The Social Democratic Party of Germany Essay Example

although active state intervention in a planned economy within a democratic framework seemed essential for rebuilding German society and avoiding past mistakes, the SPD could not attain governing power due to Schumacher's insistence on uncompromising tactics.

In 1947, the Economic Council was formed to govern Bizonia, which comprised of the British and American zones. Despite being given equal representation with the CDU based on recent Land elections, Schumacher refused to co-operate due to his reputation for intransigence. This led to the dominance of the CDU in the Council and the appointment of Erhard as Economics Director (Carr, 1987). The free-market policies of Erhard and Adenauer's unexpected popularity also contributed to the SPD's failure. The SPD's planned economy was less appealing to voters in 1949 than Erhard's promotion of free enterprise and abolition of rationing (Carr, 1987). Additionally, the SPD misread the German public's stance on foreign and domestic policy.Schumacher recognized that the widespread notion that Social Democracy had failed to prioritize Germany's interests was a significant barrier to the party's success. To overcome this, a strong nationalistic approach was adopted. This approach demanded a completely unified Germany and opposed the policies of both the Soviet Union and Western occupying powers. The party demanded independence from these powers and cooperation only on the basis of equality, but only if German national interests were not compromised. However, this nationalistic stance caused opposition to a variety of CDU government policies: rearmament, European integration, negotiations with the Soviets, and NATO membership. Domestically, Schumacher's critiques of conservatism, capitalism, and Catholicism offended many potential voters. With Germany divided, the party lost its pre-war stronghold in the Prussian hinterland. Furthermore, because 45% of

West Germans were now Catholic, compared to 33% pre-war, and were being urged by the CDU/CSU to reject 'godless socialism,' Schumacher's anti-clericalism and structural changes militated against SPD gains. Ultimately, Schumacher's politically uncompromising stance was not an asset in terms of both internal and external policy.

Despite his reservations about Adenauer's willingness to accept foreign mandates that may not serve Germany's interests and further hinder reunification efforts, the Chancellor's foreign policies enjoyed strong backing from the public. Adenauer prioritized positioning the Federal Republic as a significant player within NATO and a united Europe, recognizing the division of Germany into two states as an obstacle to reunification and in line with popular opinion. On the other hand, the SPD's advocacy for traditional socialism and obstinate oppositional stance failed to align with voters' concerns, intensifying negative perceptions of the party. According to Smith (1990, p. 100), the SPD "became trapped in its own web of opposition," consistently caught off guard by shifting circumstances and lagging behind in current events, resulting in reluctant endorsements and policy reversals that only reinforced public perceptions of political ineptitude.

Due to economic recovery, successful European integration, the intensification of the Cold War, and the increasing status of West Germany, the SPD had no choice but to embrace the F.R.G. (Carr, 1987; Smith, 1990).

Following Schumacher's death in 1952, the SPD suffered another defeat in the 1953 election, causing a decline in morale and credibility. It was evident that the party needed to reassess its policy direction and leadership style. In the 1957 election, all radical elements of the party programme were ignored, making it difficult to distinguish from the CDU. Led by Ollenhauer, a party

functionary lacking in charisma, the SPD suffered another significant defeat. This setback allowed revisionists in the party to gain power and address the widely held view that the Social Democratic approach required a complete overhaul to avoid further stagnation or decline. The reformists presented a new party programme in Bad Godesberg at the 1959 SPD party convention, formally abandoning Marxist doctrine and terminology, rejecting nationalisation of means of production and economic planning, and strongly committing to Western Alliance and anti-communist policies, defence policy, European cooperation, (Conradt,1986).

The philosophy behind its recent economic policies was a blend of practical socialism, which incorporated a trust in central planning with a confidence in the market economy, that had been prosperous and widely accepted during the 1950’s. The slogan “as much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary” epitomizes these principles (Carr,1987,p197). At the core of its new program, the party declared that democratic socialism is based on “Christian ethics, humanism and classical philosophy”. Significantly, they rejected any "dogmatic belief or claim to a special understanding of society", and went on to clarify that the SPD was under no obligation to “explain the history of mankind” (all in Smith, 1990 p102). According to Conradt (1986), the new programme reconciled socialism with Christianity, committing itself to safeguarding religious freedom and advocating state support for religion. The party also renounced its former traditional anticlericalism. By recognizing the SPD as an integral part of a pluralistic West German society, the new programme abandoned any notion of it being a narrow class-based party.

