Multinational Operations C2 Arrangement Essay
Command and Coordination Mechanism of Multinational Joint Operations Nationality: Fijian Rank: Major Name: Ilai (Jack) Moceica 20th April 2010 Name: Ilai (Jack) Moceica Rank: Major Arms: Infantry Corps Enlistment date: March 1985 Post: Officer Instructor Education Level: Grade II Military Staff and Tactics Auto-biography I was born in Fiji on 14 July 1965 and educated at the Queen Victoria School.
I enlisted into the then Royal Fiji Military Force in Sep 1985 was posted to 1st Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment, UNIFIL Lebanon from Oct 1985 – Oct 1986, and subsequently served with the 2nd Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment, Multinational Force and Observers, (MFO) Egypt from Apr 1987 – Apr 1988, on both occasions as a soldier. Returning to Fiji, I was posted to the Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Squadron after successfully completing the CRW Selection Course and Continuation Training Cycle. I attended Officer Cadet training in Fiji and was commissioned to the rank of Second Lieutenant in Mar 1992.
During my posting with CRW Squadron from Jan 1991 – Nov 1994, I? ve held various appointments namely Troop Commander, Training Officer, and Intelligence/Operations Officer. In Oct 1988, I got transferred to the Force Training Group and appointed a cadre Team Leader. I was posted again to FTG in 2005 as Officer Commanding School of Infantry. I have held appointments with the 3rd Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment as Intelligence Officer from Aug 2000 – May 2002 and Operations Officer from Jun 2003 – Nov 2004.
In Peacekeeping missions overseas, I held the appointment of Platoon Commander in Dec 1994 – Dec 1995 and again in Sept 1997 – Sept 1998, whilst serving with 1st Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment, (1FIR) – UNIFIL, South Lebanon. I was appointment Information/Operation Officer with the Fiji Company deployed under the 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment which was part of INTERFET/UNTAET Nov 1999 – Jun 2000. I served as Operations Officer with 2nd Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment, MFO – Egypt from May 2002 – May 2003 and he Fijian Battalion, Iraq in Nov 2004 – May 2005. In Jan 2006- Jan 2007, I was attached to the Australian Defense Force as an Observer/Trainer at their Combat Training Center-Live, Townsville. I had another deployment with 2FIR MFO as Field Force Liaison Officer from Sep 2007 – Mar 2009. My last appointment was Officer Instructor, at the Fiji Army Officer Training Center before coming to Nanjing, China. I have also attended Junior and Senior Military Officers training and courses both in Fiji and overseas.
I was fortunate to have attended the UN Military Contingent Course held in New Delhi, India in Sep 2005 and the International Liaison Course in Israel in 2008. I am married with three beautiful children. E-Mail address: [email protected] com Command and Coordination Mechanism of Multinational Joint Operations Essay Abstract The search for effective forms and methods of coordination in the military sphere has been unceasing. Official documentation of historical past wars and operational experiences had been drawn on to improve the coordination and interaction of matters on joint action by the army, navy and air force.
Relative to the interaction in all three multidimensional components of the forces are the relationship of individuals who command the different organizations, his principal staff and methods on how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of members interaction through coordination. This can be understood in the process of analyzing the mechanism of these relations, given its hierarchical structure and complex character. War history exemplifies that a combination of objective and subjective reasons have placed military command into chaos, resulting in not fully connecting the ways to the means in achieving the desired endstate.
One main reason for this is the existing contradiction between the theory and practice of coordination. The trend in theory is the aspiration to integrate the subordination of the specifics to the general, appraising the effectiveness of performance by individual military components based on their contribution in attaining the general objectives. Similarly in practice, the aspiration is to isolate the specifics from the general, appraising the effectiveness of performance not based on contribution to the general cause but in relation to a particular effect that has been achieved.
Unless the reality of the diverging issues of theory and practice is combined harmoniously by effective coordination, elements of the system will start moving in opposite directions. In the interest of avoiding the negative impact of the processes, a study on past historical multinational/ combined/joint military wars and operations would be the most appropriate platform in examining the effectiveness of coordination by analyzing the mechanism of command and control of the military components involved. Command and Coordination Mechanism of Multinational Joint Operations 1.
