Was nuclear strategy an attempt to rationalise the irrational Essay Example

superpower with nuclear capability, found itself in a favorable political position. The demonstration of its capacity to inflict unprecedented damage during the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave the country a significant advantage. From 1945-62, under President Eisenhower's leadership, the USA applied the strategic "massive retaliation" doctrine. John Foster Dulles, former US Secretary of State, often used "brinkmanship" by threatening US enemies with nuclear destruction to avoid conflict and bring the country dangerously close to war to achieve national goals. However, as Sun Tzu stated, "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting," implying Dulles was achieving his aims peacefully. In summary, when only the USA possessed nuclear arms, their strategy rationalized what could be considered irrational.

Despite the US using their nuclear power to further their political agenda, they never had plans of actually deploying nuclear weapons and faced no effective retaliation. However, this approach is not comparable to later nuclear strategies and deterrence methods. From the 1960s until the 1990s, mutual deterrence was established through the Soviet Union's second strike capability. Leaders understood that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was inevitable if either side showed weakness, resulting in a standoff between both nations. Only by possessing an indisputably strong arsenal could leaders guarantee that their weapons would never be used. The tenuous peace between superpowers relied on counter-value threats and counter-force threats aimed at something valuable to the enemy, preventing either nation from going to war for fear of total annihilation.

Between 1945 and 1950, the number of nuclear weapons in the USA rose from six to 374 with the cooperation of the USSR. The five countries possessing nuclear weapons - USA,

USSR, France, China, and UK - had a total of 22,069 by 1960. Despite only using two nuclear weapons during conflict (Little Boy and Fat Man over Japan in '45), it is evident that MAD doctrine poses considerable danger as seen in events like Cuban Missile Crisis where misunderstandings coupled with leaders' reluctance to appear weak could result in numerous casualties. In an attempt to render nuclear weapons obsolete against possible ballistic missile attacks, US President Reagan proposed a Strategic Defence Initiative comprising three concepts for space-based ballistic missile defence systems: high energy lasers; infrared-guided missiles equipped on 432 satellites; and multiple lasers aimed at a mirror in space that would focus on incoming missiles. Although scientifically unfeasible ultimately, this idea encouraged substantial advancements in anti-ballistic missile defence technology. With the end of Cold War in 1991 and increased prevalence of nuclear arms worldwide among developed nations over past two decades has led to several modifications being made to nuclear strategy.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was effective from December 5th, 1994, helping the United States towards nuclear disarmament. By 2002, global warhead numbers had decreased to less than 30,000. Aiming for a reduction of up to 92% in warheads compared to peak levels in 1986 by the year 2012, US President Bush and Russian President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) that same year. Henry Kissinger's book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," published during a "nuclear age" in 1957 when he served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, argued against excessive use of nuclear weapons against minor provocations from perceived enemies such as the Soviet

Union due to inadequate security benefits provided by them and potential harm caused to US credibility.In the nuclear age, Kissinger sought to update Clausewitz's concept that war must serve policy goals. The presence of nuclear weapons reduced U.S. foreign policy objectives as Kissinger famously recognized America's acceptance of its own mortality due to nuclear arms. During the Cold War, strategic thinking following rational principles kept the world secure, and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear deterrence became a crucial strategy displaying humanity's vulnerability and fragility while humiliating nations; total annihilation was not rationally justified. It is intriguing to investigate Soviet Russia's stance in the early years of the nuclear arms race since they had successfully tested their first atomic bomb in 1949 despite Khrushchev and Soviet Russia having no desire for a nuclear war in the 1960s. Some members of the communist party believed that a triumph could be accomplished through a victory with nukes; however, it wasn't until 1982 when Soviet Defense Marshal Ustinov excluded any possibility for such an outcome.

The Soviet Union aimed to spread communism among the working class globally, but this was hindered by the threat of nuclear war. Despite this, communist ideals and policies heavily influenced Soviet nuclear strategy in the pre-cold war and cold war periods. However, there are significant differences in modern nuclear strategy during the 'second nuclear age' including the role of the state and non-state organizations, as well as how deterrence applies post-cold war for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In "The Second Nuclear Age" by Colin S. Gray, four reasons why a state might pursue nuclear technology are identified: to secure from external threats,

gain security advantages, satisfy domestic interests or politics, or for global prestige.

Although possessing nuclear weapons can be justified for certain countries, acquiring more of them increases the risk to global security and upsets the delicate balance of power. The consequences of a newly-armed Iran attacking an American city or a rogue nation igniting World War III - possibly leading to human extinction - are unknown. Current nuclear strategies acknowledge these issues and recognize the importance of preventing additional countries from building nuclear arms, despite this seeming contradictory. However, this does not mean that initiatives involving nuclear energy are fundamentally flawed. In today's world where nuclear weaponry is prevalent, one primary concern is the danger posed by non-state actors and other non-governmental organizations.

Preventing terrorist groups or religious extremists from obtaining nuclear weapons presents a unique challenge, as traditional deterrence methods used during the Cold War might not be effective. This is due to the difficulty in retaliating against unknown attackers and concerns that self-proclaimed martyrs may use various types of weapons for mass murder, including nuclear, chemical, or conventional explosives. Moreover, newly armed nations may not have the same values and fears as state leaders who rely on traditional deterrence techniques. Consequently, deterrence has become less reliable in today's nuclear age since there is no clear frame of reference regarding nuclear strategy policies across different countries such as Iran, China and Pakistan.

The necessity and justification of nuclear weapons and strategy in modern warfare is a topic that raises questions. While nuclear weapons will not disappear overnight and their importance remains significant, especially in the context of states newly acquiring nuclear arms within the second nuclear

age, they are mostly irrelevant in the wars being fought globally at present. In contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where guerilla-style fighting is predominant, nuclear weapons are just a relic and serve merely as a deterrent. A theory gaining momentum is "pax atomica," whereby major superpowers do not engage in full-on clashes or World Wars due to fear of the use of nuclear weapons. This fear has resulted in a global stalemate and long-lasting peace, ironically caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. My belief is that nuclear strategy, or "pax atomica," plays a critical role in modern warfare.

The idea behind deterrence strategy is not to justify the irrational decision of starting a nuclear war, but to find a rational approach to prevent it and serve the interests of the state. I still believe this is relevant today, although nuclear weapons are now over 60 years old and pose as great a threat as ever in the wrong hands. The biggest danger nowadays, however, comes from unknown and perhaps irrational acts by rogue terrorists or states. In this context, nuclear strategy should not rationalize an irrational state leader's actions. Instead, it should focus on disarmament, non-proliferation accords with countries, and safeguarding existing nuclear weapons.