The Bay of Pigs Invasion Essay Example
The Bay of Pigs Invasion Essay Example

The Bay of Pigs Invasion Essay Example

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  • Pages: 15 (3896 words)
  • Published: October 22, 2018
  • Type: Case Study
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The unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion can be attributed to mismanagement, overconfidence, and inadequate security. The operation's failure rests on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as a young president and his advisors. Consequently, this event heightened tensions between the two superpowers. It is noteworthy that Fidel Castro managed to retain control for 34 years despite the invasion's intention to overthrow him.

To fully understand the beginning and consequences of the invasion, it is crucial to first examine the invasion itself.

Part I: The Invasion and its Origins.

The Bay of Pigs invasion began in April 1961 when Cuban air force pilots who had defected carried out bombings in Cuba. These bombings occurred on April 15th and targeted three Cuban military bases: Camp Libertad, San Antonio de los Baos, and Antonio Maceo airport in Santiago de Cuba.

...

The attack took place at 6 a.m. on a Saturday morning using B-26 bombers.

In Libertad, seven individuals were killed and another forty-seven people were killed in different places on the island. It appears that two B-26s left Cuba and flew to Miami with the intention of defecting to the United States. The Cuban Revolutionary Council, based in New York City and serving as the exiled government, released a statement confirming that "Cubans inside Cuba" who had communication with the governing body of the Revolutionary Council carried out the bombings within Cuba.

The New York Times reporter expressed doubt about the council's awareness of the pilots' arrival from Cuba, given their decision to leave on Thursday.

Despite the suspicion of betrayal by a fellow pilot and a subsequent plot to strike, both planes successfully landed in Miami later that morning. One of the

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specifically landed at Key West Naval Air Station at 7:00 a.m.

Two planes, one at Homestead Air Force Base and the other at Miami International Airport, suffered crashes resulting in substantial damage. Furthermore, both aircraft were nearing depletion of their fuel supplies. The following day, The New York Times published an article featuring a picture of one of the B-26s along with an unidentified pilot wearing a baseball hat and sunglasses. These incidents initially raised concerns about a possible conspiracy.

The assault on the Bay of Pigs began at dawn on April 17th. To ensure secrecy and efficiency, frogmen were sent out at 2 a.m. to set up landing lights and clear obstacles that could impede the main attacking forces when they arrived. This action was repeated again at both 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.

Two battalions landed at Playa Girn and one battalion at Playa Larga beaches. The troops at Playa Girn were instructed to proceed west, northwest along the coast and rendezvous with the troops at Playa Larga in the center of the bay. Additionally, a small contingent was designated to head north to secure the town of Jaguey Grande. Considering a contemporary map of Cuba, it becomes evident that the chosen landing area posed challenges for the troops.

The vicinity of the Bay of Pigs is a marshy area that would prove challenging for the troops. Cuban forces promptly reacted, with Castro ordering his T-33 trainer jets, two Sea Furies, and two B-26s to take flight and halt the invading forces. Adjacent to the coast were the command and control ship along with another vessel carrying supplies for the invaders. The Cuban air force swiftly destroyed

the supply ships, using five-inch rockets to sink both the command vessel, Marsopa, and the supply ship, Houston, reducing them to fragments. Consequently, the 5th battalion, present on the Houston, as well as the supplies for the landing teams and eight other smaller vessels were lost. With some of their ships destroyed and lacking a command and control vessel, the operation's logistics quickly collapsed as Casto's air force kept other supply ships at bay.

One of the problems during this failed military adventure was the issue of supplying the troops. In terms of aerial warfare, Castro had easily gained superiority over the invading force. Despite being unimpressive by modern standards, his fast-moving T-33s quickly defeated the slow-moving B-26s of the invaders. By Tuesday, two of the B-26 aircraft had been shot down, and by Wednesday, the invading force had lost 10 out of their 12 aircraft.

