Poli Sci 378 – Flashcards

Every War Must End * Summary > There is always incentive to overestimate power and capabilities so going to war clears any confusion of your capabilities. It becomes known just how capable you are and just how costly the war or conflict would be. * Argument: > Leaders that start wars and conflict are powerless to end the conflict > Hawks portray doves as traitors.. will conflict continue or change course? > States lose sight of goals in conflict, find it hard to come to resolution * Example: > Wars get normalized: Iraq wars 1991 and 2003

How Wars End * Summary: > An understanding of credible commitment propositions are required to understand why sides choose to fight or make compromises > attempts to explain war termination behavior and relationship between information and commitment * Argument: > Uncertainty about one sides commitment=total/absolute war and the overthrow of regime > after war breaks out, info proposition and credible commitment proposition dictate war termination.. Also things like shifts in balance of power, escalating costs, public pressure. > There is always a lesser or higher degree of uncertainty if other side will follow war-termination agreement, generally because there is no overarching world-government or institution that can enforce agreements.. argues that this can explain why wars end * Example: > Korean War: American cannot cut deal with NK because there is no trust that they will accept one.. commitment problems; may return to war if see advantage

War and Punishment (to remember, Go past the Man to understand reconciliation through regimes) * Summary: > Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. * Argument: ; Democracies: prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Presidents concerned with re-election, but not much else. ; Dictatorships: leadership not that scared because have control over military, act in way that democratic would ; Mixed regimes: formulate war aims differently bc their likelikhod of punishment remains the same whether they lose moderately or disastrously.. more risk of leadership being overthrown/killed/exiled. Costs of war go up and if losing attempt ineffective hail mary strategies * example: ; Germany : leaders formulated war aims to cover costs of war because feared that "insufficient peace" would change the political, economic, and physical survival.

How Enemies Become Friends Need common cultural ideas for stable peace. Warring parties progress from rapprochement to security community to union. Parties need to show restraint to signal their willingness to work for peace. ; similar social orders, ethnicities/religions, ideologies usually create alliances (ie UK and US.. China and Russia) ; How: 1) unilateral accommodation, 2) reciprocal accommodation, 3) social integration, 4) Narrative generation ; Why: Cultural commonality, compatible social orders, Institutionalized Restraint not necessary that states are democratic for peace

(to remember, He be mythmaking) "He: Compares German-Polish and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation after WWII. Myth making causes problems in easing post war tensions. Differing historical narratives cause divides (Ex: Japan & China). Agreeing on a factual events of the past may be tenuous especially after a war, but it will help ease the two countries together and will warm relations faster. "

Lind: Denials of past wrongs inhibit reconciliation, contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries, countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all (Ex: W. Germany ; France). ""The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash""

Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage

Reassurance in International Conflict Management * Summary: - when to use deterrence versus reassurance - deterrence more effective with prospect of gain than with fear of punishment - otherwise reassurance effective when: ; Restraint: unilateral or negotiated limits on weapons, deployments ; Irrevocable commitment: dramatic gestures that tie political hands ; Norms of Competition: Informal agreements ; Limited Regimes: Confidence building measures, notifications of military exercises, rules of the road ; 1973 Egypt and Syria invade Israel to regain lost territories, they fail.. Sadat breaks Arab wall of solidarity against Israel and pursues negotiations

Collins: Grit - Graduate Reciprocation In Tension reduction A process in which the two superpowers could reverse the Cold War spiral of increasing tension by embarking upon conciliatory policies. Since their fear of one another was based on a false premise, Osgood argued that conciliatory policies would be able to reduce the suspicion and tension in their relationships "

Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation * Summary: > Costly Signals: each player can be either trustworthy or untrustworthy, trustworthy types distinguish themselves from untrustworthy (can do so by lowering military capabilities because leaves them vulnerable and is costly to them). * Argument: > whole point of trust is the unknown factors, so must reveal and set self apart to prove your trustworthiness.. not so much step to step like GRIT method, but parallel to it. * Example: > End of Cold War, Gorbachev makes series of gestures that looks like GRIT, or costly signals

