Did Desert Storm Represent a Revolution or Evolution in Air Power Essay Example

evolution or revolution from the NATO Joint Glossary or the UK’s terms, therefore the Oxford English Dictionary definition will be employed in that : “Evolution is the gradual development of something” which juxtaposes with revolution, which is defined as “a dramatic and wide-reaching change in conditions, attitudes, or operation“ . And as Murray and Knox (2001) point out; at the heart of both terms there are contemporary debates about military strategy.

In seeking to identify evolutionary or revolutionary elements of Op  from an air intelligence perspective, the employment of air power will be considered against the intelligence cycle, focusing on collection, dissemination, analysis and employment . The first area for consideration will be the airborne intelligence collection assets, deployed against the Iraqi problem set. In excess of eight thousand air intelligence collection missions were conducted in the Combined Joint Operations Area in the build-up to, and during Op.

The aircraft focused primarily on the collection of IMINT and SIGNIT , conducting 3236 reconnaissance flights and 2918 electronic warfare flights between the 16 Jan 1991 and 28 Feb 1991 . In addition, some members of the coalition had access to US SIGINT and IMINT data, derived from US Intelligence Satellites developed during the cold war for global intelligence gathering. All intelligence collection assets – strategic, operational and tactical deployed, were developed in the decades preceding Op , in response to Cold War problem sets .

This research and development proved to be fortuitous, as intelligence preparation of the environment indicated that a significant amount of capability fielded by the Iraqi Forces was Russian in origin and therefore the coalition forces were already configured

against these systems. Some adaptations were made to the aircraft and sensors, to deal with local climatic conditions and collection parameters . However all of these were an evolution of existing capability and capacity and can be placed on the continuum of assets that were developed for the Cold War.

Before any assessment pertaining to dissemination of intelligence can be made it is important to place intelligence knowledge management into the correct technical setting, circa 1990. During Operation  linked computer networks, for the transfer of large quantities of data, had not been developed and intelligence harvested by airborne assets was assessed primarily by analysts organic to the unit. The results were then released in signal format, conveyed by telephoned and disseminated as a hard copy report .

In addition to this, some unprocessed data was couriered to higher formations for further analysis on magnetic tape . However, this represented a small amount of the total collect effort. The effect of this linked, or at best branch network structure, for the sharing of intelligence, vice the multi-channel multi-modal methodologies that are currently employed, limited the flow and dissemination of information and its subsequent processing into intelligence.

A key lesson identified in the review of Op was that there was a requirement to transmit and share intelligence material in a timelier manner . To address this structural weakness the US invested heavily in technology in the following decades. Once processed the intelligence was disseminated to customers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level the intelligence was employed primarily to determine regime intent, most notably in relation to weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and the employment of weapons against Israel.

This focus of collect would have overridden the priority to collect in other areas; a prioritisation that remains an issue in contemporary prioritisation . Due to the dynamic nature of the operation, the intelligence analysis struggled to keep pace with the changing situation, and as a result did not produce a coherent set of reporting to inform the decision making by senior commanders. General Schwarzkopf, in Senate Committee hearings following the war, described that he was often fed heavily caveated reporting or it was not timely enough .

An explanation for this is that the collection plan was targeted against the problem sets and compartmented in a hierarchical manner in order to understand the environment against which fielded forces were arrayed. However, there were many issues in the employment of intelligence in this manner, including timeliness, security caveat and collection priorities and battle damage assessment . An analysis of elements that comprised the A2 for Op DESERT STORM suggests that the war represents a continuation on the spectrum of intelligence technological and doctrinal development that occurred post WW2, through Vietnam and through the Cold War.

The next area that will be considered is the conduct of operations examining platforms, weapons, and targeting. During Op  whilst there were 34 members of the UN coalition, the practical contribution by nation varied significantly, both in their role, capacity and capability . This is a critical factor to acknowledge, as any discussion about evolution or revolution in airpower has to focus primarily on the US, with the UK, France, Canada and Italy taken into account albeit to

a lesser extent, due to their relative contribution.

In quantitative terms Cordesman and Wagner (1990) conclude that the US provided 85% of all air power assets involved in the operation. Of the airpower brought into theatre (approximately 1800 aircraft) , there were aerial platforms that fulfilled a spectrum of roles, including but not limited to: command and control, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, airlift (tactical and strategic), air re-fuelling, attack and rotary . It was necessary to deploy this broad range of aircraft due to the perceived omplexity of the operational task. The profile of air asset employment was driven by the strategic campaign plan which had four distinct phases: (1) The Strategic Air Campaign, (2) Gain Air Supremacy, (3) Battle Field Preparation and finally (4) support the Ground Offensive Campaign . Of the assets deployed the majority had been developed in response to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Some argue that the F-117A low observable aircraft represented a revolutionary military technology .

