Re-Unification of North and South Korea Essay Example

fundamental transformation of the Peninsula (Pollack & Chung, 1999: 1). North Korea’s vulnerability increases as its past alliances with Russia and China diminish.

“North Korea’s defining imperative is no longer to present itself as an alternative model for Korean unification, but to arrest its internal decline and avoid extinction as a political, economic, and social system’ (Pollack & Chung, 1999:1). Many scenarios have been presented over the years, but all have severe limitation as to their implementation.Before these scenarios are presented, and overview of the DPRK will set the scene of how the Korean War came to be. The DPRK is among the world’s most impenetrable regimes where controls over life, press and travel make it virtually impossible to attain a balanced view. The creator, Kim Il Sung, surrounded himself with comrades and only relinquished power upon his death in 1994. Because the DPRK formed during the period of maximum Soviet influence, the party had a structure ‘typically associated with Marxist-Leninist regimes’ (Cumings, 1995: 52).

A strong, highly organised party with a ‘centralised top-down administration of large bureaucracies’ (Norland, 2000). As well as an economy where goods and services were rationed and allocated, rather than by using the principles of a market driven economy. This structure was ‘building socialism toward a distant final transition to communism’ (Cumings, 1995: 52). With the above information in mind, the scenarios presented below show both virtuous and destructive approaches to successful re-unification.

The ideal scenario for re-unification is through peaceful integration, which is the current South Korean government’s doctrine towards North Korea, and is known as the Sunshine Policy (Pollack & Chung, 1999:1). This scenario sees increasing economic and social interactions

followed ultimately by political interaction between North and South governments (Pollack & Chung, 1999:1). This scenario would require specific policy and operation mechanisms designed and implemented by the ROK, the United Nations, and the super powers of Russia, China and the U.S.

These policies and mechanisms would then need to be accepted by the Government and the people of North Korea. This idealistic and simplistic approach seems implausible given that it is ‘starkly contradicted by the acute ideological, political, and security animosities in place for a half century’ (Pollack & Chung, 1999: 49). Furthermore, this scenario assumes that both governments will be able to alter ingrained attitudes and assumptions about each other and interim steps can be created and then satisfactorily implemented by all parties concerned.The Sunshine Policy was articulated in 1998, and while the policy has resulted in some political contact, it has produced little in the way of tangible results.

German unification came about as a ‘result of the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe’ along with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Verheven, 198: 17). This unification has prompted a second scenario where re-unification will occur as a result of a similar chain of events in North Korea. There is however, a fundamental difference in the unification of Germany and a possible re-unification of North and South Korea.In Germany, the people of East and West Germany were separated at the end of World War II in a similar fashion to Korea, but the people did not fight each other in a bitter and bloody war as was the case in Korea.

Rivalries between the two Germanys were ‘largely as

a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – Warsaw Pact rivalry’ (Verheven, 1998: 29). Indeed, the two Germanys agreed to simultaneous recognition in 1972, thereby permitting ‘full diplomatic relations and a quasi-normal political relationship for nearly two decades before unification’ (Verheven, 1998: 55).In the case of Korea, it has been utter and total isolation between the two states for fifty years. The German scenario also assumes the absorption of the economically weaker North Korea by an economically dominant South Korea, which would be unacceptable, both from the North Korean and Chinese perspectives. While North Korea appears to be in systematic decline, it continues to amass weapons of ever-greater destructive capability.

This ongoing threat which includes Weapons of Mass Destruction and actual nuclear capabilities, places an ever-increasing burden on South Korea to continue to upgrade and modernise its military forces.Indeed, North Korea’s ‘principle military objectives appear to have changes very little through the 1990’s’ (Pollack & Chung, 1999:67). Despite North Korea’s poor economic prospects it maintains the military capabilities needed to achieve strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain momentum so that ‘breakthrough operation can be successfully concluded before the arrival of major U. S reinforcements’ (Institute for Nation Strategic Studies, 1997: 101). This introduces a scenario where re-unification is achieved through conflict, instigated by either party.This scenario is unacceptable due to the potential loss of life on the Korean Peninsula, plus the fact that other world military powers would become entangled in a war, further escalating both the extent of the war and the casualty numbers.