Introduction Multinational operations are not new concepts, but the evolution of its application have proven it to be the most reliable tool in managing threats of violence across the globe. The end of the cold war has offered opportunities and challenges for nations to embrace a more effective cooperation in order to prevent belligerent threats and deadly conflicts. One legacy of the cold war is thinking of the use of military force in terms of either doing nothing, or employing overwhelming forces in a decisive manner.
Such thinking is no longer appropriate, but a middle ground solution involving a more modest use of international force in a limited yet persistent manner favored to be the best compromise. In this way, leaders would be willing to commit their states to the international efforts if they are confident in the ability of the international community to manage an intervention successfully. Such confidence together with a clear understanding of the costs, risks, expected duration of a contemplated intervention and the prospects of success would convince leaders to make a compelling case and take the risks associated with military intervention.
Past practices have proven beneficial both in terms of increased knowledge and experience base on studies advanced in developing a more systematic approach in dealing with international crises. Issues that at one time seemed intractable, like forming coalitions and establishing fully capable coordinating mechanisms for military operations, are now proven less complicated in light of the lessons learnt. One such major phenomenon has been the modern notion of command and control in coalition operations, a relatively enduring undertaking in recent times.
This essay will examine selected command arrangements since the Second World War and in doing so, the paper will establish that coordination is essential to the command function in effectively integrating the complex combat systems in multinational joint operations. Discussions will be advanced to elevate the importance of other entities crucial to the command and control of operations and finally parallels drawn and compared to two separate and very distinct multinational joint operations I was privilege to have served with in recent years. . Management of Multinational Force Multinational operation is a military operation carried out by two or more nations. They are managed in a variety of ways either under an alliance/regional organization, a coalition, or supervised by the United Nations. 1 In all cases, the purpose, scope and possible operational timeline along with an effective interface between the military commanders and the political leaders are clearly defined in the mandate authorizing the military commitment.
This interface should translate broad political objectives into explicit military missions that in turn will determine the composition of the forces. Unified operational control of the multinational forces and systematic supervision with regular feedback to the political leadership are central to all these management systems. Each of the above arrangement presents its own diverse and difficult challenges. The UN management system will likely be limited to peacekeeping and even in this restricted role, there is room for improvement.
Management by an alliance is an excellent concept and NATO would be a classical example. The North Atlantic alliance possesses a highly capable command and planning structure with a well established Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Coalitions are favored to be the most likely arrangements for managing multinational military interventions due to its much flexible characteristics that can also be tailored to meet varying contingencies. Within the United Nations structure, the Security Council and the Secretariat each play a distinct role.
The role of the SC is to provide the ultimate source of legitimacy for the multinational military operation and that authority, thus becomes the unifying purpose for the international commitment for a multinational military intervention. 2 The UN’s other role involves managing peacekeeping operations under the secretary general in conjunction with his diplomatic role in conflict resolution. It is important to understand that in addressing threats of violence under the UN Charter, there are two specific chapters which outline commitment of multinational forces when required. Chapter VI defined as the „Pacific settlement of disputes? is passive in its application and has limitations. Peacekeeping operations are undertaken only with the consent of the belligerents, and UN contingents cannot use force except for self-defense. The main focus of this effort is on the latter stages of conflict, usually after a cease-fire agreement has been reached. Chapter VII, a more robust mandate is usually authorized in extreme cases where there is an urgent need to bring an immediate end to violence and an expedient restoration of an enforced peace in the environment.
Alliances in the view of many observers should carry more loads of multinational operations. Established trends have proven that conflicts occur in areas between bordering states. The threat in this regard is more immediate to neigbouring states and they usually have better understanding of the problem and its cultural context than far away nations. Despite these advantages, most regional organizations decide not to intervene militarily in conflicts because they are neither appropriately structured to manage military operations nor do they have the necessary resources.
