Midterm: Poli60: Essay Outlines

question

Different political systems are divided along different lines of conflict. Examples around the world include divisions based on ethnicity, region, religion or other beliefs, class or factors of production (landowners vs. laborers vs. owners of capital), consumers vs. producers, gender, and generation. Which lines of conflict have been most salient in Nigeria and Indonesia, and why? Why not others?
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CAUSAL EXPLANATION: In Nigeria, the relatively centralized distribution of ethnic groups, the general coincidence of ethnic, regional, and religious identities, and the paucity of fragility of mass-based crosscutting functional or class cleavages explains the country’s vulnerability to violent conflicts between ethnic, regional, or religious groups, or between such groups and the state. Similarly, in Indonesia, the exemplary case of ethnic, or regional conflict has been Java versus the Outer Islands, though there also have been conflicts among groups in particular regions, at the provincial level and even lower. Therefore, the salient bases of political conflict prominent in Nigeria and Indonesia are religion, ethnicity, and region. SHOWING HOW IT WORKS IN NIGERIA AND INDONESIA: A feature of conflict in Nigeria and Indonesia has been the ethno-religious conflict within Islam. In northern Nigeria, there has been a consistent attempt to shape contemporary political institutions and orientations in order to emphasize traditional Islamic values. The north is determined to establish and expand Shariah, the Islamic canonical law and there has been great persistence to increase radical, reformist, or even Millenarian grassroots, in order to promote an Islamic social movement, in which the north’s Islamic heritage is strengthened and the traditional Islamic values are extended to the rest of the federation. Therefore, the ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are based on Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria, who have fought over issues, such as Nigeria’s external relations with the Muslim world, the nature of the country’s secularity, the provision of public support for religious activities (such as pilgrimages), the status and scope of Shariah law, the entho-religious distribution of public offices, the allocation of air time to religious programming on government-owned electronic media, the construction of places of worship in government buildings, the allocation of public land to religious organizations, and the teaching of religious subjects in public educational institutions. Furthermore, in Indonesia, the most serious religion-based conflict has been within Islam, among parties representing santri, abangan, and priyayi cultural streams. The santri, particularly the modernists, tend to characterize the priyayi and abandon as weak or misguided Muslims who need to be encouraged, in part through government action, to live up to their religious obligations. At its most extreme, this encouragement takes form of a call for an Islamic state in which Islamic law (the syari’at) will be enforced. More typically, it involves attempts by conservative modernist politicians to promote legislation or regulations governing the sale of religiously forbidden food products, marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims, gambling the wearing of Islamic head covering by female students in public schools, and so on. Liberal Muslim, priyayi and abandon groups, often in alliance with Christians and other non-Muslims, oppose these initiatives. Their deep fear is that, if given half a chance, the santri will impose on the Islamic state on everyone. In the last few fears, the conflict has shifted to the local level, as conservatives have been increasingly successful at persuading district and municipality governments to adopt syari’ at-based laws, despite the clear constitutional reservation of authority over religious matters to the central government. WHY NOT OTHERS? WHY IS IT SALIENT? In comparison to other conflicts, the ethno-religious conflict of Islam is particularly salient in Nigeria and Indonesia because Islam is a symbolic and normative part of the culture for a large group within these countries. Traditional Islamic values have continued to frame contemporary political institutions and orientations in the Muslim north. This influence is reflected in diverse ways, including a bra ode reverential acknowledgement of the caliphal status of the traditional office of the Sultan of Sokoto; the entrenchment and continuing expansion of Shariah (Islamic) courts and codes; the proliferation [rapid increase in numbers] of radical, reformist or even Millenarian grassroots Islamic social movements seeking to reinvigorate the north’s Islamic heritage and and possibly extend it to the rest of the federation; the low levels of nonreligious associational life; the intense opposition among the intelligentsia and political leadership to the concept of a secular state; the relatively greater willingness than in the south to accept non-democratic (theocratic or authoritarian) alternatives to democratic rule; the preference for more, rather than less, intervention by the state in socioeconomic life; the cultural restrictions on participation by women in politics; and a generally greater inclination to deter to established governmental authority. Furthermore, 88 percent of Indonesians, including most Javanese, are Muslims. They can be divided up into three groups: santri, abandon, and priyayi. The santri are devout Muslims who make a serious effort to pray daily, to attend Friday mosque services, to save for the pilgrimage to Mecca, and so on. The abandon and priyayi are also Muslims, but pre-Islmaic Hindu-derived and even older indigenous beliefs and practices play a much larger role in their religious lives. The priyayi were the the traditional ruling aristocracy in precolonial and colonial times. They were more influenced by Hindu high culture, brought to the archipelago two millennia ago, while the abandon were the common people, more influenced by ancient animistic ideas. With independence, the priyati as a ruling aristocracy was abolished, but their world view has remained influential.
