. Although some believe that international opinion made Britain look foolish, it is more accurate to say that they were humiliated for conceding under US and UN pressure.
The humiliation experienced by Britain was partially due to their decision being overruled, resulting in shame. The public may not have helped, but was justified due to Eden's neglect. Additionally, the majority of other nations disagreed with Britain's actions, leading to international opinion being against them and causing further humiliation.
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