Empathic Access Essay Example

occurs. Abrupt and drastic changes tend to disrupt identity, whereas gradual changes are viewed as personal development. Schechtman's example of two matrons (Schechtman, 2001, p. 101) illustrates that identity change can occur slowly or quickly.

According to Schechtman (2001, p.01), a matron who was once wild at parties remembers her past desires but has since withdrawn herself from them. She is unable to comprehend why she made those choices since she is now alienated from her old passions. However, another matron who was also once a party girl has chosen not to withdraw from her past experiences. Instead, she has decided to use the lessons learned from them in making future decisions. According to Schechtman (2001, p.101), this matron has not lost access to her past experiences but has placed them into a broader context that drives her to make different life choices. With the psychological continuity theory being applied, it is unclear which matron has retained her identity as both have undergone gradual changes over time.

According to the empathic access theory, one can see that the 'less-serious' matron has maintained her identity while the 'serious' matron has not. The former has undergone lifestyle changes based on past experiences and present views that are an extension of her past values, beliefs, goals, and desires, giving her empathic access. Conversely, the latter cannot sympathize with her past self, resulting in the replacement of her values, beliefs, goals, and desires without empathic access. The narrative view supports psychological continuity by proposing that a life story of one's actions, experiences, and events can form an intelligible narrative of change that preserves identity as long as the succeeding psychological configuration

is understandable in relation to the former one.

When considering the illustration of the matron, it is simple to construct a biography showcasing how partying loses its charm due to age and societal obligations. The concept of change as a result of age and social expectations is uncomplicated to comprehend, as there exists a logical outline of evolution. However, Schechtman asserts that comprehensible narratives of transformation merely demonstrate how someone forfeits their identity (Schechtman, 2001, p. 100); they do not outline standards for change while maintaining one's identity.

Empathic access is able to differentiate between identity-preserving change and identity-destroying change in ways that psychological continuity and narrative theories cannot. A loss of identity occurs when old beliefs are completely replaced by new ones, without any connection to the old beliefs. On the other hand, personal development happens when old beliefs are expanded into new ones that are based on the old ones and still hold sympathy towards them. However, there are objections to empathic access due to the ambiguous nature of memories. The relationship between memory and sympathy forms the basis of empathic access, where memories allow for empathy towards values, desires, and characteristics associated with them.

As one's reactive attitudes change over time, their interpretation of memories may become distorted, leading to the creation of new memories that are sympathetic to their current emotional state. This results in empathic access to a psychological state that is based on interna lly generated memories, rather than the actual psychological state of the past. For instance, a former drug addict who now leads a quiet life may claim to empathize with their wild drug-taking days. However, this empathy could be

based on the happiness associated with those memories, which is an emotion that the present-day reformed drug addict associates with carefree and exciting memories, rather than the stressful, relationship-destroying and tiresome experiences associated with drug-taking in the past.

Moreover, there is an epistemological issue regarding empathic access as it is challenging to ascertain if an individual genuinely has access to their past through empathy. If someone loses their empathic access, then they no longer accurately represent their past self. The succeeding person's perspective on the preservation of empathic access may not be appropriate. It is arduous to determine which claims of empathic access are credible. In response to objections, Schechtman may argue that strong disavowal of past experiences undermines the empathic access relationship, rendering it invalid (Schechtman, 2001, p.).

According to the text, in order for empathic access to be valid, memories must be an accurate recollection of the past. If a person, such as a drug addict, cannot accurately recall their past experiences, then empathic access cannot be claimed. Despite the epistemological objection, it is possible to confirm genuine empathic access through a person's behavior. This is because empathic access requires the retention of sympathy for a past mental state, which should participate in a person's current decision-making processes (Schechtman, 2001, p. 105).

According to Schechtman, individuals should align their actions and decisions with the views they claim to have empathic access to. For instance, a mother with access to her teenage years will behave differently from one without, including explaining her actions, feeling regret about imposed restrictions, and second-guessing decisions. This paper defends the empathic access theory, which is necessary for defining personal identity. Empathic access

is critical because it allows distinguishing identity-preserving change from identity-destroying change, which other theories cannot do.

Despite valid criticisms regarding the memory-sympathy relationship and epistemological concerns, these objections have been adequately addressed. Therefore, I believe that empathic access is a strong theory for determining personal identity.