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What is the nature of the major political parties in the countries we have studied? What factors make these parties the way they are? Does competition between them promote accountability in governance? How well does democracy hold up in practice compared to the stylized model of it presented in the lectures?
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Essence of argument: Within the major political parties of Nigeria and Indonesia, the nature of these political parties form similarly on the basis of ethnicity, region, religion and social class. Competition between parties can promote accountability in governance; however, that is if competition is allowed without the intervention of government fraud. Furthermore, democracy does not hold up in practice in Indonesia and Nigeria due to politicians’ hunger for power, and greed. HOW IT APPLIES (NIGERIA): In Nigeria, the evolution of political parties has developed through democratic instability, electoral corruption, ethno-clientelism, and the tight regulation of the party formation process under successive constitutions or transitions. Political parties are always among the first institutions to suffer proscription in the immediate aftermath of military coups against civilian regimes and this constant interruption has stunted the institutional development, not only of individual parties, but of parties as a sector of Nigerian life. EVIDENCE: For example, in the 2007 election, there was corruption in terms of electoral integrity. President Obsanjo had inner control of the political succession; he advanced a PDP, which consisted of two governors, and Yar’Adua from the northern Muslim for president. During the election, in many ballot voting stations, there were some ballots or none at all. Furthermore, during the voting period, some polls opened late and closed early, while potential voters were still waiting in line. In yet other places, INEC distributed ballots to the state capital, but not in the countryside. The rigging of the election was massive: international and domestic observers estimated total turnout at no more than 14 million or low as 5 million. However, when INEC announced the results, Yar’Adua won 24 million votes, Buhari about 6.6 million, and Atiku 2.5 million, a grand total of more than 33 million ballot cast. EVIDENCE 2: Furthermore, different from the 2007 election, the corruption in the 2011 election was more credible and competitive, yet also more violent. The 2011 election gave the People’s Democratic Party, political dominance, and they won 58.9 percent of the presidential vote, 73 out of 109 Senate seats, 205 of 360 House of Representative seats, and 23 of 36 state governorships. During the election, the People’s Democratic Party committed numerous violations and shameful abuses, including high profile political assassinations, lawless reign of godfathers, or political bosses, who manipulate candidates into political favors in return for government patronage; fraudulent voter-registration process, depriving Nigerians the right to vote, the promotion of under-age voting; the late arrival or non-arrival of polling officials and materials on voting days; the widespread intimidation of voters; vote-buying and the bribery of electoral officers; the diversion, theft, and stuffing of ballot boxes by party thugs; the blatant falsification or fabrication of electoral results; and the corruption and manipulation of post-election petition tribunals. EVIDENCE 3: Therefore Nigeria should not still be considered a democracy, given that the country does not depict a form of government, where all citizens can participate equally—either directly or through elected representatives. Democratization in Nigeria has done little to advance the rule of law, governmental accountability, effective institutions, or broad public welfare. In the public mind, civilian rule has been defined by an elite cartel chiefly concerned with how to divide petroleum rents, rather than by responsive leaders or representative institutions. The regime has been shaped by the encroaching monopoly of a single party, imperious executive control, and a self-interested political class. For many Nigerians trying to cope amid poverty, scarce public services, pervasive corruption, and widespread violence, the dividends of democracy seem more speculative than real HOW IT APPLIES TO INDONESIA: Political party competition in Pancasila democracy in late twentieth-century Indonesia was conceived of in terms of advancing the best programs and leaders to achieve the national goals. Opposition politics based on ideological competition or appeal to partisan interests growing out of social, ethnic, or economic cleavages had no place and, in fact, was defined as subversive. In 1973, in order to guarantee that disruptive competition would not occur, the political party system was restructured and simplified by government fiat, forcing the nine existing traditional parties to regroup into two electoral coalitions. The four Muslim parties, despite their historical, ideological, sectarian, and leadership differences, were joined together in the United Development Party (PPP), and the Christian and secular parties were uneasily united in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The desired result was to further weaken the existing political parties. The PPP, PDI, and the non-party Golkar became the \”three pillars\” of Pancasila democracy, the only legal participants in the electoral process. Other kinds of political activity were proclaimed illegal. The parties were placed under the supervision of the