Is Introspection a Form of Perception Essay Example

am indeed in pain". As intuitive as this claim might be, counter examples and objections are present - When a soldier is being played a practical joke and is branded apparently by a hot iron; he believes he is in pain, when in fact, there is no pain present. Churchland offers that the existence of such counter examples can be explained by the phenomena of expectation, presentation and memory effects.Another objection challenges the model's willingness to deny the need for the epistemic mediation. Wright argues that when one is having a seeing-red experience, it is required that one is able to identify and apply the concept of 'red'.

The unmediated observation model has effectively overlapped the understanding of the quality of the object to the object itself, and sidestepped genuine knowledge of the object.The Inner Sense Model of introspection avoids the above objections by taking a view that although has its own objections; I find is the most convincing and believable. The model takes inspiration from perception being the observation of the external world and terms introspection as the process in which we observe the inner world. Having thought to have begun with Locke, the main contemporary advocate of this model is Armstrong.

"This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself ... And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense." The model is simple and intuitive, but some criticise the model for over simplification and sidestepping of the epistemic difference of knowledge about the inner world and the external world. There is no better response

to this than to merely claim that the problem does not lie in the over simplification but in rather in the over-exaggeration in other models.

This can be applied to both the significance of the difference and the difference itself.Other objections are founded on the discrepancies between perception and introspection. If the two processes parallel one another, any dissimilarities would be a cause of criticism. One such criticism concerns the inexistence of an organ specific to inner sense perception. Such objections are dismissed by Armstrong by identifying that it is not true that all outer senses have an organ. For example, proprioception - sense of relative positioning of neighbouring parts of the body.

Shoemaker has been in recent years a prominent critic of the inner sense model and has proposed an alternate model of introspection called the Rational Model. He rejects several notions of the model such as the distinct existences notion and objects to the lack of significance on the capacity of self-awareness, which in his opinion is a necessary condition for rationality. Shoemaker claims that since one is rational, one has the capacity of self-awareness. If this was not the case, the person would be 'self-blind' and would not be able to function normally.A further objection is the non-explanation on how self-knowledge, unlike perceptual knowledge, is immune to misidentification. Being able to mistaken a barn for a house in the distance cannot be reflected in introspection as one will always be the subject of mental states.

Shoemaker's objections against the inner sense model are the strongest and most well-founded. Although justifications to these responses are yet to be found, the non-observational Rationality model proposed by

Shoemaker has its own criticisms and objections that one cannot ignore. I find that the model is confusing and unclear compared to the likes of observational models such as inner sense.The last objection to the inner sense model concerns the transparency of experience. Evans and Dretske claim that experience is totally transparent and there is nothing in between the subject and the object that one is able to focus on. An analogy would be observing a tomato through a pane of glass.

If experience is transparent, then there would be no such thing as 'looking within'. Introspective knowledge will therefore be gained through the inference from our knowledge of the external world. This objection is called the Displaced Perception Model. Since the beliefs of the external world are used as the foundation of inference, the response lies in the uncertain existence of strong enough beliefs in the external world to be able justify the leap from external knowledge to knowledge about the inner world.

Without such beliefs, the displaced perception model does not allow for knowledge of mental states.Additional to observational and non-observational models, there are models which are sceptical about the entire concept of introspection. The Expressivism model claims that what appears to be introspective knowledge are actually mere expressions of the respective mental states. Stating one is in pain would be a mere expression of pain such as the utterance of 'ouch'. Accepting this, it implies that all self-knowledge would be non-propositional, which is Expressivism's most critical objection. No propositional self-knowledge leads to the inability to express one's mental states.

In other words, the articulation of one's condition would be impossible.In conclusion, the

Inner Sense model of introspection provides a coherent and believable view that introspection is analogous to observation of the inner world. Although there are several objections by Shoemaker that are undeniable and yet to be justified, the non-observational model he proposes is also imperfect. Thus, despite the criticisms, the Latin meaning is an accurate analogy - Introspection is a form of inner perception.