(to remember, Wheelhouse of trustmaking) Wheeler: How two adversaries can convince each other they are serious about negotiating with each other. How to show that you can be trusted. Above notes about trust. Not taking advantage of every opportunity you have to exploit one another. Reducing military capabilities. Face-to-face diplomacy between leaders signals cooperation is desired at highest level of governance (example of Reagan and Gorbachev) "

Explaining End of Cold War - security of nuclear peace led to soviet reform and real peace * Summary: ; Once concerns of external threats are settled, can focus on internal matters and domestic issues ; Authoritarian regimes benefit in time external conflict because they can mobilize quickly and dont need to worry about freedom of speech of civil rights. * Argument: ; being secure means being armed and vice versa ; Authoritarianism is more efficient in solving crisis with nuclear war because decisions are easier to make with hierarchy of leadership rather than in a democracy when things are voted on. * Example: ; Iraq and Saddam Hussein: main fear of dictators is internal unrest, especially with external threats

Ideas do not float freely (risse -; rise -; float) * Summary: ; Ideas do not float freely, that is just because idea is out there doesnt mean it will reach relevant decision makers ; Centralized system of soviet union means outside ideas of liberalization not a huge threat * Argument: ; He thinks ideas do matter.. Gorbachev was a reformer because new way of thinking about economics and international security BUT just because new ideas doesnt mean that it will change govt.. .depends on internal institutions of that country.. not enough for people just to hear about ideas, need a change within the government. ; liberal ideas within the govt will change policy, where in democracy is usually the public that change policy * Example: ; Soviet Union and Cold War: did it end because people had different ideas about what their interests were or was it because of shift in strategic environment ie no longer in interest of soviet union to be at war with west

Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War * Summary: ; Relative decline in the soviet economy, changing global economy and ways of production, and the way soviet hardliners acted. (imperial overstretch caused their collapse). Failing economy lead to a collapse of the military industrial complex. * Argument: ; Argue importance of economic prosperity and success in government ; They admit that ideas occur but argue which ones were actually causal in ending the cold war.. The role of ideas in the end of the Cold War may be overexaggerated as ideas may have been secondary to economic concerns. Both old and new thinkers agreed on the need to retrench. ; most are endogenous (originating internally, not the result of an independent cause) * Example: ; Crisis in Soviet economy "

Power, Ideas and New Evidence on Cold War's End * Summary: > Without ideas and leadership, there wouldn't be peace process > Critique of Brooks & Wohlforth > ideas of leadership matter more * Argument: > critiques the materialist explanation for the "strategic retreat" of Moscow. Soviet policy makers didn't care about comparing economies to the USA, corruption ruled the day. Leadership was not in unison about military cuts. Gorbachev saw that a defeat was going to come if the cold war continued on its course. He did not have any sort of revelation or change in attitude.

The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement * Summary: > Civil War negotiations fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they deem unthinkable. At a time when no legal institutions exist, opponents are asked to demobilize, disarm and prepare for peace. * Argument: > Argues that even if the parties can come up with a deal that both sides prefer over conflict, there is no way to enforce it and each side will want to pretend to abide by it but then break their word > A third party, international enforcement actor is needed to overcome commitment problem.. > Argues that intervention side overcomes commitment problems and facilitates negotiated settlements **see article with Kydd**

Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory? * Summary: > Negotiated settlements to end civil wars are usually ineffective. > Wars that end in settlement tend to resume later on because there is no effective punishment if a party fails to comply with the agreement. > total victories tend to create lasting peace because the losing party is crushed and unlikely to fight again. * Argument: > Uganda rebel victory effective because rebel victories create more durable outcomes.. > This is because if a rebel group want to be successful, they need to gain popular support and legitimacy. > To do this, the rebel group needs to find ways to become a more powerful and more effective organization than the state. * Example: > Uganda: wracked by dictatorship and civil war until 1986, rebel group won civil war and became more popular and successful government than predecessor

