Navy Expeditionary Warfare (EXW) Common Core

It is a decision making tool used to calculate risk by measuring risks and benefits.

a. Identify Hazards- Outline or chart the major steps in the operation then list all of the hazards associated in each step. b. Assess Hazards- For each hazard identified, determine the assciated degree of risk in terms of probability and severity. c. Making Risk Decisions- Develop risk control options; select controls that will reduce the risk to a minimum consistent with mission accomplishment. With selected controls in place, decide if the benefit. d. Implementing Controls- (!) Using ENGINEERING methods o reduce risks by design, material selection or substitution; (2) Specific ADMINISTRATIVE actions such as providing suitable warnings & notcies, specific policies & procedures, personnel training, or limiting exposure to a hazard; (3) Use PPE as a physical barrier to the hazard (least effective0. e. Supervise- Condct follow-up elavuations, monitor changes, implement furthur ORM or take corrective action as necessary.

The overal goal of the committes is to lead initiatives to reduce mishaps and the associated costs to the Navy & Marine Corps; new or revised policies may develope from their recommendations.

A thorough investigation is essential for indentifying the root cause of a mishap and therby preventing reoccurrance. The sole purpose of a safety investigation is to find the cause of the mishap, not determine accounatability. At all levels, the immediate supervisor has greatest influence on mishap and hazard reporting BUT ultimately it is the responsibility of the Saftey officer.

All personnel must comply with standards , report observed hazards, and immediately report to a supervisor all injuries, occupational illnesses or property damage resulting from mishaps or near-mishaps.

The last line of defense and least effective metthod of personnel from hazards in the workplace. However, PPE can significantly lessen the impact of a mishap. If imprperly maintained or used, PPE can become ineffective. Any equipment failure breakdown, or misuse can immediately exspose the worker to the hazard.

Safety stand-downs are a gathering ofr safety training , awareness, and drills that cover safety & occupational health topics applicable to employees.

Ergonomics relates to the the planning, design, and evaluation of work environments, jobs, tools, and equipment to enhance worker performance, safety, and health (FITTING THE WORKPLACE TO THE WORKER). The idea is to prevent injuries and illness by aplying ergonomic principles to identify, evaluate and control ergonomic risk factors for work-related muscloskelital disorders (WMSDs).

BARACK OBAMA, 44 PRESIDENT- Commander in Chief of Armed Forces. Power is extensive and increases during wartime and can order the military into action before Congress declares war.

Dr. ROBERT M. GATES, 22nd SECDEF- Priciple defense policy advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy relating to all members of direct concern to the Department of Defense, and for all execution of approved policy.

The Honorable RAY MABIS, 75th SECNAY- Responsible for all the affairs of the DoN, including recruiting, organizing, supplying, equiping, training, mobilizing, and demobilizing. Also oversees the construction, outfitting and repair of naval ships, equipment, and facilities. The office is also responsible for the formulation and immplementation of naval policies and programs that are consistent with national security policies and objectives established by the President and SECDEF.

ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, 29th CNO- Under the direction of SECNAV, exercises comand over the operating forces of the Navy.

Reports administratively to the CNO to provide, train, & equip naval forces. Operationally reports to appropriate unified commander in chief.

RICK WEST, 12 MCPON- Most senior enlsited representative of the Navy and acts as a primary enlsited advisor to the CNO. Also provides an unofficial channel of communication between enlisted personnel and the senior polic level of the DoN.

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An enlisted advisor to the CO regarding the formulation and implementation of policies pertinent to the morale, discipline, training, welfare, etc. of enlisted personnel.

OPLAN-Detailed statement of a course of action to be followed to accomplish a future mission. OPORD- Puts an OPLAN into effect; it's a formal statement by a senior commander to subordinate commanders outling the coordinated execution of the operation to be carried out. WARNING ORDER- A brief statement advising a patrol of the frindly/enemy situation, mission of the patrol 7 general instructions pertaining to weapons, uniforms, equipment, CoC, time schedule, tasks, communications, ect.

a. CO- Has absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiaency of his/her command. b. XO- Is the direct representative of the CO (All orders have authority). He executes all orders of the CO and advises on matters and policy and significant matters pertaining to the command. Responsibel for the organization, performance, well-being, and performance of duty and general good order and discipline of those under his/her command. CMC- Enlsited advisor to the command regarding the formulation and implementation of of policies pertinent to the morale, dscipline, training, welfare, ect. of enlisted personnel. Has direct access to the CO.

Provides rate and NEC summary, current and future manning status of an activity, security clearances, nad other administrative data. Used a s a common reference point for discussions of manpower.

a. Naval Message- formal and secure messages that can be tracked once sent. Types include Routine, Priority, Flash, and Immediate. b. E-mail- Informal and un-secure means of communication and cannot be tracked.

a. Page 2- Dependancy application and record of emergency data. Provides record of information pertaining to notifications upon death, gratuity, allowances, allotments, dependent info, other life insurance in force, SGLI, & next of kin. b. Page 4- Provides record of education info, qualifications, course completions, awards, PQS, ect. c. Page 13- Administrative remarks, chronological record of significant events not provided for elsewhere in the personnel record.

a. OPREP- Report oto higher on equipment and manning issues. b. LOGREQ- Report used by ships entering ports to pass information to and request services from the port. c. SORTS- Principle report in the US Navy which includes identification and general status data to higher authorities. d. SITREP- Report of the situation, disposition, and status of forces including overview, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, personnel, and commander's assessment.

Combatants- Those in uniform, carrying a weapon, and participating in military operations are proper targets and can be fired on. Non-combatants- Medical, chaplains, and civilians.

In the midst of the conflict that would eventually lead to the 13 colonies declaring their independence from Great Britain, in 1775 the 2nd Continental Congress felt forced to act as a provisional government to the colonies. They issued money, established a postal service, adn created the Continental Navy. On 13 October 1775 the Continental Congress voted to outfit 2 sailing vessels armed with ten carrieage guns, swivel guns, and manned by crews of 80 and to send them out on a 3 month cruise to intercept British Ships carrying supplies to the British soldiers in America. This was the original legislation out of which the Continental Navy grew and as such constitutes the birth of the US Navy. The 1st Commander in Chief was Esek Hopkins, who put the 1st squadron to sea in February 1776.

Readiness, Flexability, Self-sustainability, and Mobility These qualities permit naval forces to be expeditionary, which means being able to maintain a forward-based, stablizing presence around the world.

In 1941, with US involvement in war on both oceans, RADM Ben Moreell, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Navy Yards and Docks, recommended the establishment of Naval Construction Battalions. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was given the ok. The 1st Seebeas were recruited from civilian construction trades and placed under the leadership of teh Navy's Civil Engineer Corps. Between 1949-53, Naval Construction Battalions were organized into 2 types of units: Naval Amphibious Construction Battalions (NACB) and Naval Mobile Cinstruction Battalions.(NMCB). Beginning in 1965 full Seabee Battalions (MCBs) and Naval Construction Regiments (NCRs) were deployed throughout Vietnam.

The name "Seabee" in derived from the 1st construction battalions (CBs) that were organized iin 1942. Official permission to use the term "Seabee" was given on 5MAR42.

a. Battle of Coral Sea- 1942 battle fought entirely with aircraft launched from carriers; US & Japanese fleets never saw each other. Japan suffered heavy losses and was forced to cancel Port Moresby. b. Invasion of Normandy- June 6, 1944; largest amphibious operation in history. The greatest armad ever assembled carried out mine sweeping, shore bombardment, amphibious operations, and transported supplies and troops. These operations let the Allies complete D-Day landing successfully and eventually push on to Germany. c. Battle of Midway- Fought over and near the tiny US mid-Pacific base at Midway and represents the strategic high water mark and turning point of Japan's Pacific Ocean War. ADM Chester W. Nimitz, the US PACFLT commander, planned an ambush and had his carriers ready and waiting. On 4 June 1942 the trap was sprung and the 4 carrier Japanese task force was met by a US carrier force that included the carriers USS YORKTOWN, USS HORNET, and USS ENTERPRISE as well as Navy, Marine, and Army air units from Midway. Japan lost 4 carriers to one US carrier.

in 1940, volunteers worked with the British UneXploded Ordnance (UXO) teams following the initail German Blitzkrieg attacks. In June of 1941, these veterans returned home to form the 1st class of the Mine Recovery School. From 1941-45, 19 classes graduated and deployed throughout the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters. They were later divided into Mobile Explosive Investigative Units (MEIU). and were instrumental in clearance of explosive hazards on both land and sea. The korean conflict saw a return to action of various minesweepers to ensure the continual clearance of shipping hazards. The groups were later renamed EOD. Their primary mission is to handle, difuse, and dispose of munitions and other explosives.

Primary mission is expeditionary, i.e. protection of strategic port facilities, strategic commercial shipping and naval ships operating within the littoral, at anchorages, and in harbors to ensure the uninterrupted flow of cargo and units to the combatant commander. NCW operations protect these transition areas and points from waterborne threats. Secondarily, NCW supports USCG forces in homeland security operations and the DOD in homeland defense operations.

a. Concept- Integration & employment of various types of ships, craft, aircraft, weapons & forces in a concerted effort to achieve and/or maintain control of riverine, coastal, or delta areas under command of a single Mobile Riverine Force Commander. b.Definition of Characteristics- Riverine is an inland, coastal or delta area composed of both land and water. Riverine Operations exploit the advantages of waterways for movement, capitalizing on mobility to find, fix & destroy hostile forces while also maintaining control of the water lines of communication (LOC) and providing transportation & combat support to our forces. c. Purpose- Riverine operations are conducted to (1) establish & maintain control of riverine waterways & lines of communications (2) deny, by interdiction, barrier, or surveillance operations, the use of riverine LOCs by hostile forces and (3) locate and destroy hostile forces, bases, and supplies contained within the riverine area. d. Scope- Because of the inherent waterborne mobility of a riverine force and the continuing need for its capabilities throughout the conduct of the riverine operation, it is appropriate to use these forces in their primary role. However they can contribute to a wider territorial area of control in support of other forces. e. Types- (1) Assault - (a) to establish control of the water lines in a geographical area including the water LOCs, (b) to establish control of land areas and/or population & resources, (c) to locate and destroy hostile forces, installations and supplies (d) to establish and secure the area for a combat support base as needed. (2) Surveillance, Interdiction & Security - (a) protection of friendly LOCs, (b) denying the use of the waterways by the hostile forces (c) collection of intelligence (d) performing security missions (e) enforcing population and resource control. f. Supporting Operations-At request of Riverine Force Commander and directed by higher authority to support operations outside the MRF area to include: (1) deception operations (2) Isolation of area operations (3) air, ground or naval supremacy (4) Securing of information (5) Psychological or unconventional operations.

a. SECNAV- Responsible for all the affairs of the Department DoN, including recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, mobilizing, and demobilizing. SECNAV also oversees the construction, outfitting, and repair of naval ships, equipment and facilities. The office is also responsible for the formulation and implementation of naval policies and programs that are consistent with the national security policies and objectives established by the President and the SECDEF.

b. CNO- Under the direction of the SECNAV, the CNO exercises command over the operating forces of the Navy. Specific responsibilities include: -- to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness of Navy operational forces -- to determine & direct the efforts needed to fulfill current and future Navy requirements for manpower, material, weapons, facilities, and services -- to exercise leadership in maintaining a high degree of competence among Navy officers and enlisted and civilian personnel -- to maintain the morale and motivation of Navy personnel and the prestige of a Navy career -- to plan and provide health care for personnel of the naval service and their dependents -- to direct the organization, administration, training, and support of the Naval Reserve -- to monitor, determine and maintain efficiency, discipline, and readiness -- to determine need for / provide for the conduct of R&D, test & evaluation that meet long-range goals, immediate requirements & fiscal limitations -- to devise Navy strategic plans and policies and help devise joint and combined strategic plans and policies -- to budget for commands, bureaus, and offices assigned to the CNO's command and for other activities and programs as assigned.

c. MCPON- the most senior enlisted representative of the Navy and the primary enlisted advisor to the CNO. He serves in an advisory capacity on numerous boards pertaining to enlisted members (Board of Managers, Navy Relief Society, Board of Administrators of the Central Non-appropriated Funds, Board of Equal Opportunity for Women, Rating Review Board, Navy Wives Club of America (Liaison), Fleet Reserve Association (Liaison), Navy Resale System Advisory Board). He makes recommendations to help develop effective leadership and training at all enlisted levels and to help attain high standards of conduct and general appearance within the enlisted community. He acts at all times to maintain & promote the chain of command.

d. Fleet Master Chief-

e. Force Master Chief-

f. CNOCM-

g. CO- Has absolute responsibility safety, well-being & efficiency of his/her command.

h. XO- direct representative of the CO (All orders have the authority). He executes all orders of the CO and advises the CO on matters of policy and significant matters pertaining to the command. He is responsible for the organization, performance of duty and general good order and discipline of those in the command.

i. CMDCM - enlisted advisor to the command regarding the formulation and implementation of policies pertinent to the morale, discipline, training, welfare, etc of enlisted personnel. He has direct access to the CO.

j. N-1 Admin Assistance Officer- -- Observes and reports to the XO on the effectiveness of administrative policies, procedures, and regulations of the command. -- Reviews/Screens correspondence prepared for the signature or review of the XO. -- Schedules visitor interviews with the XO and other officers as appropriate. -- Supervises preparation of the POD. -- Coordinates indoctrination and assignment of enlisted personnel to Executive Assistants. -- Supervises professional training and education of administrative personnel -- Coordinates the division safety program with the unit's Safety Officer and supervises the division Safety Petty Officer.

k. N-3 Operations Officer - responsible for -- Management and maintenance of battle group Command & Control systems & associated equipment -- Preparation of operation plans & orders and other reports or directives -- Collection and transmission of requests for operational & logistic services required by the command in support of operations. -- Maintenance and dissemination of ship or unit's operating schedule or training schedule -- Reporting to the CO concerning operations, intelligence, and tactical employment of the unit and assigned aircraft -- Obtaining clearance and operating assignments related to the movements and operations of the unit -- Execution of operations as directed including maintenance/dissmenation of intelligence data -- Conduct of surface and air search -- Acts as Communications Officer in units not having a Communications Department.

l. N-4 Supply Officer - responsible under the CO for procuring, receiving, storing, issuing, shipping, transferring, selling, accounting for, and, while in his/her custody, maintaining all stores & equipment of the command, except as otherwise noted in regulations.

m. Communications Officer - responsible under the CO (or the Operations Officer in units which do not have a Communications Department), for visual and electronic exterior communications and for the administration of the internal systems pertaining thereto.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)- The purpose is oversight and command & control of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) and expeditionary forces within the Navy. The mission is the functional commander in control of manning, training, equipping and organizing forces that will execute force protection, shore-based logistical support, and construction missions across the joint operational spectrum.

Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW)- The purpose is to ensure the un-interrupted flow of strategic cargo and units to the combatant commander. The mission is force protection and seaward security during expeditionary operations to include protection of strategic port facilities, strategic commercial shipping and naval ships operating within the littoral, at anchorages, and in harbors. Units can operate as supporting elements to an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), Amphibious Task Force (ATF), Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), Joint Task Force (JTF) or Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC).

