Philosophy 201: Test Answers – Flashcards

- Ancient science was speculative - not to explain how the world worked but to devise principles for how things had to be - Aristotelian world-view o Aristotelian views dominated philosophy, religion, and science o Aristotle gave a picture of the world which one could know with certainty o Aristotelian theory of world Made of four elements • air and fire's nature was to go up away from the centre • water and earth wanted to go downwards Celestial bodies had to move in a circle and therefore were made of something different - Over time every principle of Aristotelian astronomy was falsified

- Western philosophy began with Thades in 6th century BC o Thought everything was water o He was the first philosopher because his justification was based on experience and reason rather than tradition o People thought philosophy was about how to live and how to know what to do - about ethics and epistemology - 5th century emerged the sophists o In Greek courts, one needed to argue and the sophists instructed people how to argue and win cases o Not interested in getting at the truth o Protagoras, every truth is just how it feels to you "Man is the measure of all things" o Feeling among them of scepticism "You can't really know anything" o Scepticism is continually recurrent in philosophy - Socrates 5th/4th century o He would try to convince people things - Plato 5th/4th o Criticised Socrates for trying to find knowledge in the world of the senses o True knowledge is like mathematics o Knowledge is what can't be otherwise o Has to be in the purely intelligible world (imagine souls trapped in the body) o Was quite different as they focused on things that only can't be otherwise and wanted to know the nature of things in themselves

o Aristotle thinks it is possible know things in the world of the senses that can't be otherwise - contra plato o Distinctions between accidental and essential properties Example: • E.g. Socrates is human - knowledge because it is essential/ • Socrates is musical - not knowledge because it is accidental Example 2: • A tastiest pie • Tastiest is accidental because it arguably could be otherwise If a more tastier pie came along, that thing would still exist • Pastry is essential because it must have pastry If there was no longer pastry, it could not be a pie If you know what something is, you must know its essential nature o Change Essential does not change, • not the unmusical becomes musical but the essential became x then y, Socrates became unmusical and then musical Essential nature underlies change Accidental doesn't change because it doesn't survive o Causality To know an object, we must know why the object is the way it is Causation = A thing realising its potential (what it wants to be) Causality of an acorn: 1. Material cause - needs matter such as soil 2. Efficient cause - right place at right time - light, soil, water 3. Formal Cause - structure of the acorn which will develop 4. Final cause - its aim and teleology - oak tree o Form/matter distinction String (matter) becoming shorter (form) changes octave Socrates (matter of the human) exists but his life (form) can depart Matter remains but the form changes o View of perceptual knowledge Mind can assimilate form (like round bronze in a ball) but it doesn't take on the matter Important because we have knowledge because we have a replica of the world inside of us - it is clear why we knows something Account dominated until Descartes

- Method of doubt o Wants to figure out what he can know by systematically doubting all propositions and starting from the world up - Scepticism of the external world o Sceptical of knowledge through senses as he has been deceived before like in a dream o All social and physical sciences are doubtful yet not initially sceptical of mathematical knowledge - Mathematical knowledge can be doubtful o If a deceiving demon or God exists, then all knowledge, including mathematical knowledge, can be illusions produced by the powerful being - Scepticism of Probability o If you say a belief is highly probable, then one will continue to believe and assert them and eventually assert things that turn out to be wrong because other things he has believed in with probability were wrong - Summary of meditation 1: o He wasn't able to be sure of his senses after the first meditation o Wanted to find one point to be certain on Meditation 2: - Certainty of his own existence because I think therefore I am o Needed to exist as a precondition for deception - Self-identity o He is a thinking being o Cannot say he is anything else because he can imagine being deceived - Can be certain of the seemings Meditation 3: - Feels he has to establish the existence of God before the world because he wants to establish there is a non-deceiving being that causes everything that exists - Causal argument o Establishes causal principle - usually the cause is greater than the effect o Any idea has x much representative reality must be caused by something which has at least X much intrinsically o Photo of Eiffel tower is representationally bigger than the flower yet intrinsically smaller o Centaur idea comes from a mix of real ideas (human and horse) - Cosmological argument - from phenomena to God - for the existence of God: o Everything has a cause and effect o If an idea exists, then it must be caused by and represent something with at least as much reality as that contained in the idea o If an idea of God exist, then it is o Cannot gotten the idea of god from oneself or others but must be from an actual perfect being Meditation 4: - Trying to prove the existence of God and reconcile a good, non-deceiving God with Descartes deceived beliefs. - Error is a negative - False beliefs come from a limitation in judgment and imperfection of the individual - Deception is an indication of lack of perfection - God is essential to a knowledge of reality Meditation 5: - Ontological argument - deals with the nature of reality and has no premises - idea of God to God o Essence and existence distinction: Essence of sparrow is not the existence of sparrow E.g. What a sparrow is and that a sparrow exists Existence is not a part of the essence of the sparrow is to say you can know a what a sparrow is without knowing that it is o Argument: Existence is a part of God's essence If I know what God is, then I know that God is o Reformulated: God is all perfections and existence is a perfection If there is a God, then He exists If there is a river, then it has banks o Reformulated again: If he could exist, then he must exist because If I had an idea of God, then he could exist (because it is possible) I do have an idea of God Therefore, He exists - Necessary existence is not the nature of everything - Vivid and Clear Criteria o V and C is real and positive o If V and C is positive, then it is not a negative (error) and must be created by God o God is not a deceiver who creates deception o If D forms opinions on what is vivid and C, then it is true - Can know things that are "intellectual" in nature - such as God - and the subject matter of pure mathematics because they are C and D Sum: - He exists - Ideas have content - Ideas represent things - Established that the idea of God leads to the existence of God - Now knows God is not a deceiver because he must have perfections Meditation 6: - Mind-body dualism o Assumes that in perception, the mind was passive - Assuming the causal principle - Argument for the external world o If the ideas of bodies were not caused by bodies themselves, then God would be a deceiver because He has "strongly inclined" Decartes to believe them o He is not a deceiver o Therefore, they are caused by external bodies o Therefore, the external world exists o They are not caused by me but either directly by God or external bodies - different from Berkeley o Some ideas are produced against the will - Mechanism - world is composed of things that have mechanical features like balls on strings - Now that he knows what sources are knowledge, he can evaluate his knowledge - He can conclude what the world is like - Usually the senses provide accurate information - Objection to dreams: o "Chief reason for doubt" o Dreams are different from waking experience by virtue of memory links E.g. If he encounters something, then he cannot doubt it because how can connect it with memories from the rest of his life without interruptions and can be affirmed by all senses and intellect - A world revealed by observation, not by reasoning - therefore compatible with new science - Vividly and clearly perceive true phenomena

