Crane Brintons Anatomy Of A Revolution Essay Example

a yearly rate of 7.8% ("Iran" 896). Consequently, the income gap expanded rapidly. Every day, opulent residences, lavish dining establishments, bustling night clubs, and streets adorned with high-priced cars served as constant indications of the widening wealth disparity. Such circumstances fostered an ideal setting for numerous class conflicts to emerge.

Iran's upper class encompassed affluent landowners, intellectuals, military commanders, politicians, and diplomats. This elite faction remained loyal to the monarchy and the Shah. The lower-class peasants faced unmet political aspirations, constant monitoring by the secret police, and daunting social and economic hardships due to modernization. Contrarily, the middle class preferred socialism over capitalism, as they believed capitalism only benefitted the elite while disregarding the lower classes. The middle class proved to be the most fickle segment within this society since they enjoyed certain privileges of the elite that they sought to safeguard.

At the same time, the middle class, including students, technocrats, and modernist professionals, felt they had been cheated by the elite in terms of their share of industrialization wealth (Orwin 43). The economy was a cause of discontent among them. The key event that was supposed to bring stability to the royal dictatorship was overshadowed by extreme inflation caused by the increase in oil prices and oil income from 1974 onwards. This inflation was a result of the Shah's investment strategy, which led to a remarkable 42% growth rate in 1974.

(Cottam 14). The Shah's support structure enabled the newly affluent to profit from inflation, while the government's attempts to combat inflation proved futile. As a consequence, impoverished Iranians and individuals with fixed incomes experienced substantial declines in their real income. The previously noticeable enhancements in

living conditions ceased to exist, fueling a prevailing revolutionary sentiment among the majority of Iranians. Additionally, the discontentment within Iran's middle class during the 1970s prompted a noteworthy emigration of intellectuals.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who voiced the dissatisfaction of Iran's religious sector, was sent into exile in Turkey in 1963 for openly criticizing the autocratic rule of the Shah. He then moved to Iraq in 1965 and became the primary spokesperson for expatriate opposition against the Shah. However, on October 6, 1978, Khomeini was forced out of Iraq and settled in Paris instead. This new location provided him with better opportunities to connect with opposition groups and gain attention from Western media outlets. During his time in Paris, Khomeini consistently preached about his intentions to oust the Shah from power and remove foreign influences.

He further stated his intention to uphold religious and traditional values and shift Iran's resources away from grand industrial projects towards much-needed reforms for the common people. Throughout the 1970s, Khomeini's popularity soared among the masses, making him the embodiment of opposition against the Shah. As his popularity grew, religious factions also gained in numbers and influence. In the early 1950s, technocrats strongly supported Mohammad Mossedeq and the national movement in Iran, viewing his ousting as an American-backed coup that targeted the symbolical leader of the Iranian nation. Many of Khomeini's followers formed opposing groups against the Shah.

The Freedom Front, an offshoot of the Mossadeq movement, was led by intellectuals who were centrist in philosophy, religious, anti-Marxist, and militant (Cottam 13). They acknowledged Khomeini's large and potentially massive following and aligned themselves with him. The Shah faced a significant challenge with the emergence

of religious opposition groups and Khomeini. Over time, the Shah's weakness became evident. Starting in 1975, waves of opposition grew due to the establishment of the Rastakhiz, the authorized political party in Iran, and the prohibition of opposition political parties.

It was also evident that the rise in oil revenues due to higher oil prices was used for arming the country and promoting industrial development. Around mid-1977, religious leaders started to protest against the modernization efforts introduced by the Shah. In November, there were casualties when the police dispersed the demonstrations. As time passed, the protests became increasingly extreme.

The Shah's transformation into a more autocratic leader in an attempt to suppress opposition led to those who had advocated for moderate reform taking on more extreme positions. The economy was severely affected by widespread strikes in key sectors, including the oil industry, post office, government factories, and banks during the autumn of 1978. This trend continued for most of that year (Orwin 45). As protests became more frequent, the number of fatalities also rose, demonstrating the Shah's declining control over his government and people.

In late 1978, the Shah recognized that he could not govern a nation where he witnessed his own people's bloodshed and understood that military force was insufficient for controlling his country. The Shah's prior mistakes had significant consequences over time, as his aggressive tactics proved ineffective, leading to a weakening hold on power and decreasing confidence. Ultimately, these circumstances sparked a massive protest against the Shah's government on December 10, 1978, with eight million Iranians taking part (Bill 25).

