Youngme Moon BMW Films Essay Example

BMW product line was its sedans.

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This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. tC op yo People respond negatively to gratuitous commercialism. But in our films, the BMW vehicles are not gratuitous props; they are actors in a scene. There are no beauty shots of the cars. The cars get extensively beat up. Each car is there because it is a very important actor in the development of the plot. The cars definitely take their lumps along the way.

There’s nothing gratuitous about it. rP os t 9-502-046 REV: OCTOBER 12, 2005 502-046 BMW Films.  The 3 Series was BMW’s entry-level sedan. Launched in 1975, it tended to attract upwardly mobile professionals; as McDowell put it, “These are people who are achieving success early in life, people on their way up. ” In 1989, the 3 Series accounted for about half of BMW unit sales and was priced between $25,000 and $34,000.  The 5 Series, launched in 1972, was BMW’s mid-range sedan. In 1989, it accounted

for about 32% of unit sales, with a price range of $37,000 to $44,000.

The 7 Series, launched in 1977, was BMW’s flagship sedan. In 1989, it accounted for about 16% of BMW unit sales, with a price range of $54,000 to $70,000. By 1992, Lexus had taken over as the number-one luxury import in the country. BMW, on the other hand, had seen its sales tumble and its customer satisfaction ratings fall below Lexus, Infiniti, Acura and Mercedes. In fact, U. S. sales had bottomed out to the point that industry rumors suggested BMW would withdraw from the U. S. altogether. Instead, BMW took a number of actions to reinvigorate itself in North America.

These included: 1. The introduction of a number of new models in its core Series. Most notably, the 325i Sedan was introduced in 1992; it represented a complete, bumper-to-bumper redesign. The following year, BMW introduced a 740i sedan with a V-8 engine. Do 2 Based on the influential J. D. Power Customer Satisfaction survey. Lexus and Infiniti topped the list in 1992. BMW’s score not only placed it behind Lexus, Infiniti, Mercedes, and Acura—but also behind Toyota, Audi, Cadillac, Honda, and Buick.

This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No The Japanese cars offered superior quality, reliability, and service at lower price points than BMW. They also had competitive feature sets; in fact, many of the high-end features touted by BMW in its advertising (such as ABS brakes and air bags) were standard in these other brands. Making matters worse, the Japanese

brands were sold by a relatively small number of exclusive dealerships that were able to provide excellent service levels while maintaining high sales volumes.

Furthermore, they were promoted in large-scale advertising campaigns that dwarfed those of BMW. tC In the late 1980s, however, the North American luxury car market started experiencing a shift. A new pragmatism began replacing the conspicuous consumption patterns of the early 1980s, and BMW soon found itself saddled with an outdated image as a “yuppie car” manufacturer.

The company also aced fresh competition from Japan. Honda had been the first to enter the luxury market with its introduction of the Acura in 1986; it had been followed by Toyota (Lexus) in 1989 and Nissan (Infiniti) that same year. op yo Before the mid-1970s, BMW had been regarded by most Americans as a niche foreign car manufacturer. However, in the late-1970s, BMW had emerged as one of the hottest luxury brands in North America. (See Exhibit 1 for unit sales in the U. S. over time. ) BMW’s “Ultimate Driving Machine” campaign had been widely credited for this surge in popularity.

The campaign’s ads had featured BMWs driving through country estates, parked in front of huge mansions, and pulling up to black-tie affairs. Other ads had focused on the superior performance of the BMW, emphasizing such factors as superb handling and German engineering. This dual positioning (prestige + performance) had appealed to young urban professionals who—in an era of “conspicuous consumption”—had been looking for a car that conveyed a sense of affluence and style, without the stodgier, conservative image associated with Mercedes-Benz, Jaguar, and Cadillac. rP os t BMW Films 502-046 2.

An aggressive pricing strategy.

The new 325i was priced under $30,000, while the new 740i was priced under $55,000. These prices retained the premium that BMW believed was warranted for its brand over its Japanese competitors, but kept the models within 10% to 15% of a comparably equipped Lexus. 3. The reorganization of its dealer network. In the early 1990s, BMW had almost 400 dealers in the U. S. (only 106 of which sold BMW exclusively), compared with fewer than 150 dealers for Lexus and Infiniti, respectively. Dealer frustration with BMW was high, and the quality of customer service at BMW dealerships was mixed.

