Politicial Science – Flashcards
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Strauder v. West Virginia (1890) A West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on juries. -Does the state law barring blacks from jury service violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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Yes. Strong, writing for the majority, declared that to deny citizen participation in the administration of justice solely on racial grounds "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."
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Civil Right Cases of 1883 (10th Amendment) The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act. -Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution which reserves all powers not granted to the national government to the states or to the people?
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The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action. And the fifth section of the Amendment empowers Congress only to enforce the prohibition on state action. The amendment did not authorize national legislation on subjects which are within the domain of the state. Private acts of racial discrimination were simply private wrongs that the national government was powerless to correct.
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Plessy v. Ferguson the state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. -Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal
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Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938) Lloyd Gaines, a citizen of Missouri, applied to attend the School of Law of the University of Missouri and was refused admission because he was black. Gaines had graduated in 1935 from Lincoln University, Missouri's state-sponsored school for the higher education of blacks. -Does a state deny equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when it requires a black citizen to pursue a legal education in another state, with any necessary funding provided by the home state, because no program within the state will admit black students?
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The Court held that Missouri was itself to provide for the right to a legal education of its citizens, and that its failure to do so within the boundaries of the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Sweatt v. Painter (1949) In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. -Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School
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Brown v Board of Education (1952) Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. -Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
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Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation.
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Bolling v. Sharpe (1952) On account of their race, black children in Washington D.C. were denied admission to the same public schools which white children attended. -Did the segregation of the public schools of Washington D.C. violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
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Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that racial discrimination in the public schools of Washington D.C. denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment
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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1985) Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. -Did the collective bargaining agreement provision for race-based layoffs violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
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Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
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Gratz v. Bollinger (2002) In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted. -Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.
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Reed v Reed (1971) The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. -Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."
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Mississippi Univ. Women v Hogan (1981) Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States. -Did the state statute which prevented men from enrolling in MUW violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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Yes. The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."
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Gomillion v Lightfoot (1960) An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty- eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived. -Did the redrawing of Tuskegee's electoral district boundaries violate the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution which prevents the United States or any individual state from denying a citizen the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude?
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The unanimous Court held that Act 140 of the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" which the act was designed to serve. It was clear to the Court that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind, namely, to deprive blacks of political power.
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Grutter v Bollinger (2002) In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." -Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.
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Fronteiro v. Richardson (1972) Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down. -Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
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Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause.
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United States v. Virginia (1995) The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. They created a Women's only academy to try to justify. -Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
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No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause
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Nevada v. Hibbs (2002) William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. -May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
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Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision.
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Miss. Univ. for Women v. Joe Hogan Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. -Did the state statute which prevented men from enrolling in MUW violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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Yes. The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."
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Class 28 Look at Gomillion vs lightfoot
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PTBAP
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Baker v. Carr (1960) Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state. -Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?
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In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue.
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Reynolds v Sims (1963) In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each county was entitled to at least one representative and that there were to be as many senatorial districts as there were senators. Population variance ratios of as great as 41-to-1 existed in the Senate. -Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances?
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Yes, In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system,
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Wesberry v Saunders (1963) James P. Wesberry, Jr. filed a suit against the Governor of Georgia, Carl E. Sanders, protesting the state's apportionment scheme. The Fifth Congressional District, of which Wesberry was a member, had a population two to three times larger than some of the other districts in the state. Wesberry claimed this system diluted his right to vote compared to other Georgia residents. -Did Georgia's congressional districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment or deprive citizens of the full benefit of their right to vote?
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The Court held that Georgia's apportionment scheme grossly discriminated against voters in the Fifth Congressional District. Because a single congressman had to represent two to three times as many people as were represented by congressmen in other districts, the Georgia statute contracted the value of some votes and expanded the value of others
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Class 29: South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1965) The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Federal examiners, under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities. -Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections?
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No. The Court upheld the law. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.
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Shaw v. Reno (1992) The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. -Did the North Carolina residents' claim, that the State created a racially gerrymandered district, raise a valid constitutional issue under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
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Yes. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race.
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Shaw v. Hunt (1995) Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. -Does North Carolina's redistricting plan constitute racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause?
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Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court first confronted the threshold question of "standing." It held that some of the appellants lacked proper standing to challenge the redistricting plan. The redistricting plans was seen to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional
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Hunt v Cromartie (2000) Following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. -Did North Carolina reapportionment still violate the Equal Protection Clause in its 1997 redrawing of its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries?
