Cases on Succession Essay Example
Cases on Succession Essay Example

Cases on Succession Essay Example

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  • Pages: 10 (2726 words)
  • Published: December 13, 2016
  • Type: Essay
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Facts: Private respondents Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance against petitioner, Natalia Carpena Opulencia on the ground that the latter executed in their favor a 'contract to sell' of lot 2125. The defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. The defendant averred that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC of Binan. The court ordered the parties to submit their evidence.

Petitioner, instead of submitting evid, filed a demurrer. Moreover, the petitioner maintained that the contract was null and void for want of approval of the probate court. Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the

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appellate court set aside hte trial court's dismissal of the complaint. Issue: WON a contract to sell a real property involved in estate proceedings valid and binding without the approval of the probate court. Ruling: YES. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death.

Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. Petitioner contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings. " Petitioner's contention is not convincing.

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justify">The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father. " Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings.

Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration. " Thus, petitioner did not act as an administratix but an heiress of her father. The questioned documents which were alleged as a forgery were admitted by the court and ruled that said documents were genuine as examined by an expert.

In line with this, the question to be settled now is whether or not the first will which was executed by Rufina Arevalo was revoked and made ineffective by the second will. The wills appeared as follows: It appears that the undivided interest of Rufina Arevalo in two parcels of land and the improvements thereon which belonged to the conjugal partnership between Bernabe Bustamante, who had died before the making of the two wills, and Rufina Arevalo, was expressly devised to Amando Clemente in the

earlier will but was not specifically mentioned in the later will.

In the first will, Exhibit 6, Rufina Arevalo, who had no forcible heirs, gave to Ariston Bustamante, her nephew, three lots and the buildings thereon; devised a parcel of land and the houses standing thereon to her cousin, Petrona Arevalo Viuda de Zacarias, and to her niece, Carmen Papa de Delgado; and finally disposed, in favor of Amando Clemente, another cousin, of a piece of land and the houses thereon, and of her undivided interest in the two parcels of land and the improvements thereon, which belonged to the conjugal partnership, also making said Amando Clemente the residuary legatee. But in he second will, Exhibit C, she designates Ariston Bustamante her only heir.

At first sight, it would seem that the earlier will can stand with respect to Rufina Arevalo's share in said two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership. But a closer examination of the later will counter-acts such initial reaction. In the first place, the testatrix in the second will names Ariston Bustamante her "only heir" to all her property, both personal and real, her words in Spanish being: "Nombro como mi "unico heredero", Ariston Bustamante, de "todas mis propiedades" dejadas ya mueble o inmueble. (Italics supplied. ) It is true that in enumerating her parcels of land, she did not specify her interest in the two lots of the conjugal partnership. But this omission must have been due either to an oversight or to the belief that it was premature to name said two parcels as the conjugal partnership was still being liquidated. In either case, the

testatrix must have thought that her comprehensive words "mi unico heredero de todas mis propiedades dejadas ya mueble o inmueble" would be sufficient to cover all her property, whether specially listed or not.

Secondly, in the opening paragraph of the second will, the following words appear: "hago constar a todos este mi "ultimo"testamento y voluntad expresado en Castellano lenguaje que conozco y poseo, y "queriendo disponer de mis bienes por virtud de este mi testamento". " (Emphasis supplied. ) Though she knew that she had made a first will, she nevertheless said that the second will was her last one. This would seem to signify that her last will, cancelling her previously expressed wish, was to make Ariston Bustamante her "only heir".

Furthermore, when she said she wanted to dispose of her property "by means" of the second will ("queriendo disponer de mis bienes por virtud de este mi testamento"), it would appear to be her intention that no property of hers should be left undisposed of in the second will. This fact is corroborated in the second clause wherein she names Ariston Bustamante as her only heir to all her property whether personal or real. We believe, therefore, that the first will has been entirely revoked.

Though it might appear right that Amando Clemente should receive something from the estate because he, together with Ariston Bustamante, has been raised by the testatrix, and both are her relatives, nevertheless it would be venturesome for us to advance our own idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix

in the later will. As she had no forcible heirs, she was absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she choose, subject of course to the payment of her debts.

It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once that intention has been determined through a careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest.

It might be said that it is hard to understand how, in a temporary anger at Amando Clemente, the testatrix would entirely cut him off from the inheritance. We should not, however, sit in judgment upon her motives and sentiments, first because, as already stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward processes of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty.

Facts: Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (“Toray”) died sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children. This is a case of the probate of the will of Alipio Abada. Thereafter, the probate of the will of Paula Toray was also filed with

the court. The oppositors in the will of Abada and Toray are their nephews and nieces.

The ground for opposition is that decedent left no will or if there is a will it was executed not in consonance with the law. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Belinda Caponong-Noble was assigned as the administratix of the estate of Abada by the trial court.

Thereafter, Abellar was appointed administratix of Toray’s property. The RTC ruled only on , whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues. Unsatisfied with the decision Caponong-Noble appealed. Issue: Whether or not the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws. 1.

What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada; 2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public 3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator; 4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws; 5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising

the issue of whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada; 6.

Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada. Held: The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code. The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada.

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 governs the form of the attestation clause of Abada’s will. Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following: (1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator; (2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction; (3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three r more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; (4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin; (5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on

the upper part of each sheet; (6).

The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will.

However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed. , sec. 132. ) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will.

Abada’s will clearly shows

four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results. J. L. T. AGRO, INC. v. BALANSAG, March 11, 2005 Facts: Don Julian L.

Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: JosefaTeves Escano (Josefa) and Emilio

Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: MariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (MilagrosReyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro). The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages.

Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. The Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian that in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Don Julian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children. On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J. L. T. Agro, Inc.

Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Supplemental Deed. Thisinstrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J. L. T. Agro, Inc. Don Julian died intestate. Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses

Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.

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