Watch List Essay Example

to share identifying information of individuals involved in domestic terrorism and maintains a consolidated watch list. These agencies gather and recommend individuals for inclusion in the TSC's list, following guidelines approved by leaders within the United States.

As per the Attorney General's mandate, TSC staff must assess each record before it is added to the database. Individuals will remain on the watch list until their nominating department or agency chooses to delete their record. The database undergoes daily updates, which encompass new nominations, modifications to existing records, and removals. Since its establishment, the list has progressively grown to comprise more than 750,000 records and has been expanding by an extra 200,000 records per year since 2004.

The list is utilized by multiple government agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, NSA, TSA, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, State Department, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Secret Service with the aim of thwarting or detecting known or suspected terrorist activities.

Various organizations, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Marshals Service, and the White House, depend on watch list data. Airlines use this data to screen passengers against their NoFly and Selectee lists. Additionally, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection system employs watch list data to screen individuals entering the United States.

In the United States, the State Department and FBI systems have different roles. The State Department system focuses on screening visa applicants and passport applications, while the FBI system supports state and local law enforcement agencies in arrests, detentions, and criminal justice matters. Each system receives relevant information from a customized watch list aligned with their specific missions. It is important to note

that U.S. records are included in the State Department system.

When an individual makes an airline reservation and arrives at a U.S. destination, they are exempt from the State Department's visa screening system if they are citizens or lawful permanent residents. This is because they do not need to apply for a U.S. visa.

The consolidated watchlist databases only accept records that include essential biographic or identifying information.

S. port of entry, applies for a U. S. visa, or is stopped by state or local police within the United States, the frontline screening agency or airline conducts a name-based search of the individual against the records in the terrorist watch list database. If a "hit" is generated by the computerized name-matching system, indicating a potential match against a watch list record, the airline or agency will review each potential match. It is the responsibility of the agency or airline to address any obvious mismatches encountered.

Matches that are clearly positive or exact matches that are inconclusive (uncertain or difficult to verify) are referred to the appropriate screening agency's intelligence or operations center and to the TSC for further examination. The TSC then checks its databases and other sources, including classified databases maintained by the NCTC and FBI, to confirm the match status of an individual on the watch list. The TSC generates a daily report that summarizes all positive matches to the watch list and distributes it to multiple federal agencies. The unification of various terrorism watch lists has improved the efficiency of locating and apprehending terrorists, but it has been a long and meticulous project that involved merging at least 12 different databases. Two years after the integration

process began, 10 of the 12 databases had been successfully processed.

The remaining two databases, the u. s. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Automatic Biometric Identification System and the FBI's Integrated Fingerprint Identification System, are both fingerprint databases instead of watch lists. However, there is still more work needed to optimize the usefulness of the list. The TSC's list has raised concerns about the adequacy of information systems involved in maintaining and using terrorism-related data. Both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General have reported inaccuracies in the list, as well as inconsistent nomination and removal policies across governmental departments. Additionally, public outrage has been sparked by the size of the list and incidents where individuals who are clearly not terrorists find themselves included on it.

The protection of information regarding the process for inclusion on the list is crucial for its effectiveness in fighting against terrorists. Making the algorithms behind the list publicly known would enable terrorists to avoid detection, undermining the purpose of the list. However, this lack of transparency is troubling for innocent individuals who find themselves on the list without being able to determine why. The list's significant size and constant growth rate have resulted in criticism that the criteria for inclusion may be too lenient. While the specific criteria are not disclosed to the public, government agencies populate their watch lists by extensively collecting information on travelers, including various spellings and variations of suspected terrorists' names. As a result, individuals who should not be on watch lists, referred to as 'false positives,' are often included.

The presence of duplicate entries under different name variations has resulted in an

inaccurate count of 750,000 'records', as they do not correspond to 750,000 distinct individuals. Reports indicate that some individuals have as many as 50 different records on the list due to aliases and alternate spellings. From December 2003 to May 2007, there were 53,000 instances where individuals were positively matched to the watch lists, often occurring multiple times. While this broad selection criteria is effective for tracking potential terrorists, it also leads to a higher number of erroneous entries compared to a process requiring more precise information. Notable examples of 'false positives' include U.

