China’s Rapid Population Growth and Characteristics

consequences for China's future, prompting diverse reactions from citizens. The evaluation of the policy's efficacy is based on public feedback concerning its execution, as well as intended and unintended demographic ramifications. It is worth noting that despite uncertainties surrounding demographic events throughout Chinese history and culture, population concerns have long plagued the country.

In China, historically an ideal family was one with several children, including at least one son who held particular significance. The reason for this is that daughters typically left the household after marriage while sons remained to manage the family farm and support their elderly parents and other relatives while also producing offspring to carry on the family name. Consequently, families usually continued having children until they had at least one son, especially in rural communities where labor demands were high, and families wanted as many children as possible. However, in the last century, China has faced various uprisings, wars, epidemics, and the dismantling of imperial authority which have likely contributed to population growth remaining low annually around 0.

From 1949 to 1970, China saw a consistent rise in its gross population rate, which peaked at roughly 2.8%, resulting in a net increase of around 250 million people due to reduced mortality rates. During this time, Mao Zedong, then Chairperson of the Chinese Communist Party, stressed the immeasurable worth of human life. The government prioritized economic, political and cultural affairs that ultimately led to a shift towards collectivism and a decline in the traditional family structure based on land ownership during the Complex Peasant Family Model era.

Although several government initiatives addressed family planning, their aim was not population control (Croll, 1985). Within two decades,

the population had surged from 560 million in 1949 to 810 million in 1969, an increase of nearly 70% (Banister, 1987). One contributing factor was the rise in life expectancy from less than 40 to almost 60 during this time, thanks to changes in health services (Croll, 1985). With improved economic and health measures—especially in rural areas—large families came to symbolize newfound prosperity and stability. Nevertheless, rapid population growth did not correspond with the government's ability to provide for its people's basic needs. By 1970, fearing the long-term repercussions of continuing population growth, China's leaders began promoting the Small Family Model (Croll, 1985).

The State Family Planning Commission was established by the CCP in 1972, with the key principle of limiting population growth through "one-family, one-child". If growth continued, projections indicated that China would suffer from economic and food-related issues (Kaufman et. al, 1989). In response, the Chinese government launched a campaign encouraging families to have a maximum of two children. The campaign's slogan was "later - longer - fewer," urging people to delay marriage, postpone having their first child, and limit the number of children for the sake of patriotism (Greenhalgh, 1994).

According to Kane (1999), population research in China was stopped in the late 1950s due to Marxist doctrine. However, by 1975, new university departments with statisticians started to emerge and researchers realized that even though families remained small, the population would inevitably grow as half of it was under 21 years old. By 1982, China's total population had already surpassed one billion and was projected to reach 1.4 billion at the end of the century based on current trends. Hao (1988) observed that

most population growth targets were abandoned by the early 1980s and from 1985 onwards, the official objective was to stabilize the population around 1.2 billion by 2000 according to Kane's report.

Although the Chinese government aimed for a birth rate of 1 child per woman, the decline in birth rates from 6 to under 3 was still impressive, as noted by Greenhalgh (1994). The policy was generally well-received by the population and most of the birth reductions were voluntary.

In 1979, the Chinese government implemented a policy requiring urban couples to limit their families to one child. The goal was to emulate First-World fertility and education patterns as part of a larger effort to transform China's Third-World economy into a First-World economy by the millennium's end. Despite its success, it is unclear why the "Small Family Model" ended and was replaced with the One Child Model. To discourage larger families from having more than one child, various methods were used, such as financial levies and social pressure. The government expected third or subsequent births to be eradicated with approximately one-third of couples agreeing to follow the policy (Croll, 1985; Greenhalgh, 1994; Fong, 2004:1; Feng and Hao, 1992).

In 1979, the One Child Family Model was introduced in China to promote households with only one child as part of the country's socialist development plan. The objective behind this policy was to prevent population growth from hindering progress in industry, technology, and defense (Croll, 1985). By 1980, compliance with this initiative became compulsory and women who had two living children were mandated to undergo sterilization.

Greenhalgh (1994) stated that in 1983, the government enforced widespread sterilizations and mandated contraception use, particularly

intra-uterine devices (IUDs), among women with one living child. Kaufman et al. (1989) reported instances where second and third pregnancies were involuntarily terminated against the mother's will. Kane (1999) claimed that multiple factors contributed to almost 90% of couples in urban areas limiting their family size to one child. Meanwhile, Banister (1987) discussed how attitudes towards family size varied between rural families and those residing in towns and cities.

