Peloponnesian Politics Essay Example

200 BC, Rome had gained more military power after defeating Hannibal in the Second Punic War. As a result, they could exert more force against Philip, both through military actions and diplomacy.

The Achaean League, under Roman persuasion, switched sides and backed Rome, causing Macedonia to lose allies and Philip to become surrounded. By gaining the support of the Achaean League, Greece became a friendly environment in 197 BC. This alliance was solidified when envoys from the Achaean League visited Rome during the winter of 198/7.

During this period, Roman foreign policy was carried out by those commanding legions. Pro-consul Flamininus and a decemvir, specifically, rewarded allies in the war with territory. The Achaean League, for example, was given control of Corinth, which made it the most powerful state in the Peloponnese. At the same time, many polities that were previously under Macedonian influence were "freed". The aim behind this policy was to establish a balance of power. Although the Achaean League became Rome's main ally in Greece during that time and benefited from their control over Corinth, Rome must have acknowledged the risks of granting too much power to one state while celebrating Greek freedom at the Isthmian games of 196. Therefore, Rome supported interstate freedom. In 194 BC, Roman forces withdrew from the region, which some scholars mistakenly interpreted as a lack of interest in Greek affairs. However, it was simply a continuation of their policy. By appointing Flamininus as pro-consul, the senate considered Greece as a sphere of interest but also maintained a loose alliance with friendly Greek states. Flamininus believed this was the best strategy to gain Greek support in future conflicts. This

approach seemed to be effective, as the Achaean League sought Rome's assistance against Spartan aggression under Nabis.

Flamininus convened a meeting of Greek states in 195 BC to secure their support for Rome's military intervention against Nabis. In the Roman-Syrian War of 192-188 BC, the Romans once again sought assistance from the Achaeans as Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire marched his army through Greece and coerced states to join his side. This was understandable, as Antiochus was forcefully recruiting Rome's former allies. However, instead of aiding Rome against Antiochus, the Achaean forces focused on conquering the Peloponnese. Despite Flamininus's complaints about the Achaean League's actions against Elis, Sparta, and Messene, there were no repercussions for the League. In fact, they were even rewarded with a permanent alliance treaty in 192/1 BC. These territorial gains were formally recognized by Rome at the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC, which marked the end of the war with Antiochus.

This text suggests that the Achaeans assisted the Romans, possibly in exchange for something. This led to a coalition of Greek states, with Rome at the helm. To guarantee loyalty in the region, Rome made a treaty with the Achaean League, implying that they would fight alongside Rome. Despite Achaean aggression, Rome tolerated it because having a reliable ally in Greece was worth the trouble. In the 180s BC, there were several attempts by the senate and foreign embassies to quell Achaean aggression. For instance, in 182-1 BC, the senate declined to help the Achaean League suppress a Messenian rebellion.

Roman intervention in Greece and Achaean aggression in the Peloponnese caused complaints from Messenian and Spartan diplomats to be directed to

the Roman senate and its embassies. As a result, the senate and its legates began to see themselves as having the authority to mediate and alter Achaean actions. The senators advised the League to return Spartan exiles and cease executions after taking over Sparta, with the aim of improving relations between Spartans and Achaeans. The senate frequently urged the League to bring disputes to them for resolution instead of acting independently. However, during this period, Achaean actions were mostly unchallenged and Roman advice was often disregarded. An instance which demonstrated this was the suppression of a Messenian revolt, where Roman attempts at mediation failed once again. Despite this failure, the senate assured the League that they had fulfilled their duty as allies by preventing the rebels from obtaining anti-war materials.

The senate deferred the task of resolving disputes between Greek states to a select group of senators or Greek mediators, despite their initial intention to solve the conflicts. Rome's focus was on obtaining recognition of their status from Greek states rather than exerting control over them (Eckstein 2008: 359). Consequently, Rome's ineffective mediation in the Peloponnese region led members of the Achaean League to believe that they had the freedom to act as they pleased while Rome maintained the existing state of affairs. This outcome was not surprising, considering that Rome had effectively established the status quo. In the 170s BC, Roman diplomatic efforts in Greek affairs took a different approach. The longstanding goal of Rome was to uphold a balance of power within the Greek sphere and prevent any single power from becoming too dominant.

In 171 BC, Rome saw Macedon as a threat to stability

in the area. After defeating Macedon, Rome divided it into four client republics (Eckstein 2008: 365-6). Just like in the previous Macedonian war, foreign policy was dictated by those who wielded the sword! Roman commanders actively supported the establishment of pro-Roman factions in political entities (Polyb.24.10.3-7; Eckstein 2008: 365-6). This post-war hard-line approach gave rise to Greek politicians who pledged allegiance to Rome in order to dominate their states, as exemplified by what happened to the Achaean League (Eckstein 2008: 381). The aftermath of Macedon's defeat revealed Rome's new strategy through the decision to send a thousand prominent Achaean men suspected of anti-Roman sentiments (including Polybius) to Rome (Paus.7.10.11; Gruen 1976: 48). This was likely intended to ensure stability in the region rather than control Achaean affairs (Gruen 1976: 50), allowing pro-Roman politicians like Callicrates of Leontion to gain influence in local politics (Errington 2008: 250-1). However, during the 160s BC, these pro-Roman factions vanished from Greek states (Eckstein 2008: 365-6).

