Why Mitchell v Wisconsin Sucke Essay Example

motivated by race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation in 1993 compared to the previous year; racially motivated incidents accounted for 62 percent of these crimes (Cacas, 32). It is clear that this issue demands attention; however, it is regrettable that both the Supreme Court and state/federal governments have chosen methods that blatantly violate constitutional rights. The Mitchell decision faced criticism primarily due to concerns related to First Amendment rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the state statute unconstitutional but its decision was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Court argued that penalizing offensive thoughts violated First Amendment rights and dismissed the state's claim that it only targeted intentional victim selection.According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, they contended that the statute punished individuals for their motives and reasoning in selecting a victim. They argued that this law violated the First Amendment by criminalizing discriminatory thoughts that opposed legislative viewpoints.

The First Amendment states that the government cannot censor or forbid expressing an idea solely based on society's disapproval or offense. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in the 1989 Texas v. Johnson case, yet it appears that these significant principles were disregarded in the Wisconsin v. Mitchell case.

It is an undeniable fact that Mitchell's assault on another person is a crime deserving punishment, and it would be illogical to argue that the First Amendment protects this criminal act (Cacas, 337). However, although the state can penalize such actions, there exists a constitutional barrier to penalizing criminals' thoughts (Cacas, 337). The First Amendment has traditionally been interpreted as not only protecting an individual's speech but also their thoughts (Cacas, 338). In a significant case in 1977

called Wooley v. Maynard, the Court's majority opinion stated that "the essence of the First Amendment lies in safeguarding an individual's freedom to believe as they wish; in a society valuing freedom, one's beliefs should be shaped by their intellect and conscience rather than coerced by government authority."

Mitchell argued that the penalty enhancement law was overly broad and could discourage free speech, as people may fear their opinions being used against them. In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes disagreed with laws that restrict thoughts and expression, as they hinder the promotion of diverse ideas in society. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, dismissed the idea of a chilling effect on speech from Wisconsin's statute. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably argued that examining an accused individual's conversations and expressions may be necessary to determine if hate played a role in the crime when considering penalty enhancement for sentencing (Feingold, 16). While Rehnquist argues against any chilling effect from Wisconsin's laws, it is important to consider how his stance might change without addressing offensive issues like racism. This recent attempt at political correctness parallels the Red Scare of the 1950s; both anti-communists then and politically correct ideologists now claim noble intentions.

Unfortunately, both factions violated the rights of minority groups while attempting to enforce their own beliefs on others.

If a law required more severe penalties for individuals who were found guilty of offenses while promoting Communist ideologies, how would Rehnquist respond? Likewise, if the defendant was Mormon and their religious convictions were considered morally unacceptable by the majority, could Rehnquist endorse limitations on the First Amendment's safeguards for freedom of religion and speech if these perspectives were regarded as

repugnant as racism? The Supreme Court of the United States is exhibiting bias towards certain aspects of First Amendment rights and yielding to political pressure in order to suppress prejudiced opinions, as demonstrated in Mitchell v. Wisconsin.

Mitchell argues that the statute violates both the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment contains an equal protection clause which prohibits any state from denying equal protection of the laws to anyone within its jurisdiction. Gellman (379) asserts that the Wisconsin statute imposes harsher penalties on individuals based on their expressed opinions, while treating those with acceptable motives more leniently. This clearly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Rehnquist and the entire Supreme Court have a different viewpoint.

In his argument, Rehnquist asserts that the First Amendment does not forbid using speech as evidence to establish elements of a crime or demonstrate motive or intent. However, it is important to note that merely having a motive does not constitute a crime but is relevant in determining guilt or innocence. It is undeniable that individuals who express prejudiced opinions receive more severe punishment compared to those who do not. Rehnquist does not explicitly address the Fourteenth Amendment in Grant and Mitchell's case because it falls outside its scope. He also argues that judges traditionally consider various factors beyond evidence of guilt when deciding on appropriate sentences for convicted individuals. One significant factor is the offender's motive for committing the crime. Although this argument has merit, one could argue that this practice raises constitutional concerns by granting judges excessive discretionary power based on their own definitions of acceptable and unacceptable motives. Even if considered constitutional, implementing an additional statute declaring