Despite the awareness of previous fatalities caused by demonstrations, a significant portion of the Iranian government

participated willingly in a large opposition protest that was devoid of violence. The banners and slogans used during the demonstration communicated the religious and political essence of the revolutionary movement, clearly demonstrating the vulnerability of the Shah and foreshadowing an imminent revolution in Iran. On January 16, 1979, after facing a year-long series of public protests against his rule, Tehran saw the departure of the Shah of Iran. Consequently, control over the country fell into hands of a regency council as well as Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar who had previously been associated with the National Front (Orwin 46).

Upon his return to Iran on February 1, 1979, the opposition leader Khomeini emerged as a prominent figure among the country's religious scholars, including the Mujahedin-e Khalq. His primary aim was to establish a stable government for reconstruction and eradicate what he perceived as the demonic underpinnings of the previous regime. Khomeini expressed his disapproval of contemporary materialistic inclinations and advocated for a society grounded in principles of social justice.

On April 1, 1979, Khomeini declared an Islamic republic after winning a landslide victory in a national referendum. The new constitution reflected Khomeini's ideals of Islamic government and named him Iran's political and religious leader for life. In order to accommodate the conservative Muslim fundamentalists, Khomeini implemented moderate changes in the law. These changes included mandatory veiling for women, banning of Western music and alcohol, and the reinstatement of punishments according to Islamic law.

Following the downfall of the Shah's regime, a wave of political revenge took place in Iran, leading to the execution of numerous individuals who had collaborated with it ("Iran" 897). Despite holding significant roles, the moderate

center composed of professionals and middle-class bourgeoisie lacked competent leadership. Bakhtiar, who served as prime minister during the Pahlavi era, faced widespread disapproval and an inability to reconcile with his former National Front allies or Khomeini. Consequently, he sought sanctuary in France.

Mehdi Bazergan was appointed as a replacement by Khomeini on April 1, 1979 (Cottam 15). Aged 73 and an engineer by profession, Bazergan held leadership positions in the Freedom Front and the committee of human rights. The middle and upper middle classes trusted Bazergan to bring economic stability and restore government services. He formed his cabinet mainly with members from the Freedom Front, National Front, and religious bureaucracy. However, challenges from both extreme right-wing and left-wing forces caused him to lose support and become increasingly reliant on Khomeini.

During this time, the relationship between Iran and the US worsened, resulting in a direct clash between them. On November 4, 1979, a faction of 500 radical students captured the US embassy in Tehran and held 66 individuals from the embassy and foreign ministry as hostages ("The Iranian Revolution" 835). This seizure, seemingly sanctioned by Khomeini, lasted for 444 days and caused a substantial deterioration in American-Iranian relations.

This resulted in trade conflicts with the United States and its allies, leading to economic issues. In the midst of this, there was a dual government in place during the rising fever stage. Under Bazergan's leadership, it became challenging to enforce justice due to a court system that heavily favored the monarchy's decisions. To address these problems temporarily, Khomeini established a revolutionary committees system overseen by a revolutionary council. The revolutionary council-committee-court arrangement was largely dominated by religious leaders, creating

an almost parallel government.

In November 1979, Bazergan stepped down and was succeeded by Khomeini's choice, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr, a passionate intellectual, had the highest personal aspirations among the liberal revolutionaries. Similar to other moderates, he represented the educated middle class but lacked the skill or stamina to establish political groups. Nonetheless, Bani Sadr's efforts to free the hostages were not fruitful.

Following his victory in the presidential election in January 1980, Iran's inaugural president joined forces with the Mujahedin-e Khalq as a defensive measure born out of desperation. Furthermore, he endeavored to establish robust connections with military figures. Nevertheless, his endeavors to connect with the Iranian populace, who had little affinity for a Paris-educated intellectual like himself, proved futile. This suggests that moderate authority is diminishing amidst escalating tensions during this time.

The people of Iran grew more discontented with the slow pace of progress and desired more drastic actions. By mid-1981, leaders of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) managed to convince Khomeini that Bani Sadr was conspiring against them. They presented evidence suggesting that he endangered the revolution. As a result, on June 20, he was removed from his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His presidency lasted for a duration of 17 months.

Following his arrest and subsequent dismissal as president on June 22, he went into hiding and eventually escaped Iran on July 29, 1981. He sought political asylum in Paris. Meanwhile, on July 24, extremist Muhammad Ali Rajai, supported by the IRP (Islamic Republican Party), emerged victorious in the election against the moderates. This event signified the conclusion of a period characterized by increasing tension and initiated a crisis.

1981 marked

the year when Khomeini took over in Iran, introducing a series of radical actions. These measures included granting the government absolute control over media outlets like newspapers, television, and radio. Khomeini also exerted strict authority over important areas such as the treasury and distribution of funds to religious leaders. Those who dared to oppose him faced severe economic repercussions. As a result, the rise of radicals triggered a crisis.