With air power under Castro's control, the invading army's demise was imminent. The Cuban forces relentlessly bombarded the approximately 1500 soldiers over a span of 72 hours. Castro used 122mm Howitzers, 22mm cannons, and tank fire against them.

By Wednesday, the invaders were forced back to Playa Girn, their landing zone, and surrounded by Castro's forces. While some surrendered, others escaped into the hills. A total of 114 men died in the battle, with thirty-six perishing as prisoners in Cuban cells. The remaining men spent over twenty years in those cells, accused of plotting against Castro's government. It was clear from the beginning that the invading force of 1500 men had little chance of success.

Operation Pluto, also known as Operation Pluto, was initiated during the final days of the Eisenhower administration and

the uncertain period of power transition to newly elected President John F. Kennedy. The origins of US policy in Latin America in the late 1950s and early 1960s can be attributed to American economic interests and its anti-communist stance in the region. George Kennan, who played a significant role in formulating US containment policy against the Soviet threat, addressed the US Chiefs of Mission in Rio de Janeiro in 1950, discussing American objectives in Latin America. He stated that American policy in the region served multiple purposes...

The United States had multiple reasons to safeguard the raw material supplies exported by Latin American countries. This included preventing military exploitation by the Soviet Union and avoiding a psychological mobilization against the US in Latin America. By the 1950s, trade with Latin America constituted a substantial part of American exports, and most investments in the region originated from the US. Consequently, it was vital for the US to guarantee that Latin America remained pro-American. Furthermore, based on past events like the Guatemalan coup that brought Juan Jose Arvalo to power prior to World War II, the US government believed it could handle Castro.

Jacobo Arbenz assumed leadership of Guatemala in 1951 after winning the election that followed his predecessor Arvalo. Supported by the Communist Party, Arbenz carried forward his party's initiated reforms, including a significant land redistribution. This reform led to the United Fruit Company experiencing loss of land and other assets without receiving any compensation from the Guatemalan government.

The Guatemalans chose not to bring their case before the International Court of Law, which led United Fruit to initiate a campaign in an effort to convince the United States

government to get involved. They received support from influential figures within the government, including Foster Dulles, who had previously served as their lawyer and later became Secretary of State; Allen Dulles, both Director of Central Intelligence and a shareholder in United Fruit; and Robert Cutler, head of the National Security Council. Despite this clear conflict of interest, the US security apparatus made the decision to take action against Guatemala. As a result, from May 1st to June 18th in 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) actively worked towards overthrowing President Arbenz's administration.

Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas led a group of 450 men in an invasion of Guatemala from June 17th to the 18th, with air support. They successfully took control of the country, causing President Arbenz to seek refuge in the Mexican Embassy. By June 27th, they had firmly established their control over Guatemala. This operation boosted the CIA's confidence in dealing with any individual who posed a threat to American interests.

American interests

In late 1958, Castro continued his guerilla war against Fulgencio Batista's corrupt regime.

Before taking power, there was a clash between Castro's troops and American troops who were on vacation from the nearby American naval base at Guantanamo Bay. During this clash, some US Marines were captured by Castro's forces but were eventually released after receiving a secret ransom payment. This incident caused strain in relations between the United States and Castro's government. Admiral Burke, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, proposed sending in the Marines to eliminate Castro's forces at that time. However, Secretary of State Foster Dulles disagreed with these proposed actions and stopped the plan. In 1959, Castro successfully overthrew Batista's regime. It

is important to note that initially, Castro was not a communist and even had meetings with then Vice-President Richard Nixon.

Due to concerns about Castro's revolution, affluent individuals, including doctors, lawyers, and members of the mafia, departed Cuba for the United States. In an attempt to prevent the outflow of capital, Castro decided to nationalize specific businesses in Cuba. This decision resulted in clashes with American interests, mirroring the situation involving Arbenz in Guatemala.