Naval Coastal Warfare Group (NCWGRU)- Responsible for standardization and certification of training, strategic concepts, long range operational planning, exercise support planning, intelligence dissemination, administrative support, and general logistic support to NCWRON and MSRON staffs and their subordinate units. NCWGRUs provide administrative, reserve management, financial and supply management, and readiness oversight of subordinate units. Organized to be non-deployable however selective qualified personnel may be ordered to support local, regional, littoral or wartime NCW tasks. Commisioned Echelon 4 staff, with both active and reserve personnel.

Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron (NCWRON)- Responsible for deploying command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) and operational support detachments and units to form an ashore operations center. NCWRONs provide administrative, reserve management, financial and supply management and readiness oversight of their subordinate units. Commissioned Echelon 5 staff, manned by both USN and USCG personnel, primarily SELRES.

Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units (MIUWU)- Deployable operating units equipped with the Radar-Sonar Surveillance Center (RSSC) system and associated support equipment. MIUWUs provide surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for an integrated C4I-SR asset capable of self-sustained coastal warfare support. MIUWUs routinely operate with Inshore Boat Units (IBU) and Port Security Units (PSU) to provide a force package with command, control, communications, surveillance and interdiction capability. Commissioned Echelon 6 staff, manned primarily with USNR SELRES.

Inshore Boat Units (IBU)- Deployable operating unit equipped with armed patrol craft and associated supporting equipment. IBUs routinely operate with other NCW assets such as MIUWUs can C4I detachments to provide an enhanced force package for conducting small craft security and support for NCW operations in the littoral environment. Commissioned Echelon 6 staff primarily manned with USNR SELRES.

Mobile Security Squadron (MSRON)- Responsible for providing centralized planning, coordination & integration of subordinate MSDs relating to movement, control, readiness & training, administration & logistics. Each MSRON trains & supports assigned MSDs and coordinates deployment & redeployment activities with supported fleet and theater commanders. Commissioned Echelon 5 staff composed of active personnel. Organized as non-deployable however qualified personnel may be selectively ordered up to support local, regional, littoral or wartime NCW tasks.

Mobile Security Detachment (MSD)- Deployable component of MSRONs equipped with security boats that provide force protection, waterborne security, surveillance, interdiction, and point defense of High Value Assets (HVAs) at both ends of the U.S. Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). MSDs also provide force protection for submarine and Military Sealift Command (MSC) security missions and for military air assets at inland airfields. MSDs may operate independently or with other NCW assets in the inshore harbor environment for protection of Level I or Level II Joint Rear Area threats. Key qualities of MSDs - lightweight, mobile, point-defense.

Port Security Unit (PSU)- Deployable USCG armed small craft units (Transportable Port Security Boats) that support security operations in littoral regions world-wide and provide waterborne security, surveillance, interdiction and point-defense of HVAs. The primary mission is waterborne security for NCW operations; logistic off-loads to the pre-positioning force, and assault follow-on echelon operations. Secondary mission is support to other expeditionary warfare forces. Manned by USCG and USCGR SELRES.

Embarked Security Teams (EST) -Eleven 12-person teams that provide protection to MSC ships such as maritime pre-positioning ships, fast combat support ships, bulk fuel carriers, and their civilian crews as they carry food, equipment and other supplies destined for troops.

First Naval Construction Division- The administrative and operational commander for 6 Naval Construction Regiments (NCR) and 2 Seabee Readiness Groups. These commands are responsible for Naval Mobile Construction Batallions (NMCB), Construction Batallion Units (CBU), Underwater Construction Teams (UCT), Construction Batallion Maintenance Units (CBMU) and a Naval Construction Force Support Unit.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal- The primary mission is explosive ordnance location and disposal, rendering safe unexploded ordnance, diving and salvage operations, and organic C2 of EOD operations. Since the original conception as simple underwater mine disarming in WWII, EOD's role has expanded enormously to include all conventional munitions, terrorist devices, nuclear weapons, and chemical/biological weapons on both land and under-water and are regularly attached to both shore or shipboard missions & duties.

Naval Expeditionary Logistics Group- Provide combat service support through logistics operations, which include port operations, fuel distribution, postal operations and air cargo missions.

Navy Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit - Conduct harbor clearance operations in rivers, harbors and coastal areas and provide diving and salvage services to surface ships. MDSUs use a diverse range of specialized diving and re-compression chamber systems to accomplish missions including a mixed-gas diving system capable of support dives down to a depth of 300 feet. MDSU equipment is air-transportable, giving them the mobility to support missions anywhere within their AOR.

(1) Standard embarkation boxes, crates, pallets, and containers will be used to the maximum extent possible. Where practical, use embarkation boxes and containers to store T/E assets in the workspace. Twenty-foot International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers measuring 240 X 96 X 96 inches are maintained in the MEF container pools. (2) Tactical Markings- All units will ensure that vehicles, containers, and equipment are marked IAW Marine Corps Forces Tactical Marking Procedures for Equipment and Embarkation Containers. This standardized marking system for vehicles, equipment, pallets, and containers identifies the owning organization, general contents, stowage location, size, weight, and, when required, source and destination of the equipment and cargo. (3) Administrative markings provide amplifying information such as source, content, and destination of the cargo and equipment. Common forms include placarding and labeling. Types of markings include Placards, Bar Code Labels, AIT labels and Symbolic Markings. (4) Follow packing and crating guidelines such as maintaining uniformity, packing like items in the same container, using waterproofing and corrosion control techniques and materials. (5) Follow palletization techniques and guidelines. Each pallet must be able to withstand inclement weather and rough handling. (6) Ensure Hazmat is identified properly and prepared accordingly to prevent damage or injury to personnel and/or shipment. (7) Follow vehicle preparation guidelines & instructions in preparation for transportation of the equipment or cargo. This primarily includes vehicle inspection and securing the load for transportation.

The mission is to provide rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America's armed forces & also plays a crucial role in providing humanitarian support all over the world. In addition to below, other operational support aircraft include the VC-25, C-9, C-20, C-21, C-32, C-37, C-40, and UH-1. C-5 Galaxy- Primary mission is inter-theater strategic airlift of outsize cargo to main-theater staging bases. KC-10 Extender- Primary mission is aerial re-fueling however it can also provide cargo or personnel transport to overseas deployments. C-17 Globemaster III- The newest, most flexible cargo airlift capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or also to forward bases in the deployment area. C-130 Hercules- Primary mission is intra-theater tactical airlift of cargo from main theater bases to the front lines. KC-135 Stratotanker- Primary mission is air-refueling but can also serve as inter-theater strategic airlift of cargo and passengers, such as transporting litter and ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations. C-141 Starlifter- Primary mission is inter-theater strategic airlift of cargo and troops from the U.S. to major airfields within any theater of operations and is capable of air-refueling to extend it's range. Due to being replaced by the C-17, the C-141 is currently operated by the Air Force Reserve.

The MPF Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can directly support our national maritime strategy of protecting key naval chokepoints and sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The purpose of MPF operations is to rapidly establish a MAGTF ashore so that it is prepared to conduct subsequent operations ranging from humanitarian to all levels of armed conflict. MPF operations are economy-of-force measures that provide the combatant commander with deployment flexibility and an increased capability to respond rapidly to the crisis with a credible force. In addition, MPF operations offer an augmentation capability to forward deployed MAGTFs, ongoing amphibious operations, or other joint, multi-national, or combined operations. The essential contribution of an MPF operation is it's mobility and flexibility, allowing quick concentration of forces in a specific area. Two basic types of MPF operations are: (1) Independent- The MPF MAGTF becomes part of a JTF that involves no other Marine Corps forces or supports an ally as a JTF force. (2) Augmentation- The transfer of forces to the operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation. The MPF MAGTF supports an existing Marine Corps Force (MARFOR) or AF.

Units often overlook the requirements in packing and packaging of hazardous cargo. All units use and often embark with HAZMAT like explosives, flammable liquids or solids, oxidizers, corrosive materials, compressed gases, poisons, irritating materials, NBC testing and neutralizing substances, commercial lantern fuel, cleaning agents, lithium batteries, radio-active materials, or other regulated materials. Units will review supplies and equipment on hand, those planned for embarkation, and identify those known to be HAZMAT. All items identified will have the proper HAZMAT ID labels placed on 3 sides of the container. The ID label is used to assign the stowage location on the transport. Units are required to have available MCO P4030.19H (Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments). In addition, DD Form 1387-2 must be completed for all cargo and equipment identified with special characteristics and handling requirements.

In the creation of an Operation Plan or OPLAN, one of the most time consuming and critical aspects of plan development is constructing the Time Phase Force Deployment Data. A TPFDD is the computer supported database portion of an operation plan dealing with logistics of force deployment, the movement of forces, and equipment required to execute the OPLAN. Basically a file that says how a force such as a Cargo Handling Battalion, a Coastal Warfare Squadron, or Riverine Group deploys or mobilizes, how many people go with them, what equipment they bring, what equipment they need, where they get the equipment, what the cost of the troop movement is expected to be, where they are ultimately going, and how they are going to get there.

MSC is one of the 3 Transportation Component Commands of USTRANSCOM. As such, MSC is tasked with providing strategic, common-user sealift transportation services to U.S. Forces to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy those forces on a global basis. MSC is also a major command within the Navy, reporting administratively to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding Navy strategic sealift matters. A third chain of command exists for MSC; an operational one for Navy-unique functions such as combat-ready logistics and special mission support. This third chain of command ultimately leads to the CJCS and in this instance MSC functions as a type commander much like other type commanders in the Navy. MSC's largest force of ships (Strategic Sealift Force), is a combination of various ship types designed to support both peacetime and contingency operational support. To perform its mission, the Strategic Sealift Force utilizes 3 strategies: pre-positioning of assets at strategic locations, surge sealift capability of critical weapons and equipment, and sustainment sealift capability. This includes (1) Afloat Prepositioning Force (2) Fast Sealift Ships (3) Ready Reserve Force (4) Aviation Logistics Support Ships and (5) Hospital Ships.

a. Phonetic alphabet and numerals- a way to speak letters and numbers that can be easily heard and understood. Letters: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo, Foxtrot, Golf, Hotel, India, Juliet, Kilo, Lima, Mike, November, Oscar, Papa, Quebec, Romeo, Sierra, Tango, Uniform, Victor, Whiskey, Xray, Yankee, Zulu. Numbers: Zero, Wun, Too, Tree, Fower, Fife, Six, Seven, Ate, Niner. Numbers are transmitted digit by digit, except when they are exact multiples of hundreds or thousands they may be spoken as such; however there are special cases b. Prowords- Pronouncable words or phrases that have been assigned particular meanings to expedite message handling on R/T circuits. Prowords cannot be substituted for text. Some examples include: ALL AFTER, ALL BEFORE, BREAK, OUT, OVER.

Oral communication is often difficult or impossible in combat conditions & at times complete silence must be maintained. Under such conditions, signals are used to transmit commands or information. 3 types of combat signals used include Arm and Hand Signals, Whistle Signals, and Special Signals. Special signals cover all the special methods and devices used to transmit commands or information. Signals must be determined and practiced before they are used. Unit Leaders should devise special signals whenever they appear to be useful in a particular situation. Before devising a special signal for the unit, the leaders should make certain that higher authority has not assigned some other meaning to the same signal.

Factors that affect the range of radio equipment are weather, terrain, antenna, power, and the location of the radio. Trying to communicate near man-made objects such as bridges and buildings may also affect radio transmissions. Interference in the form of static often occurs when you use radios near power lines or electrical generators. Interference may also come from other radio stations, bad weather, or enemy jamming.

a. Nature and Purpose Nature- It is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The process and of command and control includes the planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of forces and operations, from a high level. The system of command and control includes the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed to accomplish the mission. The Purpose of Command and Control is to allow a commander to make effective decisions and direct the successful execution of the military operation. Basically, it enables the commander to understand the situation in his battlespace.

The Process of Command and Control translates ideas into action, enabling the commander to coordinate actions of his forces in his battlespace. It is a continuous, cyclical process called the "decision and execution cycle", also called the OODA loop- (1) Observe (2) Orient (3) Decide (4) Act. *First, the commander observes the environment to collect data about his surroundings and the status of enemy/friendly forces. *Second, the commander orients himself by forming a mental picture by converting sensor data and other information into estimates, assumptions or judgements about what is happening. *Third, based on this mental picture, he then decides on a course of action and plans the execution. *Finally, he issues orders and puts his plan into action. During the cycle, the commander monitors the situation and execution of the operation and begins the cycle again. The commander strives to build, validate, update and disseminate his image of the battlespace and plans for future operations while conducting current operations.

a. Nature and Purpose- Nature- "Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection, exploitation, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation & interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas or an adversary's capabilities and intentions. The intelligence product is used to support planning and operations at all levels of warfare. There are 3 types of intelligence: (1) Strategic Intelligence- Required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. (2) Operational Intelligence- required for planning operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. (3) Tactical Intelligence- required for planning and conducting tactical operations at the component or unit level. It focuses on a potential adversary's capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the environment. Purpose- The primary purpose is to support the commander by providing the tool to evaluate risk factors, to plan and direct operations, and to evaluate the effects of their actions.

b. Support to Operating Forces- This is the cornerstone of Naval Intelligence, which is designed to support operations at sea, from the sea, and ashore. Naval forces engaged in operations are supported by theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). JICs are focal points that ensure operating forces receive intelligence support from national and service intelligence centers such as the DIA, CIA, and NSA.

c. Fundamentals of Naval Intelligence- Guide the commander and the intelligence officer and include principles, key attributes, intelligence sources and the process of the intelligence cycle. Principles include know the adversary, ensure unity of intelligence effort, plan for combat, & to use an All-Source approach. Key attributes include Timeliness, Usability, Availability, Thoroughness, Accuracy & Relevance. Intelligence sources include Counter Intelligence (CI), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement And Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open-Source Intellignece (OSINT), Radar Intelligence (RADINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Some types of SIGINT include Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), Scientific & Technical Intelligence(S&TI).

d. Intelligence Cycle- Series of inter-related activities resulting in intelligence products. It is the process starting with the requirements need all the way through the dissemination of the final product to the users. The 5 steps include (1) Planning & Direction (2) Collection (3) Processing (4) Production and (5) Dissemination.

e. Support for Expeditionary Forces- Intelligence requirements in littoral regions are significantly different from those of open ocean operations. Our proximity to littoral threats will mean less warning and reaction time for friendly forces. Consequently naval intelligence must maintain detailed databases on potential threats and develop methods to exploit each adversary's weaknesses. Identifying those areas where military operations may be conducted is vital. Detailed information on the environment and local infrastructure will be required to support the full range of expeditionary operations. Non-traditional intelligence sources, collection means and dissemination methods must be explored and employed. Forward deployed expeditionary forces must incorporate medical intelligence as a force protection measure. The naval command and control architecture must ensure connectivity between naval forces afloat and ashore, and must be useable by the warfighter.

a. LO (low power) 200 - 400 M b. M (medium power) 400 M - 5 KM c. HI (high power) 5 KM - 10 KM Voice transmission ranges for Vehicular Radio Only d. PA (power amplifier) 10 KM - 40 KM

COMSEC is the safeguarding of communications information, also known as communications security. Various devices and procedures are used to increase COMSEC such as authentication procedures, codes, ciphers, radio silence, monitoring and IFF. The CMS Custodian is responsible to the CO for (1) Managing the CMS account, (2) Advising the CO on matters concerning the physical security and handling of CMS publications and materials, (3) Stowage of CMS publications and materials, as well as the drawing, correcting, and authorized destruction and (4) Submitting all reports concerning the accountability and issuance of CMS publications and materials.