During the years 1981 to 1989, Khomeini's leadership was characterized by a period of fear and violence. One tragic event occurred when Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a speech, leading to a merciless assault by right-wing revolutionary guards on roughly one hundred thousand Muslim leftists who had gathered near the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. This brutal attack resulted in five fatalities and caused over 300 people to sustain injuries.

Supporters in Tunisia held food riots, while others in Kuwait carried out six car bombings. Simultaneously, the Islamic Jihad orchestrated suicide bombings in Beirut, causing the deaths of 241 American servicemen and 58 French troops. Instead of being seen as acts of terrorism, these actions were viewed as displays of heroic patriotism. As a result, extremists exploited the resulting terror to gain full control. By the early 1980s, Iranians grew weary of countless laws and regulations and were infuriated by their deteriorating quality of life.

People were beginning to rebel against the mistreatment they had endured, which Crane Brinton refers to as the civil war. The civil war commenced in Iran through clashes involving the Kurds who were forced to leave their residences, religious sanctuaries, and workplaces due to the dominant radicals.

The brutal actions of extremists resulted in the near extermination of

an entire religious community. Subsequently, it was discovered that the Kurdish issue was merely a justification used by Iran to establish connections and collaborations with Turkey and Syria, two influential countries in the Middle East. People endured suffering so that the government could forge alliances. The mistreatment of the Kurds caused widespread confusion within the nation, leading to a state of chaos characterized by numerous public protests and large-scale riots. As a consequence, various government factions began to emerge.

The IRP, an organization supporting nationalism, and the Hojatieh, along with a third party representing the Mullahs and high ayatollahs, opposed each other. The third group disapproved of Khomeini's recklessness, resulting in considerable hostility towards the IRP. These factions caused division among the people of Iran. During the early 1980s, there was an overwhelming surge of patriotism, bordering on hysteria, which played a significant role in the subsequent phase of the revolution known as the republic of virtue.

Iran's population possessed a strong nationalism, shown through numerous parades and marches. However, this period was accompanied by the imposition of veils on women in public, the abolishment of modern divorce laws, and the establishment of rigorous courts that imposed strict laws and severe punishments. The contrasting perspectives among Iranian factions and the presence of the republic of virtue presented challenges for Iran's international relationships.

During this time, Iran's relationship with Iraq deteriorated due to various factors. The conflict originated from a dispute over territory and oil, but it was also influenced by the strong-willed nature of both leaders, Hussein and Khomeini, who harbored mutual animosity towards each other (Orwin 42). It is likely that the war-induced circumstances played a role

in sparking and perpetuating the hostility between Iran and Iraq (Iran-Iraq War 77-78).

In September 1980, Iraq initiated an attack on Iran in order to gain control of the waterway that separated the two nations ("Iranian Revolution" p. 835). This conflict had a detrimental impact on various industries, with chemical, steel, and iron plants located in the war zone being heavily bombarded.

The mid-1980s brought about significant economic challenges for Iraq, marked by shortages in electricity, fuel, and spare parts. Additionally, the available workforce dwindled as thousands of men left for the front lines to join the fight, further exacerbating the situation. Iraq sought to exacerbate the crisis by targeting tankers and ships located 50 miles off the oil terminal, aiming to weaken Iran's oil economy and deprive them of a substantial source of income (Orwin 41).

According to reports in 1984, the number of refugees in the Iranian province of Khuzestan had reached one million. The casualties of the war included approximately 300,000 Iranian soldiers and 250,000 Iraqi troops, who were either killed or wounded in action. Among the Iranian soldiers who were injured, some suffered burns, blisters, and lung damage due to the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi forces (Orwin 47). This war, which lasted for approximately eight years, had devastating consequences for Iran, not only in terms of loss of life but also in its economy and leadership. The ongoing purges within Iran, coupled with the war with Iraq, contributed to a severe economic depression. In addition to the immense human toll, the economic losses from the war exceeded $200 billion.

Agricultural growth has decreased due to war, as mentioned by Orwin

(34). The industry has faced challenges during the crisis and the war with Iraq, including inadequate labor management, a shortage of skilled technical and managerial staff, and a lack of raw materials and spare parts. The agricultural sector has also been impacted by a scarcity of capital, raw materials, and equipment, resulting in a decline in food production. Additionally, unemployment has risen to 3-4 million out of an estimated workforce of 12 million, as reported by Orwin (16). Iran's economy was in a desperate state.

