Democracy In The Middle East Essay Example

revised, significant censorship still occurs in Libya today (Reporters without Borders).

Since 1902, the regime in Saudi Arabia has faced the challenge of maintaining a balance between its "traditional, tribal and decentralized society under its cultural, ideological, and religious hegemony" and has subsequently become a regional leader in media censorship (Wilson, 2002). Internet use in the Kingdom was only allowed in 1999 (Wilson, 2002). Despite extensive censorship and the encouragement of the general population to report "immoral" or offensive sites (such as porn), Saudi Arabia has the second largest number of bloggers in the Middle East, including many women who must disguise themselves due to fear of being caught by the authorities (Ian Black, 2009, the guardian). Both Saudi Arabia and Libya have a long history of weak formal institutions.

In both cases, the prohibition of independent political or civic associations, including political parties and elections, results in severe consequences such as death (Background Note: Saudi Arabia). Public accountability is essentially non-existent and civil liberties are constantly at risk (Background Note: Saudi Arabia). Activists within civil society face imprisonment or torture when they initiate any independent political action (Entelis 39).

Gaddafi and the Saudi regime shared similarities in their authoritarian leadership, whereby state power was centralized around the respective leaders (Columbia electronic encyclopedia). Despite this, Gaddafi's rule did not evolve into a rational legal system of governance and traditional bases of legitimacy persisted among Libyan citizens, including tribal identity, family ties, and Islam (Entelis 38). In 1977, Libya became a "depoliticized entity" under Gaddafi's newly established "Jamahiriya", or "the Peoples State", serving the interests of a few under the guise of people power (Luis Martinez 151; Entelis 39).

While these autocratic regimes were alike in many ways, they experienced divergent outcomes following the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring has disrupted conventional thinking and theories about democracy in the region. It has revealed that a regime's survival, despite its significant oil wealth, can be threatened if it mismanages its resources. Additionally, scholars have overlooked the sectarian divisions within Arab states and their impact on regime stability. Therefore, this section will examine why two resource-rich states, Libya and Saudi Arabia, have experienced divergent outcomes. The Arab uprisings were a surprise to most academics and shook the region.

Beginning in Tunisia and spreading throughout North Africa, waves of protests shook the region. In 2011, Libya’s own revolution was brewing, particularly in Benghazi. Despite being a society in turmoil long before the uprisings on February 15, 2011, Libya's renowned rentier state did not seem likely to succumb to the protests. During his lengthy rule in Libya, Gaddafi faced numerous internal and external challenges, yet remained a controversial, complex and contradictory political survivor. For almost four decades, Gaddafi exercised authoritarian rule over Libya through a careful manipulation of complex patronage networks, traditional tribal structures and intricate layers of national, regional, and local governance (Blanchard 2011, 24).

Previous expectations of Libya's ability to withstand uprisings due to its wealth and strong coercive apparatus have been challenged by factors such as unequal revenue distribution, societal fractionalization, and international intervention. Scholars have traditionally attributed authoritarian regime sustainability in the Arab world to control over natural resources. Prior to 2011, oil wealth facilitated the development of patronage networks, directed dependent private sector growth, and provided social services. Gregory Gause posited that rentier states

typically used their wealth to manage crises and satisfy the population.

(Gause, 2011, 85) For decades, Libya has been classified as a "rentier state," where rulers had the privilege of leading without the approval - or the tax revenues - of the people they governed (Entelis, 38). However, the Arab Spring demonstrated that oil-producing countries could also experience popular uprisings. Rather than squandering funds on frivolous projects, rentier states must properly distribute revenue to endure (Gause, 2011, 85). This is evident in Libya, which endured public protests as the only oil producer to do so. Comparatively, Gaddafi fostered corruption by creating a history of induced shortages across essential goods and medical care for extended periods, unlike Saudi Arabia's regime (Anderson, 2011, 497). While rentier state theory remains suitable for recognizing democracy's resilience in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, it fails to acknowledge the long-term rifts in society caused by uneven resource distribution.