To address these problems, BMW restructured its account management approach and reconceptualized its “dealer operating system” (DOS) to ensure greater consistency in the customer experience across dealerships. The introduction of several new Series. 1995 saw the launch of the Z3 roadster ($31,000– $38,000), a car that was designed to “embody the ideal of the thoroughbred open-air sports car. ” This was followed in 1997 with the launch of the M roadster ($45,000), and in 1999 with the launch of the Z8 roadster ($131,500). Near the end of the 1990s, BMW also launched a sports utility vehicle, the X5 ($40,000–$67,000).

At the same time, the company worked hard to make the BMW more suitable for the North American market. McDowell recalled, “It was simple things, like one-touch windows and cup holders. These were important to North American consumers, but they’d never been part of the design specifications for our cars before. ” Steadily, a new brand image was formulated. The company’s “DNA” still revolved around the idea that BMW produced “the world’s most exciting luxury cars,” and the

Ultimate Driving Machine tagline remained. But BMW’s advertisements became edgier and more youthful.

They celebrated the pleasure of driving a BMW, showing hairpin turns on mountain roads with copy that read, “Happiness isn’t around the corner. It is the corner. ” McDowell remarked, “They were aimed at the type of individual who has since become the core of our customer base: That highly-educated, bright, affluent person who wants to have a great driving experience. ” These efforts paid off. During the period from 1996 to 2001, BMW sales rebounded, eventually reaching record levels in the U. S. By 2001, the company was delivering over 800,000 cars and 74,000 motorcycles annually to customers worldwide.

The company had just under 2% market share in the U. S. , about 7% market share in Germany, and about 5% market share in the rest of Europe. Do No Moreover, analysts were reporting that, over the next several years, BMW was planning to increase U. S. sales by 40%, to 300,000 cars a year. The company was also reportedly planning a number of new product introductions. Expected to hit the market in 2002 were a completely redesigned 7 Series; a new Z4 roadster to replace the Z3; and a $20,000 subcompact Mini Cooper (without the BMW brand label).

In addition, three new engine series were apparently in the pipeline: a smaller X3 SUV to complement the X5; a 1 Series to target younger buyers; and a new 6 Series to provide a sportier complement to the 7 Series. Meanwhile, the company’s success had begun to spawn imitators. McDowell explained: I remember one advertising campaign in particular in which we focused on the “responsive

performance” theme. In the campaign, our ads provided viewers with the perspective that they were directly behind the wheel of a car.

Pretty soon, a bunch of other companies—Audi, Mitsubishi, Pontiac—all started running campaigns that were similar to ours. It was clear that everyone was trying to become more BMW-like in their ads. tC op yo This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 3 502-046 BMW Films The BMW Customer In 2001, BMW faced competition from a variety of competitors in the luxury/performance category (Mercedes Benz, Jaguar, Lexus, Infiniti, Volvo, Porsche, Audi, Saab, and Ferrari).

All of the vehicles in these categories touted elegant design, high performance, and up-to-date technological features for driving and safety; however, each manufacturer sought to establish a unique positioning in the market. (See Exhibit 5 for short descriptions of BMW’s competitors. See Exhibit 6 for data about BMW’s image versus the competition’s. ) Despite the increasingly crowded luxury market, BMW believed that its target customer was fundamentally different from that of its competitors. As McDowell put it: We don’t think anyone else serves the particular psychographic we do.

Take Mercedes, for example. People buy Mercedes because they care about status, and the Mercedes says, “I’ve arrived. ” Volvo is another example: People buy a Volvo because they think of it as being very sensible and practical and they are very impressed by the concept of safety. BMW is targeting a different psychographic than they are. No one’s really playing in our field. Porsche comes close, but they’re much more

niche than us. The average BMW customer was about 46 years old, with a median income of about $150,000.

Most BMW customers were well-educated, married, and had no children. Two-thirds were male. (See Exhibit 7 for demographic information about BMW’s customer base versus the competition. ) Beyond this, BMW constantly conducted market research to track the tastes, personalities, and lifestyles of its core customer base. Based on this research, the company knew that BMW appealed to “people who tended to be leaders, who worked hard, played hard, and achieved a lot very early in life. ” They tended to be very active, and engaged in sports as part of their daily regime.