A fourth scenario is one where events lead to ‘grey outcomes’, i. e. , ‘ambiguous

political or military outcomes that are difficult to pinpoint or define’ (Pollack & Chung, 1999:75). For example, if the current North Korean regime collapsed but a successor government was unable to halt the collapsing economy, how would the ROK and the U. S deal with a weakened DPRK government?Alternatively, what is North Korea, on the verge of collapse, requests and receives political and military assistance from China? It must be assumed that China would not remain passive in the event of a collapse in the North, so what policy objectives would the U. S and the ROK pursue in this case? While these hypothetical scenarios all depict problems in the North, one could equally envisage events in the South, which could lead to intervention requests.

Widespread corruption within the Government could lead could lead to a mass rebellion by the public to a point where the Government verges on collapse, and the U.S or Japan is called upon for assistance. Clearly there are numerous probabilities under this scenario, but as it is impossible to plan for these ‘grey outcomes’, this scenario is not tenable. From the four scenarios offered, the third can be immediately discounted, as war is an unacceptable road to re-unification and the fourth likewise, as the ‘grey outcomes’ are unpredictable, improbable and there unmanageable. While the “German” scenario demonstrates that re-unification is possible, there is an imperfect parallel between the two.Sharif Shuja (2003: 1) highlights the difficulties of a German style re-unification.

While positives could include learning from Germanys mistakes, North Korea has not ‘created the dependency culture of East Germany’ and the ‘relative economic success of South Korea is even more

striking than that of West Germany’ (Shuja, 2003: 1). Negatives to a German style re-unification include timing, which for Germany was the downfall of the Soviet Empire, but for North Korea may come from unrest within the population.North Korea has a much more formidable military force, and the North Korean people have been less exposed to Western ideas than was the case with the East Germans who had been accessing luxuries like Western television (Shuja, 2003: 2). Added to this, South Korea does not have the ‘resources to bring northern living standards up to southern levels in the space of five years, as is being attempted in Germany’ (Shuja, 2003: 1). The German model is therefore seen as implausible, leaving the only practical option as one where e-unification is through a ‘willing act of cooperation between the two sides’ (Shuja, 2003: 1).

This presents the initial scenario of peaceful integration, through adoption of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ being the only plausible way forward to re-unification. However, before re-unification can begin, China will need to give its blessing. This is unlikely while ‘there continues the fundamental discord between China and the U. S.

over the larger vista of East Asia’s basic strategic conditions’ (Rhee, 2001: 4). This in turn will require the U.S to detach itself from Taiwan completely, including weapons supplies. Only once the U. S.

is ‘removed from the Taiwan-China equation, can there be a true beginning of mutually beneficial relations between Beijing and Washington’ (Rhee, 2001: 4). In addition to China and the U. S. agreeing to and supporting Korean re-unification, there will need to be a catalyst from within North Korea to implode

the regime of Kim Jong-Il and his successors in the present North Korean political system.

This would be the only way to change the ingrained mindset, which has governed North Korea for fifty years.China would, against its own intense preference, need to sit back and allow North Korea to collapse to a point where re-unification is the only way forward, and accept that the result will be a united and unified Korea moulded very much on the South (read Western) style. Once could not see China allowing this to happen unless China itself was in a state of collapse from its present centralised state into ‘multiple regional independent state-entities and major ethnic lines such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and even Manchuria’ (Rhee, 2001: 4).A re-unified Korea would also need to become a ‘neutral state where it was not seen as a threat to its neighbours’ (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1993: 20). Further, given the ever increasing economic and energy contributions from the South, economic ruin of North Korea seems further away, rather that closer.

Yet this relationship can also be seen as a step forward for Korea as it shows a peaceful trade relationship.An article titled’ Disarmament Move’ stated that North Korea is to ‘receive the equivalent of 950,000 tonnes of oil for declaring all its nuclear programs and disabling its facilities’ (Geelong Advertiser, 2007: 27). Along with food aid and humanitarian supplies, the North Korean regime may appear to be improving living conditions, in turn delaying any population revolt or regime collapse. The current status of the two Korea’s and their quest for re-unification was evident at the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Sydney, Australia. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun asked U.