Coalitions are the more promising alternative to UN and alliances. Nations that form coalitions are self-selected states with a genuine interest in preventing deadly conflict. Past experience has proven that they either template their command structure similar to NATO or rely mainly on the assets of the leading partners. Like minded nations will often possess interoperable equipment, which will ease logistical problems and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises.
Since these coalitions usually involve one or more of the major powers, materials and financial support is always assured. 3. Coalitions and Alliances Operations ADFP 101 defines coalition operations as one conducted by forces of two or more nations which may not be allies, but acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission4. JP 1-02 (2001) provides the additional notion of the ad hoc nature of coalition operations with the definition that a coalition is „an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action?. Compared to the certainties of an alliance where trust could be built over a number of years, with a coalition, different forces operate in ad hoc arrangements with non-traditional partners to serve a short-term purpose. This leaves the multinational commanders to inherit „coalitions of the willing? , designed to meet political-strategic, rather than operational and tactical, requirements. The 1991 Gulf War or INTERFET in 1999 are classical examples. Conversely, an alliance is the result of formal agreements between two or more sovereign nations for broad and long-term objectives.
In effect, alliances are coalitions that have formalized their common goals into a long-term partnership. NATO and ANZUS (Australian, New Zealand, and United States of America) are excellent examples of longstanding alliances that were created to provide a common goal in which case a collective agreement based on common defense interest. As Ryan explains, these partnerships have a tendency “…to develop a high level of military collaboration and interoperability through common doctrine, training and equipment. 6 Due to their ability to integrate quickly and adopt a common organizational structure, alliances are often a source of coalition forces. 4. Command Arrangements Command and control generally leads to a great deal of confusion as the terms often have different understanding and interpretations of what it means. This is brought about by the existence of three possible meanings that can be attributed to command and control, with the meanings variously used either singly or in combination. The terms are command arrangements, command, and command support systems, which are explained as follows: „Command arrangements? provides the operational and administrative arrangements that must be established in order that a commander may exercise command of assigned forces. „Command? as understood in the context of command and control, refers to the commander and involves such matters as quality of decision making, situational awareness, commander? s intent, communication of decision, timeliness, decision making under stress and dealing with uncertainty. Command Support Systems? represents the most common meaning given to command and control and refers to items such as the equipment, staff and doctrine used to support the commander in the command process. Even though the examination is concerned with command arrangements, discussions generally will also encompass the command and command support as these are essential coordination mechanisms critical to the process. Command arrangement is said to establish the operational and administrative onstraints or boundaries placed on the commander? s authority. For theatre commanders, command arrangements are established by the appropriate military and national strategic level authorities Up to the early part of the 20th century, senior commanders were accustomed to having extensive command authority over their largely single-service subordinate forces. Today we would categorize this as the commanders exercising command arrangements such as Full Command (NATO), Combatant Command (United States), or Theatre Command (Australia).
However there was no real need to coin such terms prior to the introduction of air forces as a third service and the increased occurrence of joint and multi-national operations that came about in the 1940s. While it may not be possible to definitely establish the claim, there is evidence that the term „Command and Control? originated during this period amongst the Western Allies to describe those command arrangements necessary to achieve unity of effort through unity of command. 5.
Evolution of Command Arrangements – Second World War The conceptual development of multinational command and control was perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the Allies during the Second World War, but Eisenhower and his fellow commanders? would certainly remind us of its importance. 8 As one of the early pioneers, Eisenhower had to grapple with two diverging issues as he sought to develop a workable command structure for operations in the European Theater. A difficulty noted in his attempt was, he tried to unify command of the strategic air forces to support the Normandy invasion.
Eisenhower? s aim was to win control of all aviation assets of the allied nations, in order to achieve the desired goal of his Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, (SHAEF). 9 This was never forthcoming initially, due to diametrically opposing views on the command process held by the United States and British. The British agreed that the Supreme Commander have only „supervision? of the strategic air forces which the American queried as they thought it should be under „command?. 0 Assigned to lead operation TORCH in 1942, Eisenhower put great personal energy into the development of a combined staff for his Allied Force Headquarters. In January of 1945, General Eisenhower had a fully functioning operational staff and a mature command structure with the army, navy and air force as its three interdependent dimensional components. The structure he took back into Europe for operation OVERLORD was a version of his TORCH command concept refined over twelve months of combat.
