Conflict Analysis: Angola Essay Example

be 'generally free and fair'2. However, as per Angolan law, the winner needed at least 50% of the vote, necessitating an election runoff that ultimately did not occur.

UNITA contested the results, reactivated its forces, and initiated another civil war in the country. Despite UNITA temporarily holding 70% of the country by late 1993, it was compelled to resume negotiations in Lusaka in November 1994 after the government regained control over 60% of the territory. The goals outlined in the Lusaka protocol were to establish a ceasefire, facilitate demobilization supervised by the United Nations, and integrate UNITA's soldiers into the national police force. In June 1995, Savimbi was presented with the opportunity to become vice president. Lusaka aimed to unite both parties under a civilian-led government. The Peace Process remained uncertain for multiple years.

During this period, both sides blatantly violated the process, particularly in terms of arms purchases, which the UN chose to ignore. As both sides became better armed, their commitment to the peace process weakened. In August 1996, Savimbi officially rejected the offer of vice-presidency and remained stubborn about allowing government forces to gain control in UNITA areas, despite the gradual inclusion of UNITA ministers in government positions. Angola is a geographically diverse country with abundant natural resources, including oil and diamonds. It also possesses fertile land that made it a significant coffee producer during the final years of colonial rule.

Despite Angola's potential to become the richest country in Africa, there exists a notable disparity in wealth between its citizens and the ruling elites of MPLA and UNITA. The MPLA has amassed riches through undisclosed oil transactions lacking financial transparency, thereby fostering widespread corruption

across the nation. Conversely, UNITA possesses multiple diamond mines that generate annual revenues amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Both factions employ these funds to perpetuate ongoing destructive conflicts. Consequently, numerous experts view Angola's plentiful natural resources as more of a curse than a blessing. Moreover, Angola stands as a diverse nation with regards to ethnic composition.

The country's population, with 13 million people, is divided into two main ethnic groups - the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu. The Ovimbundu account for 40% of the population, while the Mbundu represent 25%. Geographically, there is a division between coastal residents (including mixed race individuals and Mbundus) and Africans from the interior who are primarily Ovimbundu. This division has been exploited by UNITA, an opposition party that represents the Ovimbundu and opposes both the Mbundus and urban coastal residents associated with MPLA.

Although historical tensions exist among these groups, it would be incorrect to solely attribute this conflict to ethnicity. The ongoing civil war in this country has resulted in a significant number of internally displaced people, exceeding four million in 2001. Many of these individuals rely on international aid for support.

In terms of political parties, MPLA and UNITA are the two primary ones in this country.

Both Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi rule Angola in a dictatorial manner, making it clear that they are not democratic. The United Nations acknowledged the MPLA as Angola's governing party in 1976, and after the cold war ended in the 1990s, the MPLA gained recognition and support from the United States. The MPLA heavily relies on oil exports for its survival, while UNITA depends on the illegal trade of diamonds. This draws

the oil and diamond industries into the conflict as secondary parties. In fact, some analysts suggest that the intensity of fighting in Angola can be directly linked to fluctuations in oil and diamond prices.

Through these means, both factions have obtained advanced military equipment such as tanks and fighter jets. The United Nations (UN) has made efforts to mediate the conflict between UNITA and MPLA, but with no enduring success. Additionally, the neighboring countries of Angola have been involved as secondary parties. Since 1998, MPLA has received support from the Kabila regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Conversely, UNITA has utilized the DRC (formerly known as Zaire) as a safe haven for its troops, a means to smuggle diamonds, and a source of weaponry.

Zambia has permitted UNITA actions, much to the MPLA's dismay. Namibia, on the other hand, has been in favor of MPLA and has taken strong measures against UNITA activity within its territory. Congo has collaborated with UNITA by allowing the hiding of UNITA weapons during the Lusaka peace negotiations. Similarly, Rwanda has played a supporting role by facilitating the illicit trade of UNITA diamonds. And finally, Togo has served as a storage location for UNITA arms.

