The Involvement of Carthage and Rome in the Three Punic Wars Essay Example

prepared not to promote her commercial interests in certain areas by aggressive force and Rome was primarily concerned with the peoples of Italy (Scullard, 1989 as cited in Walbank et al., p. 537). In 279 B. C., the commercial treaty between Rome and Carthage became a military alliance against their common enemy Pyrrhus. After the war with Pyrrhus, Rome was able to assert control over the other Greek cities in southern Italy (Cowell, 1967, p.

According to Cary (1970, p.32) and Frank (1931, pp. 94-95), the peace between Rome and Carthage grew more tenuous following Rome's triumph over Pyrrhus and the Greeks in southern Italy. Prior to Rome's authority in Italy, Carthage had clashed with the Greeks in the western Mediterranean. Carthage regarded these waters as its own territory and would sink any ship that ventured into them. However, with Pyrrhus' defeat and Roman dominance in southern Italy, the Greek cities of Magna Graecia came under Roman control.

According to Grant (1978), the conflict between Carthage and Rome was bound to happen because Carthage had control over the sea, spanning from Spain to Sicily, while Rome exerted dominance over Italy. As suspicions and jealousies grew, tensions escalated for both parties (Cowell, 1967).

Both the Romans and the Carthaginians were worried about the possible repercussions of losing control over Sicily. The Romans were concerned that if a hostile force took over the island, they would have a strategic advantage in launching attacks against southern Italy. Conversely, the Carthaginians understood that if the Romans controlled the Greek cities in southern Italy, they might intervene in Sicilian matters and back up the Sicilian Greeks in their ongoing conflict with Carthage. The

absence of a shared adversary among the Greeks and the increasing Roman influence in southern Italy made war an unavoidable result.

According to Plutarch, Pyrrhus stated that the Romans and Carthaginians were inheriting a brave battlefield as he left Italy (as cited in Liddell, 1889, p. 199). Caven acknowledges that war between Rome and Carthage was inevitable but argues that the event triggering the First Punic War was an incident that escalated out of control. The spark igniting the First Punic War was rather insignificant (Freeman, 1996, p. 319). The Mamertines were a group of Campanian mercenaries.

Having been recruited by the Greek city of Syracuse, the Mamertines subsequently defected in 289 B.C. and captured Messana in Sicily (Heichelheim and Yeo, 1962, p. 115). Upon taking control of Messana, the Mamertines massacred its male inhabitants, seized their wives, and embarked on a campaign of looting neighboring towns that were allied with Syracuse.

Heiro II, king of Syracuse, initiated an assault on Messana in 265 B. C. with the goal of eliminating this threat. The Mamertines requested aid from the admiral of a nearby Carthaginian fleet, who agreed to assist them. However, the Mamertines were worried that the Carthaginians might establish a permanent presence in Messana, so they appealed to Rome for assistance. After extensive deliberation, Rome decided to form an alliance with the Mamertines due to their concerns that Messana could serve as a strategic base for future Carthaginian assaults on Italy and potentially jeopardize Rome's control over the straits.

Moreover, if Carthage were to gain control of Messana, it could endanger the trade of southern Greeks in Italy, potentially causing them to turn against Rome. In response, the

Romans dispatched a preliminary force to rescue Messana and encountered minimal resistance from the Carthaginian fleet. When faced with Roman forces, the Carthaginians retreated from Messana without much opposition (Freeman, 1996, p.319). Despite their historical conflict, Syracuse and Carthage were compelled to form an alliance due to Rome's occupation of Messana. This newfound coalition besieged Messana. The Roman commander Appius Claudia successfully transported his troops across the straits and ordered the allies to end their siege on Messana. However, his demand was rejected; thus prompting Claudius to launch attacks against both the Syracusans and the Carthaginians. Claudius effortlessly defeated both adversaries. In 263 B.C., the Romans further initiated an assault on Syracuse.

C. , Hiero grew angry with the lack of support he received from his Carthaginian allies and joined forces with Rome. Rome recognized that they could not win the war in Sicily if the Carthaginian fleet controlled the seas. The Carthaginian navy's superiority allowed them to cut off Rome's communication lines in Italy and starve their forces in Sicily. In addition, the Carthaginian fleet could launch attacks on Rome's coastal cities. Rome's chances of conquering Sicily's coastal cities were further reduced if Carthage maintained control of the seas (Freeman, 1996, p.).