Violence decline in Iraq in 2007 * Summary: > Violence in Iraq would not have declined if it weren't for the 2007 Surge OR for the Anbar Awakening. The Surge would have been less effective if it didn't have the help of the "Sons of Iraq" who realigned from the enemy to the US during the Awakening. The Awakening would not have spread as far or as quickly as it did without the Surge. It was the combination or the synergy of the two working together that did the trick. * Argument: > Effective counterinsurgency strategy needs to take local conflicts and cultural identities into account. > insurgency is hard to fight and can last a long time against weak governments; strong govts can defeat them because they have the resources and time

Byman: The Second intifada" Use of Coercion in Israel was effective - use of the wall, tons of checkpoints - main cost of this tactic is you throw out possibility to use "hearts & minds" approach - yet this method is much better at intelligence gathering - - many more opportunities for intel. When everyone must frequently talk to police, peers are not suspicious of each other after they talk to police

Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes --- TYPES * Summary: > The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. > By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or to destroy it. > Spoilers only exist when there is a peace process to undermine, so when two warring parties have committed selves to a pact > Inside spoilers use stealth, outside use violence * Argument: > The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. > Concludes that an international consensus about norms and a strategy of aggressive management of spoilers, and unambiguous signals to peace supporters and spoilers will foster a successful peace agreement Based on TYPES inside vs. outside; motivation= limited (fixed, appeasable), greedy, (opportunistic), total (uncompromisig, maximal goals)--> strategies for spoiler management= inducement, socialization, coercion

* Summary: ; Spoilers are weak and extreme, known to oppose peace and negotiations.. but sometimes can convince moderate factions to abandon peace deals using mistrust ; The government wants to fulfill the peace deal if moderates are trustworthy (won't renege) and strong (can suppress extremists). Extremists can send signals with terrorist attacks. If an attack occurs, it sends the signal that the moderates either didn't try to suppress it (which makes the moderates untrusworhty) or couldn't suppress it (which makes the moderates weak). The signals sent by a successful terrorist attack can cause the government to reject a peace deal. (Ex: Palestinian attacks against Israel) * Argument: > method: foster mistrust between more moderate groups that are engaging in peace treaty.. Create suspicion among both sides that maybe one side will back down on deal > extremists more likely to succeed in preventing peaceful compromise when mistrust is high, public and govt more hard lines, and moderate opposition is capable of preventing terrorist violence but doesnt * Example: Palestinian/Hamas attacks against Israel

Perils of Profiling: Civil war spoilers * Summary: > spoiler types not as important in determining the kinds of outcomes that are possible, but the kinds of outcomes that are possible determine the type of spoiler that may emerge > Arrow of causality goes other way: there is an opportunity structure that creates greediness or environment which fosters the spoilers. * Argument: > dont start by assuming that spoilers are just always there, instead look at the structure or the two moderates/peace agreement and why some spoilers would come from that. > anything with commitment problems between groups creates space for spoilers. > all actors are involved in undermining peace process, but only a real threat when the custodians of peace are unwilling/unable to contain the effects of the spoiling > calculate balance of power of govt and then peacekeepers will be able to successfully deter spoilers

First, negotiating and spoiling as internal argument are more likely when at least one party to a conflict lacks an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. Second, whether internal contestation motivations lead factions to act as peace makers or peace breakers depends not only on their policy preferences but also on the balance of power within their community. Outbidding theory: extremists show that they are true representative of peoples interest in contrast to moderates who are ""traitors to cause"".. signal is to own public and people inside group that you want to support you."

Possible and impossible solutions to Ethnic Civil wars * Summary: > Partition solves the security dilemma that arises during ethnic civil wars. Un-mixing of the ethnicities allows for the ethnicities to be defense without it being perceived as offensive. > Mixed populations face spiral model * Argument: > International community should encourage partition in aftermath of ethnic civil wars > Separation of ethnic groups into defined territories: As in A land and Bs in B land, draw line between them.. essentially ethnic cleansing and re-order, for ethnic homogeneous areas > ex: Serbs and Croats impossible to attack one another when not around each other

Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War * Summary: > opposite of Kaufman * Argument: > Partition would not work. Too many ethnicities, incomplete un-mixing can occur, the new partitioned states could have territorial ambitions, could create a moral hazard. > Laitin argues that rather than unmixing, you need more thorough ethnic mixing to prevent ethnic civil wars. Ethnic groups are less likely or are unable to rebel when they're dispersed throughout the country. ; if no concentrated base, there is no military homeland or realistic prospect of fighting majority.. BUT if you have a homeland then you can actively think of succession **See article with Fearon**