The acknowledgement of the interests and values of all sections of society replaced the previous assertion of working class primacy,

according to Carr (1987). The SPD renounced the class label and instead positioned itself as a party for all, or a Volkspartei. This shift was evident in the Bad Godesberg programme, which rejected the symbols and traditions of 'the movement'. These 'revolutionary myths' were seen as barriers to achieving wider electoral support (Smith, 1990). The party's focus was on appealing to the middle classes and emphasising its commitment to free markets and pro-western ideals in order to challenge the CDU on centrist ground.

By sacrificing its 'critical perspective', the SPD gained more flexibility and pragmatism, resulting in increased support from previously wary segments of the electorate. Brandt's involvement in the reform program also raised his profile and lifted the SPD out of political stagnation. As a chancellor-candidate, Brandt was viewed as a dynamic representative of the younger generation capable of continuing Adenauer's legacy. During the 1961 Berlin crisis, Brandt, acting as Mayor of Berlin, embodied the city's defiant spirit and stood in stark contrast to Adenauer's lackluster response (Carr,1987).

During the 1961 and 1965 elections, there was an increase in electoral support which demonstrated the success of the Bad Godesberg reforms. The main purpose of these reforms was to make the SPD more electable so that the party could gain power, either through a coalition or with a majority. Although Erhard, Adenauer's successor, managed to maintain his power in 1965 and even increase the CDU vote, his administration was short-lived after the FDP resigned from the coalition. This allowed the SPD to enter the government for the first time in December 1966 through a 'Grand Coalition' with CDU. Brandt became foreign minister and vice-chancellor while Kiesinger took

over as chancellor and CDU leader. This coalition provided an opportunity for the SPD to demonstrate its ability to handle governmental responsibilities and work alongside other parties. The SPD ministers proved successful in their competencies, with Schiller, as Economics Minister, particularly shining in his debut.

Conradt (1986) states that Schiller implemented Keynesian policies, such as increased government spending, tax reductions and lower interest rates, to revive the economy and restore it to good health. This led to economic prosperity and allowed a large portion of the electorate to associate with the Social Democrats for the first time in German history. However, by March 1969, significant differences emerged between coalition partners which eventually caused the collapse of the coalition. In September 1969 election, SPD made notable progress particularly in North-Rhine Westphalia where they gained support from urban Catholic strongholds that were previously inaccessible. Their vote share rose to 42%, enabling them to form a coalition government supported by FDP (Carr, 1987).

For 13 years after Brandt's appointment as chancellor, the SPD/FDP coalition maintained its hold on power. During this period, Brandt furthered his 'Ostpolitik' foreign policy, a series of agreements with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from 1970-72 that normalized and strengthened relations. In 1972, he signed the Basic Treaty which governed the relationship between East and West Germany until reunification in 1990. Economic growth and prosperity also continued to flourish, resulting in the SPD becoming the dominant political party in the 1972 election.The adoption of the reform program at Bad Godesberg aimed to gain power and enter the government in 1966 while maintaining independence from the CDU. This goal justified the program's implementation, despite criticisms from

the SPD’s left-wing groups like Young Socialists and Marxist intellectuals and Trades Unionists who claimed that the leadership took an easy path to political power by merely representing social groupings and classes without changing power relationships. Even with its successes, the decline in electoral support during the 1976 national election and subsequently throughout the 1980s suggests that although the Godesberg program improved the SPD's fortunes and public perception, it could not provide a long-lasting prescription for electoral success.

The SPD encountered a decline in popularity and criticism due to abandoning Marxist ideologies in 1959. Despite the desire for political power, there was a disconnect with voters. Brandt stepped down in 1974 and was succeeded by Schmidt, who was a well-liked chancellor with strong managerial skills that led the government effectively until 1982. However, the party's support decreased sharply in 1976, stagnated in 1980, and fell again during opposition in 1983. Many within the party felt it had lost direction and engaged in self-examination after their defeat. The emergence of post-materialist politics surrounding environmental issues and nuclear power became significant issues that the SPD struggled to effectively address, leading to further internal division and electoral losses.

