Grouthink in the War of Terror Marketing Book Case Study Essay Example

generally explain the invasion of Iraq as a result of path dependence, while non-theoretical works from journalists, commentators, and decision-makers shed light on the complexities of decision-making. Gellman (2009) argues that following September 11, 2001, the administration, especially Bush and Cheney, began perceiving Saddam Hussein as a distinct threat.

Instead of being seen as a problematic dictator in the past, Saddam Hussein became a different kind of threat after 9/11. However, there is currently an emphasis among scholars, journalists, and pundits on explaining the reasons for Saddam Hussein's removal from power rather than studying Iraq's role in the War on Terror. This article takes the latter perspective. I propose that associating Iraq with terrorism marked a notable shift from how the Bush administration traditionally viewed and dealt with the country and its leader, Hussein.

The administration's decision to involve Iraq in the War on Terror prior to 9/11 was influenced by groupthink, which ultimately had a detrimental effect on both the decision-making process and the perception of Iraq's dictator.

The decision to perceive Saddam Hussein as a threat to US security was influenced by Gellman's conclusions and other theoretical and atheoretical material. Groupthink, intensified by the events of September 11, drove this shift in perspective. Initially considered a troublesome dictator, Saddam Hussein became viewed as a major danger after 9/11. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other members of the administration who favored aggressive actions readily adopted this standpoint. However, Powell came to accept this viewpoint at a later stage.

Ultimately, the administration's hesitant members internalized the idea of Saddam Hussein as a significant security threat through the groupthink process. Analyzing the Iraq episode through the groupthink lens reveals

how the administration incorporated Iraq into the War on Terror through a flawed decision-making process. It also demonstrates how groupthink can change ideas, which has implications for the theory of groupthink. The use of groupthink in foreign policy scholarship typically follows Janis' approach in explaining flawed decision making during immediate crisis situations, known as 'ad hoc episodes,' as studied by Kuperman (2006).

The concept of groupthink reveals how dysfunctional dynamics within a group can lead to flawed decision-making processes in the short term, as seen in the case of removing Saddam Hussein from power. However, it also explains how groupthink can contribute to long-term shifts in ideas that shape foreign policy. In this particular situation, it helps us understand how the administration came to perceive Saddam Hussein as a major threat to American security and justified a military invasion.

Prior to September 11, 2001, there was no doubt regarding Saddam Hussein's irrational behavior on the global stage and his oppressive rule domestically. Despite this understanding, members of the Bush administration who had previously supported regime change did not view Saddam Hussein as a significant threat or engage in serious discussions about military intervention. Officials from various administrations (including those under Bush) had suggested alternative approaches such as containment, remote regime change, support for exiles, and economic sanctions to address concerns about Iraq's weapons programs, oppression of its population, threats to Israel and oil security.

The decision to invade Iraq as part of the broader US War on Terror was a significant departure from previous policies advocated by a nearly identical group in the US policy community. Although groupthink is not typically used to explain shifts in ideology, it

can effectively be used for this purpose. This paper examines the concept of groupthink and the ongoing debate surrounding its mechanics within the foreign policy academic community, as well as highlights its precursors and symptoms in the months leading up to the US-led war. The author asserts that groupthink affected the decision-making process in two ways: firstly, by pressuring for conformity, and secondly, by reducing thorough evaluation of the policy.

The article examines the influence of groupthink on the evaluation of Saddam's threat and subsequent policy choices. The former government justified their decisions based on the information they had at that time. However, because of groupthink, the assessments made about the threat were not comprehensive or accurate. This research argues that after 9/11, the government absorbed flawed information which affected their perception of Saddam's threat. Lastly, this paper discusses the theoretical and empirical implications derived from this study.

Janis (1972) introduced the group dynamics approach as a conceptual model of political decision-making. The purpose was to explain why intelligent and experienced individuals sometimes come up with flawed policies in group settings. He named this phenomenon groupthink, which refers to the deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment due to pressures within the group (Janis 1972:9). Groupthink is associated with flawed concurrence-seeking behavior, where individuals feel compelled to self-censor or adopt the group's perspective. Janis identified eight symptoms that serve as visible indicators of this behavior: (i) illusion of invulnerability; (ii) collective rationalization; (iii) belief in the inherent morality of the group; (iv) stereotyped view of the enemy; (v) direct pressure on dissenters; (vi) self-censorship; (vii) illusion of unanimity; and (viii) emergence of self-appointed "mindguards"

(Janis 1972).

