To Spanish Civil War In Defence Essay Example

those who support Radzinsky's argument are pro-Soviet. Dolores Ibarruri, who authored the official Spanish Communist history of the war, contends that the Soviet people and leadership fervently supported the Spanish people from the outset. Although there is little indication that Stalin himself supported the Spanish people, workers at many factories in major Soviet cities overwhelmingly voted to donate 0.5% of their earnings to aid the Spanish cause, which may have influenced Stalin's decision. Maisky underscores the fact that the Soviet Union's population stood resolutely on the side of Spanish democracy from the very beginning.

AJP Taylor suggests that Soviet Russia did not intervene in the Spanish Civil War based on principle, as other factors took priority over rescuing the Spanish people. In the initial weeks of the war, many Communists from around the world were disappointed with the Soviet's lack of action. This led Stalin to realize that he could not stay out of it as head of the Socialist world. Around this time, Trotsky was gaining support by critiquing Stalin's betrayal of Marxism through articles after his exile in February 1929 for opposing Stalin and being expelled from Russian Communist Party in 1927. Although betraying Spain's communists may not have been a primary reason for Stalin's decision to intervene in the Civil War, it likely played a role in motivating him to act before Soviet Russia lost credibility among international socialists. Beevor is somewhat correct since Stalin did nothing when Chiang Kai-Shek killed 80% of Chinese Communist Party after their revolution collapsed back in 1927.

Stalin was unlikely to abandon Spain as he had not lost much support at the time, and it was important

for him to maintain the position of leaders in communism being the first communist state. Additionally, fascists were attempting to crush the socialist movement in Spain which made it difficult for Stalin, as protector of the left, to remain neutral. While Deutscher and Beevor differ on why Stalin got involved in the conflict, they both agree that he had to intervene. Deutscher believes that Stalin intervened to unite socialists or defend USSR since they only broke their non-intervention policy after the fascists did so. However, according to German ambassador Schulenburg, Stalin needed to restore USSR's prestige with European communists since purges had made it unpopular.

Stalin aimed to regain support by appearing to protect global socialism. Initially, the USSR intervened in the war to promote propaganda that emphasized Stalin's position as the father of communism. Kowalsky argues that the Soviet interest in the conflict was limited to a show of solidarity within the USSR and its national Communist parties, which amounted to 'exploiting' the situation. This view is supported by the fact that the first four Russians sent to Spain were all members of the media - a correspondent, a journalist and two filmmakers - aside from a handful of Comintern agents. As such, these media representatives were among the first to represent Russia in Spain during this period.

On August 27, 1936, the first Russian ambassador for Spain, Marcel Rosenberg, arrived in Madrid with a large staff that included General Berzin, who was previously the head of Soviet Military Intelligence. Although Rosenberg's application had been planned for some time, the fact that the first Soviet ambassador and the ex-head of Soviet Military Intelligence were

sent cast doubt on the claim that Soviet intervention was solely for propaganda purposes. It is unlikely that Stalin would intervene for propaganda because it would be expensive, diplomatically risky, and potentially damaging. It is probable that Stalin intervened to defend the USSR or international socialism. Stalin needed support from the British and French governments in the World War against fascism, which he saw as inevitable. Therefore, sending someone with Berzin's military experience was probably to advise the Republic on military tactics or similar instead of a propaganda opportunity covered up by sending media.

The rise of fascism and communism worldwide caused a sharp contrast and conflict between the two ideologies. Stalin was concerned that the Anti-Comintern Pact would destroy the Soviet Union unless he received global backing. He believed that by supporting the democratic government as its only protector (along with Mexico) during the Civil War, the Western democracies would view him as a defender of democracy. Nonetheless, Stalin's decision to intervene went against the non-intervention treaty promoted by Britain and France, resulting in him falling out of favor with these nations.

Both Salvado and Thomas agree that Stalin's goal during the Spanish Civil War was to provide enough support to the Republic to survive while giving the Allies time to recognize fascism as the real enemy. Stalin could not afford to let another Fascist state emerge, which would threaten the security of the Soviet Union. Additionally, he did not want the workers' revolution to continue if the Spanish republic won, as this would alienate Western democracies from the USSR. While Stalin did not actively support the Republic's victory, he did not want it to

lose either. This strategy aimed to force Britain and France to see that the fascists aided an illegal rebellion. At the time, Stalin was preparing for the first show trial of the Great purges, which attracted international concern.