The decision to construct a Roman fleet was made after the capture of Acragas, demonstrating Rome's determination to conquer Carthage (Freeman, 1996, p.320). Polybius, as cited in Crawford (1982, p.), states that a Carthaginian ship served as the inspiration for the fleet construction.The Roman senate authorized the construction of 100 quinqueremes, which were supposedly built in sixty days. The quinquereme was a single-decked vessel with 20 to 60 oars, five men to an oar.

Unlike the outdated Roman trieme, where each rower had to be a skilled oarsman, on a quinquereme, only "one man directed the sweep and the other four had only to supply muscle power". Crews had to be trained on mock ships on land.

According to Freeman (1996, p. 320), the quinquereme, despite being heavier and less maneuverable than Carthaginian ships, was advantageous for the Romans because it saved them time in training skilled oarsmen. This was possible due to its unique feature - the corvus or 'crow', which served as a hinged gangplank attached to each quinquereme.

The Romans would position their ships next to Carthaginian vessels and release a ramp, connected to a rope and threaded through pulleys on the mast. The corvus, or spike, would penetrate the enemy ship's deck, securely binding the two ships together. Consequently, Roman legionnaires could then cross over to the Carthaginian vessels and engage in close combat with the enemy. Essentially, this naval strategy allowed the Romans to transform sea battles into land battles, making effective use of their well-trained soldiers. As a result, they gained an advantage over the Carthaginians, who excelled in seamanship but failed to recognize the importance of close-quarters combat (Dorey and Dudley, 1972, p.).

The corvus granted the Romans an advantage in numerous early naval battles, including the one at Mylae (Freeman, 1996, p.321). According to Heichelheim and Yeo (1962, p. 117), if the Carthaginian navy had not focused solely on ramming as a battle tactic, they would have achieved greater success in these sea battles. This was evident by 242 B.C.

, and with both sides almost depleted from the conflict, the Romans emerged

victorious in a significant naval engagement near the Aegates Islands. This victory essentially prevented Carthage from delivering provisions to Sicily, leading them to seek a peaceful resolution (Heichelheim and Yeo, 1962, p. 119). Rostovtzeff (1960, p.

Roman victory in the First Punic War is attributed primarily to several Carthaginian mistakes made at the start of the conflict. Despite having initial superiority at sea, the Carthaginians made a strategic error by allowing the Roman army to cross from Italy into Sicily (Grant, 1978, p. 85 and Rostovtzeff, 1960, p. 53). Heichelheim and Yeo (1962, p. 116) echo this argument, asserting that Carthage's naval forces could have easily prevented Appius Claudius from crossing the straits.

Failure to retain support from Hiero II weakened Carthage's alliance with him, which Rostovtzeff (1960, p. 53) suggests was another reason for Carthage's ultimate defeat in the war. According to Rostovtzeff (1960, p.53), the Carthaginians also failed to send a sufficient force to destroy the initial Roman detachments that had landed in Sicily, contributing to Rome's victory. Grant (1978, p. 86) adds that Carthage's defeat can also be attributed to a lack of commitment from her government.

Carthage's emphasis on Africa development rather than the Sicilian war led to their commanders being unable to capitalize on Roman losses and achieve a decisive victory. Instead, they had to settle for a prolonged war. However, Carthage's mercenaries were disadvantaged compared to Rome's legions in this style of combat. Unlike Rome's legions, Carthage's mercenaries lacked patriotic drive as they were not part of a cohesive political system like Rome (Grant, 1978, p. 86).

The peace that concluded the initial conflict, the First Punic War, was essentially just a

temporary ceasefire (Cairns, 1970, p. 0). However, by 218 B.C., it became clear that the western Mediterranean could no longer prevent further confrontations between the Roman and Carthaginian empires. Carthage was investing significant efforts in establishing a fortified presence in Spain, while Rome took control of the islands of Sardinia and Corsica.

In 226 B. C., the Romans imposed a treaty on the Carthaginians, limiting their northern expansion in Spain at the Erbro River. Saguntun, a Spanish city located south of the Erbro River and within Carthage's sphere of influence, formed an alliance with Rome. Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, saw this as interference in Carthaginian affairs. In 219 B. C., after a lengthy siege, Hannibal captured Saguntun.

According to Bourne (1966, p. 125), the Romans saw this attack as a declaration of war and insisted that Hannibal surrender. However, the Carthaginians refused, resulting in the Saguntine affair becoming the primary reason for starting the Second Punic War. Freeman (1996, p.) noted that neither side seemed interested in avoiding the conflict.

