Constitutional Law Final – Flashcards

FACTS: Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married people they advised. ISSUE: Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples? HOLDING: Yes, it does. RATIONALE: Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The right to privacy is suggested from the first amendment's right of association, third amendment's quartering, fourth amendment's search and seizure, fifth amendment against self incrimination, and the ninth amendment which states that there may be other rights other than those that are explicitly mentioned. Did this create the right to privacy? Griswold was a carbon copy of Poe. Emerson, a Harvard professor, used a substantive due process approach and threw in five amendments: 1, 3, 4, 9, 14. There are penumbras (the grey area of a shadow) throughout the Bill of Rights: First, it is the right of association under the first amendment. Additionally, the 3rd and 4th are all about privacy. The fifth is about creating a zone of privacy, etc. We cannot make this a crime if we violate other rights in order to protect it. We cannot compel someone to admit to something because it violates the fifth. We cannot search someone's home for contraceptives because it would violate the fourth amendment. The ninth seems logical, but as of 1965, what rights had been written in to the ninth amendment? None at the time this came along.

FACTS: In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions. ISSUE: Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? HOLDING: No, they do not. RATIONALE: In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The Missouri law sought to restrict the abortion right. People thought that Roe would go down the drain here. Does the federal government have to support financially things that women have a right to? No, they do not. All of the restrictions were upheld and the restrictions were consistent with the court's funding decisions for Missouri to ban public facilities from being used for abortions. State's don't have to provide funding to preserve the right to something. The attitudinal model states that conservatives rule based on conservative principles, however, Webster and Casey changed this. There is now a strategic model which states that they hear cases only that they want to hear based on political principles. Did Roe go away after Casey through the strategic model? Maybe the real momentum was set by O'Connor, which would allow the restrictions but at the end of the day, allow the core finding of Roe to stand. If we keep hearing cases, it's just going to keep saying that Roe is more and more solidified as a case.

FACTS: The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. (4) Record keeping and if relevant, the reasons the woman failed to notify her spouse. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. ISSUE: Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? HOLDING: Yes and no, husband restriction was struck down. RATIONALE: In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: This is similar to the Akron case with a strategic and concerted effort to try and overturn Roe or Akron. The Court reaffirmed Roe. (1) The privacy right does cover the right to abortion in the first trimester. (2) The state's power becomes prominent after viability. (3) The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the mother and the life of a child. The trimester system is out after Casey, and the undue burden test is in place. Protecting the life is a rational reason to create laws, but those laws can place an undue burden on the woman's rights. The problem is that the judge's ideology determines which test is used.

FACTS: Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. ISSUE: Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? HOLDING: No, it does not. RATIONALE: The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: Fundamental liberties are characterized as those that are deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition and that homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental liberty. To say it's a fundamental right is facetious, and was not intended by the framers or the history of common law.

FACTS: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. ISSUE: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? HOLDING: No, it does not. RATIONALE: The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

FACTS: In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. ISSUE: Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? HOLDING: Yes, it did. RATIONALE: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.

FACTS: The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. Plaintiffs sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a nonsegregated basis. ISSUE: Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? HOLDING: Yes, it does. RATIONALE: Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation. Discussion: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is relying on the same rationale to invalidate the segregation laws here that it did in Sweatt v. Painter (ordering the admission of a black student to the University of Texas Law School, despite the fact that a parallel black facility was available). The rationale is that it's the intangible factors that make segregation laws in the area of public education "inherently unequal." Whether stigma or the perception of stigma alone is sufficient injury to invalidate a law supported by a valid, neutral purpose is an open question.

FACTS: After its decision in Brown (1) which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief. ISSUE: What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? RATIONALE: The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION:The issue was judicial compliance. How does society adapt after they've been ordered to do something? They wanted to eradicate de jure and de facto segregation and undo the lasting remnants of 99% white and black schools. We're going to remand the case to the federal district courts in order so they can oversee implementation. You cannot use the logistical stipulations to drag your feet and we want you to move forward with all deliberate speed. The school districts were left with the implementation.

FACTS:After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation? HOLDING: Yes. RATIONALE: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The issues were: to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may be used as an implement to a remedial order, whether every all-negro and all-white school must be eliminated, what the limited are on gerrymandering, and what the limits are on transportation facilities to achieve desegregation. Having an all black or all white school doesn't necessarily practice discrimination by law. The Court stated that some kids may have to use busing in order to achieve total desegregation. No rigid rules will be used to govern all situations. The court stated that IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE COURTS TO JUST ACCEPT DE FACTO SEGREGATION. IT MAY BE INCONVENIENT, BUT YOU MUST USE REASONABLE AND EFFECTIVE MANNERS TO ELIMINATE SEGREGATION AND THESE METHODS CAN BE GERRYMANDERING AND BUSING TO ELIMINATE DE FACTO SEGREGATION.

FACTS: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. ISSUE: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? HOLDING: Yes. RATIONALE: The special admissions program is unconstitutional because of the quota, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles. J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal - minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: Affirmative action policies were put in place for remediation and to reverse the effects of desegregation. Title 7 of the CRA protects the rights of individuals with respect of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. The Civil Rights Act states that it is discriminatory for the University of California to use numerical quotas. Know what a suspect classification and race is one of them. Look at the table on 688. For a suspect classification, the state has to show a compelling interest. The first three compelling interests were thrown aside; however, they stated that a diverse student body was an important compelling interest. Should a university be able to look at racial composition of their class? Yes, but not by filling quotas. The court is stating that race can be one factor among many, in evaluating whether or not students should be admitted. The Supreme Court stated that diversity programs are not a bad things and they are compelling interests as long as they are narrowly tailored.