Two-person integrity (TPI) is the security measure taken to prevent single-person access to COMSEC keying material and cryptographic maintenance manuals. At no time can one person have in his or her possession the combinations or keys to gain lone access to a security container or cryptographic equipment containing COMSEC material. Neither can one person have sole possession of COMSEC material that requires TPI security.

a. Access- The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. b. Classification- The determination that official information requires, in the interest of national security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made. c. Compromise- Security violation that results in confirmed or suspected exposure of classified information/material to an unauthorized person. d. Need to know- A determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in the performance of a lawful and authorized government function essential to the fulfillment of an official US Government program. e. Clearance- A formal determination that a person meets the personnel security standards and is thus eligible for access to classified information other than that protected in a special access program.

a. Minimize- Used during a crisis or emergency, a message transmitted across a net to inform members of the net to reduce the message traffic drastically so that vital messages connected to the emergency can be delivered to appropriate recipients without delay. b. EEFI- Essential Elements of Friendly Information, are specific items of information which if revealed and correlated with other information would degrade the security of military operations, projects, or missions in the applicable areas. c. BEADWINDOW- A real-time procedure used to alert circuit operators that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred over a non-secured circuit. BEADWINDOW also warns other operators on the net of the disclosure.

a. HF- High Frequency, 3 MHz - 30 MHz. b. VHF- Very High Frequency, 30 MHz - 300 MHz. Frequencies in this range are not normally refracted by the atmosphere and ground-wave range is minimal. The normal limits of use for this frequency range are line of sight. This characteristic is ideal for amphibious operations. c. UHF- Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz - 3 GHz. This frequency range is known as line of sight transmission bands. This is well suited for tactical voice transmissions between ships travelling and maneuvering together.

Factors that affect the range of radio equipment are weather, terrain, antenna, power, and location of the transmitting/receiving radio. Trying to communicate near man-made objects such as bridges or buildings may also affect radio transmissions. Interference in the form of static occurs when radios are used near power-lines or electrical generators. Interference may also come from other radio stations, bad weather or enemy jamming.

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Septic tanks, cesspools, and leaching fields are used for sewage treatment processes where common sewers are not available. These facilities are for the most part underground receptacles. If properly designed, constructed, located, and operated, these receptacles work without objectionable odors over long periods of time with a minimum amount of attention. Leaching fields are an integral component of a septic tank individual sewage disposal system. Leaching fields may be referred to as "tile fields" or "absorption trenches". The lines in a leaching fields are built of 4-inch PVC perforated pipe. The following conditions are important for the proper functioning of a leaching field: (1) Groundwater levels well below that of the leaching field (2) Soil of satisfactory leaching characteristics within a few feet of the surface extending several feet below the leaching pipe (3) Subsurface drainage away from the field (4) Adequate area (5) Freedom from polluting drinking water supplies, particularly from shallow wells in the vicinity

a. Trouble desk- The trouble desk, and its attendant receive all customer trouble calls, enters information into the trouble desk log, and fills out emergency service authorization (ESA) forms. The attendant makes sure that ESA forms are properly routed and that outstanding ESAs are completed within the required deadlines. All facility history jackets are maintained at the trouble desk. b. Four Priority Work Classifications- Priority assignment of jobs is essential in deciding the importance of each job in relation to the other requirements. Manpower and funding limitations may not allow the PWD to do all the necessary and desired work at the time of identification. With a priority classification system you can get the most use from your resources. Assigning a priority designator provides you with an adequate definition of the importance of each job. The matrix shown below contains the work classifications of: Safety- Work required primarily for safety concerns Function- Work primarily identified with the mission of the activity. Preventative- Work required to prevent significant deterioration of the plant property or equipment caused by continued use or from natural forces. Appearance- Work done for preserving or upgrading the appearance of a facility. c. Operator inspection- These inspections consist of examining, lubricating, and making minor adjustments. This is another form of PM for constantly attended equipment, but they are performed by the operator assigned to the equipment as part of the day-to-day responsibilities.

a. Potable water- Water suitable for drinking. Potable water is created from the ROWPU or the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. The unit purifies water by reducing the dissolved and suspended solids in water. The unit processes raw water, brackish water, and seawater into potable water. Additionally it can treat water contaminated with CBR agents. b. Chlorination- The disinfection of water by the addition of small amounts of chorine or a chlorine compound. c. Super Chlorination- A process used to disinfect water containers, i.e. lyster bags, tank trailers, and distribution systems before they are used or when they have become contaminated. It is accomplished by chlorinating the water in a container or distribution system to at least 100ppm FAC and holding it in the container for 4 hours. During this time period the FAC must not drop below 50ppm or the process must be repeated.

Special equipment is needed by an individual under field conditions whether in combat or in training. This special equipment is commonly called 782 gear, the number of the custody card originated in the Marine Corps Supply System years ago. This gear is also known as field or bivouac equipment. The standard issue of 782 gear is divided into 3 categories: (1) fighting load-carrying equipment, (2) bivouac equipment & (3) protective equipment. The standard issue of 782 gear items includes (*These items may or may not be issued): 1. Pistol belt 2. Pack combat medium 3. Suspenders 4. Two ammo pouches 5. Canteen cover, canteen, and canteen cup 6. First-aid packet* 7. Entrenching tool and cover 8. Poncho 9. Shelter half with one tent pole, five tent pins, and guy line 10. Mess kit with knife, fork and spoon 11. Bayonet or K-Bar* 12. Kevlar helmet 13. Camouflage cover 14. Hat and mosquito net Fighting / Load-Carrying equipment has been designed to make the job of carrying the equipment you need easier and more comfortable. There are certain rules, however, that must be followed when the equipment is to do the job for which it is intended. This equipment consists of the following: Pistol Belt, 2 ammunition cases, suspenders w/belt, entrenching tool, canteen cover, first-aid case. Existence/bivouac equipment is designed to provide you with the minimum necessities while living in the field. It is carried in or on the load-carrying equipment as explained below. Take care of your equipment and it will take care of you. This equipment consists of the following items: Poncho and liner, Shelter half, Entrenching tool, Canteen and cup, Mess kit. Protective equipment includes items designed primarily to protect you from injury, either from the enemy or from nature, and consists of the following: Kevlar helmet, Camouflage cover, Hat and mosquito net.

a. Hasty/skirmisher's Position- This shallow pit type of emplacement provides a temporary, open, prone firing position for the individual rifleman. With his entrenching tool, he scrapes and piles the soil in a low parapet between him and the enemy. Thus a shallow, body-length pit can be formed quickly in all but the hardest ground. In a skirmisher's trench, a man presents a low silhouette to the enemy and is afforded some protection from small-arms fire. b. Improved One-man Fighting Position- It is made as small as possible to present the smallest target to the enemy, but wide enough to accommodate a man's shoulders, and deep enough to use entrenching tools at the bottom. A sump should be built below the firing step, at one end, to catch rainwater. The firing step should be deep enough to protect most of a man's body while firing. A circular grenade sump, large enough to accept the largest known enemy grenade, is sloped downward at an angle of 30 degrees and is excavated under the fire step. Hand grenades thrown into the fighting hole are exploded in this sump, and their fragmentation is restricted to the unoccupied end of the fighting hole. The soil from the hole is used to build a parapet. The edge of the hole is used for an elbow rest while firing. Be sure to camouflage the soil used for your parapet to avoid detection. c. Improved Two-man Fighting Position- It is essentially two 1-man fighting holes. The two-man fighting hole provides some advantages over the one-man fighting hole. By being in such close proximity, each man gains a feeling of more security, and it allows one man to rest while the other man is observing the area. One disadvantage is since it is longer than a one-man hole, it provides less protection from tanks, bombing, strafing, and shelling.

a. Fighting Position- Before constructing your position, study the terrain and vegetation in the area so after your position is completed, by the use of camouflage, you are able to restore the area as near as possible to its original appearance. Do not use more material than you need. Too much camouflage can reveal a position as quickly as too little camouflage. Obtain natural material from a wide area. When you strip a small adjacent area of foliage, the stripped area gives the position away. Always conceal excavated soil by covering it with leaves or grass or by dumping it under bushes, into streams, or into ravines. After camouflaging, inspect the position carefully from the viewpoint of the enemy. Check it repeatedly to ensure that it remains natural in appearance and continues to conceal the position. Finally, practice CAMOUFLAGE DISCIPLINE. Avoid doing anything, such as scattering cans or boxes around the camouflaged position, that may give the position away. When possible, use old, established paths to and from your position Do not create new paths that can be seen from the air. Vary the route to and from the position so there is no beaten path into the position.

b. Personal Equipment- The color of field uniforms and web equipment pack, belt, and canteen cover blends well with most terrain unless the equipment is badly faded. If it is faded, color it to blend with the surrounding terrain. When no paint is available, use mud, charcoal, or crushed grass. Color in bold, irregular patterns. Alter the distinctive outline of your helmet with a cover of cloth or burlap colored to blend with the terrain. Let foliage stick over the edges, but do not use too much of it. Use a camouflage band, string, burlap strips, or rubber bands to hold the foliage in place. Use mud or dirt to dull shiny surfaces of weapons, being careful not to foul working parts.

c. Individua - Exposed skin-even dark skin-reflects light. To prevent this, you should use camouflage face paint sticks. They are issued and used in a two-color combination. Paint the shiny areas (forehead, cheeks, nose, chin, exposed skin on the back of your neck and your hands and wrists) with the darker color. Paint the shadow areas (around the eyes and under the nose and chin) with the lighter color. When face paint is not available, burnt cork, charcoal, or lampblack may be used. Mud should be used only when nothing else is available. Mud changes color as it dries, and when dry, it may flake off and leave exposed skin. Also, mud may contain harmful bacteria and should be used only on approval of a medical officer.

d. Vehicles- The aim should be to occupy a position without altering its appearance. To do this, you should park the vehicle under natural cover whenever available. When cover is inadequate, the vehicles should be parked so their shape will disappear into the surroundings. Better concealment can be obtained by using natural rather than artificial material to breakup the shape and shadow of the vehicles. This type of material is always available near a parking site or motor pool and can be erected and removed quickly. When cut foliage is used, be sure it is put up as it was growing because the underside of the leaves is much lighter than the topside, and the difference in color could give your position away. In addition, cut foliage should be replaced as soon as it starts to wither. The principal artificial materials used to conceal vehicles are drape nets. They are easy to use, quickly erected, and quickly removed. Drape nets give complete concealment against direct observation, but, as with most artificial camouflage materials, they can frequently be detected by photographic observation because they often fail to blend with the background properly. In any case, drapes do conceal the identity of a vehicle, even though the drape net itself may be detected.

e. Buildings- The basic methods of concealment-blending, hiding, and deceiving-can be applied either to existing buildings or new construction. However, concealment is much easier when the camouflage scheme is incorporated into the designs for new construction and site selection. Buildings can be concealed by screens of garnished nettings. Another method is to have disruptive patterns painted over the netting, roof, and gable-end walls. Where concealment from close observation is required, the netting should be sloped gradually to the ground. For structures with roofs steeper than 30 degrees, the netting must cover the whole building. When the terrain permits, a new structure can be partially dug-in to reduce the height and its shadows. The nature and size of buildings can be disguised in many ways, such as the following: Placing trees between the buildings Painting the roofs to match the surrounding terrain Varying roof lines with wooden framework, then covering them with burlap or fine-mesh wire netting to simulate sloping hip roofs Erecting superstructures over existing buildings and covering them with burlap, plastic, or other material to alter their appearance so they resemble the surrounding native buildings

f. Supply Points- The main problem here is that huge amounts of equipment and supplies of all kinds are usually brought up at the same time. They must be unloaded and concealed quickly and yet be easily accessible for redistribution. Therefore, natural cover and concealment must be used at supply points whenever possible. Dispersal of these supplies is a must to minimize damage from a single attack. Existing overhead cover should be used when new access roads are planned. When the supply point is to be permanent, the tracks running in and out of the installation can be concealed by overhead nets slung between trees. Traffic control should include measures to conceal activity and movement at, to, and from the installation. When natural cover is sparse or nonexistent, be sure the natural terrain features are used to advantage. Maintain camouflage discipline at supply points including a minimum of changes in the appearance of the terrain. Control the debris so it does not accumulate and attract enemy attention.

g. Water Points- Water points must have adequate concealment, either artificial or natural, for operating personnel, storage tanks, pumping, and purification equipment. When the surrounding terrain foliage is not thick enough for perfect concealment, it can be supplemented by natural or artificial camouflage materials. To keep the enemy from observing the shine of water in the tanks, place canvas covers or natural foliage over them. By using foliage or artificial materials, you can distort their features. Small, open areas that must be crossed by vehicles or personnel operating in the area can be concealed with natural or artificial materials. A water supply schedule must be instituted and maintained. Without camouflage discipline or with a violation of the schedule, a concentration of waiting vehicles that cannot be readily concealed could occur.

When you are caught in the open by an overhead flare, you should immediately hit the deck since the burst of light is temporarily blinding to the enemy also, there is a chance that you may not have been seen. If you hear the flare being fired, try to get down before it bursts. Resume movement as soon as the flare burns out. When you are caught in the light of a ground flare, move out of the area of light as quickly and quietly as possible. Keep moving until you are well away from the area; then reorient yourself and continue on. If caught by a flare when crossing an obstacle, such as barbed wire, crouch low and remain motionless until the flare burns out. When assaulting a position and a flare bursts, continuing your assault is imperative.

To read the "writing on the ground," you can organize the analysis of weather and terrain primarily around the following set of military considerations (KOCOA): Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Concealment and Cover, Obstacles to Movement, Avenues of Approach. Key terrain features must be considered in formulating defensive tactics. Their selection is based on the mission of the command. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the ability to apply combat power. The selection of key terrain varies with the following: Level of command, Type of Unit, and Mission of the Unit. Observation and fields of fire are so closely related that they are considered together. Fields are based on observation because a target must be seen to bring effective fire upon it. Observation considerations are: Weather conditions, Time of day, Vegetation, Surrounding terrain. Cover and concealment is used together to provide protection from the effects of fire and observation. Cover ideas are: Rocks, Shell craters, Ditches, Buildings, Caves, Sunken roads, River banks, Walls, Folds in the ground, and Highway fills. Concealment is protection from observation or surveillance on both air and ground. Concealment ideas are : Woods, Underbrush, Snowdrifts, Tall grass, and Cultivated Vegetation. Obstacles are anything, including a natural or artificial terrain feature, that stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Entanglements are set up as obstacles along the FEBA or the defensive perimeter to channel the enemy into the beaten zone of various weapons held by the defending unit. Avenues of approach are routes the enemy is likely to travel to reach its objective. When setting up the defense positions, the platoon commander visualizes all possible enemy avenues of approach into the area.