Book 2: Notion of idea, sort of ideas, how we get them, what we can do with them and how they relate to the external world - Contra Descartes: Argues against the idea of innate ideas - if we had all these innate ideas, then we would all believe in God, but we don't - Not interested in distinction between mind and matter - open to a non--dualistic mind - Certainty o Descartes wanted to find rock bottom certainty - Locke was just interested in exploring the mind and not necessarily argumentation o Introverted - Limitations: o All we know are ideas o We don't need to know much more o God has given us knowledge of 1) duties to man and God and 2) having a comfortable life (like technological and scientific advances) o Indirect knowledge of the world - Nature of ideas: o Introduces word idea - idea in Plato is like an essence of something in the word beyond the senses o Locke thought of ideas as being like pictures in a dark room o Can acquire ideas through sensation - perceiving external objects - and reflection - observing internal states of affairs etc. o Assumes that substances in the external world produce ideas o Experience produces the ideas and the mind can combine or modify them - Human is not a sleeping being otherwise he would think when asleep - Assumes perception is passive - action of producing reflected ideas is active, reflection and sensation is passive - Primary/Secondary Quality distinction o Qualities in objects are whatever produces the idea - infer quality from idea o Primary and secondary qualities - secondaries are nothing in the object but/except powers to produce sensations o Primary qualities = shape, solidity, mobility, extension o Secondary qualities = colour, temperature, small o Primary qualities resemble substances - e.g. can affirm something is round o Sceptical that SC resemble substances - e.g. can only affirm something produces the idea of heat - No God hypothesis in knowledge - something is producing whiteness and that is not me, therefore something else, that something else is defined by its ability to do what it appears to do - Distinction: o Simple ideas - can have knowledge about them and must exist in the world because they can only be causally produced o Complex ideas - simple ideas are assembled and named o Modes - can have knowledge of modes because when one speaks of modes -such as murder- it doesn't matter whether it exists. Modes don't exist by themselves but depends on substances - e.g. murder requires two people (substances) at least. Triangle because it requires something to be triangular. Have no reality outside of the mind o Substances - things that produce complex ideas which we can't understand in itself o Relations - Everything we know is knowledge of ideas but we don't know the world. we advance our knowledge of the structure of ideas Book 3: Language is a label for ideas Book 4: - Knowledge has only to do with ideas - Doesn't question knowledge of ideas and assumes that what the mind directly knows is its ideas o (Descartes believes that the only thing that is certain is the content of our ideas) - Assumes there can't be an idea in your mind without you knowing it - Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas o Knows that white and red are incompatible - knows that round and white are not. That is all we can know o When we perceive relations, we then have knowledge o Knowledge - This idea, always goes with this idea - e.g. the idea of snowball always goes with idea of white o Looks as if knowledge is solely about our minds - we get it only through looking at the relations of ideas - Sometimes groups of ideas keep coming together - come in the same grouping - Groups of knowledge o Identity, diversity and relation - o Coexistence and necessary connection - judging that there has to be something out there that is responsible for ideas - Types of knowledge: o Intuitive E.g. white is not black Immediately certainty o Demonstrative - reason Not immediate certainty - initial doubt Requires time for demonstration and steps from intuitive pieces to conclusion E.g. mathematics and geometry Isn't as immediately certain Depends on intuitive as each step requires pieces of intuitive knowledge which doesn't need justification o Sensitive Not universal truths like the above but particular From the senses Only what we perceive at the time we perceive, everything else is probability based on doubt o In hierarchy at certainty with intuition at the top - Anti-realism o Sceptical of external knowledge because it doesn't matter as only practical things do o Must not look for things beyond what we are capable of - Chapter 3 summary o Knowledge - Knowledge of existence: o Intuitive knowledge for ourselves Can doubt own existence Contra Descartes doesn't conclude that we are essentially thinking things o Demonstrative knowledge that god exists o Sensitive knowledge of external things - God: o I exist, something else must have existed before I existed o Something must have always existed o That thing must be all-powerful

Anti-representative realism o Locke - we can indirectly see external things E.g. there are external trees which cause ideas o Locke assumes some objects in the external world resemble primary quality ideas o Rebuts Locke's idea that primary qualities are external - likeness principle He says that an idea can only resemble another idea and nothing else (whether primary qualities or otherwise) o One interpretation of the anti-external world argument All we perceive are ideas Ideas can only exist in minds We perceive phenomena commonly associated with the external world - trees, houses etc All these allegedly external phenomena only exist in minds - contrary to consensus - To be is to be perceived - God exists o Everything exists in a mind o Everything doesn't exist in my mind so there must be a mind in which everything exists (God) o An Idea is dependent on an idea holder - spirits (substances) and ideas o (Reaction to new science supporting atheism) - No idea or matter is active or has causal power, only spirits - Relational argument: o All qualities of the perceived things are relational o Swift, slow etc. cannot exist except outside of the mind, because they are relative - Argument against scepticism: o If sensible things are ideas, then sensible things exist and can be known because ideas exist and can be known - Anti-Materialism o Contra the notion that matter exists and things exist independently of being perceived by spirit - Idealism - p6 o All the consituents of the universe are minds (or spirits) alone, and the existence of every other existing depends on being perceived by those minds alone - Epistemological idealism o Even if external bodies exist, we couldn't know that they do - Argument for idealism o "the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived"

