Discretionary Powers in Admin Law Essay Example

of Discretionary Power

When exercising discretionary power, it is essential to ensure that the decision made does not have an adverse impact on the rights of individuals.

Establishing constraints is crucial to prevent the occurrence of situations where public bodies disregard them and make decisions based on a mistaken interpretation of their level or nature of discretion. The incorrect use of discretion can be viewed from two perspectives: when the body exceeds its limits of discretion and...

The act is considered ultra vires and the body is accused of abusing its discretion, such as acting mala fides. Both instances can be grounds for challenging the decision through judicial review.

The court usually does not overturn decisions from lower jurisdictions or tribunals unless there is a clear legal mistake or an unsupported fact finding. The court emphasizes the decision-making process rather than the actual decision. Additionally, when a discretionary power is questioned, the court tends to give deference to expert bodies with specialized knowledge. This principle is referred to as the doctrine of curial deference.

The court will evaluate the factors considered and the weight given by a decision maker when exercising discretionary power, ensuring that irrelevant factors did not significantly influence the decision. If the decision maker fails to provide reasons for their decision, it can work in favor of the applicant as it is increasingly seen as unreasonable by the court. It should be noted that abuse of discretion can happen through both improper exercise or failure to use discretion by the authorized body. Ultra Vires.

Before exploring the potential areas where an abuse of discretion can occur, it is important to first understand the ultra vires rule in administrative

law. This rule states that when executive or administrative bodies are granted powers through legislation, those powers are only valid if exercised within the intended limits, whether they are explicitly or implicitly stated. Thus, if a decision maker exceeds these limits while exercising discretion, their decision will be considered ultra vires and therefore invalid.

Wednesbury Principles

In determining whether a decision maker has abused their discretionary power in making a decision, it is crucial to consider the concept of reasonableness. The principle of reasonableness serves as a fundamental control in the exercise of any discretionary power and was elucidated by Lord Greene in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd.

According to the Wednesbury Corporation, being "unreasonable" means engaging in actions that are prohibited. This might include not following the law and neglecting relevant considerations while focusing on irrelevant ones. Engaging in such behavior would be regarded as unreasonable.

Lord Greene's judgment clarifies the proper exercise of discretionary power by a decision maker, which is crucial for ensuring the legality of their decision. This emphasizes that not following these guidelines can lead to an accusation of abusing power. Therefore, it is essential for decision makers to align their decisions with the enabling statute to ensure compliance with the law.

The decision maker cannot act in bad faith by not directing himself properly, which includes considering both intra vires and constitutional limitations.

Rand J's main argument is that individuals should act with the objective of achieving an unauthorized goal. He believes that discretion and good faith are intertwined in carrying out public duties, and statutes should be interpreted within a specific perspective. However, proving bad faith is challenging as the burden

of proof lies with the applicant. The court is reluctant to overturn decisions made in bad faith due to its respect for elected officials and public representatives, as accusing someone of acting in bad faith is a serious matter. Some argue that regardless of whether the decision maker holds an elected position or not, the judiciary must remain impartial when handling allegations of bad faith as part of upholding the separation of powers.

The difficulty lies in establishing the shared intent of a group or committee when reaching decisions, due to their diverse perspectives and affiliations, which makes it challenging to prove any malicious intentions. Previously, acting negligently was regarded as equivalent to acting with ill will. Nevertheless, SBBS clarified that it is not required to demonstrate awareness of such ill will; showing negligence is enough. However, there has been a deviation from this principle. Gyles J presided over the case of NAKF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

The statement argues that entering a state of bad faith cannot be done unintentionally, no matter how foolish or careless one may be. It also states that engaging in deception or willful ignorance is not something that can be done accidentally. Another example of an unjust use of discretionary power is when the decision maker does not properly follow legal guidelines, such as making a decision with an improper motive.

When a power is initially granted for one specific purpose, it cannot be used for a different purpose afterwards. If the enabling statute grants a discretionary power in an ambiguous manner, the courts can still exert control by inferring an implied purpose. However, the decision maker cannot imply

a purpose based on unreasonable grounds. An issue may arise when an implied purpose is inferred from an Act, and that purpose can be interpreted in various ways, as seen in the case of Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd. In this case, the Privy Council overturned a Court of Appeal decision that accused a minister of acting for an improper purpose, clearly demonstrating interpretative discretion. When multiple purposes exist.