. . legitimate U.S. Businesses were taken over, and the process of socialization begun with little if any talk of compensation. There were also rumours of Cuban involvement in trying to invade Panama, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic and by this time Castro had been turn down by the United States for any economic aid. Being rejected by the Americans, he met with foreign minister Anasta Mikoyan to secure a $100 million loan from the Soviet Union. It was in this atmosphere that the American Intelligence and Foreign Relations communities decided that Castro was leaning towards communism and had to be dealt with.

In spring 1960, President Eisenhower authorized a plan to dispatch small American-trained groups of Cuban exiles to operate as guerrillas and topple Castro. However, by autumn, the plan evolved into a full-scale invasion with air support from Cuban exiles utilizing American-supplied aircraft. Initially, the exiles were supposed to be trained in Panama, but due to the operation's expansion and the rapidly changing situation in Cuba, it was decided to relocate the activities to a base in Guatemala. Consequently, the plan started to become rushed, which CIA Deputy Director Bissell acknowledged.

Although there was not enough time to train a large group

of young Cubans according to the original plan, a larger group was formed at La finca, Guatemala. The training in this location was entirely conducted by Americans. It was autumn and a new president had been elected at that time. President Kennedy had the authority to halt the invasion but decided not to do so, possibly due to various reasons.

Kennedy's decision to take action against Cuba was driven by two main reasons. Firstly, he had campaigned for it and it was a critical moment in the cold war. Backing down would have made the Americans appear weak internationally and domestically, as Kennedy would be seen as reneging on his campaign promise.

The second reason for not aborting the operation is also its main failure - problems with the CIA. This failure led to misguided decisions by Kennedy that had long-lasting implications for relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Part II: Failure and Ramifications.

The failure at the CIA can be attributed to three causes.

The operation encountered three primary difficulties: inadequate leadership, the same agency responsible for intelligence was also leading the operation, and there were security concerns. The head of the operation was Allan Dulles, who served as the Director of Central Intelligence, while Richard Bissell, his deputy, held the main responsibility. Neither possessed expertise in Latin American affairs since their focus within the intelligence community primarily revolved around European operations against the USSR. The planners of Operation Pluto drew inspiration from the triumphant Guatemalan expedition but failed to recognize that Cuba presented a distinct set of circumstances.

In Guatemala, the situation remained chaotic and Arbenz did not have the same level of control over the country as

Castro did in Cuba. The CIA had a significant advantage in Guatemala with the involvement of United States Ambassador John Puerifoy, who coordinated efforts from within. In contrast, Castro received support from the Soviet block in Cuba but did not have a similar level of coordination within his own country. Moreover, after witnessing the overthrow of the Guatemalan government, Castro was likely aware of the potential threat to his own regime and stayed vigilant for any indicators of an imminent invasion. Additionally, the nature of the bureaucracy itself posed a second challenge.

The CIA, wanting to establish its presence and influence, viewed Cuba as a chance for advancement. Operating with utmost secrecy, the agency restricted participation to a chosen few. The CIA's intelligence division, which encompassed the Board of National Estimates and possessed valuable knowledge on the Cuban scenario and the likelihood of an uprising against Castro during the invasion, was deliberately excluded. Likewise, both the State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, who could have potentially provided military assistance, were not involved in the mission. Ultimately, the CIA retained all information exclusively within their ranks and selectively disclosed only what they deemed necessary for presidential awareness.

In his 1984 article published in Political Science Quarterly, Vandenbroucke utilized organizational behavior theory to examine the failure of the Bay of Pigs. According to him, the CIA provided President Kennedy and his advisors with selective reports regarding the unreliability of Castro's forces and the level of dissent in Cuba. Vandenbroucke concludes that the behavior of the CIA was...

Through a typical organization strategy, the CIA cunningly presented options and the necessary information to assess them, ultimately shaping the

problem in a manner that heavily favored the agency's preferred option. Thus, when President Kennedy had to determine the viability of a project sponsored by the CIA, they had ensured that the odds were in their favor. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State under President Kennedy, revealed in his autobiography that...