During the years of 167-150 BC, there were no issues between the Roman Republic and the Achaean League. Rome acknowledged Achaean dominance in the Peloponnese. In 166 BC, residents of Delos who sought safety and citizenship in Achaea faced lawsuits by Athenians who had taken control of the island. They requested to be treated as Achaeans under the simbolon, but the Athenians refused. Seven years later, the case was brought before the senate in Rome and they ruled in favor of the League. The Athenians had to recognize Achaean law and treat the refugees as Achaean citizens (Gruen 1976: 51). The issue of Spartan autonomy seems to have weakened the League's position with Rome. Sparta

had separated from the Achaean League in 149/8, and Achaean general Damocritus was preparing to intervene. In 148 BC, a Roman legion led by Q.Metellus arrived in Macedon to counter a new threat from Andriscus. It was crucial for Rome to maintain their allies in the region, so Metellus did not object when the Achaean council rejected his request to delay action against Sparta (Gruen 1976: 56).

Later in the year, Metellus requested the League to suspend action against Sparta until a senatorial embassy arrived, but this request was rejected (Gruen 1976: 56). In the summer of 147, Roman envoy Orestes threatened the Achaean council with war if they did not give up certain cities, but the senate followed this up with another envoy promoting friendliness towards them (Gruen 1976: 61). This contradictory action suggests a divided opinion within the senate. The Achaean strategos, Critolaus, asked for a six month delay on another Roman embassy, which was granted by the senate (Gruen 1976: 63). However, the League still declared war on Sparta. Meanwhile, the city of Heraclea, which wanted to separate from the League and had sought Rome's help, was besieged by Critolaus. Metellus, who had defeated Andriscus in the Fourth Macedonian War, had a legion stationed in Greece and was able to march against Critolaus to oppose the Achaeans (Gruen 1976: 65). Critolaus fled and was subsequently defeated by Metellus at Locris.

Metellus attempted to make peace with the Achaeans in both the spring and autumn of 146, but they rejected his terms on both occasions (Gruen 1976: 67). In the same year, the Achaean army was defeated by L. Mummius's army at the Battle of

Corinth, leading to the sacking of the city and the dissolution of the League (Warren 2008: 96). Numismatic evidence also supports this break-up, as the League's bronze coinage ceased around 146 BC (Warren 2008: 96). The reason for Rome's sudden change in attitude remains a question. Some scholars argue that the Senate grew impatient and tired of the Achaeans consistently disobeying their attempts at mediation in Peloponnesian affairs, as no other explanation seems to exist (Gruen 1976: 69; McGing 2003: 79). This argument holds some truth, as Roman demands and generous treatment had failed to prevent conflict in the Peloponnese (Gruen 1976: 69). Additionally, it could be suggested that despite sporadic uprisings by Messene and Sparta, the League had gained control over the entire Peloponnese (see Fig.

The Achaean League, a powerful entity in ancient Greece, consisted of a vast landmass including the region of Elis, which alone encompassed an area of approximately 2660km2 (Roy 2008: 263). This League held considerable influence and was not merely a subordinate power (Eckstein 2008: 362). While Macedon had been subdued, Rome may have realized that the League had aspirations for expansion and was inclined towards aggression, thereby threatening the regional balance of power. If left uncontrolled, the League could have posed a potential threat to Rome as well. Rome's objectives in the Peloponnese extended beyond the Achaean League and involved engaging with other Peloponnesian identities. The initial communication between Rome and the Peloponnesian powers took place during the First Macedonian War, as Rome sought allies in their efforts to counter Philip V's growing dominance in Greece.

After establishing peace in 205 BC and withdrawing its forces from the region,

Rome entered into informal agreements (amicitia) with the poleis of Sparta, Messene, and Elis through a treaty with Aetolia (Polybius 18.42.7; Livy 26.24.9; Eckstein 2008: 90; Gruen 1984: 20). However, Rome did not pursue any further agreements with Sparta, Elis, or Messene until the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War five years later (Eckstein 2008: 123). These agreements were not binding and did not include any specific guarantees from Rome - in fact, even Sparta dropped out of the war a year later (Gruen 1984: 77). At that time, Rome was already engaged in the Second Punic War and was seeking allies to deal with Philip, making it unable to fully commit to its obligations in Greece due to its war against Hannibal (Eckstein 2008: 90). The saga of Nabis also demonstrated Rome's commitment to its "friends and allies".