If Stalin managed to maintain the focus on the war, he could operate with freedom. However, the suggestions by Taylor and Conlon lack realism as Stalin's priority was defending the USSR against the threat of a third fascist state, surpassing any opportunity to solidify his dictatorship privately. In contrast to Conlon's proposal, there is no evidence suggesting the USSR aimed to remain idle and benefit from Europe's mutual exhaustion. Stalin aimed to prolong the war to compel British and French intervention while avoiding excessive involvement that would discourage their support. It was crucial to gain foreign assistance for the eventual clash with Hitler, making the protection of the USSR his top priority. Furthermore, Stalin intervened in Spain to discourage a workers' revolution that would distance western democracies and deter them from aligning with the Soviet Union.

The bourgeoisie and Catholic Church were both fearful of revolution in Spain, as the former's businesses had been collectivised and the latter's churches ransacked. Stalin was aware of the western democracies' apprehension regarding this and thus not only suppressed but also denied any revolution in Spain, with the aid of Communist press such as The Daily Worker and Pravda. To achieve this, Stalin had the POUM, a purported Trotskyite party, outlawed as a condition for further arms supply to the republic by USSR. According to George Orwell, the Spanish communists' stance was influenced by France and its objection to having a revolutionary neighbour.

The Spanish communists' line, in fact, reflected Stalin's line since Comintern policy was subservient to defending USSR, as evident from the central communist parties' slogan - 'the fight for peace and for the defence of the USSR'.

Conlon, the anarchist historian, acknowledges Stalin's commitment to defend Socialism in the Soviet Union at all costs. This was exemplified by Stalin's unwillingness to support the dissemination of International Communism. The Soviet Union's priority was to secure France's allegiance and maintain the Franco-Soviet Treaty. Given the instability of French politics, with socialists and fascists often clashing on the streets, French Communists feared that Spain's revolutionary spirit might spread to their country. Stalin sought to prevent this possibility and thereby placate France by thwarting any attempts at revolutionary Spain. Thomas concurs that the Soviet Union's response to the war was determined primarily by its impact on Soviet foreign policy.

Both views concur that the main objective was to obtain the backing of the Anglo-French, and Stalin's hesitant and insufficient involvement supports this claim. Stalin's ultimate betrayal of the revolution stemmed from his desire to safeguard the Soviet Union, as he perceived it as a decision between protecting the USSR or promoting international socialism, and he chose the former.

In order to counter Germany's threat and the anti-communist rhetoric, Stalin provided assistance to the Spanish republic. Italy's Mussolini and Portugal's Salazar were also actively building up military strength and strongly anti-communist. With such strong right-wing alliances, the USSR was left vulnerable. A victory by Franco in Spain would result in the emergence of a third fascist state, further surrounding France and leading them to adopt a policy of fascist-appeasement, ultimately reducing their ability

to support anti-fascist movements.

The text affirms Beevor’s assertion that Stalin’s priority was defending against Germany, rather than spreading communism. Stalin feared a Nazi attack and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact soon after the war. Preston supports this view by noting that both the Comintern and USSR policies were a response to Hitler’s desire for Soviet territory and his Lebensraum policy in Eastern Europe. Stalin waited until German aggression was confirmed before intervening to prevent the rapid collapse of the republic and avoid freeing up the Nazis for further eastern aggression.

Preston contends that Stalin's intention in intervening in the Spanish Civil War was not to hasten the republic's victory, but to keep Hitler preoccupied with an expensive enterprise. This would drain the fascist forces' resources, finances, and arms, ultimately reducing their military strength. It is likely that Stalin did not prioritize accelerating the republic's triumph because had he been wholly focused on defeating Franco quickly, he would have wholeheartedly supported the war. Stalin's intervention was driven by his desire to weaken fascism as an opposition to the Soviet Union, of which Franco appeared to be a representative, rather than a concern for international socialism's protection. According to some historians, Stalin's intervention aimed to benefit Soviet foreign policy by bringing the Spanish republic under the USSR's rule, with little relevance to safeguarding socialism worldwide. Araquistain believes that Stalin sought to subdue the entire Spanish state; however, Beevor believes he aimed to do so to prevent any embarrassment to his foreign policy. These views fail to note that Rosenberg, the first Soviet ambassador in Spain, was recalled to Moscow and disappeared during the purges after his attempts to control