. The CIA provided extensive information on the situation in Cuba and the anticipated outcomes once the brigade landed. President Kennedy was given inaccurate information. One example is the assurance that segments of the Cuban armed forces would defect and join the brigade, along with widespread uprisings across Cuba upon the brigade's arrival. Additionally, it was stated that if the exile force encountered difficulties, its members could easily blend into the rural areas and adopt guerrilla tactics, mimicking Castro's actions.

Despite the disagreement of senior White House aides, Kennedy decided to go with the plan recommended by the CIA, according to Rusk. Rusk himself stated that he "...".

. . did not serve President Kennedy very well . . ." and that he should have expressed his disagreement more strongly.

He came to the conclusion that he should have voiced his opposition during the meetings themselves because Kennedy was being pressured by those who were in favor of proceeding. Given the biased information from the CIA and the counsel of discreet advisors, it is understandable that the president ultimately chose to proceed with the operation.

The CIA's lack of security in the Bay of Pigs operation is ironic, especially considering that they are an organization that deals with security issues. Security started deteriorating before the invasion, as The New York Times reporter Tad Szulc became aware of Operation

Pluto through his Cuban friends.

Earlier that year, there was another breakdown in security at the training base in Florida, while I was in Costa Rica covering an Organization of American States meeting.

Residents in the vicinity of Homestead Air Force Base witnessed Cubans engaging in drills and heard their loudspeakers on a nearby farm. In a jest, individuals hurled firecrackers into the compound. . . .

The Cubans fired their guns during the ensuing incident, causing the federal authorities to persuade the local authorities against pressing charges. Operation Pluto was being exposed, losing the element of surprise. Following the initial bombing raid on April 15th and the landing of the B-26s in Florida, pictures of the planes were captured and featured in newspapers. In one of these photos, the nose of a plane appears opaque, whereas the B-26 model utilized by the Cubans actually had a plexiglass nose, . . .

The CIA's attempt to disguise the B-26 with "FAR" markings of the Cuban Air Force was unsuccessful as professional observers quickly noticed the oversight. All it took for Castro's people to realize that the planes that bombed them were American, not their own, was reading the newspapers. The New York Times published articles on April 21st revealing the Eisenhower administration's involvement with the operation, titled "C.I.A. Had a Role In Exiles' Plans." By April 22nd, the story was fully exposed with headlines in The New York Times accusing the CIA and bitter rebels. The second page of that day's issue contained a detailed article on the operation's beginnings. Based on The New York Times articles, it can be inferred that if reporters were aware of the whole

story by the 22nd, Castro's intelligence service and the Soviet Union probably knew about the planned invasion as well. Tad Szulc's report in The New York Times on April 22nd provides a comprehensive account of the situation.

. . The C.I.A. was responsible for the coordinated and directed operations that led to the defeat on a beachhead in southern Cuba on Wednesday. It is evident that the failure of the operation was partly due to the Central Intelligence Agency's lack of security measures and attention to detail, as well as the misinformation provided to the president. Additionally, the Bay of Pigs invasion directly resulted in heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the international stage.

Message exchanges occurred between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev accused the Americans of involvement in the invasion and mentioned in one of his messages that a "small war" could potentially trigger a chain reaction worldwide.

We will provide the Cuban people and their Government with all the necessary support to repel the armed assault on Cuba.

Kennedy responded by providing American perspectives on democracy and the containment of communism. Additionally, he cautioned Khrushchev against Soviet interference in Cuba, stating...

In case of any military intervention from an external force, we will promptly fulfill our obligations under the inter-American system to safeguard this hemisphere against external aggression...