Department of Home Affairs, and the president was given the power to suspend their activity. Most importantly, the 1975 law institutionalized the concept of the rural population as a \”floating mass,\” prohibiting the parties from organizing and mobilizing at the rice-roots level between election campaigns. This gave Golkar a great advantage, because government officials from the center to the village were members of Golkar. The net effect of political party legislation was to \”depoliticize\” the political parties of the 1945-65 period. Therefore, political parties were not considered vital elements in a continuous critical political process but structures that would function episodically every five years in \”Festivals of Democracy\” designed to promote the government’s legitimacy. Golkar’s crushing victory in the 1971 elections put an end to any expectation that meaningful multiparty politics could be resurrected in Indonesia. By maintaining a highly disciplined party system, the government provided a limited sense of public access and participation in a political system that was, at its core, military in inspiration. More narrowly, the party system allowed for the cooptation of the civilian leaderships of the old political parties into the New Order plan in a nonthreatening way. Although the politicians may have chafed under the restrictions, they at least were part of the process. Also, the continued existence of the political parties and elections contributed to the regime’s international reputation, particular after the harrowing trauma of its violent birth
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How has clientelism (a.k.a. patronage or patron-clientelism) been relevant to politics in the countries we have looked at?
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NIGERIA: \”Ethno-clientelism is a cornerstone of the culture of mega-corruption in Nigeria that Richard Joseh (1938) has characterized as \”prebendalism.\” Prebendalism \”refers to patterns of political behaviors which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their [communal] reference or support group…The state in such a context is perceived as a congeries of offices susceptive to individual-cumcommunal appropriation\” (Joseph 1983, 30-31). but prebendalism does not benefit communities in the long run. This is because elite appetites for personal accumulation, unchecked by a rule of law, become too insatiable to enable the effective incorporation of broad constituencies into the channels of distribution or to leave much in the way of meaningful developmental resources for dispersion to communities. Invariably, corrupt, prebendal practices in Nigeria have given rise to breathtaking loss and waste of public resources epitomized by the billions of dollars of oil revenue that have simply disappeared from state accounts in recent military and civilian regimes\” (Suberu, 139). Because it is ultimately very ruinous for national cohesion, development, and democracy, prebendalism has never become truly legitimate in Nigeria. Rather, countervailing orientations and pressures for accountability, socioeconomic equity, institutionalism, and civic nationalism challenge prebendalism. An overwhelming majority of Nigerians also strongly support democracy, see democracy in liberal terms, accept democratic values like freedom of expression and constitutionalism, and reject strongman, one-party, military, theocratic, and other non-democratic rule. Yet, in Nigeria, as in much of Africa , popular demand and support for democracy heavily outpaces the perceived satisfaction with or, or supply of, democracy\” (Suberu, 139-140) \”In essence, then, Nigerian political culture is deeply conflicted. It is continually torn between prebendalism and institutionalism, between clientelistic and civic orientations, and between ethnic chauvinism and national loyalty. These profound tensions explain much of the country’s political instability, but also its persistent promise\” (Suberu, 140). INDONESIA: Clientelism can be seen Indonesian politics through Suharto’s New Order regime. The New Order was not a dictatorship in the strictest sense, because he did not rule directly. During his rule, Suharto ensured that his extended family as well as friends from the business community and military were granted monopolies, state corporations, and government agencies. Any hopes of local autonomy that survived Sukarno were eliminated by Suharto in the name of security and development. The New Order was the \”modernization theory made flesh.\” Technocratic Five Year Plans focused on resource extraction, energy megaprojects, and transmigration. Contracts were denied to regional elites in favour Suharto’s allies, organized through the Golkar Party. Pertamina, the state oil company, gave hefty portions of state revenue, foreign investment, and control of oil reserves. The company went bankrupt in the 1970s, with the state inheriting billions in debt; \”long chains of clients extending downward from the directors’ closest confidents prospered while the organizational objectives failed.\”15 Clientelism drained state revenue and marginalized traditional elites, meanwhile enriching those with connections. Therefore, the ‘low quality’ of Indonesia’s post-New Order democracy has been attributed to the prevalence of socially rooted patronage networks.
question

What have been the effects of colonialism on post-independence politics? Consider all aspects of the colonial and post-colonial experience, including practices and institutions of colonizers, anti-colonial resistance, how decolonization happened and what it meant in specific contexts, etc.