It served him exceptionally well during the invasion and breakout, repulsing the German winter counterattack and through the final dual axis penetration into Germany in the spring of 1945. 11 The Allied multinational structure included integration of the intelligence, operations and plans functions and provided for coordination of national sub-sections dealing with personnel and logistics issues. The foundation for this combined staff was a layer of dimensional commanders and their staff (air, land and sea) which planned and executed operations and coordinated with each other.
Supporting these staff were key cells that focused and integrated component actions like air coordination cells between the air and ground components, to develop the best possible effect in achieving the mission. In general, national commitments were matched by command authority and staff representation. 6. Post Cold War – Inchon-Seoul Campaign In June 1950 the North Korean Army invaded South Korea and General MacArthur, the theater commander had initially underestimated the North Koreans.
As one of the last experienced operational commanders of previous wars, he understood that multidimensional synergy was a force multiplier given his vastly superior air and naval forces. With the unified efforts of his Army and Air commanders, MacArthur marshaled a multinational task force to strike the North Korean line of supply deep in its rear at the critical hub of power in the heart of Seoul. 12 Operation CHROMITE illustrated many of the current principles of multinational command.
The concepts of Joint boards, component commanders, decentralized operations, synchronization of air, land and sea, were techniques used to good effect. Unfortunately, these tools began to decay soon after MacArthur left his command and the allied effort soon withered, a tremendous disadvantage reflecting overwhelming American dominance in this coalition operation. 13 7. The Six Days and Yom Kippur War The late 1960s witnessed both the climax of the multinational operational experience in Vietnam and the beginning of a joint revival.
The re-birth began to take shape in an unexpected place beyond measure. First, Israelis planned and executed their 1967 war with the full employment of all three services. The Israeli Air Force stole a march on the Egyptian forces along the Suez, destroying the adversary? s air force on the ground and securing the time necessary for naval and ground forces to meet their opponents on favorable terms. 14 This was a victory in a war of high technology. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war got everyone? attention including the Egyptians who found defeat to be an excellent teacher. In 1973 they turned the tables on the Israelis, with effective use of air defense and air maneuver in the face of a static defense tactic – the Bar-Lev line. Only at the last moment did the Israelis return to a joint manoeuver concept which re-established a basis for the cessation of hostilities between the two overextended forces. 15 The Arab coalition in both of these wars became a critical weakness that the Israelis were able to use to their advantage. 8.
Paradigm Shift – Desert Shield and Storm The American emphasis on multinational operations began to take form under General Colin Powell. The 1991 Gulf War exemplifies joint force operations, but it was still overly controlled and fraught with service competition. Operation DESERT STORM did illustrate the return of multinational command and control structures. Coalition effectiveness was an early priority and the military commanders understood that a responsive structure had to be developed that incorporated each national contribution in a way that maximized its effectiveness and minimized its limitations.
General Schwarzkopf16 shared leadership of the coalition military forces with Prince Sultan Bin Khaled of Saudi Arabia, and the national leaders of the coalition seemed to have sufficient dialog to maintain a cohesive effort through the point of liberating Kuwait City. Clearly the support of the United Nations was an important factor in many national decisions to contribute and the UN mantle and its legitimizing effect did assist in the grouping of forces. The recognition of General Khaled as one of the two theater commanders? s considered to be the most important decision in helping cement the coalition against Saddam and the overwhelming support of a large number of Islamic nations. There was no doubt that the US was to make the ultimate command decisions, but the parallel command structure was a reassuring fact. 17 Despite the acrimonious competition amongst the service components, unity of the coalition was assured through the formation of the Coalition Coordination, Communications and Integration Center. The C3IC was a „round the clock? enter that exercised no command authority, but acted as a conduit between the western and the Arab/Islamic forces and serve as a link between the two command structure. 9. Lessons Learn – Somalia Joint operations returned in the 1990s to hold a position as a standard bearer in the developed world. The Americans, British and their allies employed joint task forces in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. In all of these operations joint approaches have been the hallmark, but unfortunately, it did not always fully integrate coalition support.