Compasses are used to describe direction. The most common military method of describing direction is through azimuths. An azimuth is a horizontal angle, measured in a clockwise manner from a north base line. Azimuths are described in terms of degrees or mils. One circle has 360 degrees or 6400 mils. Center Hold Method: Open the cover of the compass so it forms a straight edge with the compass base. Pull the eyepiece as far to the rear as possible, perpendicular to the compass base. Align the slot in the eyepiece with the hairline sighting wire in the cover and with the target. Read the azimuth by glancing down at the dial through the lens. Compass to Cheek Method: Extend your other index finger along the other straight side. Pull your elbows firmly into your side, place the compass between your chin and belt. Turn your whole body until the compass is pointing at the object of which you are taking the reading. Look down to read the azimuth. Night Method: Compass features for night use include Luminous markings and Bezel ring- three degrees or 53 1/3 mils per click. Using the bezel ring: Set the azimuth before it gets dark. Turning the ring to the left increases the azimuth. Left decreases the azimuth. Rotate the bezel until the luminous line is over the black index line. Since each bezel click is three degrees, divide the desired azimuth by three to get the number of clicks needed. For an azimuth of 60 degrees, divide by 3 to get 20 bezel ring clicks (60º/3=20 clicks). Turn the ring that many clicks. Continuing this example, turn the ring 20 clicks left. Using the center hold method, turn your body and the compass until the north arrow is directly under the luminous line on the bezel ring. You are facing the direction of the desired azimuth. To bypass enemy positions or obstacles and still stay oriented, detour around the obstacle by moving at right angles for equal distances. This is called the "box" method.

Troop-leading steps (BAMCIS) are simply a tool, which aids leaders in formulating initial plans and time schedules upon receipt of a mission. *Begin Planning - The receipt of a mission triggers the entire BAMCIS cycle; however, tactical planning is anticipatory and continuous. To make effective use of available time, the leader issues a warning order to his or her subordinates. *Arrange for Reconnaissance - Initially the unit leader asks, "What information am I lacking?" If possible, the unit leader arranges for a physical reconnaissance of his or her Objective, Route, and Defensive position. *Make Reconnaissance - The commander now acts to answer his/her questions. The recon will either confirm the plan or cause him or her to adjust it. *Complete the Plan - After updating his or her estimate of the situation (METT-T) with information gained during the reconnaissance, the leader decides how to accomplish the mission and completes the operation order. *Issue the Order - The leader issues the order orally to subordinate leaders. *Supervise - The leader ensures that his or her plan is adhered to by listening to subordinate leaders as they issue orders as well as inspecting Marines / Sailors and their equipment and observing Marines / Sailors as they conduct rehearsals. The leader also ensures adherence to any established time line. If any changes to the original plan are required, due to recent changes in the situation, the commander must adjust the plan accordingly.

A succinct way of stating concept of operations and orders to subordinates. Remember the acronym SMEAC: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, Command and Signal *Situation: divided into three sections: (1) Enemy Forces - Size, location, capabilities, and recent activity (2) Friendly Forces - Mission of higher, supporting and adjacent units. Identify who is providing security. (3) Attachments - Types and size of attachments. Time they attach. *Mission - States mission in clear and concise statements. *Mission is unit specific - what we are to accomplish *Execution - Assigns definite tasks to each element of the command, organic or attached, that contributes to carrying out the whole mission. No restrictions are set on the number of paragraphs, although information is typically divided into three areas: (1) Concept of operations - brief summary of the tactical plan the unit is to execute (2) Tasks, or missions, for each unit. For a Squad Leader's SMEAC, each fire team would be tasked in this section. (3) Coordinating instructions - actions upon contact, MOPP level, route, etc. *Administration and Logistics - Addresses all administrative, supply, or transportation concerns (i.e. the four B's) : Beans - distribution of food. Bullets - quantity of ammo and resupply info. Band-aids - location of corpsmen, med-evac plan. Bad guys - POW handling instructions. *Command and Signal - Chain of command and communications information given in two parts: (1) Communications instructions- typically an annex of standard reports, but also includes passwords and countersigns, radio call signals, frequencies, etc. (2) Chain of command- gives precedence of command and location of command posts.

a. SALUTE- Initial spot report of enemy activity. Used when enemy is spotted but not engaged or when a fire fight first breaks out. Size of the enemy unit Activity of the enemy Location of the enemy unit Uniform worn by the enemy Time of each activity noted Equipment used or carried by the enemy b. Spot- Detailed report of an enemy engagement. Always follow a SALUTE up with a SPOT report after engagement has ended. Report includes all information contained in a SALUTE report, friendly and enemy KIA or WIA, POWs & enemy equipment captured.

a. Security patrol- Provides physical security. In security patrolling, both reconnaissance (recon) and combat patrols are used. The typical Seabee defense is a static defense; therefore, the recon patrol is mainly used to detect enemy movement toward your position. The combat patrol is used to destroy enemy recon patrols and to delay and confuse an enemy attack. b. Reconnaissance patrol- Reconnaissance patrols are sent out to gain information about the enemy or the terrain. They are a defensive technique used to detect enemy movement toward the unit's position, locate or observe an enemy position and discover enemy avenues of approach. These patrols engage in combat only when it becomes necessary to accomplish their mission or to protect themselves. In general, they should avoid combat and accomplish their mission by stealth. Reconnaissance patrols have a variety of missions, but their primary mission is to obtain and report information in a timely manner to the commander who desires it.

1. Study the mission. 2. Plan use of time. 3. Study terrain and situation. 4. Organize the patrol. 5. Select men, weapons, and equipment. 6. Issue the warning order. 7. Coordinate (continuous throughout the patrol). 8. Make reconnaissance. 9. Complete detailed plans. 10. Issue patrol order. 11. Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse, and re-inspect. 12. Execute the mission.

In the defense, the defender takes every opportunity to seize the initiative and to destroy the enemy. The defender seizes the initiative by forcing the enemy to react in conformity with the defensive plan of the battalion and exploiting the enemy weaknesses. In general, priorities follow the acronym SAFE: S - Security, A - Place automatic and crew-served weapons, F - Clear fields of fire, E - Emplacements, dig fighting positions. Effective defensive actions are achieved by a blend of the principles discussed below. The degree to which each principle applies will vary with the mission and the situation. Proper use of terrain - Read the "writing on the ground" ; analysis of weather & terrain following set of military considerations (KOCOA). Security - Measures that prevent surprise, avoid annoyance, preserve freedom of action, and deny to the enemy information about our forces. Mutual Support - A well-developed defense plan includes mutual support from adjacent units & is critical when conducting a convoy. Defense in Depth - This applies to the squad level by engaging the enemy at maximum small-arms range as it advances and continuing this fire until the enemy has been stopped. All-Around Defense - The platoon must be prepared to defend against an attack from any direction. It is best achieved by early warning and the rapid shifting of platoons into supplementary fighting positions to counter a developing attack. Coordinated Fire Plan - Coordination of all fire from weapons organic and supporting the battalion is considered. Coordination between the companies is also critical. The fire of the squad forces the enemy to slowdown and deploy, thus creating a target for the mortar crew of the battalion, adjacent companies, or supporting weapons. This makes the squads a key element in a coordinated fire plan. Use of Barriers - Using barriers, either natural or man-made, can channel, direct, restrict, or stop enemy movement. Flexibility - A platoon commander must continually develop various courses of action to meet the enemy threat. Being flexible is to ask yourself, What should I do if the enemy does this? Maximum use of Offensive Action - Since the defender can examine the terrain in detail and plan its best use, every effort is made to prepare the defense in advance. The effectiveness of the defense depends not only on the time available for its planning and preparation but also on its advantageous use during the preparation phase. Dispersion - Firing positions are assigned and should be close enough to provide interlocking fire. They should not be close enough so an enemy machine gun or mortar can wipe out an entire fire team or an entire squad.

Forward Defense Area (FDA) - Area where frontline defensive positions are dug. Security Area - Area in front of FDA. Security patrols roam this area. Listening/observation posts are placed here. Reserve Area - Area behind FDA that reserve forces occupy.

The fire team leader formulates a fire plan to cover the entire sector assigned by the squad leader with the heaviest possible volume of fire. The elements of a fire plan include: • Individual sectors of fire • Individual fighting positions • Automatic riflemen PDF assigned by the squad leader or platoon commander • Crew-served weapon positions • Key terrain features • Position of the fire team leader Individual fighting positions in a fire plan sketch include : Primary Firing Position - Backbone of the defense, receives the full force of the enemy's attack. Alternate Firing Position - Fall back position used if the primary position is in danger of being over run; same sector of fire as the primary. Supplementary Firing Position - Sector of fire covers the flank or rear. Battle Position - This is where the main effort of defense is concentrated. Companies and platoons are assigned battle positions. The battle position is made up of a series of sectors of fire that support and interlock one another.

*Sectors of Fire are areas assigned to an individual, unit, or crew-served weapon to defend. They are pie-shaped sections with edges called lateral limits that extend from the firing position to an easily identifiable terrain feature. Two stakes are placed near the firing position to indicate lateral limits during darkness. Sectors of fire interlock to ensure mutual support by adjacent units. *Fire Discipline is the ability to efficiently apply fire on a target and is dependent on the ability of the leader and the discipline and control of the crew. It includes the ability to select and designate targets, preserving the element of surprise by opening fire at the desired moment only, regulating the rate of fire, shifting from one target to another, and adjusting / ceasing fire.

The Seabee rifle squad is composed of a squad leader, three fire teams and a grenadier (A fire team consists of the fire team leader, automatic rifleman, rifleman #1 and rifleman #2). Ideally, the rifle squad will contain three fire teams of four men each, a grenadier, and the squad leader for a total of 14 men. a. Squad leader - E6 with an M16, but only fires in critical situations. Responsible for the training, appearance, discipline and readiness of the squad. Controls fire discipline, fire control, and maneuvering. b. Grenadier - E4 armed with an M203. Responsible for the employment and care of the 203. Remains close to the squad leader in combat. c. Fire team leader - E5 with an M16, but only fires in critical situations. Leads and controls fire team. Acts as the assistant squad leader. d. Automatic rifleman - E4 with a fully auto M16. Backbone of the fire team, providing heavy fire power. Acts as the assistant fire team leader. e. Rifleman number 1 - SN with an M16 whose primary duty is to carry extra ammo for the automatic rifleman. Protects flank and acts as a scout. Takes control of the automatic rifle if automatic rifleman becomes a casualty. f. Rifleman number 2 - SN or SA with an M16. Acts as point man and occasionally a scout. Protects the flank of the fire team.

Article I - I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. Article II - I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist. Article III - If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. Article IV - If I become a Prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way. Article V - When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give my name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further question to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its Allies or harmful to their cause. Article VI - I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Search: for weapons and documents. Secure: ensure escape is impossible Silence: do not allow EPOW's to talk to each other. Segregate: into groups by rank, gender, and status (deserter, civilian, EPW, etc.). Safeguard: provide medical care and humane treatment. Speed: timely delivery of information obtained from EPOW's is essential. Along with the 6 S's there is an additional letter. T for Tagging their belongings. EPOW's should have their belongings confiscated, and cataloged.

The declaration of THREATCONS and implementation of measures may be decreed by a U.S. command or agency or by a local commander or head of an agency following receipt of intelligence through official sources or following an anonymous threat. *THREATCON ALPHA. This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely. *THREATCON BRAVO. This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities. *THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel facilities and is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel. *THREATCON DELTA. This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely.

The purpose of SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. In the absence of superseding guidance, the SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US force commanders in the event of military attack against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The intent of SROE is to: (1) Implement the right of self-defense, which is applicable worldwide to all echelons of command. (2) Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment. (3) Be used in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance. US forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the NCA. US forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When US forces, under US OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, US forces will operate under these SROE. Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements. US forces remain bound by US international agreements even if the other coalition members are not parties to these agreements and need not adhere to the terms. Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate actions for unit self-defense. US forces will comply with the Law of War during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under international law, and will comply with its principles and spirit during all other operations. All of these rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity.

Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and when all three of the following circumstances are present: - Lesser means have been exhausted, are unavailable, or cannot be reasonably employed - The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by use - The purpose of its use is one or more of the following: - Self-Defense and Defense of Others - Assets Involving National Security - Assets Not Involving National Security But Inherently - Dangerous To Others - Serious Offenses Against Persons - Protect Public Health or Safety - Arrest or Apprehension - Escape of prisoner or individual suspected of an offense above

Tactical Wire - Used to hamper enemy aggression. Placed along the front of the defensive line. Protective Wire - Prevents close surprise attacks. Placed around each fighting position at hand grenade range Supplementary Wire - Placed to conceal the exact line of the tactical wire.

1. Barbed-wire entanglements are artificial obstacles designed to slow the movement of foot troops and, in some cases, tracked and wheeled vehicles. a. Triple-standard Concertina Fence - This fence consists of two lines of concertinas serving as a base, with a third line resting on top. All lines are installed with staggered joints. Each line is completed before the next is started, so a partially completed concertina entanglement presents some obstruction. It is erected quickly and is difficult to cross, cut, or crawl through. As an obstacle, inmost situations, the triple standard concertina fence is better than the double-apron fence. The material for it weighs about 50 percent more, but it is erected with about one half of the man-hours. Every concertina fence is secured firmly to the ground by driving staples at intervals of not more than 6.6 feet. b. Double-apron Fence - There are two types of double-apron fence: the 4- and 2-pace fence and the 6- and 3-pace fence. The 4- and 2-pace fence is the better obstacle of the two and is the type more commonly used because it is more difficult to raise the lower wires and crawl over or under them. In this fence, the center pickets are 4 paces apart and the anchor pickets are 2 paces from the line of the center pickets and opposite the midpoint of the space between center pickets. c. Low wire Entanglement - This is a 4- and 2-pace double-apron fence in which medium pickets replace long pickets in the fence center line. This results in omission of wire Nos. 6, 7, and 8, and in bringing all the apron and diagonal wires much closer to the ground, so passage underneath this fence is difficult. This fence may be used advantageously on one or both sides of the double-apron fence. The low-wire entanglement is used where concealment is essential. In tall grass or shallow water, this entanglement is almost invisible and is particularly effective as a surprise obstacle. However, a man can pick his way through this low-wire fence without much difficulty; therefore, for best results, it must be used in depth. d. Tangle Foot - Used where concealment is essential and to prevent the enemy from crawling between fences and in front of emplacements. Site tanglefoot in scrub, if possible, using bushes as supports for part of the wire. In open ground, use short pickets. Control the growth of grass to help prevent the enemy from secretly cutting lanes in, or tunneling under, the entanglement.

a. Column - Used when speed and control are governing factors. Favorable for fire and maneuver to either flank. Vulnerable to fire from the front because its own fire in that direction is limited. b. Wedge - Used when the enemy contact is possible, but not certain. Provides all around protection, flexibility and is easy to control. c. Skirmishers (right or left) - Used when assaulting a known enemy position. Because the fire teams are in line, it provides maximum fire power to the front. Hard formation to control. d. Echelon (right or left) - Used primarily to protect an exposed flank. Permits heavy firepower to the front and the direction of the echelon. Hard formation to control and slow moving.