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Essence of argument: In the aftermath of their colonialism, Nigerian and Indonesia are still struggling to achieve stability. The development of their struggles lies within the history of their colonial and post-colonial experiences, which regard to the implemented practices and institutions of their colonizers, anti-colonial resistance, and process of decolonization. How the argument applies in NIGERIA: EVIDENCE: in modern day Nigeria, over five decades since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria’s new democracy is still filled with tensions and contradictions that evoke memories of [previously] failed democratic experiments\”. The country faces \”massive corruption and violent communal instability, including [rebellions] in the oil-rich Niger Delta and the impoverished Muslim north\” (Diamond, 137). Starting from 1861, Nigeria was occupied by the British, who established a colony in the southwestern coastal city of Lagos. The British establishment in Nigeria was motivated by \”economic viability,\” and their objective was to bring the poor and rich of Nigeria into a \”single economic union\” in order to end the \”economical dysfunctional competition\” in Nigeria (Diamond, 134). However, the British’s strategy of creating \”economic viability\” in Nigeria foreshadowed a lot of problems. Between 1914, the time of amalgamation and 1940s, the decolonization, the British’s colonial rule has drawn significant division between the south and north of Nigeria (Diamond, 134). In terms of socioeconomic development, the British established \”Western (European) education and religion\” in Nigeria, which made its way into the south and north, but was \”heavily restricted\” in the north, creating an \”enormous imbalance in socioeconomic development\” (Diamond, 134). In terms of political participation development, \”from 1923 to 1947, only southern Nigerians were allowed to elect members of the legislative council, which advised the British governor general in Lagos\” (Diamond, 134). Therefore, in attempts to create stabilization in Nigeria, Nigerian (anti-colonial) politicians established the \”three-region structure\” system, which further worsened the political atmosphere in Nigeria, creating \”ethno-political fragmentation\” (Diamond, 135). The system allowed for southern Nigeria to be \”[divided] into eastern and western groups of provinces [that were to exist] alongside the northern group of provinces (Diamond, 134). Essentially, northern Nigeria would have a bigger population and more political power, while the south would be more economically developed. Consequently, the system \”[denied its] smaller ethnic groups the security of their own constituent federal units [and disempowered minority communities]\” (Diamond, 135). The corruption that came out of the establishment of the three-regions system was huge, a \”small number of regions, whom promoted interregional [division]… robbed the federal system of the flexibility and fluidity that could have developed from a larger number of smaller regions [and thus began] increasingly frantic, fraudulent, and violent competition for political advantage among regionally based political parties and coalitions [producing] a succession of intense ethnic and regional political crises\” (Diamond 135). The immense corruption and violence that came from the three-regions structure led to the enactments of several other new structures, including the \”[division of] the country’s four regional governments into twelve states, six each in the north and south, [which was followed by] two and a half years of full-scale civil war,\” (Diamond, 136) \”the adoption of American-style presidential system and the constitutional prohibition of sectional parties,\” and \”an eight-month transition program, [which] \”[debilitated] military misrule,\” as the \”northern-dominate military [had been] completely discredited, and…southern Nigeria [was] in a state of bitter ethnic [turmoil]\” (Diamond, 137). Therefore, today, in Nigeria there is a consistent struggle to achieve national unity, socio-economic development, and democratic political stability\” (Diamond, 131). The country’s current system is a \”corruption-prone, multi-unit federal structure, [which is depended on to] contain deep ethnic, regional, and religious fissures, and avoid total state integration\” (Diamond, 131). Despite Nigeria’s \”enormous oil resources…exportable gas reserves, diverse ecosystem, relatively fertile agricultural lands, once bountiful cash crops, vast internal domestic market, and [vibrant informal economic sector]\”, \”the country’s recent economic performance remains a classic case of ‘growth without prosperity’. Despite earning hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues since 1970 (including the $50 billion annually in recent years), Nigeria’s key socioeconomic indicators (per capital income, unemployment and underemployment, infant and child mortality, and access to immunization and sanitation) are among the worst in the developing world\” (Diamond, 132). Additionally, despite Nigeria’s previous republics being dominated by the military, the current Nigerian republic \”seems to have broken the cycle of military dictatorships,\” yet still is corrupted with \”electoral fraud, sectarian violence… state failure and declining popular legitimacy How the argument applies to Indonesia: In Indonesia, six decades after colonialism, the country faces great challenges regarding nation and state building. In the aftermath of Dutch and Japanese rule, the