Early in his philosophy, Wittgenstein upheld the belief that living a factual life was crucial and ethical values were not important. However, this perspective underwent changes as he developed his later philosophy.
It is my belief that the approach used by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy could potentially benefit from considering a transcendental phenomenological realm, similar to that proposed by philosopher Sankara. By comparing Wittgenstein's philosophy to that of Sankara, we can observe how their ideas on the placement of "the most important things in life" within language intersect, and can explore the treatment of Ethics as one such "unspeakable" concept. Ultimately, I believe Wittgenstein encounters a distinct challenge regarding reference and meaning, which I aim to clarify and explore towards developing an ethical framework within his terminology. This
...discussion will encompass early and later Wittgenstein's perceptions of the world, ethics, and later analysis of language.
Wittgenstein believed that there are two types of propositions: "hard" and "fluid." These two types of propositions can change over time, causing fluid propositions to become hardened and vice versa. However, the propositions that serve as foundations, such as the core beliefs that make up a form of life, cannot be listed as a set like ordinary propositions. These beliefs are what ground our human ways of living, but they cannot be enumerated. Even though there are propositions that stand firm for us, such as the earth existing before our birth, they cannot be listed as a set. Wittgenstein argued that if we think we can actually list all the propositions we know, it is a misuse of the language to say "I know."
Even though I can convey som
ideas as propositions, they are not completely expressed. If needed, I am capable of transforming them into a collection during philosophical debates, but this compilation may not be exhaustive. The manner in which I conduct my life provides the most compelling proof for my convictions. Wittgenstein's comprehension of language is intimately connected to the configuration of reality that is molded by his outlook on communication.
LW posits that language reflects the fundamental structure of the world, which is composed of "atomic facts" rather than "simple things." While objects make up the substance of the world, they cannot exist without facts. The Tractatus emphasizes that objects and facts are inseparable, with LW suggesting that not only can facts exist independently but they are also essential to language as building blocks.
In spite of the fact that something must be supported by factual evidence rather than ethical beliefs to exist in the real world, Wittgenstein still has a desire to discuss ethics. Another philosopher faced this same issue but resolved it by believing in a transcendental reality. To help Wittgenstein explore ethics, I plan to study his use of meaning and reference within his factual world and compare it with Sankara's interpretation. Through Wittgenstein's concept of language-games, he emphasizes the relationship between language and life: "Language, I should like to say, relates to a way of living."3
It is imperative for any successful treatment of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to encompass a comprehensive analysis of the comparison between language and games, if not initiate with one. Despite not being synonymous, languages partake in certain vital attributes characteristic of games. This chapter intends to highlight the crucial aspects of this analogy that
hold significance for Wittgenstein. Although the points emphasized may seem apparent, they warrant repetition as numerous misinterpretations of Wittgenstein arise due to misconstruing finer details which can be effortlessly prevented.
The analogy between language and games reveals three key points. Firstly, language use is considered an activity emphasizing its active nature, as it is an integral part of human activities. Secondly, language is complex mainly because it is a distinctively human activity. Despite the perceived similarity in our use of language, the complexity remains hidden from view.
The uniform appearance of words regardless of their function causes problems when analyzing language. Additionally, language usages are interconnected though they may involve different rules of discourse. Wittgenstein's intention in the Tractatus is to differentiate between "what can be said" and "what cannot be said," not to reject the latter, but to express it. Emphasizing "what cannot be said" is crucial for him as it refers to the "unsayable."
According to Wittgenstein, language is characterized by distinguishing between what can and cannot be expressed. What can be expressed relates to language, logic and the world. For what can be expressed, Wittgenstein argues that verification is unattainable. This means that it can be either true or false, with the determination made by comparing it to reality.
Wittgenstein observes that ethics encompasses concepts that surpass verbal expression and are tangible. These transcendental notions exist beyond the physical realm and cannot be articulated through language.
The speaker suggests that sense can only be conveyed through the constraints of language. Discussing the boundaries of language results in meaningless statements, and speaking about what exists beyond them leads to nonsensical statements. The philosopher believes that
the objective of philosophy is not to express the logical makeup of propositions but to assess them in a manner that uncovers, exposes, and showcases their logical structure. In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, comprehension of linguistic expressions is understood in a completely distinct manner. Language is considered regular, everyday verbiage and is not analyzed based on truth-functions of elementary propositions or composed of names.
The exploration of language should encompass its diverse and intricate nature, rather than attempting to reduce it to basic propositions. Language is not merely a tool for describing reality and portraying facts, but rather has numerous applications. It should be analyzed and comprehended in its natural state, without being confined to a fundamental structure.