Separatist Wars, Partition, and World order Examines the implications for world order if all ethnonationalist wars will be resolved by formally partitioning states. Explanation on the reason why ethnonationalist wars cannot be decided on a case by case basis; Political and legal framework needed by major powers if they want to start redesigning states; Discussion on the history of ad hoc responses to ethnic civil wars around the world in the 1990s. Problems - if violence is the signal for great powers to intervene, then those seeking to create statehood through cultural differences are encouraged to use violence - consistent intervention from great powers to lesser powers makes all parties less secure - moral hazard problem - how will third party be incentivized/ biased

Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars - this analysis systematically examines the outcome of partition, highlighting the centrality of demography by introducing an index that measures the degree to which a partition separates ethnic groups. - Partitions that completely separated the warring groups did not experience a recurrence of war and low-level violence for at least five years, outperforming both partitions that did not separate ethnic groups and other ethnic war outcomes - partition should only occur if groups are already divided and people can be transferred safely - Partition of Kosovo into serb/albanian then successful - Partition in the highly populated and multiethnic Iraq would most likely just increase conflict/suffering

Interstate Peacekeeping * Summary: ; Peacekeeping serves as a physical buffer between the parties of conflict. Serves as an interpositional and observational force. ; Stops minor clashes from leading to a spiral of conflict. ; Fortna confronts the selection problems. Finds that peacekeeping occurs in places harder to broker peace.

Bellamy and Williams: - assesses success of UN peacekeeping Regional and state-backed peacekeeping operations have not undermined international security and norms of non-intervention. However, poorer regions of the world may get left behind in terms of peace-keeping operations due to rise of regional peacekeeping.

(Fearon and Laitin) Peacekeeping.. Problem of Weak states * Summary: ; Suggest "neo-trusteeship": Need western countries to come around and build country for them ; Like Imperialism but with international approval and hopefully temporary ; Great power occupies country, rebuilds state institutions and leaves when done * Argument: ; Peacekeeping should be done by setting up neo-trusteships. Meaning strong states should step in and help set up the weak states and ensure they stabilize. This happens through great power occupation, rebuilding, stabilizing, repressing rebels and then leaving. An example would be Iraq or post WW1 German colonies.

Postconflict resolution in Africa * Summary: ; 3 problems for state building in Africa: 1. Western Style states never been successful, Africa ruled by clientelist systems. not bureaucratic like west 2. Local actors not motivated to set up states: conflict of interest between local elites and international actors, instead elites wish to maximize profits for selves, create security 3. External actors cannot commit sufficient resources to achieve goals ; Some peacekeeprs invovled in human rights violations like rape and torture

* Argument: ; Argues that neutral third parties fail, there needs to be bias from mediators to avoid cheap talk. The bias towards one side builds trust that the third parties word can be taken seriously. ; If unbiased mediator, people fighting wont believe mediator because they have no stake in the matter and why would they care what mediator feels ; If party have interests aligned with mediator, party may listen more even if they tell party something they don't want to hear * Example: USA during Falkland War and Russia talking with Kosovo.

(think of greif of a deals to remember cost of peacekeeping) Peacekeeping - Peacemaking Dilemma - peace as a rational choice - violence provides the needed info for settlement - implementing peacekeepers interrupts the info transfer so settlements are less likely - hurting stalemate -> opponents reach a Costly Impasse where each party forced to think critically and realize neither can win/ need for settlement - peacekeepers lessen the sense of urgency made by the costly impasse - both sides are then likely to reset to original conflicting positions