Outside of Africa, there are secondary parties such as Belgium, with its city Antwerp being the diamond trading capital of the world. The US is also a secondary party, now focused on commercial purposes rather than ideological ones. It is projected that Angola will account for 15% of America's oil by 2010. Additionally, the USA, Russia, and Portugal form a group known as the Troika. Since the late eighties, they have been involved in attempting to

broker peace alongside the UN. This analysis will cover the time period starting in July 1998 when the peace process began to collapse. While violence persists today, the reversion to guerrilla tactics by UNITA in the first half of last year will serve as the end boundary for this analysis.

Incompatibilities

UNITA and MPLA have a major difference regarding power sharing in a joint government. Since the unsuccessful elections in 1992, the United Nations has been making efforts to facilitate this agreement. However, due to the fourth outbreak of war in 1998, it appears improbable that both parties will reach a consensus on power sharing. MPLA is adamant about withholding full power from UNITA until it disarms and incorporates its troops into either the Angolan army or police force. To date, there has been no indication of UNITA's willingness to comply with this demand.

The issue of power-sharing also involves Jonas Savimbi and President Dos Santos. Bringing them together has proved difficult because both men are reluctant to leave their territories due to safety concerns. After the Lusaka agreement, Savimbi was twice offered the position of vice-president, but he declined after a lengthy period of consideration. Additionally, Savimbi has explicitly stated his demand for control over certain military and mining operations in Angola.

The MPLA would find it impossible to compromise because it would give Savimbi too much power in the capital, which would be destabilizing. However, as the years of conflict have gone by, it seems that Savimbi would not have accepted anything less than complete control. The non-party defined incompatibilities between the MPLA and UNITA are centered around the difficulty of resolving the practical short-term effects

of peace on the two parties, despite peace being considered desirable. Both parties and their people have only experienced conflict since gaining independence.

Peace poses challenges in terms of reintegrating the largest standing army in Africa into civilian life, while also addressing the economic adaptations made during wartime. It also raises concerns about holding the government accountable for its corrupt finances, as the cloak of war has been used to hide personal embezzlement within the MPLA elite.

Furthermore, the middlemen in the arms and diamond trades have a significant interest in maintaining a chief client in conflict.

Symptoms

The Government of Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), established on April 11, 1997, included some UNITA members in office. Despite this positive development, GURN lacked the significant presence of Savimbi. The United Nations persistently urged both sides to fully implement the Lusaka peace process. However, despite numerous gestures, UNITA did not fulfill its commitments over the course of the following year.

The initial willingness to reconcile gradually shifted towards condemnation from both UNITA and the MPLA in Angola. UNITA accused the Angolan government forces (FAA) of displaying cruel barbarity, while the MPLA accused UNITA of accumulating troops. In January, both parties agreed to meet Lusaka's terms by February 28th. Nevertheless, the use of inflammatory rhetoric and accusations hindered any advancements towards achieving this important objective.

One MPLA minister stated "February 28th will be just another date of no consequence," while UNITA maintained that the FAA continued to brutalise its supporters, thus preventing demobilisation. These negative attitudes were complemented by negative behavior. Immediately after the

formation of GURN, violent outbreaks occurred because UNITA failed to co-operate with the extension of government control when the FAA moved into regions under UNITA's influence. This led to UN sanctions upon UNITA, despite the UN turning a blind eye on other violations of the cease-fire by both sides.

It was reported that in the latter half of 1997, the government increased its arms purchases. Additionally, the government provided military support to rebel movement in Zaire, led by Laurent Kabila. This support led to the overthrow of Kinshasha, the pro-UNITA president, and the establishment of the DRC. As a result, UNITA experienced major disruption in its supply lines and had limited ability to hide troops behind the DRC's border. Furthermore, UNITA did not adequately disarm, as 40% of the weapons and ammunition handed in were either in poor condition or unserviceable. Given this lack of cooperation from both sides in 1997, it was unrealistic to expect full implementation of the peace process by February 1998. Despite common knowledge suggesting otherwise, UNITA claimed it had completed demobilization on March 6th.