S. President George Bush when he would formally declare the end of the Korean War. This shows that the two Korea’s what to move forward towards re-unification but want to do it without the influence of the U. S.

and George Bush. However, Bush responded to this question by stating that the Korean War would officially end when North Korea ceases its nuclear weapons program. Both Roh and Bush agreed that the Korean debate had progressed significantly in resolving the divide, yet with both Korea’s signing a truce in 1953 and not a peace treaty, and with no peace treaty between the U. S. nd North Korea, Bush has clearly stated that they are technically still at war (CBS5, 2007).

When peaceful badgering appeared useless in getting the message through, Bush stated ‘I can’t make it any more clear, Mr President. We look forward to the day when we can end the Korean War. That will happen when Kim Jong Il verifiably gets rid of his weapons program and his weapons’ (CBS5, 2007). This tension between the U. S.

and North Korea comes after an agreement was reached in February this year which saw North Korea agreeing to dispose of its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the U.S. agreeing to normalise its relations with the communist country and lift the stigma attached to the North. This stigma is supported by the ‘Axis of Evil’ rhetoric which is a term U.

S. President George Bush used to describe governments he accused assisting the act of terrorism through seeking and obtaining weapons of

mass destruction (Dennis, 2003). This statement has proven effective in North Korea through the above agreement. A recent development saw South Korea’s President Roh being welcomed by North Korean President Kim Jong Il at the start of an official three day visit.

This lack of hostility between the two leaders has led both Koreans and other diplomatic officials to believe that the turmoil will soon be over (Lim, 2007). By crossing the demilitarised zone between the North and South, President Roh stated with hope that upon his return home ‘many more people will do (cross the border into the North) likewise...

then this line of division will finally be erased and the barrier will break down’ (Lim, 2007). The steps both Presidents are taking in order to ensure the recent summit is successful demonstrates their determination in uniting Korea both peacefully and without external intervention.On the 4th of October this year, both Presidents signed a reconciliation pact on order to officially declare an end to the Korean War (Reuters, 2007). Through signing the peace treaty, the North Korean government has agreed to shut down its three main nuclear facilities and provide the world with a clear and concise declaration of all its nuclear programs (Reuters, 2007). In addition, both Presidents have agreed to assist in reuniting Koreans who have been separated by the tumultuous border (Reuters, 2007).This paper has so far argued entirely from a Western perspective, but a review of North Korean politics is needed in order to balance perspective on likely-hood of re-unification.

North Korea has survived because it never made that final transition to communist state, but rather followed and ideology which simply

put, ‘places all foreigners at arm’s length’ (Cumings, 1995: 54). The regime was handed to the current President’s first born son in the style of Korean royalty of the past thousands of years.Just as Kim Jong Il was groomed to succeed his father, so did the original military commanders and bureaucrats groom their successors. The dominant father figure is the core-unit of Korean culture, so it was straightforward to create culture of unswerving loyalty to Kim Il Sung by portraying him as a benevolent father figure. The above ideology is ‘a state of mind, not an idea, and one that is unavailable to the non-Korean’ (Cumings, 1995:57). This mind-set produced a willingness to go their own way come hell or high water and a belief that ‘North Korea is a model country for the whole world’ (Shuja, 2003: 2).

Coupled with a ‘core political weakness which rests with family and personalistic ties’, with trust barely extended beyond the leader’s family and his long-time associates, means assimilation with South Korea first, and with the rest of the world in the longer term is a daunting task (Cumings, 1995: 58). Given the minuscule progress made over the past fifty years it is difficult to place a time frame on re-unification. If so little progress has been made to date, it is easy to imagine that decades or even generations will be required to achieve re-unification.Irrespective of the time frame, re-conciliation is likely and can only occur logically through peaceful re-unification. This scenario is not only what I believe will happen, but what both Korean sides, and the rest of the world wants. By reunifying peacefully, I believe Korea

will become a united nation that can prosper economically and in time, stand as one of the strongest countries in the world alongside China.

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