country was in short supply of political and policy ideas, skills and institutions, and resources. Starting from the end of the sixteenth century, Indonesia had been colonized by the Dutch, who were interested in financing an export-oriented plantation economy. Therefore, in the twentieth century, invigorated by colonialism, the people forged a new identity, began to establish political movements and oppose colonial rule, ultimately foreshadowing an upcoming independent state. However, due to Dutch repression, the national movement was politically ineffective and organizationally badly split. It wasn’t until the Japanese’s brief rule from 1942 to 1945 did the nationalist movement stregthen through Japanese policies. For example, Sukarno and other leaders were pressed into service as propagandists for the Japanese war effort, which enabled them to spread their own message and to link up with nationalists throughout the archipelago. The four year revolution against the returning dutch was one of the longest anti colonial wars in asia and africa. Three characterists of the revolution stand out in terms of later impact: first there was in precedented political and military mobiliztion, the groundwork for which had been laid during the Japnese occupation second the political leadership and organizational fragmentation of the prewar nationalist movement continued but with an added military dimension. The new Indonesian armed forces found themselves competing for arms and personnel with a multitude of spontaneously formed guerrilla groups, many of which were affiliated with political parties. There was much much conflict among the guerrillas, between them and the official army, and between all of these groups, on the one hand, the civilian positions, and on the other. The sharpest division separated the civilian politicians who chose diplomacy from the soldiers and guerrillas who chose physical struggle as the chief means to attain independence Third, the state withered. Few Idnonesians had attained high bureaucratic positions under the Dutch. There was greater mobility during the revolution, some officials were killed for having pro-Dutch sympathies, many others joined the guerrials, and normal state functions tended to be subordinated to the military and diplomatic effort. In Indonesia, six decades after colonialism, post-independence in 1945, Indonesia’s political system has faced major challenges regarding nation and state building. The country has struggled to implement complete institutions and has struggled to create an institution free of fraud and tyranny. Starting from the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch trading ships established a port down in west Java, now known as Jakarta, and became one of a number of competing centers of power. By the mid eighteenth cenutry, hwoever, the Dutch East India Compny was the dominant power on Java. In the nineteenth and twentieth centureis, the government of Netherlands Indai , which had replaced the bankrupt company, consolidated its rule on Java and extended it to what became known as the the Outer Islands. Furthermore, in 1901, Queen Wilhelmina of the fare of her native subjects, her colony at the threshold of its greatest admin and economic successes leading into the twentieth century, when indigenous inhabitants of the archipelago, under the banner of Indoneisan nationalism forged a new idnetity, established political movements opposing colonial rule, foreshadowing the leading up to of an independent state. (however- although – despite) For the next fourteen years, until the Dutch were expelled by the Japanese at the outself of WWII, the nationalist movement was politically ineffective and organizationally badly split, which had much to do with Dutch repression. Therefore, during the Japanese rule from 1942-1945, their policies strengthened the nationalst movement. Sukarno and other leaders were pressed into service as propagandists for the Japanese war effort, which enabled them to spread their own message and to link up with nationalists throughout the archipelago. The Japanese also created a self-defense force with Indonesian officers up to battalion level, which could become an important part of the Indonesian army after the war. For less than two deacdes, Indonesia has been governed as a democracy from 1950 – 1957 and again from 1999 to the present. From 1959 to 1999, the country has suffered through forty years of authoritarianism and governmental centralization, which left an organizational and institutional legacy of a week interest group and party system, barely functioning legsilatures, a corrupted bureaucracy and judiciary, and an armed forces not yet brought completely under civilian control. Furthermore, within this setting, Indonesian leaders continue to face major challenges, including slow economic growth, rising pressures against the secular state from Islamist (fundamentalist Islamic) groups and parties, and endemic local-level religious and ethnic conflict. Indonesian politicians have faced major challenges regarding nation and state building. There has a been a series of incomplete institutions that were implemented: Inodoneisa has been governed as a democracy for less than two decades, from 1950-1957 and again from 1999 to the present. Forty years of authoritarianism and governmental centralization, from 1959 to 1999
question

Governments in both Nigeria and Indonesia face significant challenges in holding their respective states together. Discuss the challenges and the political and institutional strategies developed to address them.