McDowell elaborated: Technology was important to the BMW customer. In fact, BMW was tops among car brands in terms of frequency of buyers who used the Internet, and approximately 85% of BMW purchasers were on the Internet before they bought their BMW. McDowell noted, “Considering that they tend to be time-pressured and they travel a lot, it’s no wonder they use the Internet so frequently. ” Finally, BMW customers tended to be very loyal to the brand, buying several different BMWs over the course of a lifetime (see Exhibit 8 for additional loyalty information).

MacDowell explained: A lot of people are immediately drawn to BMW through the 3 Series and have a wonderful love affair with that car. 3 Their next car after the 3 Series will either be a new 3 Series, or a nonBMW. When we lose customers to another brand at this stage, it’s typically because they’re at Do 3 In 2001, BMW sold about 103,000 3 Series in the U. S. ,

compared with fewer than 20,000 7 Series. 4 This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No

Their feelings about driving were very specific. “Many of these people look at the hour or two they spend driving as some of the most pleasurable time in their day,” said McDowell. “It’s when they are completely in control. For them, driving is a form of personal expression. ” tC They tend to be as demanding of the people around them as they are of themselves. Because they work hard, their free time is extremely valuable and they are very particular about what they surround themselves with in their free time. These are people who typically have an eye for detail. They care about how things are assembled.

They are willing to pay more to get an absolutely perfect product, as opposed to just a very good product. op yo rP os t BMW Films 502-046 a point in their lives where they are looking for a different kind of car—a pick-up truck, a minivan, or a small SUV—things that we don’t build. Once that life stage has passed, we try to get the customer back for either a new 3 Series, an M3, a 5 Series, or an X5. We don’t know exactly where they’ll land in our product portfolio, but we think we can bring them back. And then when someone has gone from a 3 Series to a 5 Series, they’re a very good candidate to go from a 5 Series to a 7 Series.

That’s a person

who has stayed with the basic sedan concept throughout. The 7 Series is obviously very profitable per unit, so these are our most profitable individual customers. BMW’s Marketing Approach Because of the company’s size and limited marketing budget, every BMW marketing campaign had to have maximum impact. McDowell explained: BMW introduces many more new products every year than we could ever hope to support. We’re a funny little company. We have a strong brand image, we have relatively small market share, and to earn that relatively small share, we have a huge number of models.

So our marketing budgets are relatively modest, but we have a lot of new products to introduce. In recent years, BMW had devoted an increasing amount of attention to non-traditional advertising campaigns. Its first non-traditional campaign had accompanied the launch of the Z3 roadster, the first BMW manufactured outside of Germany. “It was this absolutely gorgeous-looking vehicle in a premium segment where no one was actively participating at the time,” McDowell remembered, “We knew it would be a success, so we asked ourselves, do we do a normal introduction, or do e take this opportunity to try and build the brand into something that much bolder, that much bigger, that much more vital? ”

The result had been a high-profile product placement—a virtual cameo appearance—in a James Bond film, GoldenEye. The movie cameo had been supported by a series of traditional advertisements featuring scenes from the movie. As McDowell explained, “You want to achieve a balance, to create a synergy across a bunch of different media. ” He continued, “That was a big turning point for the company. It came at exactly

the time that our sales started to surge.

When we overtook Mercedes for the first time—a very important internal goal—that accomplishment was attributable to BMW’s brand momentum. ” The success of the Z3 campaign had led to several “copycat” movie placements by other car manufacturers. BMW itself had followed the GoldenEye campaign with a second Bond film placement, this time for the 7 Series in Tomorrow Never Dies. McDowell admitted that this second campaign had lacked the impact of the first: “As with so many things in life, there’s a first-mover advantage.

Whoever has the opportunity to do it first gets all the attention, and it’s never the same the second or third time that someone tries to do it. ” Nonetheless, the company had become a believer in the non-traditional advertising approach. McDowell summarized: Today, every time we have a new initiative coming up, we ask ourselves, is this something that needs a traditional approach, or is it something that needs a non-traditional approach? Keep in mind, we’ll never stop doing traditional advertising; for some purposes, nothing is as effective. On the other hand, we recognize that there are some times where a non-traditional

Do No tC op yo This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 5 502-046 BMW Films approach is going to have much higher impact. In these cases, the real challenge for us is to come up with a good non-traditional idea. There just aren’t that many good ideas out there. The Development of BMW Films In early 2000, an

interesting window of opportunity emerged for BMW. Sales of BMW were the highest ever in the U. S. and the brand had never been stronger (see Exhibit 9).