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Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the District Court's conclusion that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly erroneous findings. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "the primary evidence upon which the District Court relied for its 'race, not politics,' conclusion is evidence of voting registration, not voting behavior; and that is precisely the kind of evidence that we said was inadequate the last time this case was before us."
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Class 30: Bush v. Gore (2000) Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later. -Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?
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Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional.
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Crawford v Marion County (2007) In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote -Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens' right to vote?
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By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory.
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Class 31: Trial of John Peter Zenger(1735)
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In his newspaper, Zenger had asserted that judges were arbitrarily displaced, and new courts were erected without the consent of the legislature, by which trials by jury were taken away when a governor was so disposed. The attorney-general charged him with libel, and Zenger's lawyers. His lawyers objecting to the legality of the judge's commissions, successfully argued that truth is a defense against charges of libel.
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Near v Minnesota (1929) Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. -Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment?
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The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment.
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Sullivan v New York Times (1963) Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. -Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?
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Yes, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.
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Pentagon Papers case (Daniel Ellsberg)
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is a United States Department of Defense history of the United States' political-military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. The papers were discovered and released by Daniel Ellsberg, and first brought to the attention of the public on the front page of The New York Times in 1971.[1] A 1996 article in The New York Times said that the Pentagon Papers had demonstrated, among other things, that the Johnson Administration "systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress."[2]
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Class 32: Schenk vs US (1918) During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act -Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
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Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.
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Gitlow v New York (1922) Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law. -Is the New York law punishing advocacy to overthrow the government by force an unconstitutional violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
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No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the state's police power. It is within the state's power to prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate. This kind of speech showed clear and present danger
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Whitney vs California (1925) Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change." -Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments?
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In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right.
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Brandenburg v Ohio (1968) Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." -Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
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Yes. The government may outlaw such speech only when it is directed to inciting or producing "imminent lawless action" and is likely to incite or produce such action.
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Class 33: Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire (1941) Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "God-dam racketeer" and "a damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace. -Does this statute violate Chaplinsky's freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment?
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No. Some forms of expression--among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection.
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US v O'Brien (1967) David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. -Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech?
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No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest.
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Tinker v Des Moines School District (1968) In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. -Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment?
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Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference
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Cohen v California (1970) A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "FUK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail. -Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "Fuk the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment?
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Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket.
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Class 34: Texas v Johnson (1988) In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. -Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment?
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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature.
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R.A.V. v St. Paul (1991) Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. -Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause?
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Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. It is a content-based ordinance that does not fall into an exception of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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Virginia v. Black (2002) Black was convicted under Virginia's cross-burning statute. He argued that it was an unconstitutional law because under it any cross burning was treated as prima facie evidence of the intention to create fear in another. -Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute violate the first amendment?
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Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate
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Morse v. Fredrick (2006) Joseph Frederick (P) , a public school student, was suspended by the principal Deborah Morse (D) for displaying a banner on which was written "Bong Hits 4 Jesus", bong being slang for marijuana, at a school event which was covered by television. He sued the Principal. -Are public schools permitted under law to prevent students from promoting illegal drug use by the display of messages?
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Yes. Public schools are allowed under law to prevent the display of messages by students which would promote drug use at events held under school auspices. Students do not enjoy full rights to freedom of speech while at school
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11/17 NAACP v Alabama (1957) As part of its strategy to enjoin the NAACP from operating, Alabama required it to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all the NAACP's members and agents in the state. -Did Alabama's requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
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Yes. The unanimous Court held that a compelled disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists would have the effect of suppressing legal association among the group's members. Nothing short of an "overriding valid interest of the State," something not present in this case, was needed to justify Alabama's actions.
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Runyon v McCary (1975) Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision. -(1) Were the schools' admission policies in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (Ends discrimination based on race)? (2) Did 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 violate the Constitutional right to privacy and free association?
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Yes and no. In a 6-2 opinion, the Court held that Section 1981 prohibited the racially discriminatory policies of the schools. While the schools were private, Jones v. Alfred Meyer Co. held that Section 1981 applied to "purely private acts of racial discrimination."
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BSA v Dale (1999)
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Dale, was an eagle scout whose membership in the boy scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts of America, learned that he was a homosexual. -While individuals are given a right to freely associate, associations are not forced to include members whose beliefs may affect its own ability to express the message it wishes to convey.
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11/19 Buckley v Valeo (1975) FECA In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. -Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses?
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In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.
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McConnell v F.E.C. (2003) Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to cover the loopholes left in the first statute, The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that sought to control federal election campaign contributions. Under the BCRA federal candidates and national party committees may not use soft-money funding for federal election campaigns. -do restrictions on soft-money contributions to national party committees violates the First Amended Freedom of Speech.
