The suspect placed the highest bid for the plaintiff’s goods at an auction but withdrew it before the auctioneer struck down the cock, thereby signifying acceptance. As a result, it was determined that the suspect was not obligated to purchase the goods, as his bid was merely an offer that he had the right to retract at any time before acceptance was indicated. It should be noted that this ruling conforms to the common law rule codified in s57 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
In Fisher v Bell (1960), a shop owner displayed a flick knife with a price tag in their window, which was forbidden by the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. However, the court held that displaying an item with a price tag in a shop window is merely an invitation to negotiate and not an offe
...r for sale, so the owner was not found guilty of offering the knife for sale.
Lastly, in PSGB v Boots (1953), the Court of Appeal considered whether sales of certain drugs at Boots' self-service store were supervised by a registered pharmacist.Somervell LJ affirmed that in the case of an ordinary store where goods are displayed for clients to choose from, the contract is not complete until the client indicates what they want and the tradesman or their representative accepts the offer. This was established in Partridge v Crittenden (1968). In a different context, Lord Herschell stated in Grainger V Gough (Surveyor of Taxes) [1896] AC 325, that a price list does not constitute an offer to supply an unlimited amount of the described item at the named price. Therefore, once an orde
is given, a binding contract is formed to supply that specified amount. It would be impractical for the merchant to be obligated to supply an unlimited amount of a particular product as their stock is limited. In opposition to the suspect's belief in Partridge v Crittenden, it was ruled by the High Court that offering wild birds for sale was illegal after advertising them in a periodical. Lord Parker CJ stated that advertisements and handbills are typically invitations to handle, and not offers for sale unless they come from manufacturers.In the case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893), an advertisement was made for a product called "smoke balls" that claimed it could prevent the flu. The advertisement stated that the company would pay ?100 to anyone who contracted the flu after using their product. To show their seriousness, the company deposited ?1,000 with Alliance Bank. The plaintiff purchased a smoke ball from the company and subsequently contracted the flu. The court ruled that since the company deposited money with the bank, they intended to be bound by their offer, and therefore, the advertisement constituted an offer. Additionally, they could make an offer to the public that could be accepted by anyone who bought a smoke ball. The offer of protection included the period of usage, and purchasing and using the smoke ball amounted to acceptance.
On the other hand, in Harvey V Facey (1893), the plaintiff sent a telegram to the defendant asking for the lowest cash price for Bumper Hall Pen. In response, the defendant sent a telegram stating that the lowest price was ?900. The plaintiff then sent another telegram accepting to
buy the Pen for ?900. However, it was ruled that the defendant's telegram was only an indication of their minimum asking price and not an offer. Therefore, the plaintiff's second telegram could not constitute acceptance.
In Gibson V MCC (1979), the council provided details of a scheme for selling council houses to tenants. The plaintiff responded promptly by paying ?3 as a processing fee.The council's response to G's inquiry regarding purchasing their council house was that they would sell it at ?2.725 less 20%, equalling ?2.180 (freehold). The letter also provided information about a mortgage and advised that the letter should not be considered as an offer for a mortgage or a house purchase. To formally apply to purchase the council house, G completed and returned the enclosed application form promptly. The new Labour-controlled council instructed their officers not to sell council houses unless legally obliged to do so, resulting in the council declining to sell to G. In the House of Lords, Lord Diplock stated that the italicized words made it difficult to interpret the letter as a contractual offer that could be converted into an enforceable contract for the sale of land by G's written acceptance of it. The letter only outlined the financial terms on which the council may consider selling the house in due course. In Harvela v Royal Trust (1985), Royal Trust requested offers for shares in a company and agreed to accept the highest offer. Harvela offered $2.175 million, while Sir Leonard Outerbridge offered $2.1 million or $100,000 more than any other offer. Royal Trust accepted Sir Leonard's offer, but the court ruled in favor of Harvela in the House
of Lords.In the case of Blackpool Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council (1990), Lord Templeman stated that a fixed price sale could be represented by sellers requesting confidential offers and accepting the highest offer. This invitation, when properly construed, created a fixed price sale, meaning Sir Leonard was not entitled to submit a referential bid and the sellers were not entitled to accept it. The case involved the council inviting bids for an airport to be submitted by midday on a specific day. Despite the complainant delivering their bid by hand to the Town Hall letterbox at 11am, it was recorded as received late and was not considered. The club sued for breach of a guarantee that bids received by the deadline would be considered. The court awarded damages for breach of contract and negligence, dismissing the council's appeal. In Brogden v MRC (1877), B supplied coal to MRC for years without an agreement. MRC sent an arbitration agreement to B, who filled it out and returned it. Coal was ordered and supplied accordingly, but when a dispute arose, B claimed there was no binding agreement.The parties' conduct indicated their agreement that B's return of the amended papers constituted a counter-offer, rather than an acceptance. This counter-offer could be deemed accepted when MRC placed an order for coal or when B actually provided the coal.
- Jurisprudence essays
- Social Injustice essays
- Juvenile Justice essays
- Agreement essays
- Business Law essays
- Common Law essays
- Community Policing essays
- Constitution essays
- Consumer Protection essays
- Contract essays
- Contract Law essays
- Copyright Infringement essays
- Court essays
- Crime essays
- Criminal Law essays
- Employment Law essays
- Family Law essays
- Injustice essays
- Judge essays
- Jury essays
- Justice essays
- Lawsuit essays
- Lawyer essays
- Marijuana Legalization essays
- Ownership essays
- Police essays
- Property essays
- Protection essays
- Security essays
- Tort Law essays
- Treaty essays
- United States Constitution essays
- War on Drugs essays