McDowell recalled: With no new products being launched over the next six months, we had this unbelievable luxury; this period of time where we didn’t have to tell people about a new product. Normally, when we’re launching a product, we have a responsibility to tell people about the new product and reinforce the BMW brand message in the same communication. Of course, the more things we try to do in an ad, the more diluted the message becomes. But now we had this opportunity to do some absolutely pure branding. We had the luxury of simply focusing on, how can we better show people what makes a BMW a BMW?

We knew that the solution wasn’t simply changing creative. That would have been like trying to climb a mountain on the wrong side. Instead, we asked ourselves, “What if we were to throw out some of our core assumptions about how to do brand image advertising? ” After a series of brainstorming sessions, a couple of non-traditional advertising ideas began to emerge. One idea was to produce a series of short films. Another was to incorporate the Internet into an advertising campaign. Before long, the two ideas had merged into the idea of producing a series of short films for the Internet.

McDowell recalled: What excited us about the idea was that we knew we were dealing with an entirely new genre, an entirely new way of communicating our brand to the world. We also knew that if we produced

a bunch of short films for the Internet, they wouldn’t be seen by as many people as, say, a series of ads we aired on television. But we believed that what we lost in terms of audience size could be made up for in terms of involvement. In other words, our goal was to produce the most exciting, fun thing people had ever seen come out of their computer.

We convinced ourselves that we could create something so involving that people would remember the experience 10 years down the road. Do The final line-up of directors included some of the biggest “up-and-comers” in Hollywood: John Frankenheimer, Ang Lee, Wong Kar-Wai, Guy Ritchie, and Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu. Each of the directors was permitted to choose one script to turn into a six-minute short film. The directors were 6 This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012.

Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. arvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No Once the decision was made to create the short films, BMW’s advertising partner, Minneapolisbased Fallon, recommended that Anonymous Productions be brought in as a partner. Together, the team worked to produce a total of 15 scripts ranging in length from 6 to 12 minutes. The central character in each of the films was a professional driver who helped people out of difficult circumstances. Anonymous Productions, which was well-connected within the Hollywood community, then began approaching individuals to direct the short films.

McDowell remembered: We approached people who we thought would be superb and open-minded. As it turns out, it was much easier lining up directors than one might have thought. Our value

proposition to them was pretty simple: Here was a chance to work in an entirely new genre for a patron that was synonymous with quality. We wanted A-list everything: A-list directors, A-list actors, A-list production values. tC op yo rP os t BMW Films 502-046 then given complete creative control over content and direction. As McDowell explained, this wasn’t an easy thing to do: It went against every instinct we had.

Normally when we’re producing an advertisement, we are so precise about everything; we will discard footage for the slightest reason—for example, because the driver got too close to the center line, or because you can’t see that the driver was wearing the shoulder belt, or because it wasn’t the most flattering shot of the vehicle. But in this case, we let the directors do things that we would have never permitted if this had been an advertisement because we decided that it had to be about entertainment, not advertising. The BMWs in the films were shown dirty, banged up, and shot full of holes.

About three months before the films premiered, a low-profile public relations campaign seeded news of the project at Internet movie rumor sites. Stories were also planted in chat rooms and fan sites about what type of talent would appear in the shorts. The films themselves could only be accessed at www. BMWfilms. com (see Exhibit 10). This website was supported with print ads and street posters designed to look like advertisements for a movie. The print ads were placed in the film sections of newspapers, and the movie posters were placed in hip, urban venues.

In addition, 30-second trailers were prepared for television

audiences. 5 To unsuspecting television viewers, these trailers looked just like previews for regular movies—i. e. , theatrical releases. The key difference: the word “BMW Films” was prominently displayed as the title of the “movie’s” production company, and the trailer ended by directing viewers to the BMW Films website. The publicity was strategic, McDowell explained: The whole process depended on a certain amount of disruption. That was part of the beauty of the name “BMW Films”; it was such a disruptive name.

So the advertisements were disruptive in the sense that they were done in the style of movie trailers, but then the joke was that if you got interested in what you were seeing, you would come to the end and realize it was not playing at a theatre near you. You had to go to the website to be able to see it. This was what made it so provocative; it was a call to action. In the end it all tied back to how the BMW brand works. We are such a polarizing brand. Regardless of whether people love us or reject us, we’ve got a very definite place in their mind.