Training is the best defense. Continually train on immediate action drills to ensure prompt response. The enemy is expecting to create chaos with an ambush. Taking immediate action will surprise the enemy and giving the unit a better chance at survival. Intelligence reports can help predict an ambush. *Near Ambush: Return fire and assault through. Withdrawal from a near ambush is unlikely, so it is critical to return fire immediately and drive through. Enemy may not expect a quick and decisive response. *Far Ambush: Take cover and withdraw orderly. Immediately drop and return fire. Unit commander organizes withdrawal with constant cover fire. *Convoys caught in an ambush: Passengers return fire immediately. Driver does not stop in the kill zone but drives through. Once clear of the killing zone, vehicle halts and occupants dismount to take offensive action. Vehicles in the rear approaching kill zone halt, debark, and take immediate action. Passengers in HARDENED vehicles return fire from inside the protective vehicle. Passengers in SOFT vehicles immediately dismount, take cover, and return fire. If no cover is available, unit commander leads them in an immediate frontal assault..

As someone approaches, Sentry calls, "Halt! Who goes there?" Reply with name and company: "CE1 Spark, B Co." Sentry then says: "Advance and be recognized." The Sentry keeps person distant enough to effectively cover him, but close enough to recognize him. T he person will be allowed to pass if recognized. If not recognized, sentry offers countersigns. Always disguise countersigns in a sentence and speak in a low voice. Example: snowflake and rooster.

A helicopter Landing Zone (LZ) is a specified ground for landing helicopters to embark or disembark troops or cargo. Depending upon the terrain and the size of the unit, you can divide the LZ into several landing sites. A landing site is a specific location within a landing zone in which a single flight of helicopters may land to embark or disembark troops or cargo. Landing sites are designated by color, such as landing site red. A landing site contains one or more landing points. Preparation of an LZ should take several factors into consideration. First, you should know what type of helicopters will be using the landing zone. Second, you must consider the unit's position in relation to the enemy. Security troops must establish a 360-degree perimeter around the landing zone to defend the LZ. A third factor is the time it will take to prepare the LZ and the final factor considered is the equipment needed to prepare the LZ. Obstacles: The ground approaches to the LZ and exits from the LZ must be free of major obstacles that might obstruct landing or takeoffs, such as tall trees, telephone poles, or power lines. Approaches and exits should also be clear of obstructions that are 10 meters or higher, extending at least 50 meters in the direction of approach and exit paths. The rule of thumb for determining the distance required between the landing point and a high obstruction is a 10:1 ratio. This means that the distance a landing point is located from a tree is ten times the height of the tree. (Example: A helicopter landing or taking off near a 30-foot tree needs at least 300 feet of horizontal clearance.) Obstacles on the ground, such as stumps or rocks, should not exceed 1 foot in height on level ground and should be less on sloping ground. Gradient (slopes): Ground slope has a considerable effect on selecting a landing site or landing point within the LZ. A helicopter cannot land safely in locations where the ground slopes more than 14 degrees. Pilots prefer to land uphill on a slope because of the tail down attitude of the helicopter. Mud, excessive dust, and loose debris are considered undesirable surface conditions for helicopters. Landing site dimensions vary, depending on the number of landing points required. For each landing point, a fuselage safe circle is cleared of all obstacles, such as stumps, rocks, or bushes. Clear a rotor safe circle of all obstacles that could obstruct the rotor blades. For daylight landing, select a level area at least 100 feet larger than the diameter of the rotor blades. For night landing, this distance should be at least 150 feet larger. Marking the LZ: Once you have established the LZ, the landing sites, and the landing points, you need to direct the helicopter to the location of the LZ. The proper marking of the LZ will aid the pilot in locating it. • Daylight landing: The landing zone is equipped with a means of showing wind direction and velocity. This is usually accomplished by the use of smoke or by verbal radio message. Methods include (1) Grass Drop method and (2) Angle of Smoke method. Use smoke and landing zone panels to mark a daytime landing zone. Both should be the same color as the designation of the landing zone. This will aid the pilot in locating the landing zone. If smoke is used to mark the landing zone, use only as needed and do not tell the pilot the color of smoke; ask the pilot to acknowledge the color after the smoke grenade is set off. • Night landing: The organization and use of an LZ at night or during periods of low visibility is more complex compared to daytime operations. Special lighting equipment or field expedients as required. You must indicate outlines of landing zones by low-intensity markers. You must show obstacles near the landing zone by low-intensity markers or voice radio instructions. Another method of guiding the aircraft to the zone is vector instructions. This is simply relaying instructions to the pilot by radio.

Combat Arm and Hand Signals are one method to communicate or transmit commands when voice communication is difficult or impossible or when silence must be maintained. Other types of Combat signals include whistle or special signals. Leaders should repeat signals to their units whenever necessary to ensure prompt and correct execution of orders. Leaders giving arm and hand signals should remember that these are an order of command. The signal is given smartly. Leaders must be aware of their location to ensure the signal can be seen by the intended unit.

The principal task of security forces, with respect to waterborne vessels, is to determine hostile intent as far from the HVA as possible. Using defense in depth, security boats can determine hostile intent early because of their capability to interdict contacts at a distance from the HVA. Waterborne defense in depth around an HVA is established by creating assessment, warning and threat zones. Ideally, zones that are 500 meters in width allow for effective small boat engagement and prevention of standoff attacks from RPGs.

Western Rivers means the Mississippi River, its tributaries, South Pass, and Southwest Pass, to the navigational demarcation lines dividing the high seas from harbors, rivers, and other inland waters of the U.S. Great Lakes means the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters, the Chicago River as far as the east side of the Ashland Avenue Bridge and the Saint Lawrence River as far east as the lower exit of Saint Lambert Lock. Inland Waters means the navigable waters of the United States shoreward of the navigational demarcation lines dividing the high seas from harbors, rivers, and other inland waters of the United States and the waters of the Great Lakes on the United States side of the International Boundary.

Prior to commencing watch turnover, oncoming watchstanders should attend a guard mount brief and inspection. The COG, or designated supervisor, conducts the briefs and inspection. A standard brief should include: 1. ROE/RUF guidelines 2. Status-of-forces agreement 3. Intelligence update 4. Previous watch events 5. Current FPCON 6. Post-specific orders 7. Chain of command 8. Communications procedures (callsigns, prowords, signal plan) 9. Location of available resources, such as EOD, MWD, and reaction forces 10. Location of medical personnel 11. Location of key personnel 12. Location of HN and friendly forces 13. Weapon issue/return, armory, and clearing barrel procedures 14. Meal and water resupply. Remember the 5-paragraph format SMEAC: Situation, Misson, Execution, Admin & Logistics and Command & Signal.

a. SORTS - Status Of Resources & Training System; principle report in the U.S. Navy for identification and general status to higher authorities and is the foundation for assessing unit readiness. It indicates the status of personnel; equipment and supplies on hand; equipment condition; and training, as reported by each unit. In their reports, each unit commander also assesses the unit's ability to execute its wartime mission, indicated by one of five "C" levels. Units are required to submit their SORTS reports on a regular basis or when there is a change in their C level or location. b. CASREP - Casualty Report; the primary means used to report the status of a unit with reduced combat readiness caused by a casualty. It is also used to report accidents and disasters that include a loss of capability, material damage, personnel injury caused by collisions, strandings, fires at sea, missing or sunken submarines, and damage from natural causes such as hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, and tidal waves. c. LOGREQ - Logistial Requirements, report used by ships entering ports to pass information to and request services from the port. It describes power and general berthing requirements, will normally be received from the arriving ship prior to entering port. This information, in conjunction with the berthing assignment received from Waterfront Operations, will allow the Shore-to-Ship Group to prepare the berth prior to the ship's arrival. d. SITREP - Situation Report, provides report of the situation, disposition and status of forces including overview, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, personnel, commanders assessment. A unit SITREP is a message transmitted by any unit CO, officer in charge, or other commander to notify appropriate operational commanders and seniors in the chain of command of a significant event or incident. Generally, the unit SITREP is used when an incident does not meet the criteria of the Operational Report (OPREP) 3 reporting system. An OPREP 3 is a higher level reporting system used to inform senior authority that an incident of national or high U.S. Navy interest has occurred.

The ATFP plan should provide an integrated, comprehensive approach to deter, detect, defend against and mitigate terrorist threats. The classification of an ATFP plan is dependent upon its content, current policy and the specifics of a unit's situation. An effective ATFP plan will address: 1. Concept of operations 2. Preplanned responses 3. Tactics 4. Crisis management procedures 5. Consequence management procedures 6. Baseline security posture 7. Measures to increase security posture 8. Reporting procedures 9. Command and control procedures. Every ATFP plan includes the identification of intelligence gaps in available threat holdings, factoring in time to develop requests for information from higher echelons to include the national agencies. Threat information is typically acquired from higher echelons, host-nation authorities, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, American embassies, civilian authorities and the advance party. U.S. Navy ships and forces on the high seas should use appropriate anti-terrorism measures consistent with the known threat level in the AOR. Under customary international law, military ships and aircraft are sovereign platforms. Ships and aircraft require specific and advance entry permission (usually referred to as diplomatic clearance) for entry into internal waters or airspace of a foreign country, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements have been made. When U.S. forces are operating within internal waters or territory of a foreign nation, the foreign nation has primary responsibility for antiterrorism and law enforcement. Notwithstanding the foreign nation's primary responsibility, the U.S. commander remains ultimately responsible for unit self-defense.

**Small Boat Threat: As the bombing of the USS COLE in October 2000 clearly demonstrated, a small boat can be a lethal weapon. In a matter of minutes, a small boat carrying approximately 500 pounds of explosives approached the port side of the COLE, exploded and left a gaping hole in the ship, causing the death of 17 sailors and many injuries. The purpose for developing PPRs to counter small boat attacks is to prevent threats from gaining close proximity to protected assets or areas. The following principles will guide the development of PPRs to counter a small boat threat: 1. Detect and assess all vessels entering a predetermined assessment zone. 2. Establish positive ID and determine hostile intent of all vessels in the warning zone. 3. Prevent unauthorized vessels from entering the threat zone. **Deep Draft Threat : The potential for deep draft ships to inflict devastating damage is due to their large capacity to hold explosives, and to the difficulty friendly forces will face trying to stop an underway vessel. Security forces and boats can stop hostile small craft by shouldering, ramming or shooting them; while the same measures could be employed against an approaching hostile ship, the likelihood of stopping it is minimal. The following principles will guide commanders in forming PPRs to counter a deep draft threat: 1. Liaison with HN or USCG authorities to ensure all deep draft vessels in the area are tracked. 2. Detect, assess, and determine hostile intent as far away from the protected asset or area as possible so security forces have time to react. **Sub-surface Threat: The third waterborne threat occurs at the subsurface level, carried out by either swimmers or mines, or a combination of the two. Both threats were used successfully during the Vietnam War and remain attractive options for terrorists because of their relatively low cost and simplicity. The most difficult aspect when planning to defend against subsurface threats is employment of capability to detect them. Small boats and deep draft vessels are clearly visible and thus provide at least some time to determine hostile intent; security forces may not see a swimmer or mine until it is in the threat zone, if at all. While a mine is clearly a threat and should be acted upon immediately, a swimmer or bubbles in the water are not necessarily indicative of a hostile threat. The following principles will guide the development of PPRs to detect and deter subsurface threats: 1. Develop specific guidance for reacting to a surfaced swimmer or bubbles sighting. Such directives are critical because of the likelihood that defenders will get only one look at the swimmer at the water surface. Is any swimmer in the water within a certain distance from the protected asset or area assumed to be hostile? Can concussion grenades automatically be used if a swimmer submerges or bubbles are seen? PPRs to these questions will ensure security forces are armed with sufficient authority to counter this elusive threat. 2. Install barriers at a distance from the protected asset or area if there is a likely threat of mines. 3. Use anti-swimmer devices when possible. A variety of commercial anti-swimmer products that either put sound into the water to deter a swimmer, or detect a swimmer with a variant of sonar are increasingly available to U.S. Navy assets.

a. Procedure b. Blocking and shouldering - Blocking is the act of positioning the security boat between the contact and the HVA, thus reducing the contact's ability to attack the HVA. Shouldering is the act of maneuvering a vessel in contact with an opposing vessel to cause the opposing vessel to turn away. Shouldering is undertaken with the intent of minimizing damage to the opposing vessel. c. Equipment

Escalation of Force or Seaward Continuum of Force consists of the following levels: LEVEL ONE - Blue Lights, Sirens, Horn, Waving of hands, Hail on VHF MARBAND radio, Loud Hailer, Aggressive driving toward Contact of Interest (COI), Spotlight at night, Weapons Ready (Unpin Crew Serve weapons and maintain positive control) LEVEL TWO - Shoot flare across bow of COI, More aggressive Hail, Herding of COI, Surface Action (Condition One weapon, train on COI) LEVEL THREE - Warning shots from Crew Serve weapons across bow of COI LEVEL FOUR - Open Fire (Disabling or Destructive fire)

Shoot to stop forward motion. When engaging a hostile craft, direct fire at the engines, not the coxswain. A boat's forward motion can continue even if no one is at the helm, but a boat with disabled engines will stop quickly.

Waterborne defense in depth around an HVA is established by creating Assessment, Warning and Threat zones. Commanders should create zones large enough to determine hostile intent and, if necessary, engage a small boat threat as far away as possible from the HVA. Ideally, zones that are 500 meters in width allow for effective small boat engagement and prevention of standoff attacks from RPGs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or other known threats.

Internal injuries from an MK 3A2 concussion grenade force the swimmer to surface, thereby neutralizing a potential threat and permitting apprehension by security personnel. The MK 3A2 Concussion Grenade has a Kill range of: 5 feet, Stun range of: 25-30 feet, and ear injuries occur to 150 feet.

Warning shots are a means of communication and provide an additional tool to determine hostile intent. Failure to heed warning shots can, when considered in the circumstances, provide an indication of hostile intent. The use of warning shots is only appropriate when: (1) An unauthorized vessel has entered a naval vessel protective zone and continues to approach a Navy or naval service vessel. (2) An unauthorized vessel approaches at a high rate of speed. (3) Other means within the Escalation of Force, VHF radio calls, loudhailers, flares, have failed. Use of deadly force to protect a ship and its crew against a small boat attack is not contingent on firing a warning shot first. Warning shots will be offset from the suspected threat.