The government accepted the statement and immediately legalized UNITA as a party. Their intention was to separate Savimbi from his troops by bringing him to the capital. However, Savimbi refused to leave his secure position unless he was given more authority within the government, specifically some military control. The government offered him 'special status', but Savimbi turned down all these offers. Just like before, both leaders showed a lack of communication and only wanted to meet in their own strongholds. The repeated failed attempts to arrange meetings caused more suspicion and distance between the opposing parties in the

months leading up to the serious escalation of conflict. Despite continuous appeals for more time, UNITA still failed to meet deadlines as March passed.

UNITA's use of delaying tactics indicated that a burst of violent behavior was forthcoming. According to UN observers, both sides had started mobilizing their forces by June. The death of Alioune Beye, the UN special envoy to Angola, in a plane crash on June 26th, marked a turning point in the Lusaka peace process. This tragic event eroded mediation efforts and resulted in widespread insecurity. Consequently, UNITA regained control in various regions of the eastern province of Moxico.

Dynamics

During Angola's fourth civil war, which began in July 1998, UNITA quickly gained momentum and reclaimed 68 areas that it had previously given to the government during the peace process. The violence escalated across the country, leading to horrific incidents such as the massacre of 105 civilians in the mining village of Bula. Additionally, there was internal division within GURN (Government of the Republic of Angola), with many UNITA members leaving the capital.

Human Rights Watch has reported that since April, UNITA officials have been targeted and harassed. As a result of UNITA returning to a war footing, the United Nations imposed sanctions against them. These sanctions included freezing UNITA's foreign bank accounts, banning their diamond exports, and restricting their air and water traffic. In response, UNITA withdrew from negotiations for two months and stopped negotiating with the Troika in August, claiming bias from those nations. This further polarized the party. The fighting intensified over the next six months with UNITA gaining military strength. In August, UNITA established its primary stronghold

in Moxico province while the government drafted males aged 15-34 and targeted demobilized UNITA soldiers and officials.

In September, UNITA made progress in both Malanje and Uige provinces. UNITA received help from DRC rebels in Uige. In October, fighting intensified in these northern provinces, spreading into Lunda Norte and Lunda Sol. These provinces were strategically important as they were the main diamond producing areas of Angola and crucial for funding UNITA's war efforts. During this time, there was significant polarization and UNITA was suspended from GURN.

However, at this point, a splinter faction of UNITA known as the UNITA Renewal Committee (UNITA-RC) was established, with Jorge Valentim as its leader. This allowed the government to sever all connections with Savimbi's UNITA. The UNITA-RC movement, however, received very little support from members of UNITA. In September, the United Nations officially held UNITA responsible for the ongoing crisis, which further strengthened the UN's efforts to destabilize Savimbi's UNITA regime. By the end of the year, the violence had escalated and remained at that level for approximately one year.

In December, before the government's congress, the FAA conducted a large-scale air offensive against Bailundo and Mungo, strongholds of UNITA. In response, UNITA indiscriminately shelled the cities, leading to the government's retreat. This intensified the polarization during the government's congress. President dos Santos demanded the withdrawal of the UN observer mission, termination of the peace process, and complete isolation of Savimbi. These demands were met as the government branded Savimbi a war criminal and rejected Lusaka in January. In late December and early January, two UN C-130 Hercules planes crashed under suspicious circumstances, worsening relations between the UN and the two conflicting

parties.

The lack of co-operation by UNITA31 was condemned by the UN, and in a report, Kofi Annan stated that both parties were responsible for the worsening situation. He also mentioned that there was no choice but to withdraw the monitors and aid workers. GURN was also disregarded officially through a cabinet reshuffle, granting President Dos Santos complete control over the FAA. This internal factor increased cohesion within the MPLA, who were already in a weakened position due to sustained losses to UNITA and dwindling cash reserves caused by declining oil prices. As a result of poor communication and the absence of UN monitors in Angola, the specific details of the violent conflict become less clear. Nevertheless, it is evident that UNITA remained dominant for most of the year.