During the war, the devastating economy led to economic suffering as a result of purges, which became the next crisis. These extensive purges affected various sectors including the army, the school and university systems, and certain government departments (although the Ministries of Justice and Commerce faced resistance due to conservative elements). In response, new institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and their ministry were established, as well as the counsel of Guardians and additional judicial bodies. As a result of the purges, numerous qualified personnel were eliminated and the morale of the Iranian people declined (Akhavi 53).

Finally, after approximately nine years of crisis and conflict between various factions, a significant development occurred in the revolution with the comeback of conservatives. In May 1989, the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini took place, followed by the election and subsequent rise to power of Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani two months later. This marked the initiation of the recovery phase in Crane Brinton's revolution. Although Rafsanjani has not explicitly advocated for a reversal of stringent Islamic laws, he has indirectly hinted at his preference for a more lenient approach, particularly concerning the enforcement of the hijab (Ramazani

7). During Rafsanjani's tenure, the reestablishment of religious institutions has been permitted, which constitutes another step in the revolutionary process. Furthermore, on August 2, 1991, Iran reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq and resolved the dispute related to Iranian Muslims' pilgrimage to Mecca, which had been suspended for three years.

Inside Iran, in October there was a significant development where a group of Iranian leaders joined forces to sideline their opponents (Igram A-10).

After twelve years since Khomeini's rise to power, Iran's Islamic revolution has started to become less strict. The evidence of gradual change is evident. Women in Tehran still adhere to hijab, which requires them to cover themselves except for their faces and hands. However, some women have replaced their loose black chedors with more fitted raincoats in shades such as green and purple.

Women's nails are now also being painted with glosses (Ramazani 32). Clearly, the era of morality in the country has come to an end, marking the next phase of recovery. Following Khomeini's demise, numerous extremist factions experienced a decline in power, resulting in the removal of radicals. President Rafsanjani, backed by Khomeini, quickly ousted four of his most uncompromising opponents from politics by contesting their eligibility for re-election. Under Rafsanjani's leadership, the Iranian people reassessed the ongoing crisis.

Rafsanjani's pragmatic policies effectively replaced militancy and isolation, resulting in the improvement of ties with the western world and an increase in foreign trade. By decreasing the influence of important opponents, the radicals were ultimately eliminated, allowing Iran to return to its previous state. It is worth noting that economic problems following a revolution can bring positive outcomes.

Iran was in debt since the start of the

revolution and needed economic recovery. In 1990, there was an increase in oil revenue due to new ties with non-oil bearing countries. Additionally, there was a rise in oil price and other raw materials. Iran also had ten billion dollars frozen in American banks, some of which are still there today.

The economic issues of the country are being resolved and the final step in the recovery process is the return to the status quo. Iran has successfully returned to the status quo and has established strong connections with various nations such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Europe. Trade and friendly relations with Russia have also strengthened, as Russia is now interested in constructing nuclear reactors in Iran.

Commerce has been established with Japan, Pakistan, Turkey, and even some allies of Iraq in an effort to end Iran's pariah status in the world community and obtain urgently needed aid, according to Rafsanjani. He believes that Iran is currently undergoing a reconstruction period (Desmond 32). Following the conclusion of the Iranian Revolution, the country has successfully recovered.

Rafasanjani continues to remain in power today, providing incredible assistance to both the economy and government. Notably, Iran's strong ties with its numerous allies have further improved its relations with the western world. As a result, the nation's oil industry is thriving and the overall economy remains stable. Additionally, Americans are now permitted to freely move around Tehran, while the foreign debt has also decreased.

The United States still faces difficulties with Iran, particularly regarding the money held in banks. However, efforts are underway to resolve these issues. Iran is making steady progress and has successfully recovered from the revolution. The Iranian

Revolution exhibits key elements outlined in Crane Brinton's theory, including symptoms, rising fever, crisis, and convalescence.

Works Cited

1. Akhavi, Shahrough. "Institutionalizing New Order in Iran." Current History. Feb. 1987: 53-56, 83.
2. Bill, James A. "The Shah, The Ayatollah, and the U.S." The Economist. June 1987: 24-26.
3. Cottam, Richard W. "Revolutionary Iran." Current History.

Jan. 1980: 12-16, 35.

The text includes a citation from Jan. 1980 with page numbers 12-16 and 35. It also includes a citation from The New York Times written by Youssef Ibram titled "Standoff in the Gulf: Testing the Waters in Tehran." Another citation is from The New Encyclopedia Britanica, Volume 21 of 1992 which provides information about Iran on pages 860-861 and 896-897. Lastly, there is a citation from George Orwin's book, Iran Iraq: Nations at War.

New York: Shirmer Books, 1990.

1993.