Although there are obstacles, the EU-Russia connection holds importance. Marsh and Mackenstein (2005: 202) believe that due to Russia's size and proximity, it cannot be fully integrated nor ignored. The way they engage with each other raises questions about whether it is a strategic alliance or a cooperative endeavor. In an interview with the Italian media before the twelfth Russian-European Union summit in November 2003, President Vladimir Putin stressed how crucial Europe is to Russia as a trade, economic, and political partner.
In spite of being located in Europe, as per Lynch (2004: 100), Russia is interested in building connections with the United States, all American territories and Asia. Nevertheless, Europe remains their primary focus. Though there are certain areas where EU and Russia have similar interests like energy sector, there exist substantial disparities between bo
...th groups which this essay highlights.
Despite having strategic partnerships in certain areas, the EU and Russia are unable to collaborate on military interventions for humanitarian reasons due to points of disagreement. The main obstacle is Russia's non-intervention policy. It is essential to note that the EU accounts for more than 50% of Russia's total exports, with energy being the most important commodity traded (Senokosov Y. and Skidelsky E. 2002, 4).
According to Lynch (2004:108), in 1999, Russia provided 21% of the European Union's oil and 41% of its gas. Senokosov Y. and Skidelsky E. (2002:8) stated that in 1999, Russian oil exports to the EU made up for 53%, while natural gas exports accounted for 63% in 2000. The European Commission revealed statistics showing that member countries were responsible for almost a quarter or £20 billion of Russia's imports and around 35%
equivalent to £45 billion, of its exports.
The EU and Russia's strategic partnership is characterized by an imbalanced trade relationship, as reported in 2007. The report highlights that the EU's imports from Russia only represented 4.4% in 2000, while the EU's exports to Russia accounted for merely 2.1%.
The partnership between the EU and Russia is unbalanced, with the EU benefiting from energy supplies while Russia gains overall income. The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 led to five member states sharing borders with Russia, four of which are new, resulting in a 2,200-kilometre frontier including Kaliningrad - an exclave inhabited by around 900,000 people - added to this border region. A strategic partnership between both powers is crucial for ensuring Kaliningrad's well-being as neighbors closer than ever before. In October 1999, then-Prime Minister Putin presented "The Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010)" to Brussels outlining Russia's approach towards the EU.
According to Johnson and Robinson (2005), Russia's goal of integrating Europe without joining the EU is consistent with the strategy formulated in 1999. To achieve this objective, Russia intends to establish four shared spaces with the EU, a plan that was endorsed by Brussels at the May 2003 EU-Russian summit held in St. Petersburg.
Dinan (2005: 535) states that the EU and Russia aim to enhance their strategic partnership by establishing common spaces. One area of focus is creating a more interlinked market between the two parties, fostering reformation, competitiveness, non-discrimination, transparency, and good governance. This shared economic space also involves closer cooperation on matters affecting both sides such as energy, as well as Russia's adherence to the
Kyoto Protocol (European Commission, 2007: 6).
The main goal of the second space is to establish a shared region for liberty, safety, and justice. This also involves enabling visa-free travel through the 2005 Readmission Agreements. Its key aim is to foster collaboration and collaborative endeavors in dealing with cross-border unlawful activities such as terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. Furthermore, the EU's emphasis rests on enhancing Russia's legal system so it resembles that of Western Europe (European Commission. 2007: 6). The third space serves research and education purposes.
Russia has been granted access to EU educational exchange programs following the signing of several agreements between the two entities. The establishment of a common space is considered by many in Russia as a symbolic gesture from the EU, acknowledging the shared cultural and historical heritage of both Russia and Europe. This partnership represents one of the most successful examples of real progress being made in Russo-EU relations (European Commission. 2007: 6).
The EU and Russia have agreed to collaborate on external security and international relations. This includes crisis management, promoting peace and stability in the Balkans, and working together in the Quartet to advance the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Lynch. 2004: 108). However, this area of cooperation between the two nations is experiencing difficulties, indicating that policy making alone may not be enough to establish a strong strategic partnership (Marsh and Mackenstein).
According to Johnson D. (2005: 203), although there are common spaces and agreements between the European Union and Russia, there are still limitations on forming a strategic partnership. Moscow still maintains full sovereignty over its internal affairs, resulting in limited actual changes from
these agreements. Therefore, practical cooperation, particularly in security dialogue, is necessary for effective EU-Russian relations rather than relying on mere rhetorical declarations of partnership.
According to Robinson P. 2005: 115, Putin stated that Russia has no intention of becoming a member of the EU. Putin has reiterated this stance in subsequent statements, making it clear that Russia's goals do not include EU membership.
In 2003, Putin emphasized the importance of improving cooperation effectiveness and quality. Russia's strategy for EU relations is to prioritize national interests and economic protection, even if it contradicts the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or WTO negotiations. As a result, Brussels will not be allowed to interfere in Russia's sovereign affairs. A clear disagreement between Russia and the EU revolves around foreign affairs, specifically related to Russia's role in Chechnya.
The EU-Russo partnership appears to only operate effectively when both sides are already in agreement and receive mutual benefits, as evidenced by the European Council's condemnation of Chechen city bombings and call for a review of the Common Strategy during its meeting in Helsinki in December, leading to a £40 million reduction in Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) for Russia between 1999 and 2000 (Johnson and Robinson. 2005: 117).
According to Marsh and Mackenstein (2005: 201), the protection of what Russia defines as its 'spheres of influence' makes cooperative interventions, both military and non-military, more difficult, especially if Russia opposes such measures. This sensitivity was revealed during the Kosovo War when a Russian military unit from Bosnia arrived at Pristina airport before NATO could take control of it. Due to Russia's discomfort with NATO and the EU's close relationship with it, any
joint military action in the southern Caucasus, as suggested by the EU High Representative for CFSP, Solana, seems highly improbable. This highlights how a robust defense partnership remains far from being achieved.
Despite numerous declarations and speeches about the significance of relations with Russia, the EU has not given enough attention to this policy area, resulting in the former Russian president's failure to establish a strategic partnership. The Europeans have been preoccupied with enlargement to 25, and then 27 member states, as well as drafting a constitution, which has hindered the progress of Russian-EU relations. Therefore, these relations remain troubled (Lynch. 2004: 103; Dinan).
In 2005, it was noted that there were areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia, particularly in economics (specifically regarding energy), education and research, and a limited degree of co-operation concerning terrorism and drug trafficking. However, for a complete and genuine strategic partnership to thrive, cooperation on defense is necessary. One suggestion for a promising starting point for such cooperation is a joint peacekeeping operation to aid in the resolution of the conflict in Moldova. As a borderland between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Moldova plays a significant role in both parties' interests and influence. Thus, accommodating each other's interests and collaborating in Moldova could serve as an initial step toward creating a bona fide strategic partnership between Moscow and Brussels.
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