The symptoms mentioned above infect the decision-making process when they occur together. These symptoms include failures to survey objectives, alternatives, and risks, leading to a weak search for information, biased information processing, and a lack of contingency planning (Janis 1972). According to Janis, the presence of groupthink will increase the chances of a negative outcome (Janis 1972:12). Janis's research on groupthink generated significant interest and criticism.

The initial formulation of the concept of groupthink lacked a proper placement within the socio-psychological literature. As a result, it provided an incomplete explanation of the emergence and mechanism of groupthink. Longley and G Pruitt (1980) acknowledged this inadequacy and pointed out that some of Janis’s identified ‘‘symptoms’’ were actually precursors to groupthink, rather than direct effects. They also argued that a causal relationship between groupthink and its preconditions could not be established. Longley and Pruitt further recognized that groups ultimately cease the deliberative process in order to reach a decision, implying that the absence of deliberation alone does not necessarily indicate the presence of groupthink.

They argue that the timing of the end to deliberation depends on the decision's nature, be it a major foreign policy or a routine task. Other critics of groupthink offer alternative explanations to small group dynamics that go beyond groupthink. In the context of small groups, Hoyt and Garrison (1997) recognize that individuals can manipulate the decision-making process on various levels. This manipulation can occur in traditional ways by altering procedural norms, but it can also involve structural manipulation through deliberate inclusion and exclusion of individuals (1997:252). Individuals can also manipulate the deliberative process through direct influence; the success of this manipulation depends on

factors such as likeability, acceptance of authority, perception of expertise, or recognition of the efficacy of the strategy (1997:258). According to Hoyt and Garrison, manipulation's effects may sometimes provide an alternative to groupthink. However, structural manipulation can result in outcomes similar to Janis's symptoms of mindguarding and pressure on dissenters.

The groupthink model allows for different individual motivations and levels of participation. It also acknowledges that personal influence can lead to the internalization of information or policy prescriptions. This means that if a member is seen as an expert or perceived to have expertise, individuals may be persuaded to accept a position rather than simply giving in to pressure. This is in line with McCauley's (1989) distinction between groupthink induced compliance and internalization.

According to Stern (1997), while Hoyt and Garrison’s alternative to groupthink can be incorporated within the model, his exploration of ‘‘newgroup syndrome’’ cannot. Stern suggests that some cases traditionally seen as classic groupthink can actually be better explained by newgroup syndrome. He specifically points to the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the Kennedy administration, which occurred shortly after the group took office. Furthermore, the group's ability to self-correct and engage in effective and deliberative policy-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis supports the newgroup hypothesis.

This model can help us understand the flaws of the Kennedy administration in relation to the Bay of Pigs. Similarly, the Bush administration's decision to include Iraq in the War on Terror occurred after a series of other policy decisions, approximately one year into their term. While some members of the administration supported removing Saddam Hussein before 9/11, it was not until later that they established a connection between Iraq and

terrorism. It was this connection that led to Iraq being incorporated into the post-9/11 mission. In contrast to Longley and Pruitt's criticism of groupthink's mechanism, Hoyt, Garrison, and Stern present alternative explanations for poor decisions made by small groups. These subsequent efforts were partly prompted by accusations that scholars retroactively attribute groupthink to any foreign policy disaster.

While there may be concerns about using groupthink as an explanatory mechanism, it remains a valuable tool when used cautiously. Hart's (1990) revised groupthink model offers a broader context that allows scholars to use the framework while acknowledging its limitations. According to Hart, there are multiple pathways that can lead to groupthink, influenced by structural and individual factors. Instead of assuming a single pathway, Hart identifies various mechanisms, two of which are utilized in this analysis.

First, stress-induced cohesiveness can result in groupthink when members see the group as a "viable protective mechanism" (124), mirroring Janis's original idea. Alternatively, groupthink may occur due to anticipatory compliance, where members seek strong leadership during times of stress, when there are no clear procedural norms, or if a formal leader fails to take control. t'Hart also acknowledges that different group members exhibit varying degrees of leadership, which impacts the type of influence exerted on individuals. He distinguishes between "official" and "de facto" leaders, noting that leadership may stem from position or function, respectively (t'Hart 1990). In contrast to Janis's model that focuses only on peer pressures conditioning compliance, t'Hart identifies two types of pressure in the decision-making process: horizontal influence, arising from collegial pressure, and vertical influence, resulting from specific status differences within the group (t'Hart 1990:49). Finally, situating groupthink within realistic conflict

theory demonstrates the difficulty of resolving tensions between groups.