Despite the passing of this crisis, it set the stage for the subsequent major crisis involving Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and likely resulted in increased Soviet military support for Castro. Within the administration, the Bay of Pigs crisis prompted a few changes. Firstly, responsibility needed to be assigned for the

incident, leading Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to resign and leave the CIA in November 1961. Internally, the CIA underwent lasting changes and although it continued covert operations against Castro, they were significantly reduced in scale. Future operations were addressed in a report by the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence."

. . to nurture a sense of resistance and discontentment that could result in notable defections and other consequences of unrest." In addition, the CIA was now overseen by Bobby, the President's brother and the Attorney General. As stated by Lucien S.

Vandenbroucke states that the failure of the Bay of Pigs also made the White House suspicious of an operation that had unanimous agreement, causing them to be less hesitant in questioning the experts and adopt a "devil's advocate" approach when examining their advice. Furthermore, the lessons learned from the failure of the Bay of Pigs may have contributed to effectively managing the subsequent Cuban missile crisis. Assessing the long-term consequences of the Bay of Pigs invasion is more challenging. The fact that Castro is still in power after thirty-four years is the ultimate indication of the invasion's failure, highlighting not only the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion itself but also America's overall policy towards Cuba.

The American policy has likely bolstered Castro's support instead of diminishing it. Like in any war, even if it's a cold one, the leader can unite his people against the aggressor. When Castro gained power, he implemented reforms to improve the lives of his people and eliminate corruption. However, with the withdrawal of assistance from the Soviet Union, there have been gradual shifts. Castro has started allowing some

investment in the Cuban economy, particularly in telecommunications, oil exploration, and joint ventures.

In an effort to maintain his authority, he is seeking to adapt his country to the changing global landscape. Instead of suppressing the educated elite, he is enlisting their assistance in governing Cuba. The question remains whether they will eventually seek greater control over Cuba's destiny without Castro's guidance and support. If history is any indication, they will inevitably strive for more power. When Castro took power in 1959, the primary opponents in America were the business interests that were negatively impacted by his policies, much like what happened in Guatemala. The pressure on the Americans to take action came not only from Cuban exiles in Florida but also from those businesses. Today, the situation has reversed, and businesses are suffering due to the American embargo on Cuba.

It is estimated that lifting the embargo would generate $1 billion in business for US companies in the first year. Currently, 100 firms have engaged in discussions about doing business in Cuba after the embargo is lifted. The question arises: will American policy towards Cuba change due to pressure from business interests and increasing refugee issues? Considering the historical reasons behind US involvement in Latin American politics, it is highly likely that their stance will change if they can find a way to save face. Nevertheless, American policy remains rooted in the cold war mindset. Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that whether Castro leaves Cuba vertically or horizontally is up to him and the Cuban people, but he will definitely leave Cuba.

. . The Bay of Pigs invasion failed due to

misinformation and mismanagement, resulting in embarrassment for the Americans and an escalation of tension between the superpowers during the height of the cold war. We can only wait and see if the Americans have truly learned from this experience and will not let another chance to rectify the situation in Cuba slip away.

Bibliography

  1. Fedarko, Kevin."Bereft of Patrons, Desperate to Rescue his Economy, Fidel Turns to an Unusual Solution: Capitalism." Time Magazine, week of February 20th, 1995. Internet, http://www.timeinc.com, 1995.
  2. Meyer, Karl E. and Szulc, Tad.The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962 and 1968.
  3. Mosley, Leonard.Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network. New York: The Dail Press/James Wade, 1978.
  4. Prados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986.
  5. Ranelagh, John.CIA: A History. London: BBC Books, 1992. Rositzke, Harry, Ph.d.The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action.

New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977.
Rusk, Dean and Richard. As I Saw It.New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990.
The New York Times. 16 April to 22 April, 1961.
New York: The New York Times, 1961. United States. Central Intelligence Agency.

Cuba. Map, 22 by 52 cm, No. 502988 1-77.
Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1977.
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." Political Science Quarterly, Volume 99, Number 3, Fall 1984.

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