- Distinction between impressions and ideas: o Impressions are stronger in force and more lively in how they strike the mind Sensations, passions and appearance making first appearances in the soul o All ideas correspond to resembling impressions or is comprised of simple ideas which have resembling impressions - Distinction between simple and complex ideas: o Colour, taste and smell are united in a complex idea of apple o Every simple idea has a simple impression that corresponds to it - Ideas and existence o Idea of an apple Apple = Idea of existent apples Existent apple = apple + existence o Can't imagine an apple without it existing - Seven Philosophical relations o Idea-world relations - Non-dependant on ideas - judgments about what is before senses which can change even if the ideas do not identity, • Two object can resemble each other yet be different objects relations of time and place, • Can move objects further from each other but the ideas and object remain the same Causation • Cause cannot be inferred from an idea Can reduce three categories to causation o Idea-idea relations Dependant on solely ideas - Thus objects of certainty and knowledge resemblance, X looks like Y proportion in quantity or number, 3 x's degrees in any quality, contrariety, x is not y - Conditional observation depends on cause or effect o Berkeley: If we were in the room, then we would have observed X - Every philosopher accepts causality - Analysis of Causality o Reasoning depends on causation o Causality is a relation and not a quality o All one can find is succession in considering two objects o But causation cannot be reduced to continuity and succession because not every succession causes something o Causality is the constant conjunction - Unjustifiability of causal reasoning o Reason cannot demonstrate that P causes Q as one can imagine effect without cause o If causal reasoning is justifiable, then it must be done so by experience of causality - which is constant conjunction o Iff unobserved cases must resemble observed cases and the course of nature universally continued, then we could be justified in constant conjunction affirming causal experience - Problem of (future) induction: o Cannot establish the principle on reason since we can imagine unobserved is not like the observed and not by experience since experience presupposes the principle o Why should previous constant conjunctions cause us to think of necessary constant connections? o Hume cannot justify necessary connections o Hume can explain why we do believe causation - association of ideas Is necessary for our practical reasoning We can know causation through either 1)intuition/demonstration or 2)experiences Not intuition Not demonstration because it is impossible to show that nothing can exist without a cause - can always imagine effect without its cause because they are always distinct ideas Learn it by experience • See a constant conjunction • Cause is merely to say contiguous and succession - External world o Doesn't know about the external world or where impressions come from o Why do we believe it? o Senses cannot justify external world in absence of perception o Reason works only with perceptions and so we can't justify it by reason Assumes that all reason tells us is that the mind knows directly is perceptions Reason cannot move from perception to continued and distinct objects o Believe in external world because continuous observation of patterns reasonably conforms with interrupted observation of patterns E.g. seeing a fire die down from A Z and seeing the fire at A and Z Coherency of changes - expectation of how things change - and constancy of no change is characteristic of external objects No sense impressions exhibit perfect constancy but some exhibit constancy and coherency enough to lead us from imagination to belief, involuntarily and unnoticed o It is impossible to conceive of anything different from ideas or impressions since all that is present to the mind are perceptions o Does not accept the idea of an independently existing world - Critique of certainty of self-existence o Hume asks from what impression self-existence is derived o Can only postulate self if there is an idea of self, can only have impression of self which would have to accompany every other impression o If self-idea came from impression, then it would have to be an impression that remains the same throughout our life o Consequent is implausible because impression of self, pain, pleasure, pain etc. is always changing and always has perception o Denying knowledge of our own existence o Identity always change but appears to be the same o continuous sequence misinterpreted as constant

- Scottish Common Sense philosophy - Distinguishes vulgar (ordinary people) and the philosophers who believe in external knowledge - Methodology o Burden of proof rests on those who claim we don't know rather than those who do o Contra Descartes and empiricists: starting with doubt - Common sense: o Can reject claims of philosophers who deny common sense - syntactic feature shared by all languages - unless the philosopher provides good proof to deny it o If philosophers rejects claim consistent with facts of ordinary language and they have not demonstrated that the claim rests on a deep error, then we can reject it - Doesn't reject existence of ideas - Views on Berkeley o If we accept Berkeley's first premise on the direct knowledge of only ideas, then the rest of his system follows o Lockean Mind Model - Accepted by Locke, Berkeley and Hume that all we can perceive arte ideas o First premise is not well-established: All philosophers were misled because they thought certainty could only be attained when considering your own mind because there was the certainty only in the existence of a mind that exists LMM is not self-evident since no common sense man, uninstructed in philosophy, will accept it but will think it absurd, even though he cannot disprove it If we cannot explain connection between mind and object, then it is not more intelligible to explain connect between mind and the mental objects i.e. ideas Reid sees no reason to believe that mind can only directly perceive ideas and not external phenomena 'Answers' to argument for indirect perception • Distinction between conceiving of a thing and an image of that thing • When he conceives of an thing, he conceives of the thing, not the image of that thing • 1. I cannot conceive of two things but only one and it is immediate • 2. He doesn't conceive of the image or idea of an animal, he conceives the animal • 3. It is doubtful that he is conceiving of an idea since he does not know what it is. Even if he did know, this would not be evidence of its existence anymore than knowing what a centaur is Denies that all objects of knowledge are merely ideas and thinks that those who think otherwise need to prove the contrary o Existence of other minds is no more known to the individual than the existence of matter o Dislikes consequence of Berkeley's philosophy: All that exists is God and the individual, other spirits are ideas and spirits can't be ideas - Critique of Hume's argument from the perception of only ideas o Hume's argument If the things we perceive appear to change in their magnitude (as when moving closer to or further from a table), then we are perceiving the idea which is not external o Reid objection: Distinction between real and apparent magnitude Hume's analysis of the table is expected of what an external continuing table - e.g. the distance/apparent magnitude correlation If Hume's analysis meets what is expected of an external world, then his view supports the view that we do perceive real phenomena rather than ideas In other words, any example of uniformity and coherence can only be explained and made sense of within the framework of externally-existing, continuing objects - Neither Locke or Berkeley justify mind knowledge but Hume does have a fallacious argument - Reliability of sense perception o Question: Should we believe our senses? o Reply: Why not? o Philophers have been misled into believing sense perception should be justified by self-evident rational axioms o Sense perception cannot do this, but can give contingent propositions o Despite this, peoples beliefs on sense perception are as firm as demonstration - Common sense is the alternative he proposes

