The Logic of Terrorism Essay Example

to examine connections between criminals and terrorists, which significantly contributed to enhancing these efforts.

In response to the types of crimes committed, laws and regulations related to international crime have been amended and expanded. Recent political analysts have identified worrying trends that have resulted in increased cooperation between terrorists and international criminal groups. As pointed out by Clutterbuck in 1995, this criminal consortium is growing larger in size as well as expanding its scope and objectives.

The advancement of technology, trade, and finance has facilitated a greater global reach for these criminal sectors. Cybercrime activities like credit card fraud and money laundering are among them.

However, criminal groups have adjusted to a globalized future by altering their structure and framework. They frequently operate internationally and possess a adaptable membership that can adapt to market opportunities and establish connections with outsiders. Furthermore, there has been a change in the type of activities conducted by terrorist organizations. Rather than ethnicity, religion now serves as a greater motivator for terrorists who endanger US security. It is intriguing to note that terrorists are becoming more resilient against financial devastation, possibly due to ongoing state sponsorship or support and the growth of criminal enterprises.

If these two factors are combined, the resulting trends could suggest an increase in the geographical overlap of criminal and terrorist operations, leading to a greater interaction between the two groups. These trends may also indicate a growth in opportunities for individuals to transition from one group to the other. The key locations where this interaction is amplified include prisons and the online realm, particularly in online platforms that are assumed to be social networking sites (Paul ; Martin, 2009).

Other circumstances that can contribute to the facilitation of terrorism include ungoverned areas, such as regions plagued by widespread corruption, conflict, or post-conflict chaos where legitimate governance is lacking. Additionally, areas near borders, free market zones, and urban metropolitan cities where various legal issues arise should be considered.

Some believe that the connection between terrorist groups and drug trafficking is strengthened by unfriendly governments and criminal states that may sponsor or support terrorism. Researchers also argue that this relationship deserves more attention. The U.S.A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reports an increase in designated foreign terrorist organizations from 14 to 18 between 2003 and 2008 (Clutterbuck, 1986). A recent example of this connection can be seen in West Africa, where suspected Latin American drug traffickers have worked with associates of Al Qaeda to transport cocaine into Europe.

Illegal activities involving terrorists can include money laundering, human smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, and minor offenses. Experts believe that criminals and terrorists frequently work together because they both have access to financial opportunities. These collaborations are usually temporary and based on shared objectives. It is possible that these relationships may not progress into a complete partnership (Rhodes, 2000). Nevertheless, if a terrorist organization transforms into a criminal group or depends on illegal profits for funding, such partnerships could develop.

The financial support received by terrorists from criminal organizations has been found to be systematic and strategic in nature before being given to the targeted individuals or group. As discussed in later chapters, terrorism and organized crime are considered a business enterprise (Rhodes, 2000). The figure below indicates the sources of assistance and their destinations. However, analysts question the extent of illegal cooperation between

criminal bodies and terrorist groups. While collaboration may be common between terrorist groups and drug traffickers, analysts debate whether criminal and terrorist relations occur in other situations.

The contention is that the connection between criminal and terrorist organizations is more than just a short-term alliance based on mutual benefits and threats. In many cases, it is compared to a short-lived business relationship. Advocates of this theory point to specific examples of aggressive Islamists operating independently but contributing to financing terrorism-related operations with intermittent criminal activities (Rhodes, 2000).

A report from the National Intelligence Council in December 2004 supported this view, drawing on a study conducted by non-governmental experts worldwide. The report concluded that cooperation between terrorists and criminals is primarily driven by economic interests. This research aims to provide an introduction to the relationship between organized crime, terrorism, and related activities. It examines the potential incentives and deterrents for collaboration between terrorists and criminal organizations, the varying degrees of crime and terrorism connections, the types of criminal activities involved, and their global impact.

The study conducted by Rhodes (2000) examined terrorism and extensively discussed the empirical and theoretical aspects of criminology. The main objective was to address three research questions: (1) Is there a direct correlation between organized crime and terrorism? (2) Which types of organized crime are commonly associated with different forms of terrorism, and which types are less compatible? (3) Do all forms of organized crime solely focus on generating profits, or are there exceptions where certain activities are employed for political advantages?