Immediately following the Gulf War, operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq was a highly successful multinational humanitarian effort. 18 Approval from the UN SC brought together a coalition of thirteen nations under the control of a Coalition Task Force staff. Despite the early success, a major setback followed as the operation expanded beyond limited humanitarian responses, imposing unnecessary stress on the coalition command and control system. In late 1992 the desperate conditions in Somalia caused the deployment of a multinational forces in operation PROVIDE RELIEF.
The deployment was the centerpiece of a UN supported effort by many nations to help the starving Somalis. Unfortunately, as the mandate for Somalia expanded to include security operations, protection of convoys and limited policing functions, subsequent operations PROVIDE HOPE and UNISOM II in Somalia grew out of control and there was urgent need for command and control reform19. Differing national objectives was the cause of cracks within the initial coalition structure. Some nations withdrew forces and others severely restricted employment policies, making operations much more difficult to manage.
Finally, as the date for transition to full UN control approached, differences within the forces eroded the coalition? s effectiveness. The transition to UN command was not well accomplished and changes to political and military objectives following the transition eventually broke the cohesion of the coalition. 20 10. International Force East Timor (INTERFET) Australia Defence Force provided leadership and the insight to make a difficult operation at best stay distant from what could have been a much more serious and a deadly conflict.
General Peter Cosgrove, the multinational commander for Operation STABILISE not only successfully integrated all the service tools, but also the perspectives of many nations and the UN in a very short time and retained the initiative throughout his operations. All components of INTERFET were built upon the strong relationship that existed between Australia, its allies and other nations from the Asian and Pacific region. The level of trust established facilitated very fluid information transference among the member states of the English speaking nations, with liaisons as information transfer conduit for non-English speaking nations.
It was through this arrangement that the bulk of information was communicated within the coalition. INTERFET also demonstrated the ability to plan and synchronize the capabilities of the separate services of the contributing nations to good effect. 21 Due to the dominance of short time scales and demanding space and geography challenges, Cosgrove had to employ fairly robust levels of joint capability to accomplish many of his primary tasks. Although the requirements for joint synchronization varied over time, there was no doubt that joint planning and execution was an important factor in achieving operational success.
The transition from initial stability operations to the establishment of UN operations under UNTAET was accomplished remarkably smoothly. This seamless transition was largely the result of the regional employment strategy of INTERFET and the phased arrival of UN forces. 11. Personal Experience and Observation – INTERFET 1999 and MFO 2007 Whilst the many names of great military general can easily be association with past military operations, their personal involvement in trying to establish the right command arrangement that works best during their time is appealing.
Those very successes and failures have contributed to the lessons learnt which has become the military institutional preferences for doctrinal development in these specific areas. 22 INTERFET was a successful multinational operations sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and supported by the international community. It was a rapid intervention ad hoc coalition which delivered its regional strategic objectives well within time. The force deployment was predominantly from the Asia/Pacific region however, nations having long established alliances with Australia also contributed forces.
The Joint Operational command structure had a strong Australian make-up, together with representatives from other English speaking nations. The strong representation of the Australian with their allies from New Zealand, UK, US, and Canada at the Joint Operational HQ demonstrated a critical requirement for a robust integrated staff that was prepared to endure the stress of uncertainty and maintaining a high operation tempo. This structure was replicated throughout the brigade level with nations participating at the various operational sectors held staff appointments at the tactical joint headquarters.
Another interesting aspect noted was the application of mission command where centralized planning and decentralized execution of operational tasks assigned and accomplished at lower levels. Potential friction points existed due to cultural diversity, language, doctrine and the use of CIS systems, however, the effective use of embedded liaisons reinforced with strong personal relationships within the junior and intermediate command echelons overcame these challenges. With more than twenty countries contributing to the coalition, the differences observed had little negative impact on the entire operations.