Wittgenstein appears to endorse a realistic perspective on meaning before transitioning to a broader, more conventionalistic view of language use. Rules of use created and adopted by people determine the meanings of linguistic expressions. Grammar operates independently and thought possesses internal structures as outlined by its grammatical rules. The establishment of an isomorphic realm of reality does not dictate the selection of these rules or the grammar of thought. According to later teachings, reality lacks a language-independent structure matching the conformity of our language. Rather, human conventions structure thought, bringing their own structure to reality.
The ideology has shifted towards a new approach to explaining the linguistic device used by "ethics" or "morals". This is due to the understanding that reality, according to later Wittgenstein, is not independent of language. Thus, there might be a chance to implement a meaningful analysis or interpretation of statements in the realm of ethics.
Sankara's concept of the world pertains to linguistic
judgments and their criteria for determining concepts like spatiotemporal boundaries or false atomicity. The claim is that if reality is unitary, then the plurality of the world is mistakenly perceived. Arbitrary language criteria imposed on experience are incorrectly perceived as true experiences.
Sankara sought to liberate his philosophical inquiry from the illusion of the isolated existence of objects by examining language, which he called the "may" or deception of language. Similar to Wittgenstein's belief in the entrapment caused by language, Sankara aimed at discovering the Real: an all-encompassing experience that goes beyond words, space, time, thought, and differences, and cannot be conveyed as an eidos. The primary objective of this quest is to direct the mind, with its practical accomplishments boundless by language. Rather, Sankara contended that it stems from an instinctive self-disclosure of Reality itself, which is not reliant on observation or other knowledge criteria.
The realization of totality and non-differentiation arises from deepening one's consciousness in undifferentiated consciousness. The statement "Thou art that" denotes a progression from a level of individuality, to universality, and eventually to unity. This final stage eliminates the distinctions between the former two, starting with individual consciousness (tvam), moving to universal consciousness (tat), and culminating in non-differentiated consciousness. This integrated state surpasses the separate reality of both individual and universal consciousness, serving as their foundation. Sankara's philosophical inquiry seeks to attain this ultimate goal.
Both Sankara and Wittgenstein believe that human beings are confined by the cultural linguistic games they play. While they differ in their conclusions, they share similar views about the power of language and how it bewitches us. Sankara aims to free philosophy from language's atomistic
influence on our experiences and thoughts, as Wittgenstein does. However, people cannot survive without language and its impact on their lives.
Both philosophers agree that philosophy should offer knowledge that frees, although the Eastern tradition takes this emancipating activity further than the West. Sankara's Brahman Sutra commences with an inquiry into language usage. He states that the object and subject, with contrasting characteristics akin to light and darkness, both fall under the concepts of Thou and I and are fundamentally incompatible. Similarly, their individual credentials...
According to language, the only way for us to create logical statements is by attaching the properties of the object onto the subject, and vice versa. However, this is considered a falsehood (mithya).
According to Sankara, the confusion that arises from mixing reality and unreality is a characteristic linguistic superimposition of natures and attributes. This can be seen when individuals say things like "That I am" or "this is mine". It is not just individuals who are trapped in this faulty superimposition; Sankara argues that it is the presupposition upon which all distinctions of practical life, the Vedas (in the religious and ritualistic sense), means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, and the authority of Scripture are based. The aspect of knower, which is the sense of "I" and "mine" imposed or united with the body and senses, cannot be removed without hindering the means of right knowledge. Without this aspect, immediate perception and other activities of knowledge cannot occur.
Sankara argues that the self is superimposed on the body and it is essential for actions. To free oneself from this misconception and gain knowledge of the absolute unity of the self, one must
study the Vedas. Sankara implies that things like reading this article, writing it, and even the existence of physical objects are merely apparent and linguistic constructs.
The Real has no multiple individual minds or objects, nor any notion of privacy, location, or identity. Our only access is through sense experience. We organize our experiences within grammatical structures inherent to our language-games, which often impose subjective and objective perspectives. Terms like individuality, plurality, privacy, location, and identity are culturally or contextually constructed and not inherent to raw sensory experience. They are not factual properties discovered empirically through singular sensations but are instead conventional constructs.
According to Sankara's commentary on the Gita, "real" awareness does not change with its object while "unreal" awareness does. The objects and subjects of sensation are constantly changing, but the reality of the sense experience remains the same. Sankara suggests that language superimpositions like "I am in pain" and "This is mine" may not necessarily refer to any subject or object. Wittgenstein also discusses this in his Philosophical Investigations, stating that identity-making depends on various criteria chosen by language users.
