Did the Nazi arms economy make war an economic necessity?? Essay Example

infrastructure were rehabilitated. Indirect rearmament had significant effects. The Reinhardt Plan of September 1933 and the recovery period contributed to tangible and widespread benefits. Demand was stimulated, boosting employment. The business cycle was revived, investment was encouraged with tax concessions and subsidies, and public works schemes such as the Autobahnen, roads, canals and office buildings were created. The growth of investment demonstrates the general stimulus to economic regeneration, rising from 6.8 bn RM in 1933 to 10.6 bn in 1934 and 14.

In 1935, the investment in infrastructure development and productive capacity of the economy, totaling 4 billion, indirectly supported arms production. Hitler's statement in February 1933 emphasized the need to focus on making the German people capable of military service in the next five years through publicly sponsored employment measures. Therefore, every employment measure had to be evaluated based on its necessity in achieving the goal of rendering the German people capable of military service.

[7] Further discussion will be had later on regarding Hitler's economic policy, which was characterized by the prominent theme of indirect rearmament. In addition to this, the army implemented a simultaneous program of direct rearmament starting in 1933. The objective of the "December Programme" was to reconstruct Germany's military infrastructure after being constrained by the Versailles treaty. The emphasis was placed on establishing a small army for defensive reasons and training personnel [9]. This restricted form of rearmament demonstrated Germany's feeble position in international affairs during that period.

Between 1933 and 1934, military spending as a percentage of GNP doubled from 1.9% to 4% [10]. Despite external pressures slowing down direct rearmament progress, there was a significant increase in both its

scope and pace in 1936. Over the past three years, continued rearmament led to concerns about control and resource allocation due to the uncoordinated and competitive system.

The Four-Year Plan, alongside Hermann Gring's appointment as the "economic dictator", represented a shift from military and economic consolidation towards a more aggressive, expansionist policy. Through Gring's extensive authority, the state's role as an economic arbitrator expanded via a complex system of regulations rather than direct ownership and requisitions. These regulations allowed the state to exert control over various areas of the economy, including labor, agriculture, food supply, trade, foreign exchange, and prices. These controls were critical in centralizing economic activity under state control and weakening conservative elements in the army and industry.

The Four-Year Plan had two primary objectives: to streamline economic control and increase German self-sufficiency in key resources such as fuel oil, rubber, and iron ore. As indicated in a memorandum by Hitler, the plan aimed to make the German military operational within four years while ensuring that the German economy was ready for war within the same timeframe. Despite failing to achieve set targets, rearmament under Nazi rule led to an increase in military spending from 3% of GNP in 1933 to 23% in 1939.

German economic development during the period of 1933 to 1938 was significantly impacted by rearmament, resulting in a 45% increase in consumer goods' output and over 150% growth in production goods' output [15][16]. As a result, Germany became the second largest industrial economy globally [17]. It is important to note that Hitler believed economic restructuring was crucial for increased militarization as evidenced by the Four-Year Plan decree, which highlighted his view that

economic activity could achieve more fundamental goals [18]. Comprehending these goals is vital to understanding the "economic necessity" of war within the broader framework of Nazi policy-making.

In Mein Kampf and subsequent writings, Hitler outlined his vision for Germany's future. He sought to create a racially homogeneous state in Europe that would counter Bolshevism while utilizing resources from Eastern Europe and other areas for its own security and subsistence. This was intricately linked to economic development, as shown in the Four-Year Plan memorandum. In order to achieve this goal, armed forces were necessary both for defense and to seize Germany's rightful living space. Therefore, militarization was crucial for German survival and expansion, which required restructuring the economy to create armed forces capable of enforcing territorial expansion. Hitler's concept of Wehrwirtschaft, or defense-based economy, became central to his economic thinking. The idea of total mobilization for war originated in Germany where military leaders learned during World War One that success relied on harnessing "material and moral resources" for the war effort. General Groener recognized after the war that it was essential to strengthen the relationship between the economy and military; thus an officer network was established in key economic sectors along with Statistische Gesellschaft as a coordinating body during the 1920s.

[21] Hitler inherited the concept of political hegemony from the Nazis and the military's political role in the 1930s and used it as a means to influence the armed forces in his rise to power. [22] The Nazi government's focus was on achieving economic control and rearmament, which resulted in infrastructure investment and the development of productive capacity, followed by open rearmament. As Hitler's confidence and

successes grew, negotiation-based foreign policy gave way to a more expansionist stance. [23] Given Hitler's writings and directives, as well as the correlation between economic development, rearmament, and foreign policy, it is likely that the 1939 war was a consequence of an expansionist dynamic rooted in Hitler's strategic vision for Germany's position in Europe and worldwide.