The regime of Ghadafi relied on a system of scarce distribution and inefficiency in sharing oil revenue which, in the end, had a negative impact on its survival. The Libyan society was divided into many tribes across Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica, leading to decades of internal fragmentation. The leadership style of Ghadafi was characterized by nepotism and favoritism towards his own tribe - the Gaddafi, who held important government positions. In addition, he offered significant support to the Magariha, Misurata and Warfalla tribes. All these factors weakened the relationship between Ghadafi and those he ruled. (Blanchard 2011, 24)

Despite opposition from many members of certain tribes, the Gaddafi regime granted them high-ranking government positions, causing sectarian divisions and a lack of trust

towards both the government and each other (Blanchard 2011, 22). Due to a dysfunctional police state and unreliable public-sector bureaucracy, kin networks became essential for safety and access to goods and services according to Lisa Anderson. These divisions posed significant challenges for Gaddafi's governance and ultimately led to the downfall of his regime during protests that started along these same networks (Anderson, 2011, 497; Roumani Jaques 681-682). In an attempt to portray the conflict as an inter-tribe dispute, Gaddafi waged war against opposition tribes (Ayhan, 2011).

On February 24th 2011, the opponent tribes of Gaddafi agreed to create a new administrative and political structure which marked a defining moment for Gaddafi who had been externalized from the government for years. Despite experiencing oppression, intimidation, and execution, these tribes united against Gaddafi and triggered civil war in Libya. The coercive apparatus of Gaddafi's regime, which was merely instrumental, also disbanded due to popular protests. Tribal fragmentation existed not only in the weak institution of the army but also in the paramilitary and security organizations. (Dalacoura, 70; Gause, 85).

Throughout Gaddafi's reign, there were a total of eight recorded attempts to assassinate him. The most notable event took place in 1993, when around 2000 of his own military soldiers from the Warfalla tribe turned against him. The soldiers were dissatisfied with their under-representation in the army's top military positions (NewsOne, 2011). As for the Arab Spring, only factions led by ruling families supported the regimes. Meanwhile, other units either defected to the opposition or stayed on the sidelines. According to Gause (2011, 85), this suggests that if sectarian divides exist within institutions such as the coercive apparatus of

a state, the regime will crumble when faced with popular protests.

The social composition of society and factional divisions within governmental institutions have a significant impact on outcomes, as evidenced by the case of Libya. Eva Bellin's theory on the state's coercive apparatus emphasizes that without international support and recognition of the regime, a state cannot maintain control over its military institution, as was the case in Libya. Despite having significant oil interests, including Italy relying on Libya for 22% of its oil, former Libyan allies such as Britain, France, and the United States withdrew support and recognition of the regime, leading to its downfall.

France is dependent on Libya for 16% of its oil, according to Vanderbruck (2011). This vital support was withdrawn and NATO's military intervention contributed significantly to the downfall of Gaddafi's government. Additionally, Gaddafi's violent response to the uprising backfired, intensifying the protests and attracting global attention.

According to Dalacoura (2011, 69), it is worth highlighting that the Libyan uprising wouldn't have happened if it weren't for assistance from international players. The author also states that the removal of Libya's dictator wouldn't have been feasible without foreign intervention, as he had the support of major political and societal groups (Dalacoura, 2011, 71).

In this text, the coercive apparatus of Eva Bellins is highlighted, which includes assessing fiscal health, international support networks, and institutionalism. These elements were critical in the collapse of Ghadafi's regimes. By contrast, Saudi Arabia was able to prevent overthrowing that happened in nearby autocratic states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring. Being an absolute monarchy with a royal family makes several factors less likely

to prompt reform calls in Saudi Arabia.

The main focus of authoritarian Arab regimes is their own continued existence, according to regime security. The Al Saud dynasty, established in 1932, has managed to resist democratization in several ways. The Al Saud's legitimacy is founded on religion due to the nature of Saudi Arabia's creation under Al-Wahhab's religious leadership and the Al Sauds' rule. Their legitimacy is reinforced by the state's strong religious aspect, with ulama playing an active political role and Sharia Law in place.