bigotry as an unacceptable motive would essentially impose further penalties for unpopular beliefs. To illustrate the dangers associated with laws like Wisconsin's penalty enhancement statute, we can analyze the 1989 Supreme Court case Texas v.Johnson, where the Court deemed the state's flag desecration statute unconstitutional.If Texas had adopted the reasoning in Mitchell, they could have attained their objective by outlawing public burning and imposing harsher penalties for offenders. Laws like Wisconsin's that enhance penalties grant the government excessive authority to punish actions it considers objectionable. These laws violate both the First and Fourteenth Amendments as they stifle unpopular ideas and do not ensure equal protection for all individuals. The case of Mitchell v. Wisconsin illustrates instances where the majority encroaches upon minority rights and exposes shortcomings in the Bill of Rights during critical moments.

Wisconsin's position is likely backed by more Supreme Court cases than Mitchell's argument, but some of these rulings may be deemed unconstitutional. Rehnquist's stance can be supported by two cases, however, the first ruling has been generally ignored by the Supreme Court and the second ruling has been misinterpreted.

The fighting words doctrine, known as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, was authored by Justice Murphy. In this particular case, Chaplinsky, a Jehovas Witness residing in a predominantly Catholic town, distributed leaflets to an unsympathetic crowd. The towns marshall declined to offer protection, prompting Chaplinsky to label the marshall as a god damn racketeer and a damn fascist. Consequently, he faced conviction for disturbing the peace. Justice Murphys opinion asserted that specific forms of speech such as lewd, obscene, profane, or insulting speech are not safeguarded under the First Amendment.

Murphy states that certain types of

speech have always been regarded as constitutional matters. These include lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, insulting, or fighting words. Such forms of speech not only cause harm through their expression but also have the potential to provoke immediate violence or disruption of peace.

Under Chaplinky, making derogatory remarks that incite violence would likely be considered as fighting words. However, courts have generally been reluctant to support the fighting words doctrine, and the Supreme Court has never done so (Gellman 369,370). Even if the current Court were to consider Chaplinsky valid, it would be difficult to classify Mitchell's racial comments as bigoted. Putting aside constitutional concerns, the main issue with penalty enhancement laws like Wisconsin's is determining and prosecuting an incident as hate-motivated (Cacas, 33). At what point can we be certain that the victim was targeted based on race, religion, or sexual orientation? Additionally, another pressing problem is that police are unwilling to investigate crimes as hate-motivated (Cacas, 33). The difficulty in determining whether a crime is hate-motivated is one of the reasons why police hesitate to pursue such cases and further demonstrates why such statutes should not exist. One can consider the following FBI guidelines to help determine whether a crime is hate-motivated (Cacas, 33):

1. A significant portion of the community where the crime occurred believes that bias was a motive in the incident.

2. The suspect has a previous involvement in a hate crime.

3.The guidelines do not provide a clear and precise system to categorize hate-motivated crimes, especially when they occur on holidays significant to racial, religious, or ethnic/national origin groups.

Another case often cited as a precedent for rulings similar to Wisconsin v. Mitchell is

U.S. v. OBrien, where the defendant burned his draft card in protest of the draft and Vietnam War, despite a specific law prohibiting such burning. The Supreme Court determined that this law did not differentiate between public and private burnings of draft cards, meaning it was not an attempt by the government to regulate symbolic speech but rather a legitimate exercise of police power under the constitution. The Court concluded that there is no absolute protection for symbolic speech.

Based on OBrien, the government has the authority to regulate conduct that incidentally infringes upon First Amendment rights as long as its interest is unrelated to suppressing belief or expression. However, when states pass laws like Wisconsin's statute, they are not regulating conduct with expressive elements but rather punishing conduct because of its expressive elements (Gellman, 376). Therefore, a more accurate interpretation of OBrien would be one that actually opposes the Court's ruling in Wisconsin and does not serve as a precedent supporting Rehnquist's decision.