According to Smith (1990), Schmidt experienced a surge of opposition to nuclear weapons, specifically in relation to the Nato 'twin-track' decision of 1979, which aimed to negotiate with the Soviets while also deploying Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles, many of which were intended for German territory. Dissatisfaction with the nuclear weapons policy was expressed by the rank and file membership at Land level, not just by the far left, through rejection and increased participation in the 'peace movement'. Schmidt's authority was seriously

damaged, leading to significant loss of support from the young and others who turned to the Greens. The emergence of the Greens in the early 1980s and their success in driving the agenda presented an unexpected challenge to the SPD, forcing them to reassess the assumption that they had support from the party's left-wing.

The SPD faced a challenge from the left of their party, known as the 'Junos', who were dissatisfied with their centrist policies and increasing involvement in extra-parliamentary activism. This forced the SPD to reconsider their political strategy and purpose. Schmidt's practical style exposed conflicting elements within the party's policies, which were previously concealed by Brandt's rhetoric of social and political change. Before the emergence of the Greens, the SPD balanced its socialist roots with its commitment to being a Volkspartei, pulling towards both the left and centre. However, this posed a challenge to maintaining coherence and credibility as a party while keeping large numbers of committed leftists at the regional and local level. (Parness,1991; Smith,1990)

The party is split on how to respond and unify their diverse elements. In the 1983 election campaign, they aimed to attract potential Green voters while still maintaining their traditional core electorate. However, this strategy caused them to lose segments of their core supporters and appear desperate in their attempts to gain votes. The party needs to balance economic security with the anti-growth stance of the Greens and address the concerns of the 'new politics'. There are two paths to consider - either cultivating a potential coalition with the Greens or finding a different approach.

The dilemma of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany has been highlighted

by the poor showings in the 1987 and 1990 elections, which continue to reveal their indecisiveness, weak leadership, and lack of clear electoral strategy. The party has attempted to win over Green voters, as seen with Merkl in 1988, and has also formed coalitions with Green factions at Land level in Hesse, Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lower Saxony. However, the Greens have proven unreliable at times and these coalitions have been unpredictable. Despite this, the SPD continues to navigate this delicate situation as they maintain some coalition partnerships. Furthermore, while the Green vote has slightly diminished at the national level, the dilemma for the SPD remains.

In December 1989, the SPD launched a program review that lasted for 5 years and resulted in a new Basic Programme. Their goal was to redefine social democracy and regain the lost ideological dominance of the early 1980s. However, the new Basic Programme mainly reaffirmed the Bad Godesberg principles and lacked genuine innovation. The focus was on modernizing the party's identity and embracing structural economic change, including a more positive attitude towards a competitive market economy. Unfortunately, its launch coincided with national excitement over unification, resulting in almost total neglect and lack of impact. (Padgett,1993)Regarding the unification of Germany, the party took a slow approach and did not realize in late 1989 that rapid unification was inevitable. The SPD was caught off-guard as they had largely abandoned unification as a practical goal and may have even seen the existence of two permanent German states as contributing to European stability. Additionally, Lafontaine's lack of personal sympathy for unification heavily influenced the SPD's campaign during the 1990 election, where they emphasized the

negative consequences and costs of unity while attacking Kohl for downplaying the extensive burden to follow. Although some of their concerns have proven valid, this strategy was not productive during the euphoria surrounding unification at that time.

Despite the mounting economic problems, strikes, resignations, violence, and foreign policy paralysis that plague Kohl's CDU coalition government due to the aftermath of unification, this seems to be the hour for the SPD. The party has control over the Bundesrat, has a younger generation in charge of its Lander governments and party administrations, and is in a position to demand concessions from the Kohl administration. A new 'Grand Coalition' seemed on the cards in 1992. However, the party appears to lack faith in itself and is unable to act, despite benefiting from the CDU's problems. Engholm's recent resignation as party chairman and probable chancellor-candidate necessitates the need for a new and appropriate leader to devise and project a viable and progressive electoral strategy to sustain the party's gains.

However, according to Smith (1992), achieving success without actively trying does not establish a stable foundation for the SPD to regain its leading position in a future government. As long as they do not rekindle their desire to govern and construct a powerful and trustworthy plan and vision through assertive leadership, the party will continue to exist in a state of semi-permanent opposition.