However, its origins can be traced to the significant losses that the US incurred in Vietnam to Soviet Radar SAM systems – and indeed the long lead time in the development of such systems preclude their rapid acquisition and deployment in rapidly emerging conflicts. Of the weapons employed, Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), Cruise Missiles and Precision weapons are also oft touted as being revolutionary elements of Op DESERT STORM . For this reason each will be addressed separately.

During the opening phase of the operation one of the much vaunted weapons was the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). The weapon was deployed

to help mitigate the threat posed to aircraft by guided Surface to Air Weapons such as the SA-5 GAMMON and SA-2 GAINFUL . Conceived in the late 1970’s, HARM went into full production in 1983 and was used operationally for the first time against Soviet built SA-5’s during Op  against Libya in 1985 .

So while receiving much acclaim and providing significant utility in the sead role, harm was not a revolutionary weapon as it had been in existence for nearly a decade prior to the start of the hostilities with Iraq. The second weapon that will be considered is the precision bomb. It is possible to trace the lineage of this weapon to radio guided weapons devised originally during WWII. During the gulf war, in excess of nine thousand precision guided weapons were dropped on a diverse range of target sets.

Surprisingly, this significant figure represents only 4% of the total tonnage, as 210,000 unguided bombs were also employed . However, as Keany and Cohen (1993) convincingly argue, what made the employment of the precision guided munitions revolutionary was, firstly, the marrying of them to the F-117A Stealth fighter– allowing for rapid attrition of Iraqi C2 nodes and, secondly, their employment against fielded armour in Kuwait. This limited the need for area or ‘carpet bombing’ which, combined with the element of surprise, represented a new epoch in warfare.

The final weapon that will be considered is the cruise missile. The conceptual idea for an autonomous weapon can be traced to the 1909 film ‘The Airship Destroyer’ in which a British inventor develops an “aerial torpedo”, controlled by “wireless electricity”, which he

uses to bring down the enemy air fleet. Originally introduced into service in the 1970’s by the US, the term ‘cruise missile’ now describes a family of sub sonic, precision strike weapons .

Realised during the Cold War, cruise missiles are designed to deliver payloads (nuclear and conventional) to targets at medium range in a high threat environment, with precision and thereby limit the risk to own forces. Of the 228 cruise missiles fired during Op, the majority were employed during phase one, as per existing doctrine, against strategic target sets, including the Iraqi air defence net and command and control structures .

Whilst an important weapon, it did not represent a revolutionary step change as the weapons were originally conceived against the Soviet threat. The next area that will be addressed is the targeting strategy that was employed during Op DESERT STORM. From the outset the operation had very clearly defined goals and a legal mandate from UN resolution 678, around which to build the targeting directive in line with political objectives.

This prioritisation list was set out in National Security Directive 54 , giving six main objectives: “(1) Defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states against attack, (2) preclude Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighbouring states and friendly forces (3) destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities, (4) destroy Iraq's command, control, and communications capabilities; (5) eliminate the Republican Guards as an effective fighting force; (6) conduct operations designed to drive Iraq's forces from Kuwait, break the will of Iraqi forces, discourage Iraqi use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, encourage defection of Iraqi forces, and weaken Iraqi

popular support for the current government”. This ‘kinetic shopping list’ maps well to the ‘Rings Model’ developed by Warden which identified for any country the centres of gravity as: (1) Leadership, (2) Organic/System Essentials/Key Production, (3) Infrastructure, (4) Population, (5) Fielded Military Forces. Each of these domains was engaged by airpower and in the three days had the effect of paralysing the Iraqi C2 structure. From this it is clear that employing existing models was effective and that there was no holistic revolution in the employment of air delivered kinetic force.

What was revolutionary in the J3 arena was the combination of precision technology, stealth and surprise to get inside the Iraqi ‘OODA’ loop as proposed by Boyd and deliver overwhelming kinetic effect to nodes of the Iraqi military. The final area of air power employment that will be considered is planning and execution, focusing on: (1) Unity of Command, (2) Centralised Planning, (3) Centralised Control, and finally (4) Decentralised Execution . RAF doctrine describes unity of effort as ‘most likely to be achieved when command is exercised at the highest practicable level, where the relative priorities of combined and joint demands on air and space assets can best be assessed. ’ In order to provide a Unity of Command during Op, General Schwarzkopf delegated authority for the control of air assets to the Joint Forces Air Commander, General Horner .

This delegated authority was critical as it allowed General Horner to control all of the coalition air assets in the operational theatre, rather than just being the Air Component Commander, as had occurred in previous conflicts . This requirement was initially identified

during WWII and sought to exploit the flexibility of air power and generate the ability to mass forces when and where required. During planning for Op  issues were identified with ensuring the unity of command among the coalition and internally in the US military . One of the key differences of opinion between US Commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines was Tactical Control (TACON) versus Operational Control (OPCON) of apportionment of air assets.

