Ultimate Norm of Morality Essay Example

if not exclusively, the promotion of the agent's own happiness.

Mill rejects their psychological egoism and significantly modifies their assumptions about happiness when he introduces his doctrine of higher pleasures. To appreciate Mill's innovations here, we need to understand some aspects of the Radical legacy he inherits. Mill's proof is widely regarded as flawed in multiple ways. To appreciate the objections we need to reconstruct the steps in this argument more carefully. One traditional reconstruction might look something like this.

1. Utilitarianism is true iff happiness is the one and only thing desirable for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else). 2. The only proof of desirability is desire. 3. Each person desires his own happiness for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else). 4. Hence, happiness, as such, is desired for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else) from the point of view of humanity (= the aggregate of persons). 5. Hence, happiness, as such, is desirable for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else). . Happiness is the only thing desired for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else). Other things — such as virtue, health, music, money, and power — can come to be desired for their own sakes, but then they are desired as parts of happiness. 7. Hence, happiness is the only thing desirable for its own sake (and not for the sake of something else). 8. Hence, utilitarianism is true. The “proof” has, at least in some quarters, threatened Mill's reputation as a careful philosopher.

It is

commonly thought to be riddled with major mistakes — mistakes of inference and implausible assumptions. Here is a partial list of concerns about Mill's argument, as traditionally conceived. In an early and famous passage Mill offers one formulation of his basic principles concerning liberties. The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion.

That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.

These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to

society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him, his independence, is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.