There were acts of violence committed by both sides. In May, the United Nations (UN) condemned UNITA for indiscriminately shelling Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), who were either unpaid or underpaid, also caused suffering by looting and raping in various communities. There was a report about a man who was shot in the legs because he didn't immediately give his possessions to government troops. At this point, it was evident that the sanctions imposed to limit UNITA's ability to sustain its forces were ineffective. As a result, the UN initiated an investigation into UNITA's violation of sanctions. This external factor aimed to put pressure on individuals supporting UNITA's illegal diamond trade by threatening to expose their identities.

In August, additional external pressure started to limit UNITA's ability to act. The leaders of fourteen countries from Southern Africa convened as the Southern Africa Development Community and

all expressed support for dos Santos, although they did not provide any direct military aid. Throughout August, the government suffered further defeats and there were mass killings of civilians in Bie and Melanje. However, the situation radically changed in October when the FAA successfully seized control of the towns of Melanje and Bailundo. This defeat for UNITA was accompanied by external events such as De Beers, the world's largest diamond trader, imposing a ban on Angolan diamonds. Additionally, a UN office was established in Luanda.

In the end of the year, the FAA had further successes by capturing Jamba, where UNITA headquarters are located. The government also stated that they had destroyed 80% of UNITA's military capacity and disrupted a crucial supply route. During this time, the Namibian government began actively supporting the MPLA. In the first quarter of 2000, the government's claims were substantiated as UNITA appeared disoriented and resorted to guerrilla tactics instead of large-scale military operations. In addition to these internal factors, the UN published a report exposing seven African nations, as well as Bulgaria and Belgium, for their involvement in trading UNITA's blood diamonds in violation of sanctions.

The report caused more difficulties for UNITA, making it more challenging to transport its diamonds through previously secure routes. In the year 2000, there was a decrease in intense fighting and some reduction in polarization. President Dos Santos changed his strict stance towards UNITA by reaffirming the relevance of the Lusaka Peace Process. He also stated that forgiveness would be extended to Savimbi and his followers if they abandoned war. The President's change of attitude was prompted by both an Episcopal letter from

the Catholic Bishops of Angola and an Ecumenical open-air service in Luanda. Nevertheless, conflicts persisted in various areas, particularly along the borders of Zambia and DRC, where the government suppressed multiple uprisings.

In September, UNITA guerrillas started launching high profile attacks in order to gain international attention. These attacks often focused on international structures or occurred during times when government officials were negotiating with foreign authorities. In Soyo, a Total/Elf/Fina oil well was destroyed. As UNITA lost its last urban strongholds in October, it was forced to rely solely on guerrilla tactics. Consequently, the level of conflict decreased significantly, although isolated incidents of violence continued to occur.

The text highlights instances of sporadic violence that occurred in Angola in 2001. For instance, during May of that year, while the UN Secretary-General's special advisor on Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, was visiting, a series of attacks resulted in the death of 150 civilians and the kidnapping of sixty children from a Danish orphanage in Caxito. Similarly, in July, when a US delegation was visiting, UNITA destroyed a train located 130Km away from Luanda. As a result, passengers fleeing the burning carriages were targeted with bullets. Moreover, external influences consistently attempted to limit UNITA's potential in 2001. The UN expanded its monitoring of sanctions to ensure they were having an impact.

In April, the UN Sanctions Committee reported that UNITA still possessed hidden weapons across the country. Despite some indications of reduced conflict, such as Savimbi's claim that the FAA had defeated his forces and the government's declaration of the civil war's end, UNITA remained active and armed. Moreover, President dos Santos announced that he would not seek re-election.

The immense human toll

of the war is difficult to quantify, yet undoubtedly immense. The war claimed lives not only through combat, but also due to illness and starvation. Additionally, the magnitude of internally displaced individuals further exacerbated the situation, reaching its peak in 2001 with approximately four million people affected, comprising roughly one-third of the entire population.