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No. While a complete ban on donations and advertising would violate such rights, restrictions on contributions and advertising does not affect the right of Freedom of Speech.
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Citizens v. F.E.C. (2008) Citizens United created a documentary aimed at Senator Hilary Clinton during the 2008 race, and ran ads to urge others to order it on-demand to watch. Citizens United argued that it violated the section 203 of the BRCA -Is section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) which criminalizes ads produced by corporations that expressly advocate for or against a candidate within 30 days of the primary elections and within 60 days of the general election is constitutional.
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No its unconstitutional. The Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.
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11/21 Everson v. Board of Education (1946) The Petitioner, Everson, in his status as a taxpayer, filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education, to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from school. -Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
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No, The Supreme Court found the statute was constitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.
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Engel v. Vitale (1961) the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. -Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?
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Yes. The Supreme court ruled that State Sponsored prayer of any type is unconstitutional because it goes against the First Amendment's establishment of the religion clause
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Abington v. Schempp (1962) Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day." Two families sued, claiming this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. -Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
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Yes, by a vote of 8-1, the Court held that state-sponsored devotional Bible readings in public schools constitute an impermissible religious exercise by government. It violates the establishment clause.
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Lemon v. Kurtzmann (1970) Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. A group of individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the program. They claimed that, since the program primarily aided parochial schools, it violated the Establishment Clause. -Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state financial aid available to "church- related educational institutions"?
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In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both programs violate the Establishment Clause because they create excessive entanglement between a religious entity and the state. This created the lemon test: 1)The statute must not result in an "excessive government entanglement" with religious affairs. 2)The statute must not advance or inhibit religious practice 3) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
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11/24 Wallace v Jaffree (1984) An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile, Alabama. -Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?
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Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion.
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Lee v. Weisman (1991) A rabbi was invited to deliver a prayer at a public school's graduation ceremony. The rabbi was given a copy of a pamphlet that recommended prayers at civic ceremonies be inclusive and sensitive. The Defendant, a student at the school, challenged the practice of having prayers at public school graduations -Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
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Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school."
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2001) In an effort to address the problem of failing public schools in Cleveland, the State of Ohio enacted a voucher program that provided vouchers to low-income parents for use at participating public and private schools. Once implemented, the schools that chose to participate were overwhelmingly religious private schools, and the vast majority of participating students went to private religious schools. A suit was brought by local taxpayers and students in Cleveland public schools claiming that the voucher program unconstitutionally aided religious schools. -Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause?
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No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government.
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12/1 Van Orden v Perry (2004) Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." -Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"
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No. In 5-4 decision, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. its showing the history of the state, not promoting religion
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McCreary County v. ACLU (2004) The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause -Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause
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Yes. There is deeply-rooted history in this country against the combination of church and state. It is this Government's job to remain neutral when it comes to matters of religion
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Town of Greece v. Galloway (2013)
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is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court decided that the Town of Greece, New York may permit volunteer chaplains to open each legislative session with a prayer. It does not violate the Establishment Clause when the practice is consistent with the tradition long followed by Congress and state legislatures
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12/3 Reynolds v. United States (1878) George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute. -Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural marriage is part of religious practice?
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No. it held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy.
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West Virginia BOE v. Barnette (1942) The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency. -Did the mandatory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?
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By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that school officials do violate the First Amendment by compelling students to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.
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Sherbert v. Verner (1962) Adeil Sherbert, a member of a Jewish Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing Saturday work. -Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
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Yes. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith
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Wisconsin v. Yoder (1971) Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs. -Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons?
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In a unamimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade.
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12/7 Bob Jones University v. United States (1982) Generally, the IRS provides a tax exemption to institutions organized exclusively for religious or charitable purposes. In 1971, the IRS created a policy denying such tax exemptions to institutions that practice racial discrimination. -Can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Estbalishment Clauses?
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It did not violate the Establishment clause. The Court found that the government's interest in ending racial discrimination was substantial and outweighed any burden the denial of the tax exemption created. Second, the Court held that the IRS policy was based on a neutral, secular purpose, and was not designed to prefer one religion over another. Thus, the policy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.
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Lyng v. NICPA (1987) The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng. -Did the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibit the government from harvesting or developing the Chimney Rock area?
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No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs
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Oregon v Smith ( 1989) Smith sought unemployment compensation benefits after he was fired from his job for using peyote in a religious ceremony. -Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes?