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The international efforts to combat the association between crime and terrorism form part of broader policies aimed at dealing with these

two matters separately. Although various strategies and programs center around addressing international crime and terrorism individually, limited effort specifically targets their convergence. Current endeavors primarily focus on areas such as human smuggling, illicit travel of terrorists, money laundering, terrorist financing, and the links between drug traffickers and terrorists (Dobbelaar ; Haarman, 2005).

The text explores the reasons why criminal and terrorist groups affiliate with each other and how this affiliation can lead to the evolution or transition between the two types of groups. Organizations that want to survive, expand their achievements, improve their skills and tactics, or require external assistance may seek help and expertise from other bodies, even if those bodies have different objectives. This relationship can strengthen and enhance the potential, infrastructure, and wealth of both criminal and terrorist groups (Mead ; George, 1934). However, such affiliations also come with significant risks for both types of groups.

Collaborative arrangements can result in successful alliances as well as feelings of distrust, competition, and opportunities for exploitation. These affiliations may attract increased surveillance and analysis from government agencies, which typically do not focus on individual organizations and their activities. Criminal and terrorist organizations are motivated to form partnerships because it offers financial viability, geographic advantages, individual protection, logistical sustainability, the ability to maintain exclusive criminal actions, and enlist third parties to further their goals. Occasionally, the illegal activities conducted by terrorists may be perceived as a reflection of a group's ideological beliefs (Mead & George, 1934). Nevertheless, academia, public discourse, and legal policy have been grappling with establishing a clear definition of terrorism.

In order to establish a universally accepted definition of terrorism, it is essential to have

a solid theoretical and conceptual foundation. This can be achieved by differentiating terrorism from other types of domestic uncertainties. The aim of this research is to accomplish this objective through analyzing terrorism and comparing it with similar incidents. By doing so, we can enhance our comprehension and ultimately create a more equitable and efficient framework for preventing harm and enhancing security against acts of terrorism. The initial stage in this process involves evaluating the normative structure surrounding terrorism.

The text examines the classification of terrorism as a type of crime and its connection to organized crime and political violence. While some experts see similarities in terms of organization and political motivation, there are also important distinctions that need to be explored. The aim is to differentiate terrorism from organized crime and political violence by examining these similarities and differences. To start, the research looks into the normative standing of terrorism before delving deeper into subsequent chapters. In this study, both terrorism and organized crime are dissected, and their elements are compared to reveal any potential connections.

Terrorism: A Form Of Crime?

The question of whether terrorism is considered a form of crime must be addressed in order to analyze the relationship and differences between terrorism, political violence, and organized crime. In simple terms, crime can be defined as 'breaking the law,' which also applies to terrorism. Many people view terrorism as an act that causes immediate and unlawful psychological and physical harm. Therefore, it can be argued that terrorism is a form of crime. However, it is important to recognize the complexity associated with this assertion and consider additional factors. To gain a comprehensive understanding of this complexity,

it is essential to establish the definition of what constitutes a crime.

The concept of 'crime' is shaped by media perception and religious beliefs (Muncie and McLaughlin, 2002). In modern criminological literature, the definition of crime varies based on the act itself, its consequences, and how it is interpreted by society or individuals. This interpretation is established through the enactment of laws that specify particular behaviors and their repercussions. Criminologists argue that crime is a social construction. To exemplify the subjective nature of this construct, let's take rape within marriage as an instance. For a significant period, engaging in sexual assault against one's spouse was not deemed illegal. Even today, numerous countries do not universally classify it as a crime, leading to global impunity.

The definition of rape in marriage can vary between countries, encompassing acts like adultery and homosexuality. The way these acts are treated by the law varies as well; some jurisdictions impose severe punishments, including death penalty, while others do not classify them as criminal activities. This discrepancy highlights differing viewpoints on what constitutes a crime. One perspective is that any action forbidden by law is deemed a crime (black letter law).

The definitions of crime can vary depending on the resources and the specific nature of the crime. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, a crime is defined as the intentional commission of an act that is socially harmful, dangerous, and specifically defined, prohibited, and punishable under criminal law. However, this definition is limited because it only includes acts that have been codified or defined by statutory laws and does not cover acts under common law. Another perspective on understanding crime is

considering socially acceptable conduct which takes into account acts that are codified or defined by statutory laws including prohibited acts that may not always be subject to punishment due to public judgment.