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NIGERIA: \”In over five decades since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has struggled to achieve national, socio-economic development, and democratic political stability\” (131). National Unity: \”A mosaic of three major ethno-nationalities (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo), hundreds of smaller ethno-linguistic identities, and roughly equal numbers of adherents of Islam and Christianity, Nigeria descended into a gruesome 30-month civil war from 1967 to 1970\” (131). \”Since overcoming this war, Nigeria has relied on a remarkable, but corruption-prone, multi-unit federal structure to contain its deep ethnic, regional, and religious fissures, and avoid total state disintegration. Yet, the country continues to be plagued by horrific ethnic, regional, and religious conflicts (including the loss of at least 18,000 lives in hundreds of incidents of communal bloodletting since 1999) and its legitimacy and viability as a multiethnic state is still acrimoniously debated and relentlessly contested Socioeconomic Development: \”[Nigeria] is blessed with enormous oil resources, huge exportable gas reserves, a diverse ecosystem, relatively fertile agricultural lands, once bountiful cash crops, a vast internal domestic market, and a vibrant informal (unrecorded) economic sector\” (132) \”…one of the world’s fastest growing economies and emerging markets, with impressive annual economic growth rates of seven percent since 2003\” (132). Yet, the country’s recent economic performance remains a classic case of ‘growth without prosperity’. Despite earning hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues since 1970 (including the $50 billion annually in recent years), Nigeria’s key socioeconomic indicators (per capital income, unemployment and underemployment, infant and child mortality, and access to immunization and sanitation) are among the worst in the developing world (132) From a national poverty incidence of less than 30 percent in 1980, the proportions of Nigerians living below an income poverty line of US $1.25 doubled to 64.4 percent in 2011\” (132) Democratic Political Stability: \”protracted crisis of political development and order\” (132). \”Nigeria made the transition to its current fourth democratic republic only at the end of May 1999, after fifteen years of plundering and frequently brutal military rule. Thrice the country has undertaken to govern itself under liberal democratic constitutions, following carefully staged transitions\” (132)\” The first two republics were desecrated by antidemocratic behavior and then overturned by popular military coups (132) The third was similarly undermined, before it was even fully born, by rank opportunism, fraud, and greed on the part of the politicians, but with military actively orchestrating the destruction of its own democratic transition (132) Nigeria’s fourth republic, however, seems to have broken the cycle of military dictatorships with the conduct of four successive general elections (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) and the relatively orderly transitions from the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 to 2007) to Umaru Yar’ Adua (who died in office in May 2010) to Goodluck Jonathan (2010 date)…Yet this unprecedented record of relative democratic continuity and inter civilian transition notwithstanding, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been degraded by electoral fraud, sectarian violence, massive corruption, state failure, and declining popular legitimacy. Indeed, the continuing corruption and dysfunction of its Fourth Republic marks Nigeria as a case not of democratic consolidation, but of regression away from democracy, with potentially disastrous consequences for the polity’s economic development and national unity (132-133) \”protracted crisis of political development and order\” (132). \”Nigeria made the transition to its current fourth democratic republic only at the end of May 1999, after fifteen years of plundering and frequently brutal military rule. Thrice the country has undertaken to govern itself under liberal democratic constitutions, following carefully staged transitions\” (132)\” The first two republics were desecrated by antidemocratic behavior and then overturned by popular military coups (132) The third was similarly undermined, before it was even fully born, by rank opportunism, fraud, and greed on the part of the politicians, but with military actively orchestrating the destruction of its own democratic transition (132) Nigeria’s fourth republic, however, seems to have broken the cycle of military dictatorships with the conduct of four successive general elections (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) and the relatively orderly transitions from the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 to 2007) to Umaru Yar’ Adua (who died in office in May 2010) to Goodluck Jonathan (2010 date)…Yet this unprecedented record of relative democratic continuity and inter civilian transition notwithstanding, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been degraded by electoral fraud, sectarian violence, massive corruption, state failure, and declining popular legitimacy. Indeed, the continuing corruption and dysfunction of its Fourth Republic marks Nigeria as a case not of democratic consolidation, but of regression away from democracy, with potentially disastrous consequences for the polity’s economic development and national unity (132-133) Political and Institutional Strategies to Address the Problems: Second Democratic Republic: Oct. 1. 