In the 1992 case of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, a juvenile was convicted under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for burning a cross in the yard of a black family. This case set an important precedent, with Justice Scalia delivering the opinion of a unanimous Court. However, there were differing views on overturning the St. Paul statute.
According to Scalia, the city ordinance was too broad and did not cover enough cases. It punished almost all controversial characterizations likely to cause resentment among protected groups but selectively penalized offensive words directed at some groups but not others, contradicting the logic of the Mitchell decision. On the other hand, Rehnquist disagreed and argued that

Wisconsin v.Mitchell did not overturn R.A.V v.St.Paul.
Considering Scalia's reasoning that hate speech laws listing specific categories are invalid as government cannot regulate based on hostility or favoritism towards particular messages raises questions about how hate crime laws can withstand scrutiny when they increase penalties for crimes motivated by certain types of hatreds but not others? In simpler terms, if it is found that the St.Paul statute does not cover enough cases, concerns arise about including every possible form of hatred within any law's scope.

To maintain consistency, legislatures must now include additional categories such as sex, physical characteristics, age, party affiliation, anti-Americanism, or position on abortion (Feingeld, 16).

More interestingly and in accordance with the Constitution is the concurring opinion written by Justice White in R.A.V. v. St. Paul. Justice White is joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice OConnor.

In his opinion, Justice White argues that although the interpreted ordinance includes speech categories that lack constitutional protection, it also criminalizes a considerable amount of expression that is protected by the First Amendment. Previous cases involving fighting words have established that general negative reactions are not enough to strip constitutional protection from expression. The fact that expressive activity may cause hurt feelings, offense or resentment does not render it unprotected. Consequently, the ordinance is excessively broad and invalid on its face.

Rehnquist contends that the ordinance rendered null and void in R.A.V. specifically aimed at expression, while the statute in this instance concentrates on conduct not safeguarded by the First Amendment. However, if Mitchell had refrained from uttering the phrase "There goes a white boy; go get him," his punishment would not have been prolonged. Instead, he would have been

given the highest two-year imprisonment term for his offense rather than four years. Consequently, as Justice Rehnquist proposes, the Wisconsin statute penalizes both behavior and speech.

The decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell not only silences racists and homophobics, but it also has broader societal costs. It restricts the availability of various ideas in the marketplace of ideas by implementing laws that stifle thought and expression. Furthermore, this ruling narrows the interpretation of the First Amendment, thus limiting everyone's freedom of speech and creating room for further restrictions. Through penalty enhancement laws, the government assumes the role of judging and evaluating ideas, raising concerns about its objectivity. Additionally, when society suppresses socially unacceptable opinions, there is a risk of forgetting why those opinions were deemed unacceptable initially. Allowing individuals with extreme views to publicly express their opinions can expose their ignorance and serve as a reminder to society regarding why those ideas are distasteful. Ultimately, a strong society tolerates and permits free expression of all ideas, even if despised. Conversely, suppressing ideas demonstrates weakness (Gellman,(381-385)).

The unanimous decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell by the United States Supreme Court could be viewed as erroneous for several reasons. From a constitutional standpoint, it fails to uphold the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law for all citizens. Additionally, this decision can be seen as reversing R.A.V. v. St. Paul and suggesting a potential shift in the Court's position on fighting words, essentially equating unpopular speech with unprotected speech. Furthermore, as previously discussed, this ruling has significant negative consequences for society. In conclusion, Wisconsin v. Mitchell is a fundamentally flawed

Supreme Court ruling that we can only hope will be overturned soon.

The freedom to differ is not restricted to trivial matters. This would only be a shallow version of freedom. The true test of its significance is the ability to disagree on matters that deeply affect the established system.

According to Justice Jackson in W.V. Board of Education v. Barnette, no official, whether high or petty, has the authority to dictate what is considered orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or any other matters of opinion. This notion is seen as a fixed star in our constitutional constellation.

The following are relevant sources for further reading:

- Cacas, Samuel. "Hate Crime Sentences Can Now Be Enhanced Under A New Federal Law." Human Rights 22 (1995): 32-33
- Feingold, Stanley. "Hate Crime Legislation Muzzles Free Speech." The National Law Journal 15 (July 1, 1993): 6, 16
- Gellman, Susan. "Sticks And Stones." UCLA Law Review 39 (December, 1991): 333-396
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul
- Texas v. Johnson
- U.S. v. OBrien
- Wisconsin v. Mitchell
- Wooley v. Maynard
- W.V. State Board of Education v. Barnette