According to t'Hart (1990:105), conflict between different groups can contribute to the intensification of groupthink by making the group more cohesive. McCauley (1989:251) argues that agreement within a group can either come from members internalizing the group norm, complying with the norm, or a combination of both. This means that groupthink can result in a genuine change in ideas or simply going along with the group, depending on the factors involved. While McCauley does not distinguish between active and passive group members, differentiating between compliance and internalization processes is crucial for understanding groupthink.

Dina Badie 281 In addition to t'Hart's intergroup conflict, scholars have identified various preconditions that contribute to groupthink. These factors include cohesiveness, homogeneity, insulation, close-mindedness, high stress, recent failure, promotional leadership, lack of methodical procedures, overestimation of the group, and deindividuation (Janis 1972; Raven 1974; Flowers 1977; Tetlock 1979; Smith 1985; McCauley 1989; t'Hart 1990; Tetlock et al. 992; Schafer and Crichlow 1996). The exact causes of groupthink are still debated but it is possible that one or more of these preconditions may exist. It is widely agreed upon that stress is a necessary condition for groupthink but not sufficient on its own. Groupthink is more likely to occur in major policy-making situations rather than routine decisions.

According to the literature on groupthink, I suggest that stress, along with promotional leadership and intergroup conflict, was a crucial factor in the emergence of groupthink. However, not all members of the administration were affected by groupthink in the same manner. I use t'Hart's pathways to explain how different members of the group became susceptible to this phenomenon considering

the aforementioned conditions. The paths varied depending on pre-existing tensions within the group, specifically between hawks and skeptics, which resurfaced after 9/11 – a topic extensively discussed by Mann (2004) and others. By applying t'Hart's discussion of intergroup conflict and incorporating differentiated pathways, we can account for diverse motivations within the group.

Once the antecedents are in play and members follow different pathways to groupthink, Janis's original symptoms identify the presence of the pathology in the decision-making process. These symptoms can be divided into two categories: those that pressure conformity (illusion of unanimity, direct pressure on dissenters, mindguarding, and self-censorship) and those that result in policy evaluation failures (collective rationalization, illusion of invulnerability, belief in inherent morality, and stereotyped view of enemy outgroups). By classifying the group as "hawks" and "skeptics," another aspect of groupthink is revealed. Specifically, Hoyt and Garrison's exploration of the potential for manipulation by promotional leaders sheds light on the possibility of internalizing ideas and policies within small groups.

While presenting itself as an alternative to Janis's original formulation, the model finds relevance within the groupthink framework when the group is divided. By applying groupthink in this manner, it becomes apparent that 9/11 played a significant role in the decision to involve Iraq in the War on Terror, rather than simply being a pretext. From an empirical standpoint, it can be argued that the stress associated with formulating policy after 9/11 worsened existing divisions within the group. The hawks - including Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Perle, Feith, and the President - considered the group to be a "viable protective mechanism" as they were surrounded by like-minded neoconservatives who had all previously advocated for

regime change. On the other hand, other members of the group succumbed to anticipatory compliance and a desire for leadership. Due to the hawks' dominance in terms of official and unofficial leadership positions, their influence led to the internalization of information and policy through the groupthink process by the rest of the group.

This was particularly notable in Powell’s case. The hawks experienced horizontal pressures from traditional groupthink, while other members of the administration experienced vertical pressures from newly emergent hawkish leaders. By combining elements from Janis’s original formulation and t’Hart and Hoyt and Garrison’s subsequent studies on small group dynamics, the groupthink mechanism finds more solid ground. By positioning groupthink alongside broader socio-psychological studies, it retains its utility in explaining the unique phenomenon of small group dynamics. I also suggest that the pathology may, in some cases, result in both defective policy and ideational shifts. Thus, the following analysis aims to add the decision to incorporate Iraq into the War on Terror to the groupthink catalog while assessing the role that the pathology played in shifting ideas about Saddam Hussein.