According to Keyman (2012), the regime's resilience is bolstered by hindering reform and viewing any opposition as being against Islam. Anderson (1991) notes that the Saudi monarchy's strength, particularly in its early stages, stems from its close association with nation-building projects. As cited by Keyman (2012), Khoury explains that the Al Saud royal family has formed a collection of tribal segments united by elite interests. They serve as an informal means of representation and stay close to those they govern. Furthermore, according to the US Department of State, controlling 25% of the world's oil reserves has made the Al Saud family a global leader in oil production and one of the most influential families worldwide.According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Saudi Arabia's export earnings rely heavily on oil revenues, accounting for approximately 90-95% and contributing around 40% to its GDP. In 2011, the International Monetary Fund projected unprecedented oil revenues of $324 billion in comparison to the previous year's amount of $171 billion (El-Shenawi, 2011). This economic strategy has resulted in Saudi Arabia being categorized as a rentier state that uses its resources to reinforce

security institutions and patronage networks (Ross, 329; Lynch, 130) while also increasing social welfare budgets and further militarizing the state. Prior to the Arab Spring uprising, Saudi nationals enjoyed free healthcare services, interest-free loans for homes and businesses as well as subsidized overseas college education making it one of the most advanced welfare states at that time according to Wilson Quarterly (2004). However, following events during this period, it became evident that oil revenues remained a reliable tool used by Saudi government in maintaining regime security.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia implemented various measures in early 2011 to appease citizens and ensure regime survival, allocating more than $100 billion towards a spending package that included a minimum wage, a cost of living bonus and increased health spending. In September that same year, he also allowed women to vote and run in municipal elections, marking a historic moment. Such efforts at political liberalization and economic incentives have proved effective in gaining citizen support. However, the Saudi regime has also diverted its large oil revenues towards maintaining a strong coercive apparatus and keeping citizens politically divided, as seen in the events of the Arab Spring. In 2011 alone, $45 billion was allocated towards military spending, making it the second highest after France. Additionally, the regime employs a significantly higher percentage of its population in security branches, at 9.86%, compared to France.

Bellin suggests that in Saudi Arabia, the coercive establishments follow patrimonial logic. This means that family elites control entire divisions of these forces (148, 149). If a regime change were to occur, the dominance of favored tribal elites within the Saudi military would be at risk (Bellin 149).

The Arab Spring saw security forces respond to peaceful protests across the Arab world. Gause notes two main factors influencing this response: social divisions and institutionalism within the military (2011: 84). While there is an ideological split between Sunnis and Shiites in Saudi society, with only 15% of the population being Shiite according to Meyer, it is relatively insignificant.

The minority group in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich eastern provinces has been excluded from high-level civil bureaucracy for years, resulting in a lack of political power and voice. Moreover, the Shiite community is intentionally omitted from security force recruitment processes, notably in the National Guard (as documented by the Library of Congress in 1992), which serves as a secondary military establishment dedicated to safeguarding the Al Saud royal family against domestic unrest (source: GlobalSecurity.org).

According to Gause (84) and Pike (2012), the National Guard is a force made up of loyal tribal elements to the Saud family, exclusively recruited from the central and western regions of Saudi Arabia where support for the regime is strong. As a result, unlike in Libya, the Saudi military remains faithful to the ruling family. This makes it increasingly challenging for any opposition movement to thrive in such an antagonistic environment. Although Saudi Arabia has previously used force to quell public uprisings, its extensive riches have often allowed the regime to bribe its opponents (Szayna: 265).

When a potential demonstration was discovered, Saudi authorities swiftly mobilized in large cities and the eastern provinces, revealing their willingness to use force despite prior events in their region (Black, 2011). While the regime argued that the protests on the "Day of Rage" were a security threat, peaceful protesters

and reformists were met with repression. Additionally, the Saudi government exploited existing sectarian divides in their society by criminalizing dissent as terrorist activity (Amnesty International, 2011). In April 2011, the Interior Ministry announced that around 5000 individuals had been detained due to perceived external threats (Amnesty International, 2011). By fomenting propaganda in which the external threat was presented as an Iranian Shia conspiracy against the monarchy, the regime effectively prevented significant mobilization of protesters from within the already under-supported Shiite community (Al Rasheed, 2011; Szayna, 266).

The Shiite ideology's expansion was exaggerated and used effectively to restrain protestors catalyzed by deep-seated animosity between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects. The Saudi Arabian regime's success also stems from its ability to maintain crucial allies, notably the United States, as pointed out by Eva Bellin. Being a monarchy of significant geopolitical importance in the Arab world, the Arabian Kingdom is more than an average rentier state. The United States aims to keep it as an ally because disruption in the Saudi oil supply would adversely affect world economies unlike Libya. This ability to resist popular pressure was bolstered significantly by the monarchy's maintenance of international support, as Katrina Dalacoura noted.