According to Greenhalgh (1992), rural families were more resistant to the one child policy due to their reliance on children to support them in later life. Peasants who lacked savings and pensions were particularly hesitant to comply with government policies that they did not trust, and often found ways to avoid prescriptions that they deemed unpopular. Local authorities had to resort to financial penalties for higher order births. Family planning workers at the village level were caught between the state's expectations and the determination of their friends and neighbours (Greenhalgh, 1992, p. 56). However, since its adoption, the one child policy has resulted in a decrease in Chinese fertility, which has reduced population growth by approximately 250 million people worldwide (Kane, 1995). This reduction in fertility has alleviated some of the pressures on communities, resources, the government, and environment in China.

According to Johnson (1993), there are inconsistencies between the legislation and execution of China's one child policy, which result in avoidance, evasion, and neglect of the policy. This creates difficulties in effectively managing and reporting population objectives. The enforcement of the policy is non-uniform, leading individuals to use tactics to circumvent it. There is significant under-reporting of male and female births with females being twice as likely

to be under-reported. As a result, infant sex ratios were imbalanced with 114 boys born per 100 girls by the early 1990s (Kane, 1999), accounting for approximately half to two-thirds of the disparity. Unreported daughters are typically left with relatives or abandoned at orphanages while sex ratios are further complicated by widespread abortions (Johnson, 1993).

Banister (1987) notes that the Chinese government's one-child policy imposes restrictions on individuals' reproductive, living, and career choices across the country. Families risk losing state benefits or being fined for exceeding the birth limit, making it disadvantageous to have multiple children registered in their households (Hull, 1991). Consequently, many resort to underreporting births through methods such as not reporting them or placing babies up for adoption. This implies that China's official population figures may be inaccurate and that unregistered populations could strain social welfare infrastructure (Hull, 1991). Unregistered births are particularly prevalent in rural areas with over 20 million estimated cases accounting for at least 1.6% of China's total population in 1996 (Chen, 1996).

The PRC's ability to enforce a one-child policy is widely credited to the rise of internal migration. The need for workers in cities has led to relaxed limitations on movement. Despite government attempts at regulation, Scharping (2002) approximates that approximately 150 million Chinese adults aged 20 and 30 make up a transient population that departs from their villages for varying lengths of time.

Due to their reliance on unstable, cash-based incomes and their tendency to move frequently between jobs, cities and villages, a significant number of individuals in China exist without being registered with government authorities. This leads to unreliable population statistics, with estimates suggesting that roughly a quarter

of all births in 1991-2 went unrecorded (Zeng, 1996). The distribution of China's population has historically been uneven, with heavily populated coastal areas contrasting with sparser interior and mountainous regions. The majority of these individuals, commonly referred to as China's "floating" population, migrate towards better-developed and developing cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.

According to Freidman (2001), the residential background information of migrant workers is kept where they came from, creating a potential for a lack of control by any family-planning authority in China's migrant population (Goldstein 1997). Although some suggest that migrant workers ignore the one-child policy and have more than one child, contributing to an increase in the total number of births (Christiansen 1996). On the other hand, due to economic reforms and increased incomes, some Chinese peasants are able and willing to pay penalties for having additional children beyond the birth quota (Goldstein 1997). Despite possible economic reasons for not wanting more children, some migrant workers may pursue having additional children for cultural reasons without facing penalty from the regulatory apparatus of the PRC.

Despite instances of coercion and intimidation related to enforcement practices, the existence of China's one-child policy does not ensure compliance. This is evidenced by the various ways in which people have challenged its enforcement mechanisms (Zeng, 1996). One unexpected outcome of the policy was the removal of first-born daughters from their homes, as couples who already had a son as their first child were more likely to voluntarily follow the one-child limit (Kaufman et al., 1989).

Li and Cooney (1993) explain that the preference for male children in China has cultural roots dating back 2000 years. Parents

value sons not only for emotional reasons but also as potential supporters during their old age or contributors to the household labor force. Despite penalties, families with daughters often attempt to have a son or remove the daughter from their home, resorting to adoption or even infanticide. Johansson and Nygren (1991) report extreme responses to China's one-child policy, including changes in sex ratios from 1970 to 1987, which they refer to as "the missing girls of China."

According to Tien et al. (1992: 15), there has been an increase in the proportion of male infants, which is likely due to the government's population policy.

Yi et al. (1993) suggest that the higher male to female birth ratio in China may be due to a greater likelihood of reporting extra-quota births if the infant is male, even with fines imposed, whereas non-reporting is more probable for females. This misreporting of births has been identified as responsible for up to 85% of the sex ratio differential (Promfret, 2001). Despite government restrictions on prenatal sex determination activities, abortions are projected to exceed infanticide in popularity as a means of sex selection owing to technological advancements in prenatal sex selection methods (Yi et al., 1993).