In discussing the outbreak of European war in 1939, I will address various interpretations. One notable explanation suggests that the primary driving force behind Hitler's decision to wage war against Poland and ultimately Britain and France was the pressure from domestic issues. This argument posits that rearmament programs created tension between civilian and domestic consumption, leading to social strain and potential crises that could only be relieved through a war of expansionism in search of both resources and foreign conquest. A related belief is that Hitler deliberately waged small-scale battles to satisfy domestic demands and avoid social unrest. However, these notions are completely debunked by Overy in his highly persuasive publication on War and Economy in the Third Reich.

According to Overy, the concept of a `domestic crisis' model is flawed and has been supported mainly by a conservative faction in Germany. He refutes the evidence that suggests Germany faced more severe resource allocation challenges than other nations during rearmament with documents and statistics discrediting the `limited wars' theory. Instead, he proposes that Hitler's miscalculated foreign policy led to the war due to his belief that Britain and France would not intervene and that conquering Poland was easy, especially after signing a non-aggression pact with Stalin's USSR in August 1939. The decision to go to war in 1939 was influenced

by diplomatic and military considerations viewed through Hitler's long-term strategic plans. The issue of `relative autonomies' between the economy and state affects how we evaluate the `economic necessity' of war from both Marxist-Leninist perspectives where war is seen as capitalism's apex, as well as opposing views where the economy and industry serve only as tools for Hitler and his Nazi hierarchy.

Although simplistic, these views raise important questions about the debate between Polycracy and Monocracy. The "hard monocracy" perspective emphasizes Hitler's intentional creation of overlapping authorities and jurisdictions to better exercise control over the totalitarian state while the "hard polycracy" perspective argues that the divisions within the state, party apparatus, and economic sphere were symptomatic of a competitive social ethos that created an uncontrollable dynamic. However, I believe that this debate is most useful in understanding influences in policy-making and changes over time rather than as a fixed description of historical events and influences. Kershaw suggests that we should think of changing structures of power and influence, specifically recognizing the interconnectedness between the economy and the state rather than viewing them as separate spheres. [28][29]

It can be argued that the increase in rearmament and foreign policy expansion after 1936 was closely related to changes within the power blocs that made up the Nazi regime. The dominant force shifted from more conservative elements in the armed forces and economy to the SS-Police-SD complex. Hitler and his close allies had control, as evidenced by Gring's economic position. Despite arguments that war was economically necessary due to a domestic crisis, this perspective relies on a simplistic understanding of economic forces.

Viewing economic and political primacy as discrete areas

is not helpful for analysis. A thorough assessment of economic influences necessitates recognition of the interconnections between various elements of economic and political activity. This is especially important in the Nazi Third Reich where state interactions with economic activities were closely linked to policy decisions, and policy-making was impacted by economic developments. Despite this interconnectedness, Hitler saw the economy as a controllable tool, which was crucial in his economic decision making. Another important factor in the equation of "economic necessity" was Hitler's centralized role in economic decision-making through regulation and controls, due to the Fuhrerprinzip. Therefore, Hitler largely determined the priorities for the economy, particularly when power shifted to the SS-Police-SD complex in the late 1930s.

According to this perspective, Hitler and the Nazi leadership's intentions were incorporated into the state, military, economy, and society's structures. Kershaw proposed that the "Hitler Myth" held together the Nazi system of governance, and I believe that Hitler's strategic vision for German destiny and his drive to achieve it guided economic development and rearmament. Additionally, his dominant ideas were intertwined through the state's regulatory, coercive, and controlling systems with other functional spheres of German society. This does not diminish the importance of structures in maintaining Nazi rule but rather indicates that these structures' relationship with the Nazi hierarchy and Hitler himself was increasingly dominated by the center. In summary, I would contend that war was not a consequence of economic necessity that emerged from the rearmament program. Instead, war was ingrained in Hitler's strategy.

Hitler's strategic goals always included war and conquest, even if the timing was not optimal. The pursuit of these goals led to rearmament which was driven by

the need for more space and resources. The motive power for rearmament was the necessity of making war in the future, not the other way round. Hitler's foreign policy victories and reputation as a successful leader boosted his popularity and self-assurance. His plans for conquering Europe advanced, and the economy was reorganized to prepare for the future war. However, his misjudgment in 1939 that Britain and France would not fight disrupted Germany's economic capacity and ultimately contributed to its defeat.

The argument can be made that rearmament rendered war a necessity due to the expansionist policy's success and increasing attractiveness. Hitler had no other viable option but to satisfy the dynamic of expansion, which led Germany into a strategy that was effectively decided upon once the USA and USSR entered the war with their vast resources and production capacities. War was not just a short-term measure for domestic issues, but rather a long-term realization of an expansionist drive at the core of Hitler's objectives. While it may be oversimplified to equate every economic and diplomatic development with Hitler's desires, there is ample evidence suggesting he was the driving force behind Germany's political decisions. In conclusion, it was necessary to wage war as opposed to rearmament driving it.