FACTS: In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. ISSUE: Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? HOLDING: Yes, it does. RATIONALE: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The petitioners stated if you're using race to exclude people, that should violate the EPC. The Supreme Court struck this down because identical transcripts would lead to minorities getting into schools more. You gave all of the minorities 20 points, therefore it was not narrowly tailored in that it didn't look how qualified they were.

FACTS: In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. ISSUE:Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? HOLDING: No, it does not. RATIONALE: In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The school did not want a token minority program, instead they wanted a critical mass in order to attain the educational benefits of a diverse student body. They did not use a specific number system, they holistically looked at if they had a critical mass. This was precisely tailored to serve a compelling interest of attaining a diverse student body. Race can be one factor among several in achieving a diverse student body (Grutter said the same as Bakke). They also stated that quotas are bad and we don't want them. The Law School gave substantial weight to other factors such as geography, economic backgrounds, etc. Valuing diversity is good, but if you assign numbers to it, you're probably wrong.

Facts: In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city. Issue: Did this violate the equal protection clause? Holding: Yes. Rationale: The record included little hard evidence of city discrimination against african-american contractors in Richmond. Rather, the low rates of minority participation stemmed from a lack of minority-owned business in the area. There was no proof of minority discrimination. There was no compelling rationale for the 30% requirement.

FACTS: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. ISSUE: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? HOLDING:Yes. RATIONALE: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similar circumstanced shall be treated alike. You cannot legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute. They used the rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny, holding that gender classifications must be reasonable and have a rational relationship to a state objective.

FACTS: Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down. ISSUE: Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause? HOLDING: Yes, it did. RATIONALE: The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause. Applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to the sex-based classification, the Court found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. The Court held that statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those grounds alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.'" BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: This is a 5th amendment due process case because it's a federal law case. The federal law does not have an equal protection clause. Four of the nine said that we should make it a suspect class, and four remained wedded in the rational basis test.

FACTS: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. ISSUE: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? HOLDING: Yes, it did. RATIONALE: In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: Using the intermediate or heightened scrutiny test, they ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. Instead of a compelling state interest, it has to be an important state interest.

FACTS: Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States. ISSUE: Did the state statute which prevented men from enrolling in MUW violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? HOLDING: Yes, it does. RATIONALE: The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: This reaffirmed the standard used in Craig v. Boren.

FACTS: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? HOLDING: No, it does not. RATIONALE: In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: This is almost a ditto of Hogan. The state asked for them to use a strict scrutiny standard because there were a lot of bad feelings surrounding Hogan. You can't say that an all male university offers diversity. VWIL is not comparable to VMI, it is but a pale shadow to that school. Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities.

FACTS: Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. ISSUE: Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? HOLDING: Yes, it does. RATIONAL: a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: They did this to invalidate the three city ordinances. It should not be more difficult for one group than other to seek assistance from the government. Romeo is specifically the EPC, not the fifth amendment.

FACTS: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling. ISSUE: Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled? HOLDING: No, yes, and yes. RATIONALE: In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: They didn't get into why they overturned Bowers, they just overturned it. The due process clause of the 14th amendment says that no one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law. The due process clause many look at as procedural; however, in Griswold and all the other privacy cases, the court has looked at this as a substantive protection of your ability to be left alone. If government is regulating that they have no grounds to regulate, that violates the due process clause. This held here as well. Basically the same privacy for people to engage in abortion, allows for people to engage in sodomy. Equality of treatment and the true process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. This sets up the conditions whether or not categorizations of sexual orientation violate the due process or EPC? Basically, they violate both.

FACTS:The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words "marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale. Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed. On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. ISSUE: Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law? HOLDING: Yes. RATIONALE: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive branch's agreement regarding DOMA's unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed the Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had standing before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma" on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to review the case and that interests in uniformity and stability justified Congress' enactment of DOMA. He also argued that the majority's opinion did not address the issue of state definitions of marriage affecting same-sex couples. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor the power to invalidate democratically enacted legislation. He argued that the majority's opinion wrongly asserted the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of government. However, the majority opinion did not address the issue of whether or not the Equal Protection Clause required laws restricting the definition of marriage to be reviewed under a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. He also argued that the majority misconstrued DOMA's insidious intent and should not rule based on that presumption. Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the United States Government did not have standing in the case because the executive branch declined to defend the statute, but that BLAG did have standing because it chose to defend the otherwise undefended statute. He also argued that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage because that right is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Instead, the issue of the definition of marriage is left to the people to decide, a decision in which DOMA does not interfere. Justice Clarence Thomas partially joined in the dissent. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: This part of DOMA violates due process not to recognize the marriage.

FACTS: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. ISSUE: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? HOLDING: Yes, to both. RATIONALE: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples. BAXTER'S EXPLANATION: The facial question was can a state ban same-sex marriage? The court said using the EPC and the due process clause that they cannot.

-Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) -Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) -Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) -Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

-Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) -Sweatt v. Painter (1950) -Brown v. Board of Education (I AND II) (54) (55) -Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)

-Regents of U of California v. Bakke (1978) -Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) -Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) -Richmond v. Croson (1989)

-Reed v. Reed (1971) -Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) -Craig v. Boren (1976) -Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) -U.S. v. Virginia (1996)

-Romer v. Evans (1996) -Lawrence v. Texas (2003) -U.S. v. Windsor (2013) -Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)