The Formal Criminal Justice System Essay Example

such as prohibition of particular possessions, restricted mobility, communication restrictions (Newburn, 2007, p. 875), bans on mobile phone and internet usage (HM Government, 2011, p. 36).

Control orders are highly contentious as they allow the government to impose severe restrictions on an individual suspected of terrorism without a conviction. The most severe order permits indefinite house arrest, which necessitates a declaration of exemption from Article 5 of the ECHR (Newburn, 2007, p. 875). (HM Government, 2011, p. 37).

The issue of how the state determines if an individual is a terrorism suspect is raised by control orders. According to POTA 2005, reasonable grounds for suspicion are required, but the Terrorism Act 2006 allows suspicion based on conduct that may indicate preparation for terrorism (Zedner, 2010). The purchase of a map or computer manual, for example, may fall under this definition. Essentially, the state can exert control over an individual based solely on suspicion of terrorism. Proponents of control measures for terrorism suspects, like control orders, argue that the potential threat to many people warrants extreme pre-emptive measures (McCulloch ; Pickering, 2010, p. 33).

Those who oppose control orders may argue that they contradict the principle of 'innocent until proven guilty', contravene the ECHR, and restrict freedom and liberty as outlined in the Human Rights Act 1998 by imposing limitations on individuals, such as house arrests, based on mere suspicion of terrorism. Additionally, control orders reinforce the notion that the criminal justice system (CJS) plays a minor role in social control since they are initiated by the Home Secretary and are outside of the formal CJS framework. Liberty, a human rights group, objects to control orders because

they bypass investigation, arrest, charge, and conviction by the CJS. They advocate that terror suspects should face criminal trials and imprisonment if found guilty since real terrorists pose a threat when control orders are applied, considering they can abscond.

In 2011, the HM Government evaluated control orders and discovered that seven of the 48 individuals who had received them had absconded, which impeded their effectiveness. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 grants the state the power to detain individuals suspected of terrorism without charge for a limited period, allowing detention for up to 14 days. In a letter sent to the Home Office in 2005, Andy Hayman from the Metropolitan Police supported an extension of this period to 90 days under the Terrorism Act 2006. However, because there were concerns about lengthy detentions without charges being filed against suspects, this bill failed to pass through the House of Commons. It was subsequently revised and passed into law as it allowed suspects to be detained for up to 28 days (Crossman, 2008, p.16).

According to Crossman (2008, p.16), the Labour government lacked substantial evidence to justify the extension of power. Furthermore, Liberty (2011) opposing the measure due to its violation of human rights. The Guardian (2011) reported that the ability to hold suspects for 28 days reverted to 14 days in January 2011, indicating that the original increase was unnecessary. This power of detaining suspects without charge exemplifies how the CJS achieves social control by temporarily removing from society individuals perceived as a threat.

The government has various methods to control terror suspects, such as asset freezing and stop and search. The Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010 allows the

treasury to freeze the funds of suspected terrorism associates, similar to control orders. This power bypasses the formal criminal justice system, as it is authorised by the executive. According to Liberty (2010), campaigners think that this power should be with the courts, not the government. Police have the authority to stop and search individuals they reasonably suspect of carrying stolen items, offensive weapons, or prohibited objects, a power only available to the criminal justice system.

According to Mythen and Walklate (2010), the Terrorism Act 2000 enables the police to carry out stop and searches even without suspicion, through Section 44. This provision has been used in 117,200 searches, of which black and Asian individuals were four times more likely to be targeted compared to white individuals. Additionally, this power has been employed to impede protests related to the Iraq war, capitalism, and arms fairs (Coleman & McCahill, 2011, p. 106), as well as against a heckler during a Labour Party conference in 2005 (Coleman & McCahill, 2011, p. 106).

According to Liberty (2011), the use of section 44 was suspended by the government in July 2010 due to unjust usage of power. This suspension could be seen as evidence for the diminishing role of the formal Criminal Justice System (CJS) in social control as one of its powers has been removed. Surveillance has been employed as a social control technique to prevent terrorism but has also been misused to keep an eye on the public (Coleman & McCahill, 2011, p. 92).

Following the end of the Cold War, security companies that operate on a global scale have diversified their offerings to include surveillance solutions aimed

at civilians. Examples include CCTV, database management, and electronic tagging, which are currently provided to governments (Coleman ; McCahill, 2011, p. 105). Additionally, the Home Secretary holds the power to issue warrants that permit the interception of all communication originating from a specific person or location (Longstaff ; Graham, 2009, p. 7).

This passage argues that certain individuals advocate for the courts rather than the executive to possess a particular power (Longstaff; Graham, 2009, p. 7). It serves as an illustration of the reduced influence of the criminal justice system in enforcing social order. Additionally, it raises doubts regarding the intentions of private companies when engaging in surveillance activities.

According to Longstaff and Graham (2009), capitalistic companies may find personal information of the general public useful. The most heavily funded crime prevention method in the UK, as reported by Coleman and McCahill (2011, p.173), is publicly operated CCTV. An estimated i?? 500 million was spent on this method from 1996 to 2006. In 2006, there were up to 4.

According to BBC News, there are approximately 2 million CCTV cameras in use, which means that almost one camera is present for every fourteen individuals. The issue of privacy arises due to the fact that not only criminals and suspected terrorists but also ordinary citizens are being monitored by these cameras. Awan (2011) reports that Birmingham's excessive use of covert and overt CCTV cameras has resulted in public outrage, particularly in predominantly Muslim areas. While the police have claimed that the purpose of the cameras is to prevent all types of crime, accusations have been made that they are being utilized specifically for counterterrorism purposes, particularly since the Terrorism

and Allied Matters fund is funding the initiative.

The privacy and civil liberty of citizens are violated by CCTV, according to Awan (2011), and there is little proof that the use of CCTV cameras reduces crime (Coleman; McCahill, 2011, p. 70). In terms of achieving social control, the role of the criminal justice system is argued to be minor; the executive can exert more control through asset-freezing and control orders. Although police CCTV schemes and their power of stop and search remain as methods of social control, there is debate over their effectiveness and application. The involvement of profit-driven private corporations in surveillance raises concerns about data privacy.

Despite the fact that all of these control measures encroach upon the civil liberties and rights of individuals, the state and CJS have an obligation to safeguard the public. While it appears that the executive branch has a greater role in social regulation than the formal CJS, the latter still possesses significant powers such as the authority to hold terror suspects for up to 14 days without charge.