Civil Military Affairs, (CMA) was an essential component providing the interface between the force and International/Non-Governmental Organizations, (NGOs/IGOs). Another observation noted was the various NGOs/IGOs involved with the relief effort seemed to lack the unity and cooperation among their agencies, thus extra troop support was necessary to provide security for their many tasks. The frequent occurrence impinges on the due execution of own force primary tasks. INTERFET has proven the benefits of both Australia and New Zealand Defense Cooperation initiative in the Pacific and the Asian region.
It had allowed opportunities for officers exchange programs, military courses, joint training and operation STABILISE was a culminating point where the respective nations involved could appreciate the value of these friendly engagements during peace time. Similarly, MFO was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and commenced operations in 1982. The protocol to the treaty of peace and the strategic parameters set between Egypt and Israel was the basis for the multinational operations.
The forces deployment was undertaken after the cease fire, established within the framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed to at CAMP DAVID Accord of 17th September 1978. 23 MFO has a key element of an integrated command with a single commander appointed from one of the participating nations who is to serve for a term of three years. The multinational subordinate commanders and an integrated staff system provide the overarching support to the command structure. MFO has shown resilience over the years with a high turn-over of staff at the force headquarters as testament to this fact.
The six monthly staff rotation, at staggering intervals, has minimal impact on the efficient functioning of the force headquarters. The air, navy and infantry troops are all integral part of the command and control arrangement. The unified effort within the three dimensional components of MFO has been central to the force in maintain the confidence of the host nations Egypt and Israel. The MFO interfaces with the host countries through its force liaison system and additionally, liaison branch provides the linkage to the different contingents within the coalition.
The force has a well established training cadre, responsible for the coordination and supervision of all in-theater training. The force standard operation procedures and regulations are the main instruments governing the force daily functions. Awareness training on tradition, culture and religion of both receiving states and other coalition members is a requirement for all pre-embarkation training before deployment. Force intheater exercises are conducted bi-annually in order to gauge the overall force operational readiness.
Even though similarities and difference were noted in comparing the two multinational operations, they were both very unique and successful ad hoc coalition operations with totally different command and control construct, yet fulfilling the requirements of their respective UN mandates. 12. Conclusion The foregoing conclusions gathered in the examination prove that there is no template that can be used for all multinational operations, since there are too many variables that come into play.
However, the development trend in the discussed historical case studies since the 1940s to the present has established key persistent command and coordination mechanisms that are necessary in creating an effective multinational joint operation. They are categorized as follows: There is a need for establishing unity of purpose through international legitimacy. This is achieved through gaining the support of an internationally recognized civil authority in order to avoid unilateral action.
Unity of purpose enhances the convergence of different national interests and further facilitates the generation of a unified goals shared amongst the coalition partners; Unity of command must be initially established by determining whether a lead nation, parallel or a fully integrated structure will be used to oversee the accomplishment of the mission. This is further enhanced through an integrated multinational staff and headquarters coordination structure to include liaison that will provide the necessary interface with other stake holders involved.
Consensus on the structure is vital in order to meet the needs, political realities, constrains and objectives of the nations involved; Another necessary attribute is an educated human resource that advocates and espouses interpersonal relations to develop respect, rapport and cultural understanding between the commander and his staff. Human equations encompass those characteristics that multinational commanders and staffs must display to build a cohesive multinational force and this must be extended to subordinate national contingent commands.
These relationship increases cooperation and contributes to the unity of effort and command; Multinational in-theater training contributes to building an understanding of coalition partners? capabilities, strengths, and challenges. Command Post Exercises for command and his integrated staff on established commonly understood and explicit doctrine is necessary. Appropriate skills training and exercises for the force is critical to maintaining the desired operational level of capability; and There must be an interoperable communications and information systems (CIS) architecture established within the multinational operation.
An interoperable CIS facilitates command and control through the establishment of compatible procedures and equipment which leads to effective information flow within the multinational force. Finally, the field is yet fertile for ongoing study, while the results clearly merit our attention as the future uncertainty will require other multinational responses to deal with an ever shrinking and increasingly interlinked world. Notes 1 Carnegie Commission. 1996, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Giandopmenico, P. 1994, The Division of Labour at the UN – Foreign Affairs. Charter of the UN and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945.
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