The exercise of discretionary power can become more complicated when multiple purposes are involved, particularly if one of them is improper. Moreover, different jurisdictions employ various tests to assess the validity of a decision. In Ireland, England, and Wales, the prevalent test is the dominant purpose test. According to this test, as long as the primary purpose for making a decision is valid, the decision will be upheld even in the presence of an improper secondary purpose. Conversely, Australia commonly adopts a stricter test whereby a decision will not be deemed valid if it was made for an improper purpose.

In New Zealand, a less strict test is now being used compared to another jurisdiction. In this test, the purposes used may still be valid even if they are not specifically mentioned in the Act, as long as they align with the overall objective of the lawmakers.

Relevance of Factors

When a decision maker has discretionary power, they must consider all relevant factors and disregard irrelevant ones. To determine relevance, the enabling statute is examined, which may explicitly mention the considerations that need to be taken into account. However, in cases where the wording is not precise enough, the relevant factors must be implied into the statute. If a statute

provides a clear list of considerations but the decision maker considers an additional factor not stated in the statute, it does not automatically invalidate the decision.

In order to determine if the list provided by the legislator is meant to be definitive, it is crucial to assess each case individually. This assessment involves examining the subject matter, scope, and purpose of the Act. Additionally, analyzing the wording of the statute helps establish whether a factor being considered is mandatory or discretionary. In specific situations, decision makers are clearly directed by the enabling statute using terms like "bound" or "may" to indicate whether they must consider such a factor. It should be noted that even if a factor requiring discretion in its consideration is not taken into account, the decision will still be valid.

It is crucial to differentiate between relevance and legal relevance. Legal relevance pertains to a factor that is deemed highly significant, to the extent that disregarding it would be unreasonable, and failing to consider it renders the decision invalid.

If a less important but still relevant factor is ignored, it will not invalidate the decision even if mentioned in the statute. When a factor is not explicitly stated in a statute, who has authority to determine its relevance? Originally, English courts ruled that the decision maker should decide what is relevant, which seemed strange as it gave them a self-regulating role. However, Lord Keith later overturned this opinion and stated that it is the courts' responsibility to determine what constitutes a relevant consideration. If the decision maker mistakenly believes a consideration is irrelevant, the decision cannot stand. Lord Keith also supported Deane J.'s stance on

this issue.

Sean Investments asserts that the final decision lies in the hands of the decision maker, who has the authority to evaluate the significance of pertinent factors. This viewpoint was subsequently endorsed by Sullivan J. in Scrollside Ltd. V Broadcasting Commission of Ireland, affirming that it is within the discretion of the decision maker, not the courts, to determine the degree of importance assigned to various considerations. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the decision maker to exercise prudence and provide sufficient reasoning for their decision as courts have intervened in cases where they perceived an improper assessment was made regarding a relevant consideration.

In conclusion, decision makers must justify their reasoning when making a decision by considering relevancy and weight. Failure to mention a specific relevant consideration does not automatically invalidate the decision as it does not imply ignorance of the pertinent factor. However, if it is evident from the reasoning that an irrelevant factor was considered alongside relevant ones, the decision will only be invalidated if the weight given to the irrelevant factor was significant.

Additional Factors

When evaluating whether discretionary power has been appropriately exercised, various other factors should be considered.

The first issue is whether the decision made was reasonable. We have previously talked about the concept of reasonableness in terms of the actions of the decision maker. However, this perspective examines the rationality of the decision itself, separate from the process used to reach it. The courts will step in if they believe the decision was "...so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it..." However, there has been some inconsistency in Ireland regarding how the test for unreasonableness is established, as

seen in State (Keegan) v Stardust Victims' Compensation Tribunal.

It was argued that the decision went against basic logic and common sense. However, the Supreme Court in O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanala adopted a stricter definition. It stated that in order to satisfy a court, it must be proven that the authority made the decision without considering any relevant material. Another important factor to consider is when the decision maker disregards their own discretion or imposes a policy that restricts it, which is known as fettering of discretion.

The occurrence of rigidly applying a discretionary policy without considering individual circumstances is a common problem. Lord Reid emphasized this point in the British Oxygen v Board of Trade case, stating that a policy is acceptable as long as the authority is open to hearing new perspectives. Ireland follows a similar approach, emphasizing the examination of each case individually to allow for a review of unique circumstances. It is concluded that strictly adhering to a policy does not allow for flexibility in considering differing situations.

The importance of discretionary power in Administrative Law is evident due to the wide range of decisions necessary for proper governance. The complexity of legislation and the need for expert opinion make it impossible for legislators to provide precise wording for every scenario. Granting discretionary power is the only way to overcome these challenges. However, with discretion comes the potential for abuse, making it essential to control such abuse in the exercise of discretionary power.

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