Using terms such as "I" or "mine" does not dictate which criteria to follow for selecting a sensation-owner. It is our choice to determine the kind of game that we play with sensation-terms and select the desired "candidate" even in painful situations. The text explores the standards for defining reality and illusion, with Sankara referring to everything besides Brahman as "unreal."
The author occasionally employs the term "real" to describe the perceived world, contrasting it with the "unreality" of dreams and hallucinations, such as a water-mirage or mistaking a rope for a snake.
They also use "unreal" to denote things that cannot be experienced, exemplified by symbols common in Indian philosophy like a "hare's horn," "sky-flower," or "a barren woman's son." Additionally, they sometimes use "completely unreal" to describe imaginary entities without distinction between null classes and self-contradictions. Indian philosophy prioritizes pragmatism and avoids speculative for its own sake. Its goal is to convince the audience that the presented system could lead to moksa (liberation) through disciplined development.
Sankara proposes a four-fold distinction between the real, the pragmatically real, the illusory, and the completely unreal. Later Advaitins systematized this by explaining that unreality is not the opposite of reality and cannot be negated in the three times. The "real" is indestructible, the "unreal" has no perceived instance in any substratum, and the category of "false" includes everything that is neither real nor unreal. This category encompasses both the pragmatically real and the illusory. According to Sankara, nothing experienced is completely unreal, and there must be levels of reality that start and end with Brahman as the underlying foundation of all experienced subjects and objects.
Essentially, Brahman is the sole true reality since only intuition of Brahman encompasses all other experiences. As a result, reality is characterized by several attributes including independence - as only Brahman is independent of relations; boundlessness; non-partitionedness; unchangeability without limitations or relations; indivisibility - due to it not being partitioned; inaction - owing to its unchanging nature and unity - as it is indivisible. Additionally, Brahman's eternal nature stems from its non-partitioned and unchanging essence. Ethics play an essential role within the Vedantin system but values within Advaitin are solely meant to aid seekers of
Brahman in the phenomenologically real world and become obsolete once realization of Brahman has been achieved.
The key takeaway is that Advaita Vedanta embodies ethical values. The attainment of brahmanjnana involves combining knowledge and consciousness, rather than rejecting one or the other. According to Sankara, the essence of reality lies in human existence and consciousness. Everything else is a product of imagination and subject to interpretation. Nonetheless, it is through interpretation that we can gain insight into the intuitive experience of reality.
The reason for the need to interpret this text is that man suffers due to incorrect identification, resulting in ontological unity. The emergence of the empirical world is due to apparent individual consciousness. Personal existence can be liberated through sublating individual identity with Brahman. Sankara analyzes language to deny ontological identification, establishing the goal of identity between intuition, vision, and action. His method seeks to uncover the truth behind language for liberation from suffering. This process involves the action of the mind and speech for welfare.
Adhering to satya, or truth, means being honest and promoting the welfare of all. However, if telling the exact truth would harm others, it is better to say what is best for their welfare. This practice cultivates strong-mindedness and is crucial for spiritual and ethical success. In Advaita Vedanta, the love of wisdom and true knowledge inspires the moral commandment to strive for liberation from ignorance through self-knowledge. This system provides a solid foundation for ethics and aims to teach seekers of brahmanjnana the path of the sage, where one peacefully disconnects from the phenomenal world.
The concept of how people are treated in my imaginary world may be discussed, focusing
on the idea that according to this philosophy, other individuals may be considered illusions themselves. While labeling something as an illusion doesn't necessarily negate their empirical existence within our world, it is questionable to categorize them as such without any other basis beyond our psychological state. These illusory individuals may also have a comparable existential experience where we could be a possible part of their imaginary world. This implication can be examined when striving for freedom from this fictional world. This journey towards liberation is an informed, articulate undertaking.
The pursuit of liberation in Advaita education entails contentment with the world and the recognition that it is not ontologically real. This realization drives the seek for true Reality. The search for liberation is not an active endeavor but a passive element that may be embraced if one is prepared. Knowledge and acceptance are the crucial components, requiring listening and understanding rather than active searching. The answer is obtainable through education, and it is the sage's responsibility to passively absorb the necessary processes for achieving Brahmanjnana.
In the Advaitin system, the concept of free-will and action is viewed differently as it applies solely to the phenomenal self. The realized self transcends moral judgments and cannot be judged by anyone, not even themselves. The phenomenal judge, comprised of values, cannot go beyond the limits of what is ontologically real. Therefore, any actions performed by a realized being cannot be deemed immoral, as their actions transcend the needs and desires of the empirical self. Such actions have no phenomenological implications whatsoever.
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