Equity and Property Essay Example

development of equity stemmed from the separation of its administration and the common law in the 12th and 13th centuries, due to the split between the executive and judicial branches of the medieval state.

During the early stages of constitutional development, there was centralisation in the administration of justice through the King's courts. This marked the establishment of common law as opposed to local laws enforced by courts of local feudal lords. As "fountain of justice", the King could not personally oversee all disputes and delegated the responsibility to judges. However, these judges had a limited interpretation of their role and believed they could only decide disputes based on fixed rules. They lacked discretion to apply abstract equity and would only consider a claim if the facts matched those in a standard form writ.

Conversely, if the facts aligned with the words of the writ, the claim would prevail even if additional facts could potentially affect the fairness or justice of the issue. Only two remedies were available in a lawsuit: damages or the recovery of land by an estate owner and judges had no discretion to provide alternative remedies. If litigants were disappointed with the lack of impartiality in applying common law, they petitioned the King directly. Since judges lacked the power to apply fairness in their decisions, these petitions were passed to the Chancellor by the King. Although the Chancellor had the authority to consider equity, they would assess what was just and the moral obligation of each party involved before reaching a verdict.

The chancellor would issue personal orders to parties either to do something or to avoid acting in a way that

conflicted with their conscience. These orders, also called common injunctions, included not suing at common law or not enforcing a common law judgement if taking advantage of the narrowness and rigidity of the common law went against their conscience. However, the chancellor did not deny that the rules of the common law were in fact legally binding nor that the orders given by the courts concerning the common law were valid. The argument put forth was that in a given case, the principles and/or procedures of the common law were insufficient to ensure fairness, and thus additional parameters regarding conscience needed to be applied.

During the fifteenth century, the Chancellor's consideration of petitions for equity led to the creation of the Court of Chancery. This court dealt with various cases on an individual basis, though some similar cases were handled in a comparable manner, allowing for the recognition of predictable rules. The initial set of equitable rules developed from cases involving the enforcement of land uses, which will be further explained in the following chapter. The medieval Court of Chancery also took on cases involving relief from the consequences of fraud, accident, or lack of formalities required at common law.

The correlation between equity and the common law was not contradictory. Rather, the Court of Chancery aimed to supplement the common law with additional rules to ensure equitable outcomes. Lord Ellesmere LC famously explained that the diversity of human actions necessitated the existence of the Court of Chancery, as it was impossible to create a single general law that could adequately address every individual circumstance without failing in some way. This relationship between the Court of Chancery

and the Common Law courts remains well-established.

The role of the chancellor is to adjust individuals' moral principles regarding deceit, violations of faith, injustices, and tyrannies, regardless of their nature. Additionally, their responsibility involves easing and mitigating the severity of the legal system...

According to the text, if a judgement is obtained through oppression, wrongfulness or hard conscience, the chancellor has the power to set it aside even if there is no error or defect in the judgement itself. The case discussed arose over a disagreement between the Court of King's Bench and the Court of Chancery surrounding the ability to grant common injunctions restraining action at common law. Following this case, King James I sought advice from Sir Francis Bacon, the Attorney-General, who concluded that common injunctions from the Court of Chancery do not contradict the law or invalidate law applied in common law courts. In cases where chancery is called upon for a point of equity, the point of law or fact that concerns the law is not in question in chancery as it is already supplied by them and does not cross it.

... and only interferes with the corrupted conscience of the individual.

The Court of Chancery received confirmation of its authority to issue common injunctions through a Royal Degree issued by the King. Essentially, the order of the Court of Chancery takes precedence over that of the common law court when both have made an order in the same matter, with the former applying additional rules of Equity to those of the common law. However, this does not mean that Equity is superior to common law; rather, as Bacon clarified, the Court of

Chancery operates by building on the common law and using additional rules to achieve equity without contradicting it.

Several decades after Wright LK4, in the case of Dudley v Dudley5, it was well articulated that equity's role is to uphold and defend the law from cunning and deceitful schemes that go against justice. Equity does not destroy or create laws, but rather aids in their enforcement. Throughout the late 17th and 18th centuries, a body of equity rules was formed through similar cases being treated in a similar manner. Although there was no formal system of binding precedent at the time, development was primarily influenced by Lord Nottingham6 and Lord Hardwicke7, including Nottingham's tenure as Lord Chancellor, and is often credited as "the father of equity".

During this time frame, the Court of Chancery assumed a tripartite jurisdiction in complementing the common law. The auxiliary jurisdiction pertained to procedural matters and gathering evidence. The Court of Chancery's more intimate approach meant that it could give orders that aided actions occurring in common law courts, such as document discovery. The remedial, or concurrent, jurisdiction was responsible for awarding personal remedies for infractions of common law duties, especially enforcing contracts' specific performance and issuing injunctions to prevent or correct other transgressions of common law duties. Common law regulations were utilized to determine whether a duty breach had occurred, and equity did not attempt to overturn this conclusion.

The remedial jurisdiction aimed to provide suitable remedies in cases where the common law remedy was insufficient and a more personalized remedy was necessary, in accordance with the principles of common law. Meanwhile, the exclusive jurisdiction concentrated on substantive areas of law, with

the court utilizing additional rules derived from common law to avoid unjust behavior. These rules included the management of trusts, which evolved from medieval land uses enforced by chancellors, and the administration of the property of deceased individuals and mortgages.

The Court of Chancery did not reject the common law rules when they established and enforced additional property rules. The common law determined ownership and ownership rights that could be enforced against everyone. Though equity couldn't change that, it could add obligations based on moral considerations to the rights given by the common law. The exclusive jurisdiction included providing relief from fraud or unethical behavior and safeguarding minors and the mentally ill.

During the eighteenth century, this jurisdiction frequently dealt with property-related matters. In the early nineteenth century, Lord Eldon held the position of Lord Chancellor for a long period and worked to consolidate this area of the law. This period also marked the establishment of a structured system of legal precedent within the Court of Chancery. As a result, equity became a more solid set of regulations that complemented those of common law. The Court of Chancery no longer operated as a court of conscience that applied abstract equity alone. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this did not halt the development of this field entirely.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the restrictive covenant emerged as a significant equitable doctrine in property matters.