This gives us the flexibility to be a little more provocative, a little more interesting in terms of some of the things we do. Do No If a viewer decided to visit the website to watch the film in its entirety, he or she had to log in to the site and register; download the appropriate media viewer (QuickTime or RealPlayer) if he or she did not already have it; “stream” the film on the computer a broadband connection delivered the best

viewing experience; viewing the film over a dial-up modem resulted in significant time lags that often interrupted the continuous streaming of the film. For a higher-quality viewing Casewriter estimate. A traditional advertising campaign typically cost BMW about $1. 5 million to develop the creative.

5 CMR News (TNS Media Intelligence) estimated that the short films were backed by a total of about $14 million in media. tC op yo The end result was a series of five films collectively titled, “The Hire. ” Altogether, they cost the company about $15 million to produce,4 and each starred the British actor Clive Owen as a professional driver hired to help someone out of a difficult situation. They were released one at a time at two-week intervals, and varied significantly in terms of mood and tone.

The films featured a variety of BMW models, along with a number of well-known actors including Mickey Rourke, Madonna, and Stellan Skarsgaard. (See Appendix A for descriptions of the five films. ) This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. rP os t 7 502-046 BMW Films experience, viewers could also download a free version of the BMW Film Player, along with copies of the five films. Viewers could then watch the downloaded versions on the computer off-line, using the Player application. Early Results

Please pass this message on to the marketing folks: The film series has gotten this devoted Audi-phile to actually consider BMW for my next purchase. It single-handedly eliminated much of the stigma I previously associated with BMW (status symbol, yuppie-machine, etc.).

In terms of wooing a younger audience, Benz is dead in the water compared to you guys (and Audi, of course). I will actually root for you at Le Mans this year. Another fan had written: Awesome!! I’ve told a bunch of my friends to check out the site. WOW! What an awesome way to demonstrate what a BMW can do—I never knew they were such amazing performance machines.

I’m seeing BMW in a whole new light. GREAT STUFF. I will definitely consider a BMW for my next car purchase. Keep up the FANTASTIC work and redefining the automotive experience. BRAVO!! And: I am very impressed! What a way to market a great line of automobiles. I have been captivated by not only the films but also the vehicles. The films give the viewer(s) the chance to see the BMW really put to a test. I am currently in the market for a new car, and I was caught between the Lexus IS300, the Acura TL S-Type, and the BMW 330. I think that I’ve made my mind up—thanks to John Frankenheimer, Ang Lee and BMW!

One 20-year-old respondent from New York had written: I think the whole Hire series is a great idea. BMW lets the directors do whatever they want and they’re not constantly shoving the BMW logo in your face or anything! Overall, I think The Hire series is great and it’s something I would like to see happen again in the future, maybe with different directors or a whole new company. Perhaps the most convincing response had come from the fan who wrote, “Made me put money down on an M3. ” The

BMW marketing team had even screened “The Hire” for film critics at major media publications.

As a result, The New York Times, Time, Entertainment Weekly, and Variety had ended up publishing critical reviews of the BMW Films series in their entertainment sections. These reviews had been overwhelmingly positive: Do 8 This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo By August, BMW had logged over nine million film views on its BMWfilms. com website (see Exhibit 11 for additional information about BMWfilm. com visitors).

As McDowell described it: An Encore Performance? Looking ahead, the key question for McDowell was whether to continue to build on the BMW Films idea, or start looking for new ideas for the next BMW campaign. McDowell considered his various options: The first option was to simply “milk” the existing five films by making them available to a wider audience: “The films are really amazing works of art, and it’s almost a shame that a lot of people haven’t seen them yet. For example, the company could distribute the short films to theatres; the films could then air alongside trailers for other coming attractions, before the feature presentation.

In addition, some of the films had been edited down for Internet viewing so there was an opportunity to make the full-length versions available in the form of a DVD. As far as distribution, McDowell explained, “We could make the DVDs available in our dealerships, as well as inserting them in selected magazines. This way, we could make the films available to people

who might not have high-speed access to the Internet.

The second option was to develop more short films, all featuring “The Hire,” actor Clive Owen. As McDowell pointed out, almost 90% of the visitors to the BMW Films website were requesting additional films: There is no question that the appetite is there for far more than five films. If we did another five films relatively quickly, I don’t think it would feel like we’re repeating ourselves; rather, the momentum behind this campaign would just continue to build. If we took this option, we could continue to produce short films indefinitely, or we could stop after we built a portfolio of 10 or 12 films.