The text discusses the "core group" of decision makers involved in the debate over Iraq. This group includes the President, his Principal Advisors, and other key players in the administration such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, NSC Advisor Condoleeza Rice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense Policy Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, Richard Perle and Kenneth Adelman on the Defense Policy Board, Bill Luti and Abe Shulsky at the Office of Special Plans (OSP), and CIA Director George Tenet. These individuals, also known as the

"Vulcans," have a wealth of experience in foreign policy from their time in previous administrations like those of Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. Their approach towards Saddam Hussein existed before the events of 9/11.

After the first Gulf Crisis, Cheney, who served as Secretary of Defense under George H. W. Bush, opposed the idea of invading Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Instead, the United States implemented a strategy that involved imposing sanctions, establishing no-fly zones, and occasionally launching strikes. The US did not provide assistance to rebels seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, as time passed, former members of the Bush I administration, who had lost their influence during the Clinton years, started advocating for a tougher approach towards Iraq. Nevertheless, they never endorsed a full-fledged military invasion by the US.

During the 1990s, several members of a group, including Perle, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Libby, and Wolfowitz, were part of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). They favored establishing a permanent role in Gulf regional security and believed in the need for a regime change in Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. In line with this objective, Wolfowitz coauthored a guide on removing Saddam from power. Furthermore, in 1998, they collaborated with Rumsfeld, Perle, Woolsey, and others to sign a letter urging President Clinton to adopt the removal of Saddam as a US foreign policy objective. In 1996, Perle, Feith, and Wurmser also coauthored the "Clean Break" report which proposed a plan for Israel to remove Saddam Hussein from power as part of a wider strategy to transform the Middle East into a more favorable region.

Although the core group members agreed that Iraq was a

foreign policy problem, there were disagreements among them regarding the specific threat posed by Iraq and the best approach to implementing regime change. The administration members did not suggest that Iraq presented a significant security threat to the United States in terms of weapons or terrorism, and they did not advocate for military action. While there was a loose consensus on regime change, different Bush appointees had varying assessments of the threat posed by Iraq. Packer notes that Feith and Wurmser were influenced by Israeli security concerns, whereas Wolfowitz saw Iraq as representing unfinished war, Arab tyranny, weapons proliferation, a strategic threat to oil, and American weakness (Packer 2006:32).

Dina Badie 283 Upon assuming office, the Bush administration explored various policy options in the 8 months prior to 9/11. In a July 2001 memo, Rumsfeld presented potential courses of action, stating that the US government should reconsider its current approach towards Saddam Hussein, recognizing that he had become more assertive (Rumsfeld 2001). Apart from Powell, most members agreed that sanctions were ineffective, but they were divided on the strategy towards Iraq (Feith 2008). While they acknowledged that containment had not successfully contained Saddam Hussein, the group did not perceive Iraq as a threat that warranted a full-scale invasion for US security. The September 11 attacks added significant pressure on the Bush administration to respond to terrorism and establish a new foreign policy grand strategy.

Yet after the attacks (Mann 2004), both old frictions and new tensions emerged. The neoconservative hawks, such as Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, and the President himself, favored a broad retaliation against the vague network of terrorists and their state supporters. On the other

hand, Powell and Armitage preferred a limited approach against al Qaeda's hub in Afghanistan. Despite this, the lone insufficiency of 9 ? 11 did not generate groupthink. In the case of the decision-making process for Iraq, stress, promotional leadership, and intergroup conflict all contributed to groupthink in the aftermath of 9 ? 11. Members of the core group were under pressure to devise effective policies in response to the attacks. In line with t'Hart's analysis, post-9 ? 11 stress led to a search for leadership initially provided by Bush as a new Doctrine and later assumed by other prominent members of the administration. These circumstances also caused tensions within the decision-making team and between the core group and the CIA. As Mann suggests, "by early 2002, the Vulcans were in a hurry for new ideas," an urgency fueled by the belief that 9 ? 11 had signaled the beginning of a new era (2004:312).

Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld demonstrated promotional leadership in their response to the attacks, which made the group more susceptible to groupthink as members sought guidance in the aftermath of 9/11. Immediately after the attacks, Bush exhibited clear elements of promotional leadership by presenting his preferred solution before allowing the group to evaluate evidence and consider a thoughtful response. According to Douglas Feith's memoir, the push for war was attributed to President Bush's proactive approach, as he operated as a war president right after 9/11. Responding unprecedentedly to terrorism, Bush took the lead in seeking widespread military retaliation by declaring the attacks an act of war and expecting his foreign policy team to plan accordingly. Furthermore, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld assumed the role of

a de facto leader who advocated for significant military retribution. Packer notes that Rumsfeld's influence stemmed from his position and forceful character (Packer 2006:42).