The first approach to defining crime is universally agreed upon and states that public drunkenness should not be punished in any way. However, criminologists commonly use the second approach which allows for discussion and negotiation. This approach is more comprehensive and valid in determining the nature of crime compared to the first approach (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Terrorism also poses complexity when it comes to defining it as a form of crime. Schmid (2004) suggests that a narrow definition focusing on specific criminal acts is preferable due to international consensus. Terrorism encompasses various activities such as recruitment and bombings, making it a broad concept. In their analysis, Schmid and Jongman (1988) found multiple definitions of terrorism, each involving different acts associated with terrorism.

Schmid's opinion on mala per se crimes has been highlighted in this study, which aims to provide a rational perspective on terrorism as an international crime. International institutions mainly focus on crimes associated with terrorism, considering it a criminal aspect due to the rule of law and codification of specific acts and organizations as terrorism (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Based on this discussion, it can be concluded that terrorism can be classified as a criminal act. Now, let's explore how terrorism is related to political violence and organized crime. Terrorism can be closely associated with various types of crimes or even subcategories of crimes (Makarenko, 2003; Deflem, 2004; Munice, 2002; Crenshaw, 1998).

Criminological research involves classifying crimes into various groups and types in

order to analyze them more effectively. The differentiation is necessary due to the numerous types of crimes. This distinction is made by cross-examining criminal law, where crimes are categorized based on the nature of the offense committed (Ruller et al, 2001).

Relationship Between Terrorism And Crime: Case Studies

The interaction between terrorist groups and transnational criminal entities does not follow a single model. However, Alex P. Schmid developed a conceptual model for detecting terrorist activities.

The relationship between these two comparables can take various forms, influenced by the diverse incentives, objectives, and challenges of different actors. Many organizational variables contribute to partnership decisions, including the desire for sustainability and organizational growth, as well as long-term strategic considerations. In some cases, leaders of a terrorist group may overlook or instruct their lower-level members to expand criminal relations and activities (Makarenko, 2003; Deflem, 2004; Munice, 2002; Crenshaw, 1998). If the lower-level members are unsupervised and not ideologically aligned with the core leadership, criminal-terrorist alliances may form that are not necessarily supported by the whole terrorist group. Similarly, effective decision making can also occur within criminal organizations.

Analysts widely agree that it is very challenging to uncover and verify links between terrorist groups and international crime groups, as well as the use of similar tactics. The extent and type of cooperation between these groups also varies greatly. There is not enough concrete evidence to fully understand the connections between criminals and terrorists, although there have been some widely reported cases that prove the existence of such relationships. It is unclear whether these known cases are representative of a broader issue, a growing trend, or isolated incidents (Makarenko, 2003).

Full Convergence/Fusion of Crime and

Terrorist Organizations:

Over time, a criminal group can transform to adopt political goals and new operational objectives. These organizations may form alliances with existing terrorist groups or foreign governments to achieve their strategic aims. Alternatively, they may carry out terrorist attacks independently, thereby classifying themselves as terrorist organizations. It is common for criminal syndicates to possess the necessary expertise in engaging in acts of terrorism.

If the target appears challenging to attack, criminals may choose to hire specialists for surveillance, money transfers, weapon purchases, bomb-making, and elimination of rivals. A criminal organization can redirect its resources for political purposes, resulting in a sophisticated criminal-terrorist group or a fused criminal-terrorist organization seeking ideological alignment (Morrison, 2006). The use of criminal expertise in terrorism raises concerns among experts who fear that terrorists may prefer criminals due to their perceived higher skill levels. However, law enforcement agencies and politicians are suspicious of any involvement by criminals in terrorist operations.

Furthermore, focusing excessively on terrorist attacks may divert significant resources away from criminal activities, resulting in dissatisfaction and desertion among members who joined primarily for financial gain. Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company, a criminal consortium consisting of 5,000 members, operates in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates. This organization serves as an exemplar of a model that combines criminal and terrorist elements (Morrison, 2006). The U.S Department of Treasury classified Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), a designation made in accordance with Executive Order 13224 in October 2003.

After a few years, specifically in 2006, President George W. Bush assigned the same person, along with their organization called D-company, an important role in monitoring foreign narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics

Kingpin Designation Act (also known as the "Kingpin Act"). Since taking on this responsibility, reports have highlighted the company's achievements in combating criminal activities.

The criminal activities range from extortion, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, to contract killing. Additionally, the organization has infiltrated the Indian Film making industry, extorting producers, assassinating directors, distributing movies, and pirating films. Ibrahim started his criminal career in Bombay, India as a smuggler in the early 1970s and eventually became the leader of a multi-crime syndicate. He successfully established a thriving criminal enterprise during the 1980s and later became associated with Islamist radicals in the 1990s.