the Spanish republic began to irritate Largo Caballero, the prime minister.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Habeck and Radosh claim that all Soviet advisors in Spain aimed to take over the war, economy, PCE, and eventually the republic. Consequently, they argue that it was unlikely for Stalin to recall and execute Rosenberg for the same reason. Instead, they suggest that Rosenberg's dismissal was due to his poor management style and conflicts with other members of the Soviet delegation. Beevor and Araquistain fail to consider this explanation. It's worth noting that after Rosenberg's recall, Leon Gaikis replaced him as Soviet ambassador. However, Gaikis was also recalled in May 1937 without being replaced, leaving no high-level Soviet diplomat in Spain for the remaining civil war period. This tactic seems irrational if Stalin had indeed planned to take control of Spain. Thus, it suggests that Stalin's motives were not initially to gain control but perhaps arose out of necessity or arrogance after intervention.

The primary motivation behind Stalin's intervention in the Spanish Civil War was to benefit the USSR. However, it is uncertain whether he realistically considered this. The notion that Stalin intervened to protect the Spanish people lacks evidence and is mostly held by communists influenced by pro-Soviet beliefs or party ideology. Radzinsky does not subscribe to this view, as his limited research on the topic (as shown in a section of his book dedicated to the Spanish Civil War) likely led him to make an unsupported statement that should be ignored.

The main reason for Stalin's non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War was not to save the people of Spain, but rather due to concerns about the complex

conflict jeopardizing already unstable relations with Britain and France. Fearful of a World War I repeat, Stalin prioritized protecting the USSR over international socialism and sought alliances with western democracies. While his ultimate goal was for the war to continue, prompting British and French intervention on his side and encouraging an anti-fascist alliance, this was primarily aimed at defending the USSR from Lebensraum. Although leveraging this opportunity to regain socialist support was a secondary motivation and initially used for propaganda purposes benefiting the USSR, it is unlikely that it alone motivated Soviet intervention as it would have been too costly of a venture to risk.

While there were no diplomats in Spain during the war, suggesting that Stalin did not intervene to take over the Spanish republic, it is unlikely that he got involved to protect international socialism. Rather, as the effective leader of the opposition, Stalin had to intervene to maintain his dignity among the world's socialists and secure his leadership over both the USSR and the Comintern. His foreign policy was always focused on the defense of the Soviet Union, a goal especially prevalent in Spain. Therefore, his involvement was not to spread socialism globally as Marx had advocated. This is supported by A Primary Sources German Foreign Policy, series D iii No.

Quotations:
97. Quoted in A. J. P Taylor – The Origins of the Second World War
Dolores Ibarruri – Guerra y revolucion en Espana 1936-1939. Quoted in Danny Kowalsky, Stalin and the Spanish Civil War (Columbia University Press, 2004)
George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (Secker ; Warberg, 1938)
Luis Araquistain, El comunismo y la Guerra de Espana. Quoted in Danny Kowalsky,

Stalin and the Spanish Civil War (Columbia University Press, 2004)

Secondary Sources:
Peter Anderson, ‘Why did the Spanish Civil War start in 1936? ’, History Review March 2004
Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (Orbis Publishing Ltd, 1982)
Raymond Carr, Modern Spain 1875-1980 (Oxford University Press, 1980)
Eddie Conlon, The Spanish Civil War – Anarchism in Action (http://flag.

The following sources are available for further reading on the Spanish Civil War: Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations (Penguin, 1992); Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Oxford University Press, 1949); Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2005); Habeck and Radosh, Spain Betrayed (Yale University Press, 2001); Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes (Vintage 1996); Eric Hobsbawm, War of Ideas (Saturday Guardian Review, 17th February 2007); Danny Kowalsky, Stalin and the Spanish Civil War (Columbia University Press, 2004); Sean Lang, ‘The Spanish Civil War’, Modern History Review, September 2004; Ivan Maisky, Spanish Notebooks (Hutchinson, 1966); Eddie May, ‘Origins of the Spanish Civil War’, Modern History Review, April 1999; Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War 1936-39 (Butler and Tanner Ltd, 1986); Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives (Anchor, 1997); Francisco J. Romero Salvado, ‘The Spanish Civil War – The International Dimension’, Modern History Review, February 1995.

J.P Taylor's book "The Origins of the Second World War" published by Simon ; Schuster in 1996 and Hugh Thomas's "The Spanish Civil War" published by Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd in 1961.