- Phenomenalism o What constitutes a continuing thing is if someone were in this circumstance, then they would observe X phenomena o E.g. study and table - Definition of Induction Thus induction is inferring the unobserved from the observed • All emeralds are green, all fires burn, sun will rise tomorrow • is greater than "the past is like the future" • We infer the past was like the past E.g. fire burning before we were born - Warrant of Justification o Question: If the future is going to be like the past, then how do we know it will? o Answer: By knowing many particular truths in which nature is uniform, and then reasoning to the principle of the uniformity of nature o Generalising association If occurs X in circumstances Y, then a similiar X| will always occur in similar Y| This particular X has occurred in circumstances Y Therefore, some similar, particular X will occur in circumstances Y|

- Includes: o S believes P o P is true o S is justified in believing P - Truth o If something is not true, you cannot know it - knowledge is factive It is impossible to know 2+2=5 and other falsehoods o Not very controversial but we have different of ideas of what it means for something to be true - e.g. relativism, objectivism, pragmatism - something is true if it helps you get on in life - Belief o One cant now something unless they believe it - Possibility of knowledge without the belief o Some people maintain that we can know without belief E.g. The nervous student in an exam giving right answers but so nervous that they don't believe they are true or non-occurrent beliefs (as soon as anyone asks me I would believe it but I don't believe consciously) o Can one know without thinking they know or do they need to know they know - Acceptance vs belief o Acceptance: to adopt proposition in reasoning o Belief: to feel the proposition is true o Acceptance may be enough o Are usually connected but possibly separable o Because belief (e.g. 2+2=4) is not very voluntary - Voluntarism about belief vs voluntarism about acceptance - e.g. scientific theory o Belief without acceptance Loved one in peril o Acceptance without belief Ladder Scientific Theory • people may become too invested in theories if they believe them - Justification o Some people believe justification is necessary for belief E.g. John's two year old son said the plane which His grandparents were travelling on was going to break and it did yet he didn't have justification o Reason to stick with JTB Justification may not be perfect and therefore requires the truth criterion Response - uncertain knowledge may sound self-contradictory

- All involve inference to true propositions from false beliefs - Examples: o Wolf in sheeps clothing o Jones is in Barcelona o Smith getting the Job

- A solution might be that JTB where S's justification relies on no false belief - Responses: o Not necessary Overdetermination - Allows you to have knowledge that is based (at least partly) based on falsehood Jack and Jills wedding • Jack and Jill got married • Had a ceremony later • You infer that they are married on the premise that they got married at the ceremony • Premise was false because they got married earlier rather than at the wedding • Yet is it still knowledge Omar and Knowledge • Omar had a heart attack, then his head got chopped off • You saw his head get chopped off and infer that that killed him and therefore he is dead • He still knew he was dead despite the false premise Objections: • Some people think that these cases include some true evidence which justifies the case o Not sufficient - Shows JTB without false beliefs doesn't work Barn façade case contains no false evidence yet is not knowledge Change falsehoods to beliefs about evidence • I have good evidence that Jones will get the job etc. Sceptical because of the threat of falsity

- DJTB - Attempt to ensure no important truths are omitted from justification o S believe P o S is justified in believing and there is no further fact that defeats this justification o P is true - D defeats S's' justification in believing P iff: o S justifies their belief that P on the basis of J o J by itself justifies S's belief that P o D is true o Combination of D and J does not justify S's belief in P - Solves Gettier cases and cases of false justifications - Jack and Jill (wouldn't defeat your justification) - Problems for defeasibility: o Tom Grabit Case - Mrs Garbit's statement is a defeater o One fix: Fourth condition: D is true, and S needed to be justified in believing D to be false • You were justified in believing DF to be false although it is true o Another fix: Defeater can't have a defeater All the important information collectively defeat your justification Problem: • How far does this go? What is all the relevant information • You don't know if your justified, thus you may not know you don't know

- Ditches justification - This is concerned with how sensitive a belief is to the truth - Adds counterfactual conditional premise: o S believes P o P is true o If p were true (in the relevant altern), then S would believe it and Adherence criteria o If p were false (in relevant worlds ), S wouldn't believe it Variation criteria - Accounts for the sheep case because the variation condition is not meet - Sensitivity to truth: o A BIV is is being fed information that it is a brain in a vat but it isn't sensitive to that truth o Nozick states that, although the adherence and variation conditions are met, they must be so in such a way that the belief is sensitive to the truth o Worried about similar but not the extremely abstract cases - like a massive world conspiracy - Problems: o Problem with the Fourth Criterion - It is true, and you still believe it in slightly modified circumstances Suppose you learn P by luck - You know about a surfing dog because you walked past the television at the right time But it doesn't meet the adherence condition because if you walked by two seconds later then you would not have believed it o Problem with the Third Criterion - It isn't true and you believe it If a grandson is killed the war and his Grandma, then she will be told that he is ok out of respect for her health Let's say he comes to visit her and she knows he is OK But it wouldn't meet the criteria because if he wasn't ok, she believe he is ok - Nozick's response: o Truth tracking concerns the method o Revised truth-tracking criteria: S knows P via method M iff: • P true • S believes via M that P • If p were true (in the most similar world) and S were to believe P via M whether or not P, then S would believe it o Adherence criteria • If p were not true (in the most similar world) S were to believe P via M whether or not P, then S wouldn't believe P via method M o Variation criteria o Application to Gma case: If Gma used the method of being visited to determine whether he was ok, then she would know if he was ok or false Thus, similar worlds must involve the same method