1979 – Dec 31. 1983 (Shehu Shagari) In attempts to resolve ethno-regional competition \”Gowon moved decisively on May 27, 1967, to divide the country’s four regional governments into twelve states, six each in the south. Gowon’s dismantlingg of the regional structure directly precipitated Ojukwu’s declaration of the (defunct) Eastern Region’s secession as an independent Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967. There followed two and a half years of full-scale civil war in which up to one million Nigerians perished, mostly in ill-fated Biafra. Yet the new structure of multiple constituent states contributedcrucially both to the defeat of Biafra’s secessionist campaign and to the longterm survival of the nigerian federation. In particular, the new multi-state federalism gave satisfaction to the long-standing aspirations of Nigeria’s ethnic minority groups (including the non-Igbo peoples of the east) for sub federal units of their own in a more equitable federation. The new structure also diluted the hegemony of the north, undercut the conflation of regional and major ethnic group boundaries, and promoted the ascendancy of the federal government as an authority that is substantially independent of any one single ethnic or regional group. Yet, post-civil war Nigeria continued to be plagued by eruptions of ethnic and political turbulence, including the ethno-regional crisis over the 1973 census, the removal of General Gowon from power in 1975, and the assassination of his successor, Murtala Mohammaed, in an abortive coup attempt in 1976. Nevertheless, the massive inflow of federally collected export oil revenues after the end of civil war, and the creation of seven additional states in 1976, helped to stabilize the federation and ease to return to civilian rule\” (136) 4th Republic’s Strategy of the 8-Month Transition Program \”An unexpected reprieve from the tightening spiral of repression and polarization came from Nigeria with the political accession of General Abdulsalami Abubakar following Abacha’s sudden death in June 1998 (from a ‘heart attack’ widely believed to have induced by some of his fellow officers). With the northern-dominated military completely discredited, and with southern Nigeria in a state of biter ethnic ferment, Abubakar briskly conducted an eight-month transition program. This culminated in the election of retired General Obsanjo as civilian president in Februrary 1999, and in the inauguration of the Fourth Republic that May. The restoration of democracy relieved some of thee pessimism engendered by Nigeria’s ruinous political and economy trajectories in the previous two decades. Yet, reflecting the debilitating legacy of military misrule and the shallow nature of the May 1999 transition to civilian rule…\” (137). INDONESIA: In the case of Indonesia… \”Serious problems remain, however, in both nation and state building. In six decades of independence, Indonesia has ben governed as a democracy for less than two decades, from 1950-1957 and again from 1999 to the present. Forty years of authoritarianism and governmental centralization, from 1959 to 1999 (1957-1959 was a transitional period) have left an organizational and institutional legacy of a weak interest group and party system, barely functioning legislatures, a corrupted bureaucracy and judiciary, and an armed forces not yet brought completely under civilian control. Within this setting, politicians in today’s democratic Indonesia face major challenges, including slow economic growth, rising pressure against the secular state from Islamist (fundamentalist Islamic) groups and parties, and endemic local-level religious ethnic conflict\” (176). SOLUTIONS: In the period since the declaration of independence in 1945, indonesian politicians have sought to deal with the challenges of nation and state building. The most serious recent challenge to the Indonesian national identity which was established during the independence revolution from 1945 to 1949 was an armed independence movement in the northwestern province of Aceh that began in the mid-1970s. It was resolved in 2005 in a negotiated settlement proving special autonomy to the region Furthermore, the state’s political and administrative capacity, weak in the early post-colonial years, was strengthened considerably beginning in the late 1960s. One consequence was an economic growth rate of 6-8 percent per year for more than 2 decades, placing indonesia in the group of east asian newly industrializing countries and making it the eight fastest growing economy in the world rapid and sustained economy development has in turn contributed to the rise of a modern middle class with an interest in further modernization and democratization in 1999 in response to widespread discontent with excessive governmental centralization, parliament passed laws devolving all state authority —-except in foreign policy, defense, security, justice monetary and fiscal affairs, and religion —to provides districts and municipalities

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