S. Marine Daniel Brown, who was subjected to extra screening at the airport after serving in Iraq for 8 months; Senator Ted Kennedy, who has faced repeated delays in the past due to his name resembling that of a suspected terrorist's alias, and 6-year-old John Anderson, who was subjected to additional investigation despite his young age at the airport. Similar to Kennedy, Anderson may have been included on the watch list due to a mistake in his name matching that of another suspected terrorist. These incidents raise concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the data in the consolidated watch list maintained by the TSC. In June 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General released a report revealing inconsistencies in record counts, duplicate records, and records with missing or unclear data sources.

Despite efforts by TSC to enhance watch list management, weaknesses were still identified by the Inspector General in September 2007. The expanding size of the list, now exceeding a million entries, has raised doubts among critics regarding its usefulness and significance. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

has openly criticized the list's large scale, arguing that it subjects numerous individuals to harassment and privacy violations while only monitoring a smaller group of suspects. Senator Joe Lieberman, Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, shares concerns about the list's effectiveness and its rapid growth compromising its quality.

Despite its flaws, many people would choose a comprehensive list that tracks both potential terrorists and innocent individuals over one that avoids tracking innocent individuals but may miss many terrorists. However, those who are wrongly included face difficulties as there is currently no simple process for innocent individuals to remove themselves from the list. The number of removal requests has been increasing, with over 24,000 recorded so far (around 2,000 per month), but only 54% have been resolved. In 2008, it took an average of 40 days to process a removal request, slightly better than the previous year but still insufficient to keep up with incoming requests. Consequently, law-abiding travelers who find themselves inexplicably on the watchlist are left without an easy way to have their names removed.

In February 2007, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the "Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP)" to assist mistakenly listed individuals in removing themselves from terrorist watchlists and avoiding additional screening and questioning. According to John Anderson's mother, she made multiple unsuccessful attempts at removing her son's name from these watchlists.According to reports, Senator Kennedy was able to successfully remove his name from the list by directly contacting Tom Ridge, who was serving as the Director of the Department of Homeland Security at that time.

Security officials explain that errors like the one that occurred with Anderson and Kennedy being added to both

the no-fly and consolidated watch lists happen because flawed data from airline reservation systems is matched with imperfect information on the watch lists. Many airlines do not include gender, middle name, or date of birth in their records, which increases the likelihood of inaccurate matches. While government organizations have successfully merged their data into a single list, further efforts are required to integrate this list with those maintained by airlines, states, and other localities that use additional information for identifying individuals. The TSA is currently improving its screening process so that the responsibility for matching travelers to watch lists rests with the government rather than individual airlines.

< p >The watch list is a major privacy concern. In order to improve screening and reduce false identifications, one option is to implement an advanced system that includes additional personal information about individuals on the list. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been developing a solution called "Secure Flight" for this purpose, but its progress has been hindered by concerns over data sensitivity and security. Similar criticism has been directed towards other surveillance programs and watch lists, including the National Security Agency's (NSA) initiatives to collect data on suspected terrorists.< /p >

Moreover, the watch list has faced backlash for potentially endorsing racial profiling and discrimination. Certain individuals contend that they were included on the list solely based on their race or ethnicity. Instances include David Fathi, an attorney at the ACLU with Iranian ancestry, and Asif Iqbal, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani heritage who shares a name with a detainee in Guantanamo Bay—both have asserted inclusion for these reasons. Additionally, there exist outspoken adversaries of the U.S. who

vehemently oppose this watch list.

The report by DOJ Inspector General Glenn A. Fine revealed that certain elected officials and university professors were included in the list of individuals associated with foreign policy. It also pointed out the lack of consistent procedures within the FBI for adding or modifying information on the list and communicating these changes to other government offices. Instances were mentioned where the FBI did not promptly update the list with new information or remove individuals who were no longer considered a threat. The report also noted that sometimes inaccurate or incomplete nominations were submitted by FBI field offices without going through necessary headquarters review. Despite this, FBI officials claim that improvements have been implemented, such as requiring field office supervisors to review watch-list nominations for accuracy and completeness.

Several non-FBI offices, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Thbacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and others, expressed their lack of involvement in the watch list information process or their disagreement with the FBI regarding the definition of terrorist activity.