- Scepticism - We don't know anything or most of the things that we think we know - Local scepticism: Don't have knowledge about certain things - metaphysics, morals and other peoples' minds - Global scepticism: we do not have knowledge regarding any (substantive) domain o Global sceptics attack justification Not saying that we can't believe or have true beliefs but just that we can't know that beliefs are good

- Scepticism can be divided based on the response to the self-refutation problem - Self-refuting: We can know that we can't know anything o Responses: Pyrrhonian scepticism - Bite the bullet - We don't know anything including that we don't know Academic scepticism - We can know only that we can't know anything else • People who came out of Plato's academy adopted academic scepticism Neither are self-refuting - Impracticality: People couldn't live and would be paralysed if they were sceptics o E.g. Pyrrho used to not look after himself as he couldn't choose one course of action over another yet survived because he had non-sceptical helpers o Cannot live practically and cannot follow convention if one doesn't know what convention is o Responses: It assist living because: • A detachment from knowing creates peacefulness • Scepticism avoids dogma Response: it cripples progress • Response to both: Can't know the above reasons are true A sceptic can acknowledge no knowledge but can accept beliefs - Irrelevance o Scepticism works because it creates a definition of knowledge and denies that we have it o Sceptics should explain what we do have 1. If scepticism is plausible, then it denies that we have knowledge 2. We do have knowledge (although we may not understand precisely what it is) 3. Therefore, scepticism is false o Sceptics deny a construction of knowledge that is irrelevant to what we are talking about o Good move o Different from Moore's argument, as Moore argues for a proof of the external world - Unjustifiability 1. If scepticism is true, then sceptics cannot know that other people exist 2. If sceptics cannot know that other people exist, then it cannot know that they do not know 3. If scepticism cannot know that others do not know, then they can never justify scepticism to anyone else

o If external objects exist, then the external world exists. I have two hands (external objects) therefore I have at least two hands o Assessment: 1. Must not be circular: Premises must be different from the conclusion 2. Conclusion must follow from the premises 3. Premises must be plausible o Objection: Third condition is implausible • He has missed the point that we can't use such arguments from the external world o Rebuttal from incredulity Moore is saying that it is incredible to deny the premises of his argument so one of the premises in the sceptical argument must be false because the conclusion is false Any valid argument can either prove the conclusion or refute its premises o Rebuttal from ambiguity It is ambiguous as to how the argument goes wrong

- Justifying beliefs requires justification etc. - meta-justification o Professor Maxwell is on a plane because he told me and if he told me then it is true because he is trustworthy because he never lied because I never heard him tell lies because etc. o If there is an infinite regress, then can we ever be justified or stop the regress - Responses: o Foundationalism - Some propositions are self-justified and thus the chain is finite: (Roughly) Empiricism: • Beliefs based on sensory experience o I see Professor Cresswell on a plane, therefore he is there • Response: o Scepticism of external world and experience of that world • E.g. dreams, illusions, brain in a vat, demon, simulation, matrix • Things are not as they appear to be (Roughly) Rationalism: • Beliefs are based on self-evident axioms o Two plus two etc. • Response: o Demon can place false seemingly self-evident beliefs o Disagreement over self-evident truths leads to logical contradictions and there is no way to discern right from wrong o Case study: Euclid:It appeared self evident but was later false - Sceptic can respond to foundationalism 1. Either these beliefs are not secure in the way we need 2. Or they are not up to the task of support all of our beliefs about the world - Can respond to sceptic: 1. Can doubt scepticism on the basis of its conclusion so something must be wrong in their attack 2. Where might they have gone wrong? Disagree about how justified these foundational beliefs have to be - don't have to be water tight despite a shred of doubt which is insignificant • Can believe in moderate or weak foundationalism - Sceptic 2nd objection to foundationalism: 1. Doesn't rely on scepticism and can apply to weaker foundationalism 2. A def of a foundational belief is a belief that S is justified in having this belief but not via some other belief E.g. you see an apple and, therefore, according to an empiricist, you are justified 3. Sceptical argument: There is no reason to think that foundational beliefs are special and self-justifying If the foundationalist think there is (e.g. sense experience has been reliable), then the view is non-foundational because there is a reason to believe it is special and foundation If the foundationalist thinks there is no reason, then there is no reason to think they are right and it is just an unconvincing leap of faith that is poorly motivated (just a fix to a problem) If a belief is either non-foundational or not justified, then there is no reason to believe it Therefore, we have no reason to believe foundational beliefs

- Justification is infinitely long - Infinite justification may not be about a temporal act or communication but just an intemporal state - Response to state: o If you were in the state, then you would have infinitely many belief o You cannot have infinitely many beliefs o Therefore, you are not in the state

- Another response is that a finite set of beliefs work together to be mutually supportive o Like a ship at sea rather than a building o The every belief has justification, which could continue infinitely, but without the requirement that there are infinitely many beliefs involved - Circularity objection from sceptic: o Looks as if some of the beliefs are circular P because Q because R because P o It seems strange because some beliefs are logically presupposing themselves - Response to sceptic - Bonjour: o It is circular only if beliefs are linear. Many beliefs are linear but they terminate pretty quickly. P is true because P appears to be true. No more justifications. Believe it. o Alternative - holistic view of justification - For the coherentist, the overall justification of beliefs comes from the overall coherence of those beliefs Analogy of crossword rather than a circle • You think that the answer to the crossword is X because it is coherent with the question, Y etc. • Even if you having a starting point, it is because all of the answers fit together - Coherence as Consistency: o Beliefs aren't like crossword puzzles - a metaphor is different from an account o A set of beliefs is consistent if and only if there are no contradictions within that set o If there is contradiction, then they can't all be true. o This is a necessary restriction on coherence - Problem: o There are infinitely many belief sets yet all of them can't be similarly justified - Coherence as explanation- explanatory coherence: o Coherence is about how well the set of beliefs explain the data, the data is justified because the beliefs have an explanation for it o Scientific analogy - Theory is good if it can explain all parts of the theory coherently - Series of coherence-making properties, such as: o Logical consistency o Probabilistic consistency o Level of interconnectedness - don't want coherent clumps that don't connect, need beliefs with all these connections between them o Lack of anomalous beliefs - Overview: o Motivated by foundationalism cannot withstand scepticism o Tries to avoid the problem of circular justification via a notion of justification through coherence o Can be defined differently but at least requires consistency