This friction was greatest in employment of air power for the defence of capital assets, such as the carriers for the Navy and control of battlefield interdiction assets for Army and Marines . For each of these services control of these assets was seen as critical. In order to limit the negative effect of this command and control structure, operational control vice operational command being retained by the components. This tension continued throughout Op in the prioritisation of Navy, Marine and Army aviation assets; with virtual presence being perceived by ground forces as actual absence. Allied to unity of command is the ability to plan centrally.

In current UK Doctrine “Centralised planning is essential to ensure that integrated operations meet the Joint Force Commander’s overall intent, avoid mutual interference and that high value assets can be concentrated at the critical time and place”. During the build-up to Op, planning for the employment of airpower was conducted at the Joint Force Air Component Command level by General Horner. However, the US planners did not fully integrate all members of the coalition into the planning organisation . Only American, British and Saudi planners were included. Arguably the Saudis were

only included as a political gesture to appease the Saudi Arabian government due to the grand strategic requirement to base coalition forces within the country .

It is credible that if the operation had been launched from an alternate location Saudi planners would not have been invited into the core planning group. This lack of coordination with coalition partners is likely to have resulted in a limited understanding of the capabilities of assets that each partner nation possessed. However, due to the significant imbalance of US forces compared to other nations, the US retained overall control. In future conflicts where there is greater parity of coalition force numbers, it is credible that other nations will seek greater input into the centralised planning of air operations. Allied to centralised planning is centralised control of assets.

As “Centralised control gives responsibility and authority for planning, directing and coordinating air capabilities to a single commander, maximizing operational effectiveness and avoiding duplication of effort” . The creation and fusion of a number of air space control documents, by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander – from the Combined Air Operation Centre (including the Air Tasking Order, the Air Space Control Order, the Communications Card and Special Instructions as per NATO Doctrine) allowed for the effective control of highly congested airspace. The ability to control the airspace effectively and avoid duplication overcame many of the issues encountered during the early employment of airpower.

By generating Composite Air Operations through the Air Tasking Order process, it was possible to develop large combined multinational packages which sought to create a specific effect in time and space. The engagement of

this strategy, from prevailing NATO doctrine and tactics, provided a mechanism for the effective centralisation and control of air power. However, whilst this mechanism allows for effective control it can be argued that the rigid nature of the air tasking order cycle reduces the Air Commander to little more than being a manager of assets, vice an operational commander who is able to dynamically control the air battle. The final area that will be addressed whilst examining planning and execution is decentralised execution.

Air Publication 3000 states that : “Decentralised execution is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable subordinate commanders, providing agility and catering for the uncertainty and fluidity inevitable in all operations. ” The requirement during Op to devolve execution authority to subordinate commanders was necessitated by the speed required for decision making in the employment of air power. As has been discussed and shown the majority of the planning and conduct of Op  was developed from existing NATO doctrine and adapted for the theatre and available technologies. From a concatenation of these factors there was no revolution in the planning and execution of airpower during Op  rather there was a make and do approach with existing capabilities.

This paper has addressed three key areas; intelligence, operations and planning, in an attempt to determine if Op  was in military terms evolutionary or revolutionary. Intelligence collection, dissemination, analysis and employment were individually evaluated, concluding collection employed assets that had been developed over the previous decades, focusing primarily on airborne sigint and imint to provide situational awareness. Once collected there were considerable technological and security challenges in disseminating the intelligence, and

the senior hierarchy was highly critical of the heavily caveated nature of the reporting that they received, opining that it was effectively useless in the conduct of operations; for this reason the A2 cannot be classed as revolutionary.

Operations were considered through analysis of platforms, weapons, and targeting. The platforms employed were primarily designed for the Cold War against the Soviet threat. This proved to be prophetic as the Iraqi’s had purchased significant quantities of Soviet era weaponry. The F117A was held up to be revolutionary in the media, but this too was forged in the crucible of the Cold War. A similar pattern emerges for the weapons and tactics, however, what was novel was the matching of low observable technology to precision weapons along with surprise, which proved more than the Iraqi’s could match or adapt to. This area can therefore be considered revolutionary.

The last area that was addressed was the planning and conduct of the operation, examining: (1) Unity of Command, (2) Centralised Planning, (3) Centralised Control, and finally (4) Decentralised Execution . Each of these areas was carried out as part of a coalition using doctrine and tactics primarily developed by NATO. This too was a continuation of the work conducted during the Cold War and as such was yet again not revolutionary. So whilst the initial images of Op  and the stealth jets portray a narrative of military revolution as Binford (1994) succinctly puts it: "We need to understand that the Gulf War did not take 100 hours to win. It took 20 years. " ?