His allies included Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Al Qaeda. D-Company became a criminal-terrorist group after the destruction of Babri Mosque in Uttar Pradesh, India, in December 1992. The subsequent riots resulted in the mass killing of Muslims. Angered by the merciless slaughter and believing that the Indian government had played a role, Ibrahim sought revenge. To protect vulnerable Indians, the organization intervened through a previously secular organization with Hindu members (Fernandez-Montalvo, Echeburua & Amor, 2005). Ibrahim's D-Company sought assistance from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and successfully carried out a series of bomb attacks on March 12, 1993, resulting in the loss of 257 lives.

The attacks resulted in the D-company headquarters being relocated to Karachi, Pakistan. It is believed that in Pakistan, D-Company strengthened its strategic alliance with the ISI and established connections with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), which had been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the USA in 2001. This new partnership with LeT led to a change in D-Company's approach. It provided financial support to LeT and lured recruits to join their training camps. In return, LeT

operatives were given access to smuggling routes and contacts. Press accounts suggested that Ibrahim may have supplied a boat to the 10 terrorists who carried out the massacre of 173 people in Mumbai in November 2008.

According to the USA government, the D-Company is believed to have connections with both the Al Qaeda and smuggling routes used by terrorist groups. Ibrahim's name is listed among individuals associated with the Al Qaeda. D-Company has shifted from being a profit-focused criminal syndicate to a fusion of crime and terror, resulting in a change to its established structure. After the bombing incident in 1993, many Hindu members abandoned the group and formed a rival gang (Fernandez-Montalvo, Echeburua & Amor 2005).

Analysts suggest that despite allegations of collaboration with groups like the LeT and Al Qaeda, the D-Company is becoming more secular-focused. However, there are concerns that this could eventually lead to convergence with terrorist organizations. Despite these allegations, the D-Company remains focused on its own interests and maintains a strong financial base. Its reported links to the LeT and Al Qaeda pose a potential threat to US interests in South Asia. Security experts believe that if Abraham lends his criminal skills and networks to these groups, he could facilitate activities such as smuggling terrorists internationally, illegal weapons and drug trading, extortion, and money laundering. This could ultimately strengthen the capabilities of terrorist groups and support their continued engagement in terrorist actions (Fernandez-Montalvo, Echeburua & Amor 2005).

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

The research on the interest of this paper is limited and has not been extensively explored. There is a lack of broad research on issues related to

terrorism and organized crime, and most of the available information is held by legal agents who have the authority and resources to conduct investigations in these areas. Researchers have found this topic to be dangerous to investigate and have encountered limited access to information. Some individuals with knowledge in this field withhold it due to concerns about national security, while others lack the necessary authority to disclose it.

The introduction and literature review provide the context for this paper, focusing on terrorism and organized crime. Secondary data comprises most of the analysis and findings, with some aspects of primary data used to fill in gaps.

The capture of certain data through secondary methods was not possible, thus necessitating the utilization of primary data. This was done to ensure that the most relevant information for the paper's purpose was compiled. The collected, compiled, and analyzed data was then applied to the subject matter of this paper to establish the identified relationships. For the collection of the necessary data, samples were drawn and underwent a process (Dobbelaar ; Haarman, 2005).

Data Gathering Techniques

In addressing terrorism and organized crime, a qualitative approach to data gathering was employed in the specific research areas.

The research involved collecting both secondary and primary data to achieve the paper's objective. Secondary data was gathered from relevant sources such as previous research, crime and terrorism journals, defense and foreign affairs reports, studies on conflict and terrorism, political papers, books, and other relevant materials (Dobbelaar & Haarman, 2005). Primary data was collected using multiple methods.

Among the data collection methods used, semi-structured data collection methods, scenario observation, and interviews were prominent. Interviews and scenario observation were the main techniques

used to gather primary data due to their simplicity in administration. The interviews were conducted randomly with different individuals and groups related to terrorism and organized crime. These primary data collection methods focused on security forces responsible for terrorism and organized crime tasks. The primary data collection methods were applied to all willing agents who could provide essential information for the research paper's interests and objectives.

The researcher's aim was to avoid complications by keeping the criteria for selecting interviewees simple and aligned with the interests of the paper.