The level of press activity was 10 times what we had anticipated. We also started getting tons of what we call “pass-alongs. ” It turns out that once someone downloads a film to their computer, they’ll show it to someone else. We have incredible anecdotal information that this is what’s going on; people are inviting other people to come by their computer and watch it. This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.

The third option under consideration was perhaps the most radical: The development of a feature-length movie that would air in theatres around the country. McDowell explained the rationale behind this option: What has really surprised us about this campaign is how invested people have become with the character (Clive Owen) and the personalities in the films. Millions of people have an emotional connection with this guy, the driver. So we’ve had a lot of viewers beg us to

produce a two-hour movie, to tell the whole story, from beginning to end.

McDowell concluded, “We’ve always believed that the future belongs to the nimble. You see this in our cars, and you see this in our marketing. The challenge, of course, is in identifying what that radical new thing is going to be. That’s the kind of stuff you don’t necessarily learn in Marketing 101. ” Do 10 This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo The final option was to do nothing, i. e. , to simply move on to the next thing, whatever that might be.

Already, McDowell had heard rumors that some of his competitors were pursuing their own film projects which meant that the genre could start to get crowded with “copycat” efforts. The GoldenEye experience had taught the company that repeat performances were rarely as compelling as premiere performances: “The last thing we want to do is go back and try to repeat history. Part of me tells me that we have to do something significantly different the next time around or we’re going to get diminishing returns. ”

Mercedes had a long-standing image of classic prestige and status. Each of the Mercedes’ classes had long histories; the SL was launched in 1954; the E Series was first launched in 1958. With four classes in 2000 (the C-Class, E-Class, M-Class (SUV) and S-Class sedans), Mercedes cars were considered more comfortable, but more conservative, than BMWs. Mercedes’ advertising was traditionally prestige-oriented, focusing on luxury first and performance second. However,

by the mid-1990s, the company was experimenting with younger, hipper themes and music to promote its cars to a younger demographic.

By 2000, Mercedes was promoting its relaunched C-class with the tagline, “Enjoy yourself, it’s later than you think. ” Volvo: Volvo competed on its perception of safety and comfort. Sturdy boxy design reinforced its practical brand image. More recently, Volvo had added more affordable lines to its model lineup (the S40 and V40) to attract less affluent customers to its brand. Volvo advertising consistently highlighted quality of life, safety for families with children, and comfortable travel in all weathers and on all terrains. Porsche: The first Porsche 911 was introduced in 1963, launching this classic sports car brand.

Porsche made only two cars—the 911 and the Boxster—but a commitment to classic, eye-catching design and high performance had secured the company a strong niche as the Everyperson’s race car for the daily commute. Fun, passion, excitement, and exclusivity were central to the brand. Two new additions to the model lineup were being planned: the Porsche Cayenne, a sport utility developed with Volkswagen, was being readied for dealers in 2003; and an all-wheel drive Carrera GT concept, which if built would carry a $300,000 price tag.

Audi: Founded in Cologne, Germany in 1899, Audi had a long tradition of innovative technology in automobile manufacturing. Their entry performance sedan, the A4, newly designed for launch in 2000, had been hailed as the “gold standard among entry luxury vehicles” by some. a The launch of the TT in 1998 (and the Roadster in 1999), and the redesign of the entire Audi model line, with chrome detailing and retro lines, boosted the

perception of this car as a high-performing, stylish, luxury car. Saab: Like Audi, Saab emphasized sportiness and handling, but at a more economical price.

In addition, Saab’s Swedish heritage and the unique styling of its cars created a more individualistic image for this brand. The classic Saab 900 sedan was first launched in 1978; the more spacious 9000 followed in 1984. More recent models had upheld the company’s reputation for quality, performance and safety, while maintaining Saab’s quirkier image. Source: Casewriter research. Do a Edmunds. com. 14 This document is authorized for use only by Allan Collard-Wexler until October 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Permissions@hbsp. harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. No tC op yo

Jaguar: Jaguar sought to promote a timeless shape and classic heritage with its cars. Traditionally distinguished by luxurious interiors and attention to stylistic details, Jaguars appealed to an older, conservative demographic. However, by 2001, the company was promoting an all-new, luxury compact sport sedan (the X-Type) to a younger demographic. Priced at approximately $30,000, the car was being promoted in TV ads featuring music stars like Sting,