In order to launch their offensive campaign, both powers, the Romans and the Carthaginians, made strategic decisions. The Romans opted to send an army led by Gnaeus Scipio to Spain. On the other hand, Hannibal devised a bold plan to cross the Alps swiftly and unexpectedly attack Italy. His aim was to humiliate Rome and sever her connections with her allies (Freeman, 1996, p. 322). Hannibal believed that Rome's strength stemmed from the abundance of manpower she garnered through her various alliances. He reasoned that his tactical superiority, the expertise of his experienced army, and a series of early significant triumphs would prompt these allies to abandon

Rome's cause.

Without their support, Rome would weaken and crumble. Hannibal's strategy, after crossing the Alps, was to establish a base among the Gauls in the Po Valley (Starr, 1974, p. 483). The Gauls had been adversaries of the Romans and were newly conquered. Cowell (1967, p. 33) asserts that Hannibal's surprise crossing of the Alps and initial triumphs indicated Carthaginian weakness.

If the Carthaginians had maintained control of the seas, Hannibal would not have had to undertake the arduous journey across the mountains, which led to the loss of almost half of his army (Bourne, 1966, p.127). In Italy, Carthage could never rival Rome's capability to mobilize a large number of soldiers from its heartland (Bourne, 1966, p.127). Despite taking sixteen years, ultimately sheer numbers settled the matter (Bourne, 1966, p.127). The battles at the Trebia River in 218 B.C. and in 217 B.C. played a significant role.

At Lake Trasimene, Hannibal achieved two devastating victories over the Romans. However, despite these successful military triumphs, he was unable to achieve the political success he desired by weakening Rome's alliances. Rome's allies, for the most part, remained loyal to the city. Although the Gauls joined Hannibal's cause, the central allies of Latium, Umbria, and Etruria maintained their alliances with Rome. Their fear of the Gauls and their belief that Hannibal's mercenaries were no better than barbarians ultimately kept them faithful to Rome (Freeman, 1996, p. 323 and Crawford, 1982, p.).

56). The alliances remained strong despite Hannibal's forces pillaging the land for sustenance (Cowell, 1967, p. 33). As a response to these losses, Fabius Maximus was appointed as dictator. The Fabian strategy differed from previous tactics employed, acknowledging Hannibal's

superiority and recognizing the lack of thorough training in his own troops (Bourne, 1966, p.

130) Fabius declined to give Hannibal the chance he wanted for a decisive battle, instead opting to delay and avoid confrontation by employing hit-and-run strategies against Hannibal's experienced soldiers until his own troops were sufficiently trained (Bourne, 1966, p. 130).

Fabius Maximus also had a plan to undermine Hannibal's reputation among the allies by portraying him as nothing more than a bandit (Bourne, 1966, p. 30). However, unable to break Rome's alliances in the north, Hannibal shifted his focus to the south. Fabius' army pursued Hannibal's forces into southern Italy, constantly shadowing them and choosing to engage in combat only when they could isolate small groups of the enemy. Fabius Maximus' cautious tactics irritated many of Rome's politicians. According to Freeman (1996, p. 323), avoiding battle was so contrary to Roman thinking that two new consuls were appointed to replace him and resume the traditional policy of directly confronting the Carthaginians.

In 216 B.C., Rome experienced a monumental defeat at the Battle of Cannae. However, despite this devastating loss, only Capua and a few smaller cities switched allegiance to the Carthaginians. The aftermath of Cannae revealed Rome's unwavering determination not to surrender (Crawford, 1982, p.)

58). Upon Hannibal's offer to accept ransom for his prisoners, Rome's response was that he had the freedom to do as he wished with them as the city had no need for men who surrendered in battle. The Roman senate exhibited an indifference towards calculating their expenses (Lavell, 1980, p. 292).

According to Cairns (1970, p. 2), the Romans possessed an unwavering spirit that made it difficult to determine

if they were more or less human. This persistence would be crucial in their eventual triumph over Carthage (Crawford, 1982, p. 56). Even though Hannibal had the opportunity to march on Rome, he decided against it due to the lack of siege equipment, a nearby supply base, and the necessary numbers to attack the city's fortifications. This choice was documented by Cowell (1967, p.).

32) Believes that Hannibal made a mistake by not capturing Rome, which ultimately diminished his chances of achieving final victory.