- Objection from world: o Why should we think that coherence is adequate justification for our beliefs? Why think coherence guides to truth. Shouldn't the world something to do with our beliefs. o Objection to Coherentism about truth What makes something true is well it coheres with some set of propositions (kind of relativist) People reject coherence theory of truth and keep correspondence Justification is to do with the world not internal propositions • Take a coherentist who thinks that is a sunny day and then move them to a non-rainy day. All the beliefs are still coherent yet the proposition changes • Coherent fiction o Thus, it seems the coherentist needs to allow experience of the world to influence our beliefs and that can revert to foundationalism - Input rebuttal : Allow input from the world cause our beliefs Separate the cause of a belief from justification for belief They can allow that we form beliefs based on experience, but not without recourse/justifications to other beliefs - Objection to consistency: o It is unclear that human have completely consistent beliefs, it seems everyone has some inconsistent beliefs when searching long enough - Degree rebuttal: o Degrees of coherence - It is not that beliefs are coherent or not, but there are degrees of coherence o Thus, we can allows some inconsistency o Like the additional criteria - Objection from conflicting coherent sets Could have equally coherent sets of belief yet disagreement • E.g. Every belief is opposite in one set to the other - Rebuttal from convergence • These will differentiate over time o Bonjour - As we receive more input from the world, one of these sets of beliefs will be forced to become less coherent than the other E.g. sunny day o More input will force convergence - Counter-Rebuttal from the Duhem-Quine problem: o Famous issue regarding how we update our beliefs according to observations o We always have a choice about what belief we alter according to our data o More slides o Example = Newtownian: Theory makes prediction • E.g. see planet in particular position That prediction comes out false according to your observations • It appears only nearby Do you reject the theory or the observation? • Perhaps you theory is wrong? • Perhaps your telescope is faulty? Therefore, there is always a choice about how we change our beliefs - Counter-counter rebuttal from unsustainability Bonjour thinks this will be unsustainable - we would have to deny that observation is at all reliable. Bonjour disagree with denial of external input o Bonjour thinks some sets will be more explanatory o Possible for two people to have the same data available but try to explain this data in different ways Unlikely state of affairs Perhaps that is enough?

- Whether a belief is justified is going to depend on beliefs because justification requires factors that are cognitively accessible to the subject o You are aware of the justification or could be if you reflected on it o Beliefs matter for justification - The externalist position is the denial of the internalist position o That is, it is possible for a belief to be justified without the subject having awareness of this o Justification is about truth-conduciveness, and this doesn't require that it comes from beliefs (Berneckers Reading Epistemology) o Note externalist says that beliefs can constitute justification when you know that they do, it is just not necessary - Not solely outside of the head, but just part is external o Note it could be understood that the externalist knowledge requires - no justification, more than justification in a true belief, justification as an external matter not necessarily through beliefs.

- Internalism does and externalism doesn't require that you know or be in a position to know that you have knowledge - Nozicks criteria can be met without knowledge

- Unconscious knowledge - Externalism allows other agents to have knowledge that possibly shouldn't be excluded - e.g. children and animals can have propositional knowledge without knowing it - Forgotten Justification - Externalism allows for a learnt fact to be knowledge despite forgetting how one learned about it - Intuitive knowledge - Externalism allows for savants who know things yet don't realise it - intuitive

- Externalist view that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the fact and your belief - JTC - Goldman includes inferences and logical connections under his umbrella of "causal connection" - This accounts nicely with the Gettier cases - As long as there is some causal connection between the event and your true belief, you know - Problems o Problem of knowledge of future events If we need the event to cause the belief, then beliefs can't be known if they concern (currently) non-existent events o Goldman response: Doesn't have to be direct causation from event to event, just causal connection E.g. friend told me on Sunday he would be in town on monday. The intention caused both belief and event o Problem of non-causal entities - abstract mathematical concepts like shapes o Goldman's response: Causal theory concerns only empirical knowledge o Problem of deviant causal connections Sheep causing the wolf to be dressed as a sheep Barn case • Have knowledge in neither of these areas despite the fact that true proposition caused your belief

- Whether a belief is justified depends on how it came about o E.g. if it came about through some reliable cognitive process (e.g. memory), then it is justified o Note you don't need to be aware that it is reliable - Processes o Function which takes in inputs and produces outputs o Memory, perception - Reliability o Probability that the process produces great surplus of truths rather than false beliefs - Problem of generality o How find do we individuate the processes o When seeing a sheep in the field, the process could include visual, remote, brief, well-lit perception on a Tuesday when not too tired o Difficult to determine to finely o If you do it to the inth degree, then you only use the process only once o If it is true then it is always reliable - Goldman's response o Should be content neutral - Problem - false inputs o Can be %100 reliable with true out puts but may only have false inputs - Response: o Goldman differentiates between condition and unconditional reliability Beliefs are justified if they result from a conditionally reliable process with true inputs Or An unconditionally reliable process

- Objection from demand: o TIV - Two people - One in BIV, one in non-BIV o Have the exact same experiences, but one is justified and the other isn't - Objection from Leniency: o Too lenient to have knowledge according to Lehrer Mr Truetemp has a thermometer in his head which produces true beliefs in him by a reliable source about the temperature. Doesn't believe that he really knows what the temperature is and believes that he shouldn't take on board the temperature. But externalism says he has knowledge Sloppy belief that Prof hellier is in office, random individual (could be lieing) tells them and they just accept it despite the fact he has no reason to believe that is true - Lehrer - Rebuttal to Leniency; • The must not have another way (cognitive process available) that might lead him to deny their belief - Goldman o Response: If there is another process available to you, like simple logical inference, and it would undercut your belief, then you don't have knowledge • Problem - what does it mean to have the cp available? • Doesn't quite address the problem o Sloppy person - accepting testimony unreasonably