*Surface Threat: (1) Show a waterborne presence (2) Detect and report contact. (3) Intercept contact approaching the warning zone. (4) Assume a blocking position between the contact and the HVA (5) Conduct Escalation of Force (SCOF Levels). (6) Classify contact as unknown, friendly, or hostile. *Subsurface Threat (Swimmer Attack) - Patrol Boat can perform a Parallel Search pattern between the HVA and the suspected Swimmer to deploy MK 3A2 Concussion Grenades (1) Determine weapons/measures to be used against subsurface threat (2) Identify floating debris (3) Lookout for air bubbles, snorkels, or piles of floating debris (to conceal a swimmer (4) Turn screws, maintain sea suction and shift rudders. (5) Activate sonar, (6) Rig shark nets, (7) Deploy underwater lights, (8) Use draglines

-Assessment Zone: The outermost defense zone is not typically patrolled, thus allowing security boats to remain close to the HVA in case of an incident. Security forces first detect and identify contacts, notify craft that they are nearing a restricted area (if they approach the warning zone), and create a visible deterrent presence in the assessment zone. Unlike the warning zone, access to the assessment zone is not challenged. -Warning zone: In this zone, security boats actively interact with and challenge unknown craft for classification as either a threat or non-threat, to determine hostile intent and to ensure unauthorized vessels do not approach closer to the HVA. The size of a warning zone is determined after consultation with local civilian, military, or HN authorities since it involves interaction with local craft. -Threat zone: The innermost layer around the HVA. No hostile craft should be permitted to enter this zone. Hostile intent should have been determined in the warning zone after repeated attempts to deter the unknown craft from approaching the protected asset or area. Predetermined ROE/RUF guidelines will specify what lethal actions can be taken by security forces once hostile intent is determined. Zone sizes and locations are dependent upon several factors: 1. HN restrictions. Political sensitivities, availability of HN security forces, and HN laws all restrict U.S. actions when OCONUS. A HN, for example, might restrict a U.S. ship security boat to patrol only 200 meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere with commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or a HN may not even allow U.S. boats in the water, insisting that HN boats will provide security. 2. Geography. Channel width, port size, and pier dimensions are just several restrictions that can limit sizes of defense zones. The ideal of establishing zones 500 yards in width to deter standoff RPG attacks is not possible for a pierside ship in a 100-yard-wide river. 3. TAs. Location-specific TAs can shape the size of zones. For example, if there is a high threat of vehiclecarried IEDs, security forces should establish ECPs far from the protected asset, post additional vehicle inspectors, and employ a variety of detection equipment. Zones that protect against a swimmer threat would extend upstream of the current that flows past an HVA, while zones against a small boat threat might extend in the other direction toward local marinas, which could serve as boat launch points. 4. Capabilities of U.S. security forces. The number and skills of AT/FP forces will affect zone size and location. If four, vice two, security boats are available per watch, zone sizes could be extended so identification and classification of unknown vessels occurs farther from the HVA, providing more time and distance to neutralize threats. Conversely, using nonorganic security forces, such as FAST or NCW, would result in more robust coverage of ECPs, which could then be constructed closer to the HVA. 5. Proximity of targets. In a crowded port or urban installation, security forces may be limited in choice of weapons employment. In such environments, zones could be extended, if permissible, to ascertain intent further from the protected asset, better ensuring an ability to neutralize the threat with allowable weapons.

When a single boat is on patrol, its crew will be required to exercise sharp judgment, because interdicting every craft that comes into the warning zone will leave the HVA vulnerable to a diversionary attack. As a result, the security boat should maintain a static position, close to the HVA, facing out toward potential waterborne threats. The boat's task is to assess all craft near the HVA and only react to vessels that are deemed potential threats. When two or more security boats are on patrol, sectors must be assigned. To protect pierside, anchored, or underway HVAs, boats will randomly patrol near the outer edge of the warning zone sectors and assess all vessels in their vicinity. Their physical presence should deter craft from approaching the HVA. Since diversions are a standard tactic in the asymmetric environment, security boat personnel must be aware of, but not distracted by, contact in another sector. When the HVA is at anchor or underway, security boats should position themselves to maintain 100% visual coverage around the HVA.

a. Selection of Landing Areas/Sites. -A river landing area includes a segment of river bank or similar features along a waterway over which troops, supplies, or equipment can be landed by watercraft. A river landing area contains one or more river landing sites, within which are contained one or more points at which individual craft land and disembark troop units. Whenever possible, river landing areas are selected to avoid opposition and facilitate the rapid and orderly debarkation of ground combat units. Primary considerations in the selection of river landing areas are: Scheme of maneuver, Enemy situation, Hydrography, Obstacles, and Terrain/river bank. The primary considerations in selection of helicopter landing zones are: 1. The concept of operations. 2. Enemy capabilities and dispositions, and known counter-helicopter tactics. 3. Friendly capabilities to suppress enemy air defense and to provide air, artillery, and naval gunfire support for ground operations. 4. Ease of identification from the air. 5. Firm dry ground suitable for landing helicopters. This frequently may not be available. Accurate data on the depth of water in inundated landing zones and the location of minor waterways within the landing zones are essential to prevent unnecessary loss of life and inordinate delay in troop reorganization upon landing when it becomes necessary to land by jumping from hovering helicopters. 6. Adequate obstacle clearance for approach and departure routes. 7. Helicopter landing zones shall be approved by the commander on scene through liaison with supporting helicopter unit as appropriate. 8. Potential for deployment of combat service support area. b. Selection of waterway routes - The primary consideration in selection of waterway routes between the mobile riverine base and the selected landing areas are: Hydrography, Enemy capabilities, Capabilities to support primary & alternate plans and Terrain/bank characteristics. If not prescribed by the mobile riverine force commander, waterway routes are selected by the Navy component commander, in coordination with the Marine Corps component commander. c. Selection of Base Site Riverine base sites must contribute to accomplishment of the mission and meet the following criteria: (1) Be within an area which can be defended by available forces without jeopardizing offensive capabilities of the MRF. (2) Provide for mooring assigned ships and craft and, when necessary, sufficient area and facilities to accommodate forces ashore. (3) Be within operational and communication range of deployed elements of the MRF and facilitate their logistic support. (4) Potential for deployment of combat service support area. Other considerations : (1) If the Navy mobile riverine base element does not include a helicopter landing capability, it may be desirable to locate the afloat base adjoining a land area suitable for staging and loading helicopters. (2) Defense plans should permit rapid establishment of defense on land and along the waterways. (3) Mine countermeasures and swimmer 7. Most effective employment of supporting defense must be provided for. arms. (4) The area should be thoroughly reconnoitered. (5) The location of the afloat base of operations should permit safe passage of other waterway traffic.

a. Assault - A riverine assault operation commences when troops begin tactical assault loading to depart the riverine base for an operation and terminates when all forces involved have returned to the base. In any assault landing against a hostile or potentially hostile point, several options rest with the assaulting force. In all options the assault must support and contribute to the attainment of the mission. The phases of the mobile riverine force assault operations are tactical loading (i.e. troop personnel), movement (i.e. to the objective), landing attack (preparation of the landing area, landing, initial ground and waterborne maneuver, and special support operations), subsequent operations (such as coordinated employment of artillery, assault craft fire, naval gunfire, and close air support), and planned withdrawal. b. Waterway interdiction, surveillance, barrier and security - These operations are conducted by specially configured craft and aircraft in the waters of the riverine area and may be used to gain control of waterways preparatory to subsequent riverine assault operations or they may be conducted by Navy forces alone, with Marine Corps elements provided only as a reaction or security element. An individual waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operation may be called a patrol and consists of two or more craft in execution of a specific operation. Waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations serve five basic purposes: (1) Protect friendly lines of communication (2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways (i.e. modes of transportation) (3) Collect intelligence information (4) Perform security missions (5) Enforce population and resources control (i.e. deny the enemy the means to wage war. Isolate the enemy from his support to take away his operational initiative and make his primary task that of supply). Air and surface operations are mutually supporting and may be conducted independently or concurrently. However, close coordination is required between airborne and waterborne patrols in the employment of mutually supporting fires. c. Special - Riverine special operations are ancillary or supporting operations conducted by the MRF as adjuncts to a riverine assault operation or a waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations. Special operations are normally characterized by employment of procedures and techniques which require special training and equipment. The capability to conduct these operations is generally limited to specific units which have been assigned primary mission responsibility within the service organization. Types of operations include : (1) Reconaissance and Waterway Clearance (2) Riverine Base Security (3) Mine Warfare Operations to include mining and mine countermeasures (4) Salvage Operations (5) Cover and Deception Operations (6) Unconventional warfare operations (7) Physchological Operations (8) Civil Affairs

Historically, MIO is a peacetime measure designed to enforce embargoes sanctioned by the UNSC, national authority, or other regional organization. MIO characteristics vary depending on the purpose and authority. The provisions of the embargo are usually promulgated in the form of a UNSCR that establishes the parameters, objectives, prohibited items, and geographic area of MIO. It may also designate the C2 structure and amount of force authorized. The enforcing nations ensure that MIO responses are proportional to the violation of international norms by the target state. Proportional response means taking the minimum measures necessary to enforce compliance and ensure the security of the MIO force. MIO is generally tailored to create the least impact on freedom of navigation for nations not targeted by MIO. The following are common characteristics for traditional MIO that enforces an embargo: (a) Interception terms are publicly announced, usually in a Notice to Mariners/Notice to Airmen. These notices specify start date, location, prohibited items, and cargo access inspection requirements. (b) Use of minimum force required for mission accomplishment. (c) An embargo may encompass virtually all imports and exports even though specified items are prohibited. (d) Ships and aircraft not carrying prohibited items are permitted to pass. (e) Ships carrying prohibited items are turned back, diverted to a neutral port requested by the detainee, or diverted to a port selected by the cognizant commander. They are not seized as a prize. However, MIO may permit the seizure and sale of ships (and their cargo) that refuse to comply.

Type of operations include: (1) Littoral surveillance support operations (LSSO) - LSSO refers to the synergy developed between the capabilities of an MIUWU and those of the LSS operated and manned by the Naval Space Reserve Program. The combined capabilities of the MIUWU and LSS resources provide a naval tactical commander with timely receipt of all weather, day/night maritime and littoral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data from selected national, theater, and tactical systems. The MIUWU's role in this operation is one of support only; providing security, equipment and communications support. MIUWU personnel do not man or operate the equipment of the LSS. That task falls to personnel assigned to a LSS/NFN unit which provides the cleared and trained equipment operators. (2) Harbor approach defense (HAD) operations - HAD ensures the unimpeded use of designated offshore coastal areas by friendly forces and denies the use of these areas to enemy forces. HAD operations are an extension of HD/PS operations into the littoral area. This area is also referred to as a defensive sea area (DSA). HAD operations are performed by NCW forces, freeing up theater forces for employment elsewhere. HAD is a focused NCW operation that complements broader naval operations designed to maintain SLOCs. (3) Harbor defense/port security (HD/PS) operations - There are two distinctly different applications of HD/PS operations, depending on whether the tasks being conducted are expeditionary or for homeland defense. The primary goal of expeditionary HD/PS operations is maintaining unimpeded access and security within ports and harbors. In homeland defense, terrorism and sabotage are the primary threats within the port or harbor. Harbor defense (HD) — "the defense of a harbor or anchorage and its water approaches against external threats such as: (a) submarine, submarine-borne, or small surface craft attack (b) enemy minelaying operations and (c) sabotage." HD operations involve conducting surveillance, employing defensive measures, and monitoring ship movement within the harbor and port. Port security (PS) — "the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature." These operations are not law enforcement operations in that security forces are not charged with maintaining order within a port area. (4) Antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) - The goal of AT/FP is to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack, and effect mitigation if one occurs. Preventative measures in AT/FP must include awareness of the threat, physical security enhancements, and the deployment of forces in a layered defense. AT/FP plans identify and, when implemented, reduce the risk of loss or damage to people, equipment, and facilities. Plans provide procedures to detect or deter planned terrorist actions before they take place. The plan addresses the reactive or tactical stage of a terrorist incident, including direct contact with terrorists to end the incident with minimum loss of friendly life and property. The layered defense concept employed by NCW forces is an effective means of deterrence against terrorism. Layered defense is additive to the point defense employed by individual ships within the NCW AO. Random antiterrorism measures, when activated by NCW forces, serve to disguise the security measures, in effect thereby denying terrorist surveillance the opportunity to accurately predict security actions, further enhancing the deterrence created by force deployment. (5) Point defense operations - In the case of a ship or aircraft using a port or airfield where security is a concern and the Host Nation security infrastructure (in the case of expeditionary operations) or CONUS port security measures (in the case of homeland defense operations) are inadequate, the employment of various components of the NCW force for point defense may be appropriate. Point defense is generally conducted in confined and traffic-congested harbors and ports and air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and/or neutrals. This environment complicates threat identification, stresses C2 capabilities, and makes reaction times critical. NCW forces assigned point defense normally operate in a Level I or II threat environment to protect ships (in transit, at anchor, or in port), aircraft on flight lines, and very important persons (VIPs). Threats may come from agents, saboteurs, enemy sympathizers, terrorist groups, small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces and guerilla groups involved in surface, subsurface, or air attacks. Some of the specific means used by these adversarial forces include: High-speed attack craft, Innocent appearing civilian boats, Swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), Mini-submersibles, Divers, Mines, Small aircraft or Vehicle based improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (i.e., car bombs).

Host Nation Support: To a great degree, effective expeditionary NCW operations depend on active and effective liaison with the HN that supports unity of effort, and are further enhanced with coordinated support from other US military commands and government agencies. A capable and friendly HN can provide invaluable civil and military assistance to US forces. HNS is normally based on agreements (standing, interim, or exigent) that commit the HN to provide specific support under prescribed conditions. The intrinsic littoral and rear area nature of NCW operations makes close and effective HNS and cooperation particularly critical. In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on the operational capabilities of the HN and its political acceptance of US policies. The type and amount of support to be provided by the HN is specified in signed agreements and detailed in the plans of all the nations concerned. Maximum use of HN capabilities is especially critical in crisis response situations when US forces may not be in place or have outpaced their logistics support lines of communications. The amount of civil or military support provided by an HN will depend on its national laws, industrial capability, and willingness to give such support. Some of the planning factors taken into consideration when planning for HNS are: 1. HN international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement in the AO 2. Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain resources 3. Shortfalls in NCW forces supplemented by HNS 4. Implications of HNS on the political structure both within the host nation and the region 5. Effects on security, to include operations security (OPSEC) 6. Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed upon and its applicability across the range of NCW operations 7. Availability of US liaison (DOS, attaché, etc.) amd language interpretation support, if necessary. Examples of HNS include: 1. Government agencies - Police, Fire, Translators/liaison personnel, Customs/immigration. 2. Civilian Contractors - Support services. 3. HN civilians - Labor pool. 4. HN military units - Coast guard/navy, Maritime police, Border guard, Army and marine corps. 5. HN facilities - Harbor entrance control towers, Boathouses, Checkpoints/hardened guard mounted posts. 6. Selected functions - Rail operations, Air traffic control, Harbor pilot services. 7. Logistics support - Supplies, Equipment, Laydown and material staging areas. 8. Community security materiel system (CMS) and other classified material stowage and handling. 9. Intelligence support - Devices, Facilities, Intelligence products. United States Interagency Support: NCW operations generally involve a close relationship with and support from US governmental agencies. For example, when expeditionary NCW forces are deployed, interagency support is arranged through the embassy. The ambassador speaks and acts with the full authority of the US government and can bring other governmental agency capabilities to bear in support of NCW missions. Homeland defense operations provide another example of NCW and US governmental interagency support and interaction. Both NCW forces and other governmental agencies are assigned as supporting forces under USNORTHCOM. Effective accomplishment of the overall mission requires that all supporting commands and agencies coordinate efforts. The US Embassy has at its disposal representatives from various US aid, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. NCW forces can request and gain support from the agencies represented by liaison with the defense or naval attaché assigned. These representatives have an intimate knowledge of the culture and capabilities of the HN and the advice of these individuals should be relied upon when issues arise that require interaction with the HN.

