Prevention and Mitigation Analysis Essay Example

security include conducting thorough pat downs from the moment they leave their cells until they reach the kitchen. It should be obligatory to conduct cross-gender and same-sex pat downs regularly. Each department of corrections should establish a dedicated team to conduct searches on every inmate throughout the facility.

To mitigate the ongoing issue of inmates acquiring contraband, it is suggested that increased searches and scanning be conducted on inmates' cells, mail, yard, and person. This measure will help minimize the chances of inmates obtaining dangerous weapons. Moreover, the department should perform these searches with an element of surprise, thoroughness, and consistency. Security officers have found evidence of inmates hiding weapons used in previous escape attempts by concealing them under gravel or other soft materials while walking to the kitchen from the yard. Therefore, a recommended course of action would be to eliminate all gravel or any other objects that could potentially aid inmates in hiding weapons either within or underneath them.

The yard must remain empty at all times. In terms of kitchen security, it was observed that the officers on each shift were not rotated and their behavior remained consistent every day. Since the officers' actions were predictable, the inmates closely studied their behavior before attempting their escape. It should not have been possible for two inmates with such violent backgrounds to be assigned to work in the kitchen. Additionally, the inmates had their kitchen duties revoked weeks before the escape when the guards learned about their plan, although no evidence of the plan was found and the duties were eventually reinstated.

The lack of surveillance cameras and unlocked doors in the kitchen area resulted in extended

periods of vulnerability, which were further exacerbated by manual utensil handling processes. By assigning only one officer to oversee the inmates in the kitchen, it became easier for them to overpower their guard and escape. To address this issue, it is recommended to regularly rotate officers' work shifts in the kitchen, making it difficult for inmates to anticipate a routine. Additionally, inmates with a history of violence should be assigned limited work duties. It is also advisable to have multiple guards monitoring the inmates at all times in order to reduce the chances of them overpowering the guards.

Maximizing security is essential, and this involves keeping all doors securely locked. Additionally, it is important to install a sliding opening in locked doors to deter unauthorized access by kitchen staff civilians. To ensure comprehensive surveillance, every room should be equipped with cameras that have both audio and video capabilities. It is crucial to consistently follow thorough procedures for searching the kitchen staff. The Tower security investigations uncovered multiple entry points but were unable to positively identify any guards. Unfortunately, besides being used for storage, the Tower was also utilized for distributing medication to inmates, giving them an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the layout and operations of the Tower.

The tower provided insufficient surveillance of the inmates' actions and movements between the housing and kitchen areas. It also limited the guards' ability to access necessary weapons for self-defense against the inmates. To enhance security, it is recommended to install audio and video cameras in the tower, covering all concealed areas to enable guards to monitor inmate movements. Additionally, the tower's architecture should be modified to have only one

or two entry points, allowing guards to observe inmates instead of utilizing the tower for medication storage and distribution.

So, in order to prevent inmates from having access to the layout and functions of the Tower, the identification procedures should be comprehensive, possibly including fingerprint scanners instead of badges, as inmates can obtain a guard's badge. Additionally, there should be easy access within the Tower for armed guards to retrieve their weapons and defend themselves against such attacks. The security policies and procedures in the Tower should be regularly practiced. In terms of defensive tactics, the investigation revealed that the correctional guards were unable to effectively defend themselves and utilized minimal defensive tactics.

One major factor in subduing the guards, escaping, and gaining access to the Tower was the lack of defensive tactics available for the guards to defend themselves against the inmates. The guards' attempts to use OC spray as a means of defense were ineffective and left them unable to protect themselves from attacks with lethal weapons. It is necessary to update the policy in Department order 804-behavior of inmate control to authorize the usage of lethal force. Recommendations for improving defensive tactics include updating the policy and procedures for determining when deadly force should be used.

The department needs to enhance defensive tactics and weapons for the guards to improve their ability to defend against attacks. Additionally, all correctional employees should attend refresher training classes focusing on hand-to-hand and small defensive tactics, as well as weapons training. In terms of communications, it has been discovered that the improved technology is not utilized effectively, as many cameras throughout the facility are unused. Furthermore, certain rooms lack

camera surveillance to monitor inmates, while hidden areas provide inmates with easy access due to limited camera coverage.

The two officers who were held hostage lacked the ability to seek help and falsely indicated that everything was secure. The inmates had the upper hand in terms of communication, as there was a significant delay between the start of the escape and gaining access to the tower. There is a recommendation to enhance communication by leveraging the available technology such as cameras, radios, and phones within the facility. Additionally, the department should review the usefulness of distress capability, encryption, radio durability, and battery dependency.

The department should improve the cameras by adding audio and video capabilities, installing sensors, and implementing distress signals. Also, the investigation found that the correctional officers were unaware of the situation, putting the facility's security at risk and endangering both officers and employees. The guards took too long to respond to the incident, and there were no codes in place to distinguish between a real incident and an IMS simulation.