- S is justified if S is being able to answer reasonable objections to that belief o And of course, the context is going to matter for the kinds of objections you have to answer o S might have responses to the reasonable objections in one context, but not to another This means that someone might truly claim to have a justified belief in one context, but fail in another o Sometimes, you don't need to justify your belief - sense perception. Sometimes, you need to do a lot E.g. Disease context example: • TV justification for belief in fact about Polio is not justified in the context of exam - Reasonable objections may include such factors as: o How probable to objection is o The group you are responding to o What's at stake - mushrooms in the forest can mean there is quite a lot at stake - Contextualism response to infinite regress: o We don't need coherence or foundationalism o Just sometimes beliefs will be self-justified like seeing an apple - Problems from demanding o Means you can't just be justified but have to be able to show you are justified - Rebuttal from non-demanding - Rebuttal from non-importance - When it is demanding, it doesn't matter because knowledge should be demanding

- S knows P can be assessed by the context - A practical approach, linked to how we use language

- Lewis is an infallibilist because of lottery paradox: o Lottery ticket o Do you know that you are not going to win o You might be very justified in thinking this indeed o But there may be a chance that you won't - can't know that you are not going to win o Therefore, high likelihood justification doesn't constitute knowledge - Should choose fallibilism over scepticism - Rejects fallibilism because of the lottery paradox - doesn't think that he know one will lose - Lewis thinks that knowledge is that S's evidence eliminates every possibility in which not -P - Knowledge depends on alternative possibilities being eliminated - Problem of sceptical hypothesis: o How does lewis account for it?

- Knowledge o Elimination of every possibility, except irrelevant possibilities Response to the sceptical hypothesis where logical entailments can be affirmed but there logical antecedents denied Irrelevance is like saying "Everyone is tired" o S knows P iff: S's evidence eliminates every possibility of not -P Except for possibilities we are properly ignoring o Example: The lawn is flat Except for the bumps that we are properly ignoring

1. Rule of actuality - a. Cannot ignore possibilities that are actually the case - this is knowledge (not justification) o This is S's actuality, not actualities for others o Indexical facts also have to do with actuality - e.g. Who S is, where they are, what they are doing, when they are there 2. Rule of belief - a. Cannot properly ignore anything that S believes (rightly or wrongly) b. Also anything that they ought to have believe (whether did or not) must not be ignored c. E.g. if S believed P or ought to have believed P, then you can't ignore P d. If the stakes are high, then a weak belief shouldn't be ignored i. E.g. improbable poisonous mushroom 3. Rule of resemblance - If possibility A sufficiently resembles possibility B and you can't ignore B due to one of the other rules, then you can't properly ignore A either a. This is why you don't know you won't win the lottery: i. Whichever tickets holder actually wins, we can't ignore that event (rule of actuality, rule of resemblance) 1. Someone will win and that resembles us sufficiently ii. All of the events with different possible winners saliently resemble on another iii. So we can't ignore any of those possibilities, including the one where you win (rule of resemblance) - Application to Gettier cases o Brown is in Barcelona is possibility where this is false that relevantly resembles actuality so it cannot be ignored More slides

- Former rules can interact with and trump these rules - Properly ignored is diff from ignoring 1. Rule of reliability a. If an info gathering process is reliable, you may properly ignore that possibility where they fail i. Important side note - OK to ignore, never can be eliminated ii. This rule will be beaten in any case where the previous three rules apply 1. E.g. can ignore perceptual hallucination (reliability), if not hallucinating but if one believes or is, then it cannot be ignored (belief, actuality) 2. Rule of method a. We are defeasibly allowed to assume that induction and inference to the best explanation work i. Induction - moving from observed cases to unobserved cases - All swans are white because of a few cases ii. Inference to the best explanation - Best explanation for the data - e.g. dinosaurs died, meteor hit, earth fractured, therefore meteor killed dinosaurs 1. Thus can ignore the possibility of white crows 3. Rule of conservatism: we can ignore the possibilities that everyone else ignores, and understands everyone to ignore (again, with caveats) a. E.g. if everyone ignores the remote possibility that wolves are dressing up as sheep then this possibility can be ignored b. Unless there actually are wolves doing this: unless the rule of actuality trumps conservatism 4. Rule of attention- If a possibility is not being ignored then it can't be properly ignored a. This is an important rule because it generates elusive knowledge - this is why epistemology destroys knowledge, because it draws attention to stupid possibilities b. As soon as you start to think hard about what we know and come up with the sceptical scenarios, we can no longer ignore them c. Therefore: i. In a normal context we know a lot of things ii. But then we question sceptical hypotheses and infinite regress and our knowledge then vanishs d. Objection: i. Shouldn't we be able to ignore this rule and such scenarios inasmuch as judges should ignore crazy scenarios in the court room ii. Lewis' reply: rule of attention helps explain why the sceptical position is so compelling -

- Lewis thinks eliminating possibilities is more strong than ignoring them o E.g. eliminating the possibility that a wolf is a sheep is better than ignoring that possibility - Don't have to deny closure - Knowledge claims change according to context o Switch contexts from everyday knowledge consideration to sceptical knowledge consideration - rule of attention

- Choice between contextualism - meaning changes according to context - and invariantism - meaning remains the same but interpretation differ. - Presents alternative to contextualism called invariantism - Explains same data as contextualism but favors scepticism - Basic idea is: o Statements involving "flat" or "knows" always mean the same thing o But we convey different things according to the context Semantics strict meaning Pragmatics is what you convey • E.g. student always turned up to class on time o Was he a good student o Was he punctual • The field is flat o Semantically false o Pragmitcally accurate - Invariantism about knowledge o Claims that we don't really know anything because we never rule out the other possibilities o But we use the term know because it is close enough to what we understand - Philosophical relativity o Invariantism places complexity in sentences and meaning and contextualism place complexities context o Can't resolve it o No evidence will favour either view, there is just views either way