The MSO ensures the safety, security, and environmental protection of CONUS ports and surrounding areas. MSOs fulfill this mission by enforcing marine safety standards, responding to environmental and military threats, and planning and coordinating with other agencies. MSOs are headed by a COTP who is a USCG O6. By law, the COTP has the statutory authority within their respective areas for port safety, security, and marine environmental protection regulations, including without limitation, regulations for the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities; anchorages; security zones; safety zones; regulated navigation areas; deepwater ports; water pollution; and ports and waterways safety.

a. Chemical warfare- Produces physiological and psychological effects. It is used in solid, liquid, and vapor form, causes casualties, degrades performance, disrupts support, and restricts maneuvers. Chemical agents are used to produce death, injury, temporary incapacitation, or irritating effects. There are three types of antipersonnel agents: (1) Casualty (nerve, blister, choking, blood) (2) Incapacitating (symptoms vary) and (3) Harassing (tear and vomiting gases). b. Biological warfare- The intentional release of living organisms or substances produced by living organisms to cause Death or Disease. Biological operations use living organisms to cause disease or death. Cause diseases such as typhoid fever, cholera, and influenza. c. Radiological effects- Involves the employment of nuclear weapons that produce explosions of great force and heat and release nuclear radiation. Their primary purpose is the mass destruction of property and personnel. d. Routes by which agents enter the body- (1) Skin (2) ingestion by water & food (3) Eyes and linings of the mouth & nose

a. MCU-2/P- Protects face, eyes, nose, throat and lungs from CBR agents or contamination. It offers no protection against carbon monoxide or ammonia. It filters the air removing particles of dust that may be radioactive or otherwise contaminated. It purifies the air of many poisonous gases. The latest variant in the MCU-2/P mask series is the MCU-2A/P mask. It contains the same features as the MCU-2/P mask and, with modifications, may be integrated into the ship's Interior Voice Communications System (IVCS) and the Flight Deck Communications System. b. Chemical Protective Overgarment- Two piece suit that protects against all known chemical and biological agents. It is NOT to be used for radiological contamination. c. Wet-weather clothing- Provides complete protection against alpha/beta radiological contamination when worn with battle dress and antiflash gear. It also provides an extra layer of protection for the chemical protective overgarment. d. Atropine/Pralidoxime Chloride (Oxime)- Used to counteract the effects of and relieve the symptoms of nerve agents only. If you are told that your pupils are getting very small or if you are having trouble breathing and your chest feels tight, use the atropine nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK), Mark I. The injectors contain medications to treat the initial symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. But, most importantly, it will check the more serious effects of nerve agent sickness. The injectors are antidotes, not a preventive device; therefore, only use the injectors when you actually experience symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. e. Pocket dosimeter- Size and shape of a fountain pen. Used to measure exposure to radiation over a period of time.

Casualty Agents include nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. Harrassing Agents include Tear and Vomiting agents. 1) Nerve Agents- Types include G Agents and V Agents. Used as a quick-action casualty agents. Symptoms include: Runny Nose, Tightness of chest with difficulty in breathing, contraction of pupils, nausea, cramps, headache, coma and convulsions. Symptoms can take place in 30 seconds when the dose is sufficiently heavy. 2) Blister Agents- Types include Mustards, Phosgeneoximedichloroforoxime and Lewisite. Used as a delayed-action casualty agent. Symptoms include the following : For the eyes - Watery eyes, Redness and inflammation. For the skin - Skin starts to turn red after several hours, Blisters appear on the skin, throbbing pain and swelling may be observed. 3) Blood Agents- Types include Hydrogen Cyanide and Cyanogen Chloride. Used as a quick-action casualty agent. Symptoms range from convulsions to coma. These agents interfere with the ability of oxygen-carrying cells to transfer oxygen to other body tissues and also cause an irritating effect on nasal passages. 4) Choking Agents- Types include : Phosgene CG, Diphosgene DP and Chlorine CL. Used as a delayed-action casualty agent. Symptoms involve the inability to breathe. 5) Vomiting Agents- Types include Diphenylchlorarsine (DA), Diphenylchanoarsine (DC), and Adamsite (DM). These agents are dispersed as aerosols and produce their effects by inhalation. Symptoms include minor eye irritation and a feeling of pain and sense of fullness in the nose and sinuses. This is accompanied by a severe headache, intense burning in the throat, tightness and pain in the chest, and irritation of the eyes, producing excessive tear formation. Coughing is uncontrollable and sneezing is violent and persistent. Nausea and vomiting are prominent. Mild symptoms, caused by exposure to very low concentrations, resemble those of a severe cold. Effects will continue after donning a mask. Victim will become sick to the point of vomiting. The victim will be exposed to even more hazardous agent when the mask is removed for vomiting. 6) Tear Agents- Types include CN, CNC, CNB, BBC, CS. Of these agents, CS is the newest and most effective. Tear agents are essentially local irritants, which, in very low concentrations, act primarily on the eyes, causing intense pain and a considerable flow of tears; stinging of warm, moist skin; and irritation of the nose. High concentrations produce irritation of the upper respiratory tract and lungs and cause nausea and vomiting. The agents may be either solids or liquids and may be dispersed in the air as vapors or smokes. The physiological effects of tear agents include: Extreme burning of the eyes (accompanied by a heavy flow of tears), Coughing, difficulty in breathing, and chest tightness, Involuntary closing of the eyes, Stinging sensation of moist skin. 7) Incapacitating Agents- are used to wage and win a war without resorting to the massive killing, enormous destruction of property, and immense monetary cost, as in past wars, which undeniably will characterize any future conflict in which nuclear weapons are used. Incapacitating agents are the latest discovery. Many are still in the research, development, and testing stage; and much remains to be learned about them. An agent of this type is BZ, a slow-acting aerosol. It enters the body by inhalation and interferes with mental processes that control bodily functions. Advantages to the commander is that they are flexible, economical, not destructive, less injurous, simpler to store and utilize, and are difficult to detect.

a. Air burst- Fire ball does not touch the earth. All materials in the fireball are vaporized. Blast and thermal effect is maximized over a large area. b. Surface burst- Fireball touches the earth. Surface material is vaporized and lifted in the air. The blast produces large amounts of fallout. The range of the blast is less than that of an air burst. c. Underwater burst- Practically all thermal radiation is absorbed. A large base serge is formed which billows up several hundred feet.

a. Blast- Primary blast injuries result from the direct action of the air shock wave on the human body. Secondary blast injuries are caused mainly by collapsing buildings and by timber and other debris flung about by the blast. b. Burns- Primary burns are a direct result of the thermal radiation from the bomb. Secondary burns are the result of fires caused by the explosion. Flash blindness also occurs. c. Nuclear radiation- The effects of nuclear radiation include the following: - Alpha particles: Must be taken into the body through ingestion or cuts to be injurious. - Beta particles: Enter through the skin or ingestion, carried in contaminated dust, dirt, or bomb residue - Gamma Rays: Pure energy and not easily stopped, can penetrate every region of the body. Gamma rays strike atoms in the body cause ionization of these atoms, which may result in any number of possible chemical reactions that damage the cells of the body. - Neutrons: Have the greatest penetrating power of the nuclear radiation hazards, create hazards to personnel when the neutron is captured in atoms of various elements in the body, atmosphere, water, or soil. The captured elements become radioactive and release gamma rays and beta particles. d. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) phenomenon- An EMP is an intense burst of radio-frequency radiation generated by a nuclear explosion. The strong, quick-rising surges of electric current induced by EMP in power transmission lines and long antennas could burn out most unprotected electrical and electronic equipment.

A flexible system of protection against chemical agents, used to facilitate mission accomplishment in chemical warfare. MOPP requires the individual to wear protective equipment consistent with the chemical threat, the work rate imposed by the mission, and the temperature. The flexibility of MOPP in providing individual protection is limited by temperature of the surrounding area, fatigue level of the troops, the degree to which the troops need to use their senses, and personal needs. MOPP Level 0 - Carry MOPP Gear at all times MOPP Level 1 - Don CBR Smock and Trousers MOPP Level 2 - Don Protective Overboots MOPP Level 3 - Don Chemical Mask, hood may remain open MOPP Level 4 - Don Chemical cotton liners and gloves. Close hood on Chemical Mask.

CPO Inspection- Check the Packaging, Expiration date and look for "tears" or "rips" in the materials. CPO Maintenance- Keep dry, Store in bag when not worn, Avoid POLs Gloves and Boots- Inspect for wear and tears MCU-2/P Mask Inspection: Pre-fit mask prior to storing in mask carrier. Test the drinking tube. Conduct a negative pressure test. Maintenance/Cleaning and Care- Clean with warm soapy water. Air dry before storing in carrier. Keep filter dry. Replace damaged or worn parts. Donning the Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPO) : 1. Don the trousers and tighten the waist by using the hook and pile fasteners. 2. Bring the straps over your shoulders and cross them across your chest. Insert straps into the belt loops and secure them snugly. 3. Don the smock. 4. Secure bottom of smock with hook and pile fasteners. Donning the overboots : 1. Attach the laces to the toe loop, making sure that the laces are centered. 2. Put a lace through each of the holes on the sides of the boot and pull them up snug. 3. Cross the laces over the instep. 4. Put one lace through each of the holes at the heal, inserting them from inside to outside and pulling the laces snug. 5. Again cross the laces over the instep. 6. Thread the laces through the holes on the side again from inside to outside. 7. Cross the laces over the instep one more time and pull them snug 8. Wrap the laces behind the ankle and back to the front. Tie the laces securely. Notes: Trousers are worn over the boots. White cotton undergloves and black, butyl rubber chemical protective outer gloves are worn under the sleeves. The use of masking tape at the wrists and ankles is a common procedure to protect against loosening of hook and pile seals and to provide additional sealant protection. Donning the Mask : 1. Open mask carrier with left hand. 2. Hold bottom of mask carrier with your left hand while removing the mask with your right hand. 3. Slide your thumbs inside the facepiece under all of the head harness straps. Grasp the top of the facepiece and thrust your chin forward. 4. Hold our head still while you raise the mask to your out-thrust chin and bring the harness over the back of your head. 5. Center the head pad. 6. Grasp the tab ends of the lower straps and tighten them. 7. Close the outlet valve with the heal of your hand. Breath out forcibly to clear the mask. 8. Test the mask for fit and for possible leakage by placing your palms over the canisters. --When you inhale normally, no air will enter mask.

The base of the triangle should be about 11 inches and the opposite sides about 8 inches. The signs are in the shape of a right isosceles triangle and are made of plastic, wood, metal, or other rigid material, with holes or "ears" that are used for hanging them about the ground. They are placed on wire boundary fences, poles, trees, or rocks. NBC Marking Kit- NATO-standard triangular signs. Markers are placed outside the contaminated area. Markers face out (away) from contamination. Fluorescent paint is used, when available. Chemical Contamination Markers: The triangle is yellow on both sides. The word GAS in red 2-inch block letters. Biological Contamination Markers: The triangle is blue on both sides. The letters BIO in red 2-inch block letters. Radiological Contamination Markers: The triangle is white on both sides. The word ATOM in black 2-inch block letters. Chemical Minefield Markers: The triangle is red on both sides. The words GAS MINES in yellow 1-inch block letters.

The M9 chemical agent detector paper detects the presence of liquid chemical agents encountered by the individual. It does NOT detect chemical agent vapors. The paper indicates the presence of a nerve agent (G and V) or a blister agent (H and L) by turning a red or reddish color. The paper is sensitive to droplets as small as 100 microns and responds in approximately 10 seconds or less. If spots or streaks on the paper appear pink, red-brown, red-purple, or any shade of red, assume it has been exposed to a chemical agent. The M-9 detector paper has no agent specificity; the red color appears for all detectable agents.

This paper detects the presence of liquid V agents, G agents (nerve), and H agents (blister/mustard). When the M-8 paper is brought in contact with the suspected chemical agent, the chemicals in the paper react with the agent to produce specific color changes. The sheet of paper is then matched to the color comparison chart printed on the inside front cover of the M-8 book. Liquid droplets as small as 125-200 microns will produce a color change that is detectable by the naked eye. Response time is approximately 20 seconds. Certain agents give a red-brown color response, which is inter-mediate between the typical H and G colors. The paper may also be used to detect liquid contamination by placing the paper in contact with the suspect surface. A color change similar to that shown on the inside cover indicates the presence of chemical agents. This paper will NOT detect gases or vapors.

a. Symptoms - Mild to moderate symptoms include : Unexplained runny nose, Unexplained sudden headache, Drooling, Difficulty with vision (dimness), Tightness in chest/difficulty in breathing, Localized sweating/muscle twitching in contaminated area of the skin, Stomach cramps, Nausea. *Casualties with severe symptoms can experience most or all of the mild symptoms and most or all of the following: *Strange or confused behavior *Wheezing, severe difficulty in breathing, and coughing. *Red eyes with possible tearing *Vomiting *Severely pinpointed pupils *Severe muscular twitching and general weakness *Involuntary urination and defecation *Convulsions *Unconsciousness *Respiratory failure b. Contents of Nerve Agent Antidote kit (NAAK) MK 1 - Auto-injectors: Atropine (x1) 2PAM Chloride (x1). c. Treatment (self and buddy aid) --Treatment (Self) : Don protective mask, Remove a NAAK from the protective mask carrier, Inject the thigh with first injector from the kit (atropine) and hold against thigh for at least 10 seconds. Follow immediately with second injector of 2-pam chloride and hold for at least 10 seconds. Bend needle to form a hook and place on the protective outergarment. Massage injection site if time permits. Wait 10-15 minutes before administering second series of injections (no more than three). Administer the back pressure arm-lift method of artificial ventilation if breathing is difficult or has ceased. --Treatment (Buddy Aid) : Mask the casualty. Using the NAAK belonging to the victim, administer three sets of injections immediately and in rapid succession in the thigh muscle of the log. Hook the expended auto injectors to the overgarment pocket flap of the victim. Administer the back pressure arm-lift method of artificial ventilation if breathing is difficult or has ceased. Seek medical attention NOW

These kits replace the older M258A1 and M-280 kits. The M291 Skin Decontamination Kit replaces the M258A1. The M-295 replaces the M-280 and is the large version of M291. The M-295 is used for equipment decon. M291 Skin Decontamination Kit - Wallet-like pouch with 6 decon packets. Black, reactive, and has absorbent resin power. It also has an attached strap for inserting finger. Steps and procedures for using the M291 (or older M258A1) decontamination kit for skin: • Open the decontamination kit, and pull out one DECON 1 pad packet by the tab • Fold the packet on the solid line marked "BEND", then unfold it • Tear the packet open quickly at the notch, remove, and unfold the pad. • Wipe your skin for 1 minute. • Deposit the pad in a proper container. • Pull out one DECON 2 pad packet. Crush the enclosed glass ampoules between your thumb and fingers. • Fold the packet on the solid line marked "CRUSH AND BEND", then unfold it. • Tear the packet open quickly at the notch, and remove the pad. • Fully open the pad. Let the encased crushed glass ampoules fall into a proper container. • Wipe the contaminated skin for 2 to 3 minutes. • Wipe the contaminated skin for 2 to 3 minutes.

a. Exposed to chemical agents- After exposure to CBR agents, the CPO provides at least 6 hours of continuous protection. b. Not exposed to chemical agents- After the protective suit is removed from the protective envelope, it must be used within 14 days.

The Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) overgarment is lighter and less bulky than previous chemical protective garments and can be worn for up to 45 days with six (6) launderings and provides 24 hours of protection against battlefield concentrations of all known CB agents once contaminated. It was developed as part of the Joint JSLIST program led by the USMC. The JSLIST overgarment will be worn in all environments when under imminent threat of a chemical attack and after chemical operations have been initiated. Depending upon temperature and operational procedures, the overgarment may be worn over the standard duty/utility uniform, personal underwear, or under/over cold weather garments.

a. Immediate- Skin decon, Individual wipe-down, Operator spray-down. b. Operational- Removal of gross contaminants, vehicle wash-down and MOPP gear exchange. c. Thorough- Detailed troop and equipment decon. Goal is to reduce contaminants to a negligible risk.

The PDS is set up in a secure, uncontaminated area located as far forward as the tactical situation permits. Personnel from both the decontamination and the supported unit operate the PDS under supervision of the Chemical, Biological & Radiological Defense Officer or the Disaster Preparedness Operations & Training Specialist. Removing contaminated MOPP gear, including the Protective mask, is the major action in Detailed Troop Decontamination (DTD). If DTD is not performed chemical agents may eventually penetrate the over-garment and contaminate under clothing or skin. The contaminated unit is responsible for setting up, Operating, and closing the DTD in a thorough decon site. The CBR Officer recommends to the COC the general location of the DTD within the decon site. (1) Individual Gear Decon (2) Overboot & Hood Decon (3) Overgarment removal (4) Overboots & Glove Removal (5) Monitor station (6) Mask Removal (7) Mask Decon (8) Gear re-issue

Detailed Equipment Decontamination (1) Primary Wash Station (2) DS2 Application (3) Interior Decon Station (4) Rinse station (5) Check station

a. Pre-attack actions - Be prepared to wear protective clothing and equipment for extended periods. Attach the M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper to clothing. If spots or streaks on the paper appear pink, red-brown, red-purple or any shade of red, assume it has been exposed to a chemical agent. Remain alert and constantly aware of the chemical threat. Protect equipment and supplies by keeping them organized and covered. b. Attack - Stop breathing, Don protective mask, Give the alarm, Continue mission & wait for further orders, Assist others when situation permits. c. After-attack - Remain in protective gear and continue your mission. Give first aid to casualties in the immediate vicinity when the situation and mission permit. Await the commander's order for unmasking.

a. DT-60/PD - The DT-60/PD is a gamma radiation dosimeter with a usable range of 10 to 600 R. It is a solid-state package in the form of a locket designed to be worn on a chain around the neck. Inside the black plastic casing is a phosphate glass. When the phosphate glass is exposed to ultraviolet light, it emits an orange light. The intensity of the orange light is proportional to the amount of radiation the glass has received. The DT-60/PD stores the dose information indefinitely and is a permanent record of the amount of exposure to radiation. b. IM 143/PD - The IM-9/PD is a self-reading pocket dosimeter of the quartz-fiber type. This unit indicates the gamma radiation dose in the range of 0 to 200 mR. By holding the dosimeter up to the light and looking through the lens, you can read the radiation dose received. It is primarily a health-physics device that is particularly useful in areas of low dose rates. The IM-143/PD is identical to the IM-9/PD except in range. The IM-143/PD indicates gamma radiation dose in the range of 0 to 600 R. It is used by repair locker personnel that are involved with the survey, monitoring, and decontamination details during CBR evolutions. It keeps track of the dose they have received up to the time they read the dosimeter. c. CP-95A/PD - A radiac computer-indicator that is used to read the amount of radiation a DT-60/PD has been exposed to. The cover must first be removed before the DT-60/PD is inserted. Each radiac computer-indicator has two scales: 0 to 200 R and 0 to 600 R. However, 10 R is the minimum detectable exposure. These units have an accuracy rate of ±20 percent.

Purpose/Importance: The COSAL is a technical and supply management document designed to enable ships to achieve maximum self-supporting operating capability for extended periods of time, independent of external logistics support. How: It establishes equipage allowances for the ship and the storeroom allowance of repair parts for installed equipment. It covers all electronic, ordnance, electrical, and mechanical equipment on board your ship. The COSAL is a technical document because it provides the nomenclature, operating characteristics, technical manuals, specifications, parts lists, technical data for installed equipment / machinery, and equipage & tools required to operate and maintain the ship and its equipment. It tells the supply officer how much and what type of material to stock and also tells the quantity of each item of equipage that must be carried aboard ship. The key word in COSAL is "Consolidated". Computers assemble a list of the allowed parts from the hundreds of APL/AELs into lists of repair parts to be stocked by the ship. These lists are prepared by the activities and cover the equipment supported by them. The preparation of these lists takes into account the installed equipment on board, the quantity of each item of that equipment, the failure rate of parts, and the relative importance of these parts to the operation of the equipment. Thus, the COSAL, aided by experience and advice from technical ratings, enables the supply officer to stock the items that should be carried to meet the requirements for repair parts.

Validating & Updating is completed annually and during every turnover. Information on the equipment identification plates is checked against the COSAL. Discrepancies are noted on an OPNAV 4790/CK form and submitted to CESO. The COSAL is changed to reflect correct equipment and the APL and Automotive Repair Parts (ARP) stock is updated as appropriate. Proper maintenance of the ship's COSAL(s) is vital to adequate support of installed shipboard equipment. Once a ship's installed equipment has been validated, reported, and reflected in an updated COSAL, it is incumbent upon the ship's Supply Officer to ensure that any subsequent equipment installations, removals, or modifications are reported to the ICP and Type Commander, and that the ship's COSAL is revised accordingly.

Every time a part is ordered, SNAP II records the date and quantity. SNAP II periodically reviews the frequency parts are ordered. If a part is stocked, but is never requested, it will eventually stop being stocked. If a part gets requested very frequently, the quantity kept in stock will eventually be increased.

The MOV Program ensures that the requirements for the material still exist and the quantity requested is still required. It also verifies that the priorities assigned in the requisition are still valid. It cancels material requests no longer needed (example: FEX material that was not received in time and is no longer needed). It corrects files (example: Open purchase was made, but receipt was never turned in, so requisition is still open. Internal MOV requires end users to provide copies of receipt to clear the outstanding requisition on file). *Frequency: For External MOV, the higher unit (Inventory Control Point) initiates the MOV quarterly. For Internal MOV, the Supply Officer initiates an MOV for each department monthly.

(1) Requisition / OPTAR Log (NAVCOMPT 2155) - Similar to a checkbook, every grant and requisition is recorded here. A separate log is maintained for each OPTAR (i.e. 02 funds are kept separate from 03 funds) (2) Travel Log - Tracks deployment per diem and TAD travel.

a. Departmental budget - All OM&N money is allocated in categorized funds (02, 03, etc.), which are centrally controlled by supply. The unit supply officer can choose to divide these funds into departmental budgets (i.e. $40,000 budgeted to A Co for all parts, maintenance, and consumables). Separate funds cannot be mixed (i.e. Administrative money can't be used to buy parts). b. CHRIMP - Refers to the Consolidated Hazardous Material Reutilization and Inventory Management Program. Its purpose is to reduce costs and to protect navy and other personnel from unnecessary exposure to Hazardous Waste and Material. It minimizes the Navy's long-term risk for liability associated with HW disposal. It complies with all Federal, state, and local environmental statutes, laws, and regulations. c. Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO) Materials in one of the following three categories may be turned into DRMO: (1) Items that need inventory manager disposal authority. (2) Items that do not need inventory manager disposal authority. (3) Scrap or waste. All items turned in must have a completed DD Form 1348-1 with S-4's signature. Excess material that has been turned into DRMO may be drawn out by any Navy unit which has an allowance or mission requirement for the material (requires screening and authorization by the supply officer).

When materials are ordered wrong or the received material is the wrong part, then the parts may be returned to supply. The refund money goes to the TYCOM (NCB). The only way the unit (NMCB) may get the money back is by requesting additional funds from the TYCOM (NCB) at the end of the fiscal quarter/year, using the return as justification.

Minor Property- All Navy-owned property bought for immediate use on shore establishments that (1) costs between $300-$5000 or (2) costs more than $5000 but has a useful life expectancy less than 2 years. Also, regardless of cost, all classified, sensitive, or highly-pilferable equipment is considered Minor Property. Plant Property- Includes property used for the purpose of cutting, abrading, grinding, shaping, forming, joining, testing, heating, treating, or otherwise altering the physical, electrical, or chemical properties of materials components or end items. Navy-owned property that costs $5000 or more. There are two categories: (1) Class 3- useful life expectancy of two or more years (2) Class 4- industrial plant equipment.

An ACR (NAVSUP 1220-2) is used to change the quantity on an allowance list. An ACR is submitted through TYCOM (NCB) to Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP). An ACR regarding CESE must go through TYCOM (NCB) to CESO. Before submitting an ACR, remember to ensure that a similar request has not been previously denied. Typical reasons for an ACR include: (1) Material failure rates other than expected. (2) New operating areas or conditions. (3) Mission assignments require additional support. (4) Technical improvements in equipment, systems or repair parts that can provide additional capabilities.

a. NAVSUP 1250-1/1250-2- A 1250-1 is a requisition / consumption reporting document used by submarine force and non-automated units. A 1250-2 is a requisition / consumption reporting document for procuring non-NSN material. b. DD-1348- Requisition form that can serve as a requisition follow-up, modifier, or cancellation request. c. NAVSUP 1149- Requisition invoice / shipping document used for open purchase items or services. Example: Prior to a battalion movement, an 1149 is used to request a cruise box shipment. d. DD-200- Survey form as well as a report for lost, stolen, or damaged items.

a. ARP- Automotive Repair Parts receives, stores and issues repair parts for CESE and material handling equipment. ARP validates and updates CESE COSAL. Typically located in Alpha Company spaces. Financial records, reports, and requisition files are normally maintained in Supply. b. CTR- The Central Tool Room manages all hand tools, power tools, tradesman's tool kits, and other special tools. Assets are kept under strict security because items are highly pilferable and can be easily converted to personal use. Inventory management measures include maintenance of separate records for individual items, scheduled physical inventories, and scheduled preventive maintenance. c. CSR- The Central StoreRoom is the central shipping and receiving outlet in the battalion. The CSR receives all shipments that are not project related (ARP, consumables, etc.). The CSR manages and issues administrative and consumable items in the TOA. Typically located in Supply spaces. d. MLO- The Material Liaison Office manages all project funds and materials in accordance with NAVSUP P-48. The MLO receives, issues, and inventories project materials. The MLO maintains records and accounting and submits reports of expenditures for project materials at the main body site. Details manage their own materials. The Supply Officer is overall responsible for project materials at all sites, including main body. e. CUU- The Camouflage Utility Uniform (CUU) is responsible for individual combat equipment (782 Gear), CUUs and other organization and foul-weather clothing.

a. NSN - The National Stock Number is a 13 digit stock number used to identify an item of material in the Federal Supply System. It is assigned by the Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, Michigan. b. COG - The Cognizance Symbol is a two position alpha-numeric code that identifies to the Navy inventory manager, or cognizant authority, of the specific category of material that item falls under. Example: The COG for all CESE is 2C. All CESE falls into the same category of material, which means all CESE has the same cognizant inventory manager. c. APL - The Allowance Parts List is a list of all the repair parts installed in the equipment or component to which it applies. The APL also lists the equipment or component's operating parameters and capabilities. Each piece of equipment or component has a separate APL. APLs are filed in Part II of the COSAL. d. AEL - The Allowance Equipage List is a list of all the equipment that a specific unit or platform is supposed to have (Examples: A Camp Maintenance Builder Shop would have an AEL. A possible entry on a ship AEL would be life rings). e. NC - Means an item is Not Carried (i.e. Material the supply department does not stock). f. NIS - Means an item is Not in Stock (i.e. Material the supply department carries, but is out of when requested). g.SIM - Refers to Selected Item Management which is used for Inventory control. If a part is requested two or more times in a six month period, it is identified for SIM. All SIM items are inventoried quarterly. Non-SIM items are inventoried semi-annually.

Report of Deficiency (ROD) (SF-364) - Used to record shipping or packaging discrepancies. Examples include : Material shipped to a wrong activity, Erroneous material or unacceptable substitutes, Items not received or are received in damaged condition (at least $100 per line item), Wrong quantity shipped (at least $100 per line item), Technical data markings are missing or incomplete. Quality Deficiency Report (QDR) (SF-386) - Documents deficiencies with the quality of the product due to design flaws. There are two categories: Category I: Quality deficiency which will cause death or serious injury or illness; would cause loss or major damage to weapon system; directly restricts combat readiness of a unit; or causes production line stoppage. Category II: All other quality deficiencies.

The primary objective of this program is to improve availability of DLRs, resulting in improved fleet readiness. This program is designed to provide financial incentives for end-users, improve carcass tracking procedures, and provide a valuable resource to base decisions about the procurement and repair of DLRs. Depot Level Repairables, are those Navy managed items which, based on unit cost, annual demand, difficulty of repair, or other economic considerations, have been selected by cognizant inventory managers for special inventory control. DLRs must be returned to the Designated Support Point (DSP) / Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) when they are Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM) at the authorized maintenance activity.

a. Turn-in available- When a DLR item is issued from stock and the departmental turn-in of the unserviceable item is received at the same time that the replacement item is issued. Procedure: The issuing storekeeper will enter the notation "TURN-IN REC'D" and his signature in block 29 of the DD Form 1250-1. After the required entries (see par. 6207-3) have been made, the issuing storekeeper will give the "receipt" yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 to the requester and the remaining copies of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 will be forwarded to the DLR storekeeper for the DLR suspense file. If a procurement action tickler file is maintained (see par. 6188-8) and stock replenishment is required, the stock records storekeeper must prepare an additional yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 for the procurement action tickler file. b. Remain in Place (RIP)- These items are repairable components that cannot be removed until receipt of a replacement item (i.e. a DLR item is issued from stock and the unserviceable item cannot be removed from an equipment or system until the replacement item is available for installation) The items in this category are identified in the Consolidated Remain-in-Place List (CRIPL). Items identified in the CRIPL are the only authorized exceptions to the one-for-one exchange rule. Procedure: The issuing storekeeper will enter the notation "RIP ITEM" "TURN-IN NOT REC'D" in data block 29 of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1. After the required entries (see par. 6207-3) have been made, the issuing storekeeper will give the yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 to the requester, with instructions to return it with the departmental turn-in of the unserviceable repairable when it has been replaced. The remaining copies of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 will be forwarded to the DLR storekeeper for the DLR suspense file. When the unserviceable repairable is received, the recipient storekeeper will enter his signature in data block 29, and delete the word "NOT" from the previously entered notation "TURN-IN NOT REC'D" on the accompanying yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 which was used to issue the replacement item. The "receipt" copy will then be returned to the person who made the turn-in. The No. 6 copy of the skeletonized DD Form 1348-1A will be annotated "TURN-IN REC'D", signed, dated (in data blocks FF-GG), then returned to the DLR storekeeper for further processing and shipment. When the RFI item is received, it will be turned over to the ordering department to allow replacement of the NRFI carcass which will be turned in to AIMD or IMA. The carcass will be turned in to shore regardless of the condition (RFI or NRFI) when returned to supply from AIMD or IMA.