Improving the training of correctional officers is imperative. Clear guidelines and procedures should be in place to distinguish between real crises and practice exercises. It is crucial that inmates remain unaware of their participation in training simulations, which should aim for maximum realism. To ensure proper training, DOC sergeants should be on duty to identify any deficiencies, performance issues, or operational problems. They ought to conduct regular inspections of multiple posts to ensure inexperienced officers adhere to search and observation policies and procedures, thus reducing the risk of inmate escapes due to inexperienced guards. Furthermore, new correctional officers lacking experience should receive daily training classes.

The investigation has revealed a lack of collaboration between the Department of Corrections and law enforcement agencies concerning tactical maneuver training as well as sharing tactical and intelligence/negotiation findings.

It is recommended that local and state law enforcement agencies, along with the Department of Corrections, work together to engage in tactical and intelligence/negotiation scenarios at the state's correctional facilities. This collaboration will ensure that they are informed about intelligence gathering, tactical maneuvers, and technologies.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) should work with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to analyze the physical layouts of events for intelligence gathering and tactical planning. It is important to keep this information on-site and regularly update it. The DOC's policy against negotiating with hostage takers was compromised during a 15-day hostage situation when negotiations took place throughout the entire duration. Despite being aware of opportunities to use lethal force, the tactical team was instructed by their superiors not to do so. Several members of the tactical team later contradicted this instruction.

The transfer of inmates from the Morey unit to out-of-state prisons is a common management practice. To resolve hostage situations, it is recommended to update negotiation policies and procedures. Negotiations should not be prolonged and if they fail, the tactical team should resort to using lethal force. The Department of Correction should eliminate the policy of non-negotiations and instead implement a negotiation policy in line with state and local law enforcement agencies.

The administrative policy/budget of the investigation is outdated. The inmate classifications have not been updated since the 1980s, making them unreliable. The civilian staff in the correctional facility lacks proper training in various areas. Inexperienced officers are being placed

in high-risk areas. The correctional officers are being underpaid, resulting in low morale, high attrition, and causing hardships for their families. Additionally, it was discovered that most sergeants receive lower salaries than the officers they are supposed to supervise.

There were many performance and supervision deficiencies that contributed to the hostage incident, indicating a lack of professionalism. Recommendations include updating inmate classifications to prevent violent offenders from working in sensitive areas. The department should also offer programming for drug treatment, education, and mental health. Additionally, policies and procedures for protective segregation should include an assessment and requesting national assistance to enhance and replace the current system.

The department should prioritize improving training for civilian staff members in all areas of a correctional facility. If an inexperienced officer is assigned to a high-risk area, they should be supervised by or work alongside a more experienced officer. Another option would be to avoid assigning inexperienced officers to high-risk areas altogether. The DOC needs to analyze their pay scale, considering federal, state, and local correctional facilities in Arizona. Furthermore, the DOC should bring back longevity pay and merit increases. It is essential for the department to acknowledge the importance of effective communication and professionalism in running a correctional facility.

The SWOT method is a useful tool for analyzing the operations of an agency. The Morey Unit hostage incident provides the Arizona department of corrections with valuable lessons to be learned from the mistakes that resulted in the incident. By employing the SWOT method, the department can acquire knowledge about its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Strengths observed during the incident include officers taking charge when made aware of the situation and

the incident commander promoting unity in structure and communication among state and local law enforcement agencies.

The officers and leaders responded promptly and efficiently in establishing the necessary conditions for a successful capture of the two inmates and the release of the hostages. However, there were several weaknesses identified, including the department's failure to utilize available technology systems, poor execution of inmate searches by certain officers, the presence of inexperienced officers in high-risk areas, and inadequate identifications for accessing the Tower. On the other hand, there are opportunities to invest in and utilize available technology such as cameras, radios, and alarm systems with sensors.

The department should provide training on policies and procedures for searching inmates and defensive tactics. The threats that should be considered include analyzing inmates attempting to escape, riots, and inmates trying to overpower officers. Prevention and mitigation efforts involve improving the policies and procedures for searching inmates as they move within the facility. The Department of Corrections should consistently and thoroughly search inmates to minimize the risk of them acquiring weapons.

Using fingerprinting scanners for improved identification process of correctional officers will provide greater protection. Additionally, enhancing cameras, radios, defensive tactics, and intelligence gathering will aid in minimizing future prison escape attempts. Ultimately, the Morey Unit hostage incident had profound consequences for correctional officers and facilities, emphasizing the daily dangers and challenges they encounter in the United States.

The attempt by two inmates to escape revealed security gaps and a lack of situational awareness within the facility. The response from leaders and officers was effective, leading to a successful resolution of the incident. Lessons learned emphasized the importance of essential qualities in operating a

correctional facility. The Department of Corrections cannot guarantee that inmates will not attempt escapes. However, correctional facilities can learn from this incident and take steps to reduce the risk of inmates attempting to escape. Reference sources:

- Peak, K. (2008). Hostage Situations in Detention settings: planning and tactical considerations. FBI Law Enfrocement Bulletin. Retrieved from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_10_77/ai_n30935422/?tag=mantle_skin;content

- Wagner, D. (). 15 Days of Anguish. The Arizona Republic, Phoenix. Retrieved from http://159.54.227.112/go/newswatch/2005/april/phoenixanguish.htm

- University of Phoenix. ( ). The Morey Unit Hostage Incident. Retrieved from University of Phoenix, CJA560 website