Should peacemakers take sides? (take favorites - Favretto) * Summary: > mediation and armed interventions by third parties can secure settlements, but have to consider any sort of third party bias > biased powers are inclined to use military coercion, threatening to fight if other side does not settle > Third-party bias reveals info about that party's willingness to use force. When a biased power intervenes, a peaceful settlement is likely bc opposing party is certain the third party will enforce agreement with military, and may not want to fight the third party. ; When a biased intervener shows no bias, negotiations fail because the disputants doubt that it is committed to force. One side stands strong bc they think the mediator will come to their aid. The other side stands strong bc they think the mediator will stay out of it. * Argument: ; Medium biased mediators make the problem worse with these unclear signals of uncertain resolve. Peace is more likely when the third party acts as a mediator with no bias bc they seek an agreement reasonable for both parties. ; a highly biased third party should always be able to communicate its intention to use force in a conflict. Therefore, third parties with the highest stakes in disputes should never have to resort to military intervention, because the opposing party will believe that the third party will act militarily if don't comply > military intervention when very biased, mediation when slightly biased * Example: when Stalin-friendly Yugoslavia first clashed with Italy over Trieste, the United States and Britain threatened force to protect Italy's interests because they were heavily biased against Yugoslavia.

Agreement without peace? International mediation (Beards are good in the short term but unstable long term ) * Summary: ; Mediation secures short term peace but nothing stable for the long term ; Mediators can facilitate information ex-change, use leverage to increase the perceived costs of conflict, and promise enforcement. Since mediators generally do not remain involved after a crisis, such temporary effects, however, tend to weaken as the actors' bargaining positions change and the mediator's involvement wanes over time ; Mediators promote settlement that are not self enforcing. * Argument: ; failure to follow agreement after mediation is a result of failed post-mediation environment, not the mediation itself.. so mediators should stay for a longer time to ensure problems dont remain ; Long-term consequences of mediation not so successful because actors create artificial incentives that leave parties with a solution weaker than before mediation bc of changing incentives and mediator's influence failing.

Camp david skipped in lecture

A Problem From Hell American and the Age of Genocide * Summary: > Genocide and humanitarian intervention > concludes that humanitarian intervention is necessary and also needs military intervention > moral hazard argument.. if don't bring leaders to court afterwards, could encourage genocide in future because no accountability ; doesn't always intervene in genocide > what would Kuperman say to samantha powers? intervening more likely to instigate wars bc international powers will come help... used Kosovo and Bosnia as example

The Responsibility to Protect (think of R2P as its own -noun to remember author) - justifies humanitarian intervention - sovereign states have R2P - if sovereign states fail internat. community, UN will get involved despite their sovereignty It applies with these characteristics: - Just cause -> large scale loss of life/ethnic cleansing, even if not genocide - Right intentions -> no gain/conflict of interest - Last Resort - Proportionality -> in use of force - Reasonable Prospects -> an achievable goal - Right Authority -> think UNSC

Moral hazard of humanitarian intervention (unlike superman, kuperman does not believe in a R2P) * Summary/argument > R2P unintentionally fosters rebellion, weakens the state, and increase power to rebel groups > R2P favors rebel groups because state kills them.. if they know international govt will intervene then more incentive to rebel

Ethical objections to humanitarian intervention (humanitarian intervention still an Atack) * Summary/Argument: > Danger of threatening national sovereignty, lead to more human suffering and escalation of war > Shifts from legal to moral.. Redefine international law based on morality.. but how do you define norms? Blurs moral and legal framework/logic. > Bold move coming in militarily to save civilian lives but STILL mobilizing troops and weaponry to kill humans. Who decides who deserves to live?

True costs of humanitarian intervention (think valentino as value-tarian to remember) * Summary/Argument: > Focused on humanitarian aid not military intervention.. provide assistance and disaster relief because more cost effective > weigh cost benefit of intervention. Side we support commits atrocities too (Croatian ethnic cleansing). Intervention inevitably kills civilians too (US killed hundreds in Somalia and thousands in Iraq/Afghanistan). > We should look at the opportunity cost of intervention, could save millions of lives if we used intervention money on public health initiatives instead.

Pragmatic standard of humanitarian intervention * Summary/Argument: > Argues for 'pragmatic standard' for intervention. > The Genocide convention sets the bar too high for intervention, once we see a genocide occurring it's too late. ; R2P sets the bar too low, too many cases fit with no limits on international community intervention. ; Pragmatic standard: intervene when mass killings (5,000) occur with expectation of thousands more, when intervention can be done with little risk to intervening forces lives and when stable peace is feasible outcome