Paralleling Bush’s perspective, he believed that the United States needed to respond to 9/11 in a way that inspired confidence, as he feared that taking military action solely in Afghanistan would seem inadequate (Feith 2008:95). Cheney also played a silent but influential role, taking it upon himself to persuade those who were skeptical of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein (Gellman 2009). Together, Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld drove the policy and acted as leaders who influenced other members of the group. Within the groupthink process, members of the administration began accepting the perception of an increased threat from Saddam Hussein, which resulted from some symptoms of groupthink (specifically those that impacted evaluation) and the influence of Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld. This is evident in Powell's conformity and apparent confidence in the intelligence, which occurred well after the announcement of the Bush Doctrine and pressures from the President and other members of the decision-making group.

Groupthink during the War on Terror was exacerbated by intergroup rivalry and distrust between Bush appointees and the intelligence community. The failure of the CIA to effectively analyze intelligence after 9/11 caused the decision-making team to rely more on internal sources of information, excluding outside counsel. Douglas Feith, for example, criticized the CIA's intelligence-gathering methods which relied heavily on official channels rather than utilizing commonly available sources or common sense. In response, the Defense Department established specialized units to uncover links between terrorist groups and their state sponsors. This intergroup conflict, along with promotional leadership and the intense pressure

of 9/11, contributed to the development of groupthink within the decision-making team.

The group became fixated with 'connecting the dots' and expanding the War on Terror to include more than just Afghanistan; after 9/11, the core group united around the idea of linking terrorism to state sponsors and taking military action against those states. Ultimately, they connected Iraq to the War on Terror and abandoned previously supported strategies. According to a memo from the OUSDP (Feith's office) to Wolfowitz, they determined that 'Containment can work against armies, not against terrorists - can't contain when Iraq could use terrorists to deliver WMD' (OUSDP 2002a). By 2002, the threats posed by Saddam and terrorism were seen as interchangeable. The pressures of groupthink led the group to adopt Bush's grand strategy without critical evaluation and internalize the perceived 'new threat' posed by Saddam Hussein, incorporating Iraq into the War on Terror. Division within the group emerged immediately after 9/11.

The administration's hawks quickly accepted the Bush Doctrine and the necessity of a wide-scale military response, which might involve Iraq. On the other hand, Powell and Tenet were skeptical and preferred to concentrate on Afghanistan. These differences ultimately influenced the paths each member took towards groupthink. The hawkish members and leaders embraced the new grand strategy and actively confronted critics, becoming susceptible to Janis's original pathway. The pressure to conform horizontally within the group and the desire for group unity following the traumatic events of 9/11 led to groupthink. Powell and Tenet both found themselves in delicate positions.

Both men, as members of the decision-making team and heads of departments, were confronted with pressure to conform regarding the con? ation of

Iraq and terrorism. Powell experienced vertical pressures and mindguards, which ultimately caused a conversion. Despite his initial skepticism, Cheney and various groups within the Defense Department actively engaged Powell and urged him to conform, resulting in the Secretary of State internalizing the Saddam threat. On the other hand, Tenet desired to maintain his influence within the policy-making group and chose to self-censor in response to increasing pressure from the hawks. An illusion of unanimity occurs when individuals mistakenly interpret silence as consent.

Members of Bush’s core group did not question the President’s premise of broad military retaliation, which meant that retribution would go beyond Afghanistan and involve military engagement. During the first stage of the decision-making process, the group failed to consider other options after 9/11, which was a clear indication of a flawed decision-making process. After 9/11, two factors led the core group members to unanimously support the Bush Doctrine. Firstly, the hawks became more unified due to the trauma of 9/11, which influenced their acceptance of broad retaliation. Secondly, the consistency in their approach to foreign policy prior to 9/11 created horizontal pressures that made broad retaliation appear as the effective strategy.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Feith acknowledges that the core group reflected on the first Gulf War and learned that it's important for the President not to specify a war goal that could potentially restrict his choices, as George H. Bush had done (Feith 2008:10). Secondly, the