Exploring Memory and Its Role in Forgetting.

in the gaps with what typically happens in that situation.

Loftus (1975) demonstrated that new information can be absorbed into existing memory representations. In an experiment, eye-witness subjects were shown a film of a car accident and then given misleading information by Loftus. The misleading information was integrated into their memory and had a significant influence on their recollection of the event. In a later experiment with Miller and Burns (1978), correct information was replaced by false information. These experiments on eye-witness testimony show that subsequent information can modify the memory representation of an event.

Loftus (1979) conducted an experiment that demonstrated the resistant nature of memory to outside interference. However, under certain conditions, such as when it is clear that information is deceptive, witnesses are less likely to accept fictitious information and become more cautious towards future attempts at misleading them. The important takeaway from this research is that once tampered with, the original memory is highly unlikely to be retrieved. This realization applies to all memory theories, not just eyewitness testimony. Harris and Monaco's (1976) research is also applicable, as they discovered that pragmatic implications influence how information is stored in memory.

When information is presented, it is understood to include both explicitly stated facts and previously held schema knowledge about the situation. Harris (1978) investigated how pragmatic implications can mislead a jury into believing an implied statement as a confirmed truth. He found that it is easy to deceive juries in this way, indicating that remembering verbal information may cause confusion between implied details and actual facts. Research on eye-witness testimony has mainly focused on how memory can be altered, overlooking the fact that witnesses

integrate prior schema knowledge and combine observations with verbal information.

It can be inferred that memory is not exclusively based on schema, but may include various sources of information. Schema theory has also been applied in the study of memory processes related to common mistakes and errors. For instance, absentminded slips happen when the incorrect action sequence schema is triggered instead of the correct one. Reason (1979) examined slips and errors and found that they often manifest when performing routine tasks that are already learned and have become automatic.

According to Norman (1981), actions that are automatic are different from ones that require careful attention because the latter involves unfamiliar tasks. In contrast, repetitive tasks become automatic with practice. As a result, individuals can perform automatic activities while focusing on other tasks, potentially resulting in errors or mistakes. Norman proposed that schema theory can explain these slips of action.

Norman's hierarchical organization model involves the harmonious collaboration of schemas. The schemas, which used to apply to events or places, now represent motor action knowledge. Reason and Norman share the belief that schema-related errors are a common occurrence. Reason hypothesizes that selecting the schema for the incorrect action sequence results in absentminded mistakes. On the other hand, Norman's model proposes that errors may arise from inaccurate overall intention specification, faulty triggering, or faulty activation of schemas.

Brewer and Treyens (1981) demonstrated that the schema appropriate for a scene affects people's memory of that scene. Their experiment involved leaving people in an office and later asking them to recall the objects that were present. They found that subjects successfully recalled expected items, but some also mistakenly recalled items that they

expected would be present but were not actually there. This reveals the subjects' use of schema-based knowledge in their effort to recall the office's contents.

Despite schema theory being useful in explaining how people forget and misremember, it falls short in explaining how people recall odd events like the skull in the office. Yet, schema theory can still explain everyday slips and errors that occur when individuals fill in gaps with their own knowledge based on specific schemas for that event or action. Brewer and Treyens show that schema theory is not entirely effective in explaining memory recall during everyday activities, as a considerable number of subjects accurately remembered the skull in the office. Overall, schema theory has its strengths in explaining confusion among eyewitnesses and errors in daily tasks.