During the First Macedonian War, Nabis initially sided with Rome (Livy 29.12; 34.31). However, in the Second Macedonian War, he switched his allegiance from Macedon to Rome in order to gain control of Argos and halt his attacks on the Achaeans, as requested by T. Quinctius (Livy 32.38-9). Despite Nabis's refusal to liberate Argos, he claimed to have maintained his "friendship and alliance" with Rome. Nonetheless, Rome deemed him unworthy of ally status due to his mistreatment of Sparta (his own city-state) and Messene (Sherwin-White 1984: 62-3). Interestingly, this highlights a stark difference in how Rome treated the Achaean League compared to Nabis. While the League could act freely without consequence, Nabis faced severe repercussions. This distinction arose because the League had earned their status as a "friend and ally" through their cooperation with Rome, whereas those

considered merely "friends" were deemed inferior to independent city-states (Sherwin-White 1984: 66). In 195 BC, Flamininus even invaded Sparta and returned Argos to the League, stripping it from Nabis (Livy 34.22-40)! One possible explanation for this glaring disparity may be that Rome saw Nabis as a threat to stability in the Peloponnese (Eckstein 1987: 305).

According to Eckstein (2006: 303), the peace settlement stated that Sparta should remain independent. In the Roman-Syrian War of 192-188 BC, Antiochus II, the Seleucid king, marched his army through Greece and compelled states to join his side. Elis, a state in the Peloponnese, switched sides to support Antiochus (Eckstein 2008: 325-6). Although Rome was assisted by the Achaean League in the war, the League took advantage of the situation and conquered Sparta, Elis, and Messene, despite objections from Flamininus. The League faced no opposition in this action other than ineffective reasoning (Livy 36.31.4-6; Eckstein 2008: 332). Flamininus even supported including Messene in the Achaean League (Errington 2008: 240). It seems that Rome tolerated these actions, despite having proclaimed 'freedom' for Greece in 196 (Polyb).

In 191 BC, a delegation from Sparta arrived in Rome requesting the return of hostages and the restoration of perioikic towns. These requests were initially dismissed by the Roman senate, who advised the Spartans to seek resolution with the Achaean council. This demonstrated Rome's deference to the League in local politics at that time. However, acknowledging the Spartans' appeal went against the League's constitution, creating fragility in the Peloponnese (Eckstein 2006: 302-3; Polyb. 21.1.1-4).

During the passage of time, Rome's power increased due to continuous pleas (Derow 2003: 66). In 190, the senate returned the hostages but retained

Nabis' son (Polyb. 21.3.4). Throughout the early 180s BC, Roman embassies that traveled through the Peloponnese conveyed a similar message to the Achaean League: they condemned the League's excessive use of violence against Sparta (Gruen 1984: 485).

Q. In 185 BC, at a meeting of League magistrates, Metellus carried out the actions described above (Polyb. 22.10.1-2). Rome, even after 188 BC, continued to seek moderation of Achaean oppression of Sparta (Eckstein 2008: 348). Although an excuse for intervention existed, Rome never made use of it (Gruen 1984: 486).

Another embassy, led by Appius Claudius Pulcher in 184 BC, criticized the League for the recent massacre at Compasium and accused them of destroying the Lacedaemonian constitution (Livy 39.36.3-4). Despite this, Appius also warned the Achaeans of future consequences (Livy 39.37.18-9). In 183 BC, a Messenian envoy named Deinocrates once again requested secession from the League but was rejected by the senate. However, as a result of this rejection, the Messenians revolted anyway (Plut. Phil. 18.3). Once again, another envoy, this time under Q.

Marcius Philippus, in Polyb. 24.9.12, suggested that the League should seek advice from Rome before making any decisions. In 164 BC, a territorial conflict arose between Sparta and Megalopolis, a member of the Achaean League. At that time, an embassy was sent under the leadership of C.

Sulpicius Galus appointed Callicrates, an Achaean statesman, to preside over the case, deferring to the League (Pausanias (8.1.1-3)). Around 150/49 BC, a Spartan embassy raised the issue of Sparta's membership in the League and its jurisdiction over a territorial dispute with Megalopolis (Gruen 1976: 55). The senate responded by deferring the dispute as a matter of League jurisdiction, maintaining the

status quo to the detriment of the Spartans. The following year, Sparta, led by Menalcidas, once again challenged the League's control. The senate responded ambiguously, giving both the Achaeans and Spartans reason to believe they had control (Gruen 1976: 55-6). In 147 BC, the legate L. Aurelius Orestes requested that Sparta be left out of the Achaean League along with other poleis (Paus.7.14-15). However, this warning was later revealed to be a scare tactic (Polyb).

It is possible that Rome could grant independence to Sparta and other poleis if it desired (McGing 2003: 79). The arrival of a Roman army in the Peloponnese brought about significant change as the army's leader dictated foreign policy along their march (Sherwin-White 1984: 2). The defeat of the Achaean League by Metellus and Mummius resulted in the breaking up of the League and granted independence to Spartan, Elean, and Messenian, who were also given compensation in the form of fines imposed on the Achaean League (Paus. 7.16.10; Kallet-Marx 1996: 91-2).