What was “appeasement” Essay Example

him. Nevertheless, Hitler faced an obstacle due to the Treaty of Versailles prohibiting a union between Germany and Austria. To overcome this hurdle, he pressured Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg into appointing two leading Nazis in his government. Despite Hitler's coercion, Schuschnigg opted to hold a referendum which displeased Hitler. As a result, he sent troops to invade Austria leading to the declaration of Anschluss despite formal protests from Britain and France. Following this, Hitler aimed at expanding his "living space" by targeting Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The diversity of opinions among historians on the topic of appeasement in the 1930's stems from varying time periods and personal experiences. These factors have shaped each historian's perspective and resulting bias towards the policy itself and those involved. As a result, historians' viewpoints on appeasement can be classified into four distinct time periods.

The first period cited is the era of appeasement. According to Source F1, the initial Lord of Admiralty pointed fingers at the policy of appeasement for instigating the war. He observed how the meeting with Hitler disregarded Neville Chamberlain's views, and how Hitler never compromised on any issues. In contrast, Lord Halifax's perspective on appeasement, as outlined in Source H2, upholds Neville Chamberlain's efforts and deduces that he did his utmost to avert war in Europe.

Despite blaming Neville Chamberlain for raising public hopes with phrases such as 'peace for our time', it was during the post-war period that he was directly held accountable for the outbreak of the war. The 'guilty men' theory attributed this to Britain's failure to confront Hitler, with some pointing specifically to appeasement as the wrong decision. The emotional responses of those who lived

through WWII, as seen in sources J3 and F, made it necessary for them to assign blame for the atrocities of the war.

Following Neville Chamberlain's death in 1940, he was easily held responsible for the war's outset. The third phase, known as the 'revisionists' in the late 1950s and 1960s, had a less severe perspective on Neville Chamberlain. This could be due to their subdued emotions regarding the war and having had ample time to review information, leading to a more rational viewpoint.

Despite their disagreement on the appropriate policy, all sources agree that appeasement was not the solution for the situation. According to N4 by A. J. P. Taylor, Chamberlain's unwavering confidence in his policy prevented him from recognizing that Hitler could reject his concessions without any consequences from France and Britain. Taylor also argues that Hitler would have continued to conquer one nation after another regardless of any attempts to stop him.

The perspective expressed here is less emotionally charged and more definitive than the 'guilty man' theory. The 'counter-revisionists' from the 1970s and 1980s provided a more recalibrated outlook and consequently a more logical assessment of culpability. Neville Chamberlain was again attributed with some fault during the fourth time period. However, he was not completely responsible for the mistakes made. The declassification of various documents like those from the cabinet and imperial forces substantiated the position that although appeasement was an incorrect approach, they misinterpreted Hitler's intentions and tactics.

According to Source O5, Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany, was known as 'our Nazi Ambassador in Berlin' due to his sympathy towards Hitler. Historical hindsight during this era led to a more rational

and revised view on appeasement, as opposed to emotionally fueled perspectives. However, more recent sources, such as A6 and B7, defend Neville Chamberlain and place less blame on him.

Source A suggests that Neville Chamberlain was not a pacifist and that nobody connected the German rearmament with Hitler's aspirations. Additionally, Chamberlain believed that rearmament in Britain would send a message to dictators that negotiation was the preferable option. In contrast, Source B reports on the widespread approval of the Munich agreement among the British populace.