Security Dilemma the Collective Action Problem and the Nash Equilibrium. Essay Example

and is argued by many to be the nucleus of security studies hitherto now. (strat137) The entire international system is driven by realism, by state fear, fear of attack, fear of losing strategic position, fear of losing prosperity and so on (strat138). The solution is the increased dialogue between states through the encouragement of open communication and diplomacy. The UN has facilitated this function.

Secondly, the presence of the ‘security dilemma’ has made the UN important to peace and security due to the mitigator logic that was derived from the security dilemma and the idea of security regimes. The mitigator logic is in line with offensive realism explaining that since the world is anarchic beyond the state, cooperation will help states to understand others intentions. However, cooperation is limited to the degree to which it is beneficial to the individual state interests (strat140).

What are the benefits? The benefit of states cooperating is demonstrated through the analysis of the concept of security regimes that demonstrates how institutionalization by states in systems such as the UN mitigates the uncertainty of the world. The UN is central to the creation of norms and laws in international relations which allows for state strategists to predict the motives and intentions of other states as it outlines the rules of the game. strat141, Jervis 1982: 357) Collective action increases security for states as cooperation reduces the anarchic nature of the world by imposing boundaries on state action such as just war theory and jus ad bellum (pols gov:28) This is demonstrated in even the most adverse case where neo-conservatives who abhorred international organisations still sought their approval in order to legitimise its

security actions. On three occasions the Neo-conservative based administration sought Security Council approval to invade Afghanistan and renew weapons inspections in Iraq, but was unable to get UN approval for the invasion of Iraq.

Although the U. S unilaterally invaded Iraq despite UN approval this still demonstrates the importance of the UN(changing world 3). Critiques of the concept of security regimes would argue that this demonstrates a logical flaw in analysis which is the collective action problem. Mancur Olson argues that because states will always act in their own self-interest this questions whether or not collective action is possible if, in the case of the US and Iraq, states defect from the system(102).

The prisoner's dilemma illustrates this showing that in game theory using the Nash equilibrium the utility maximizing option will be to act in your own self-interest and defect from cooperating as it is in the best interest of your opponent to do the same. This is a valid argument but only in a one-shot game such as the prisoner’s dilemma, however collective action in international relations is an iterated game. The basic logic of this position is outlined in Robert Axelrod’s book The Evolution of Co-operation here he demonstrates that cooperation is the most viable option. In a repeated game, participants in the game will realise that they can develop strategies of conditional cooperation. Put simply, they can cooperate with the other person in so far as the other person cooperates with them and defect if the other defects (Axelrod 1984: 27-55). If both come to recognize that this is happening (with open communication making the difference such as states at the UN) then

both will have an incentive to cooperate (abiding by a strategy of what Axelrod calls tit-for-tat).

What iteration does is effectively remove the option of defection as there is no real benefit to defecting, reducing the option of any party to defect and thus exponentially increasing cooperation. Each will come to recognize that if they take the short-term gain of defection then they will risk the long-term loss of punishment from the other states. Cooperation is not certain as it is possible that all states will misunderstand the intentions of the other. But in a repeated game it becomes far more likely and thus the Nash equilibrium (Axelrod 1984: 55-69).

This explains the benefits states gain by using the UN and thus why it is important to security and peace in the world. The security dilemma illustrates why states use the UN despite its apparent impotency and their disagreements, as well as explaining why the UN is needed and how it mitigates the threat of conflict through diplomacy and norm creation. Cooperation increases the predictability of state action thus reducing the security dilemma making the UN an important agent of international peace and security.