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Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate.
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12/10 The Chicken Sacrifice Case (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah) (1992) The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities. -Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause?
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Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church.
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Boerne v. Flores (1996) The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. -Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?
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Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden
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Incorporation
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A process that extended the protections of the Bill of Rights against the actions of state and local governments. They are held to the same standard as federal govt
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Undue burden test
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says that the Legislature cannot make a particular law that is too burdensome or restrictive of one's fundamental rights
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Fundamental rights
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1)Freedom to express opinions 2) to choose one's own religion 3) to organize peaceful gatherings 4)to associate with any person or group.
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Separate but Equal doctrine
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the doctrine established by Plessy v Ferguson (1896) that African Americans could constitutionally be kept in separate but equal facilities
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State action doctrine
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Rule stating that only the actions of state and local governments must conform to the equal protection clause, not those of private individuals.
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Section 5 of 14th amendment
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Enforcement Clause: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
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Voting Rights Act of 1965
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It outlawed the discriminatory voting practices adopted in many southern states after the Civil War, including literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. Signed by President Lyndon Johnson.
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Per Curiam Opinion
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A brief, unsigned opinion issued by the Supreme Court to explain its ruling.
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Pre-Clearance Requirement of Voting Rights Act
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states and local jurisdictions covered under the Act must submit all changes affecting voting and elections for preapproval by the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Part of the Voting rights act of 1965
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Clear and Present Danger Test
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Interpretation of the First Amendment that holds that the government cannot interfere with speech unless the speech presents a clear and present danger that it will lead to evil or illegal acts.
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Clear and Imminent Danger Test -Brandenburg v Ohio -Schenck v US
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the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was replaced in 1969 by Brandenburg v. Ohio, and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an "imminent lawless action".
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Bad Tendency Test
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Interpretation of the First Amendment that would permit legislatures to forbid speech encouraging people to engage in illegal action. Also, Brandenburg v Ohio overturned this.
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Prior restraint
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A government preventing material from being published. This is a common method of limiting the press in some nations, but it is usually unconstitutional in the United States, according to the First Amendment and as confirmed in the 1931 Supreme Court case of Near v. Minnesota.
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Incitement
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This requires clear proof that speech presents the likelihood of imminent lawless behavior.
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Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA)
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Allows corporations, unions and trade associations to form PACs as a means of raising campaign funds. It also increased disclosure of contributions for federal campaigns, and amended in 1974 to place legal limits on the campaign contributions. The amendment also created the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
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Bi-Partisan Campaign Act (BCRA)
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A United States federal law that amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which regulates the financing of political campaigns by banning Soft (Party) money.
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Fighting words
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Speech that directly incites damaging conduct. [Chaplinksy v New Hampshire]
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Libel/Slander
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Slander occurs when the false and defamatory communication is spoken and heard. (S=spoken) Libel occurs when the false and defamatory communication is written and seen.
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"Actual Malice" Standard -New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
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This is the definition in only the United States and came from the landmark 1964 lawsuit New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which ruled that public officials needed to prove actual malice in order to recover damages for libel.
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Content-based restriction
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a restriction on the exercise of free speech based upon the subject matter or type of speech.
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Viewpoint discrimination
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unconstitutional government regulation of speech expressing a particular view on a subject. [Freedom of Association] {Brandenburg vs Ohio}
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Wall of Separation
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Court ruling that government cannot be involved with religion
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Schempp Test
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1) must have secular purpose 2) primary effect must not be to inhibit or enhance religion
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Lemon Test
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1) The government's action must have a secular legislative purpose; 2)The government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion; 3) The government's action must not result in an "excessive government entanglement" with religion
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Rational Basis Test
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a law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
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Non-Establishment
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Laws must be neutral and may not endorse a particular religion.
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Disestablishment -Everson v. BOE
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separation of church and state; no religion is officially supported by state/gvt.
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Intermediate Scrutiny (Significant Government Interest Test/Exceedingly Persuasive Justification) -equal protection cases
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To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. As the name implies, intermediate scrutiny is less rigorous than strict scrutiny, but more rigorous than rational basis review. I
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Strict Scrutiny (Compelling Government Interest Test)
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To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a "compelling governmental interest," and must be narrowly tailored to the law to achieve that interest.
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Burwell v Hobby Lobby (2014)
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is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court allowing closely held for-profit corporations to be exempt from a law its owners religiously object to if there is a less restrictive means of furthering the law's interest. It is the first time that the court has recognized a for-profit corporation's claim of religious belief, but it is limited to closely held corporations.