- Whether S knows depends on their virtues - What is an epistemic virtue: o Praiseworthy virtues o Virtues that lead to truth - Normative claim about virtues of the knower o E.g. Impartiality, self-reflection, good memory - Problem whether a virtue is reliable under scepticis

- Virtue reliabilism - rather than reliable process, looking at reliable virtues which tend to produce truth o S's belief that P is justified when it arose through an epistemic virtue - For Sosa, the basis of epistemic virtues is that they make you believe more truths o The relevant virtues are those that generate more truths than falsehoods in relevant circumstances - Reliabilist objections from unconscious true belief Mr. Truetemp Savant - Reflective knowledge rebuttal: o Two types of knowledge Animal knowledge: knowledge obtained without reflection or understanding Reflective knowledge - knowing that you know or seeing coherence between beliefs Both cases has virtues - but one has higher-order virtues - Lenience and demanding objection: o Twin in a vat case BIV twin is non-virtuous because they always form false beliefs but they work just as hard o Reverse of twin in a vat problem: Maybe a benevolent demon gives a world that gives true beliefs to lazy people despite people not having virtues - Circumstantial rebuttal to TIV problem o Should relativize virtues to environment Place these people in the actual world and judge them there, not elsewhere If TIV was in real world, then they would be virtuous

What is John Greco's view on virtue epistemology? - Responsibility - Virtuous person must have responsibility (not just reliability) for getting true beliefs, not just them getting them. It is an achievement, not a given. o Someone who strives for the truth is epistemically virtuous o Virtues based on wanting to discover the truth - Non-circumstantial - Virtues do not depend on the environment o No matter where you are, open-mindedness is good - Reflective knowledge is too demanding o How often do individuals reflect on their beliefs? - Greco approach to justification: o S is subjectively justified in believing P iff S is epistemically virtuous in believing P o This gives a response to the sceptical problem because TIV is justified but doesn't have knowledge because beliefs are false - Objection from the Gettier problems o It isn't sufficient because of the Gettier problems - Buttal from virtue reliabilism; o S's belief that P has a positive epistemic status iff: S believes P S's belief that P is the result of a reliable cognitive virtue of S This virtue has its basis in S's conforming to basic norms which S countenances (both internalist and externalist) • Agent acting for the right desire to find truth and to reliably succeed in that o Countenance a norm is to: Not necessarily understanding how we formed a belief A basic norm is one which is what we aspire to follow: • e.g. we want to reason correctly even if we don't understand the rules of logic So if we reason in a reliable way, and that is based in the fact that we want to believe truths and avoid errors, and to act in epistemically virtuous ways, then we have a positive epistemic status

- Praise-worthiness - Knowing is something you can be praised for and is not just good luck - Self-Attributability - If you know something, then it is because something about you means that you weren't just lucky - Formula - If you have a true belief by exercising epistemic virtues, then you have knowledge - Responds to Gettier cases: o You don't have a true belief in the barn or sheep case because of your virtues

- Encourages pursuit of good epistemic virtues - Social dimension of knowledge: o Virtue epistemology helps us to try cultivate virtues in society - Virtues are important so others can have knowledge E.g. no telling lies o Virtues good for society as well as individuals

- Testimony - loosely when you know P because A asserted P - T know P, T testifies P, S accepts P, then S knows P o Problem of whether they know or not or are unreliable - Tremendous amount of knowledge comes from testimony o Lecturer "almost everything that you know comes from testimony" o Almost all of our knowledge is based on testimony and in almost all cases, we just accept it." o Classic example of going to a city and asking for directions. Without testimony, quite literally, you would be lost. - Normally just accept it - Seems risky

- Do you need to ensure that the speaker is a good source of knowledge? - Reductionists: Yes. Testimony reduces to other types of knowledge o Acceptance should be based on evidence of the reliability of the testifier - Objection from circularity o Evidence for testimony usually includes testimony Virtually Impossible to discard everything and start from scratch - Objection from unconventionality o People don't act like this E.g. children learn without evidence for reliability - Anti-reductionists: No. Think there is something unique about testimony o Idea that testimony by itself is a source of knowledge without drawing on other evidence or beliefs o It seems that most people need reasons not to believe what people tell you rather than reasons to believe o E.g. Perceptual beliefs unless evidence to the contrary - Objection from reason o Testimony needs something more otherwise one can't know there is a testimony - Rebuttal from perceptual causation: Perception of testimony isn't belief Point is about where the epistemic justification comes from, not how one forms the belief • E.g. perception caused testimonial belief but didn't justify it - Objection from non-acceptance o We don't always accept what people say: - Reliabilist rebuttal perception: Testimony is like perception • Accept it most of the time unless it produces something funny or implausible - Objection from transmitting justification o Testimony doesn't transmit knowledge like perception If T is unjustified in believing P, T testifies P to S, S accepts P, then S is justified in believing P but not T, and P is false Gettier cases

- Local Reductionist - People can deceive or be honest but wrong - Need to establish, in particular instances that these don'ts hold: o Common sense interpretation Can tell whether others lie easily or aren't competent Don't need to do this consciously - Difference is that with fricker we put in extra effort and with Audi something extra has to happen

• Hume is thought to be the archetype of a reductionist • He agrees that we base a lot of our knowledge on testimony • But he also notes that there is nothing about testimony per se, or a priori, that means we should accept it • In that case, our reasons for accepting testimony must be based on evidence: evidence that testimony is reliable • This is a reductionist position, because this can mean testimonial knowledge is just a particular case of knowledge via another method • For example, we might (ironically) use induction: o (Local) S has always been a good source of knowledge in the past, so I can justifiably treat S as a good source of knowledge now o (Global) I rely on testimony all the time, and it sees me right nearly all of the time