Introduction to Law: Cases – Flashcards

Facts: Cedar trees were about to infect an apple orchard with a disease, so the state ordered the trees destroyed. Rule of Law: The public interest outweighs the property interest of the individual, and the state may use its police power to preserve the public interest, even if that means property must be destroyed. Issue: When two classes property exist in dangerous proximity, may the state choose to preserve one, which is of greater value to the public over the other? Holding: Yes.

Facts: Five year-old Dailey (Defendant) visited Garrett (Plaintiff) at her sister Ruth's home. The later contends that as she was about to sit on a lawn chair, Dailey pulled it out from under her causing her injury. The Superior Court found in favor of defendant in an action for assault and battery and Plaintiff appealed. Rule of Law: Intentionality is central to the tort of battery, and while a minor who has committed a tort with force is liable as any other would be, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant committed his or her act for the purpose of causing the harmful contact or with substantial certainty that such contact will result. Issue: In an action for battery, what constitutes willful and unlawful intent? Holding: The Supreme Court for Washington remanded for clarification, with instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Defendant knew with substantial certainty that Plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been. If so, the court was to change the judgment.

Facts: Putney (Defendant) slightly, but unlawfully, kicked Vosburg (Plaintiff) during school. Defendant did not intent to do any harm to Plaintiff. Although the kick was slight, Plaintiff lost the use of his limb because Defendant's kick revivified a previous injury. Rule of Law: In actions for assault and battery, Plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that Defendant is at fault. The wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. Issue: Is the rule "the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault" in actions to recover for assault, applicable to actions to recover for assault and battery? Is the wrongdoer liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him? Holding: No, in actions for assault and battery, Plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that Defendant is at fault. Yes, the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial.

Facts: Mohr (Plaintiff) brought suit against Williams (Defendant), a surgeon, for assault and battery after Defendant successfully and skillfully performed an operation on Plaintiff's left ear that impaired Plaintiff's hearing. Rule of Law: If an operation is performed without Plaintiff's consent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its performance without consent, then the operation is wrongful and thus unlawful. Issue: Did Plaintiff impliedly consent to an operation on her left ear when she consented to an operation on her right ear? Holding: No. An operation that is performed without the consent of the patient is wrongful unless the circumstances were such as to justify its performance without it.

Facts: Plaintiff appealed a judgment from the Court (Pennsylvania) that sustained Bigan's (Defendant) demurrer. It dismissed her wrongful death and survival actions against Defendant, which arose from the death of the Plaintiff's husband, Yania. Rule of Law: A possessor of land becomes subject to liability to a business invitee for any physical harm caused by any artificial or natural condition upon the land: (1) if, but only if, the owner knew or could have discovered the condition which, if known to him he should have realized involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the business invitee; (2) if the owner had no reason to believe the business invitee would discover the condition or realize the risk of harm; and (3) if he invited or permitted the business invitee to enter upon the land without exercising reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe or give adequate warning to enable him to avoid the harm. Issue: Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of Defendant? Holding: No. The trial court properly ruled for Defendant. Although Defendant enticed Yania to perform a dangerous act, it was the performance of that act that caused Yania's death, not the enticement.

Facts: Passengers sued RTD for injuries sustained during a fight that occurred on a city bus. Issue: Is the RTD liable for the injuries sustained by the passengers? Holding: Yes.

Facts: The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (New York) affirmed the trial court's holding that the Long Island R. Co. (Defendant) was responsible for injuries to Plaintiff resulting from an explosion. The Defendant appealed. Rule of Law: To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: duty, standard of care, breach of duty, cause-in-fact, proximate cause (scope of liability) and damages. Issue: What constitutes negligence? Holding: The court reversed the appellate court judgment and dismissed the complaint.

Facts: Spano's (Plaintiff's) garage was destroyed by Perini Corp.'s (Defendant's) non-negligent explosion of 194 sticks of dynamite on its nearby property. The trial court awarded Plaintiff damages. Rule of Law: One who engages in blasting must assume responsibility and be liable without fault for any injury he causes to neighboring property. Issue: May a person that has sustained property damage caused by blasting on nearby property, maintain an action for damages without a showing that the blaster was negligent? Held: Yes. Judgement Affirmed. One who engages in blasting must assume responsibility and be liable without fault for any injury he causes to neighboring property. This holding overturns the holding in Booth.

Facts: A bottle of Coke manufactured by Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (Defendant) exploded in Escola's (Plaintiff's) hand. Absolute liability was imposed on Defendant. Rule of Law: A manufacturer incurs absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to humans. Issue: Is Defendant absolutely liable for its failure to inspect a bottle of Coca-Cola that proves to have a defect that causes injury to Plaintiff? Holding: Yes. Judgment affirmed. Using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the majority inferred negligence upon Defendant.

Facts: The Defendant, Zehmer (Defendant), writes a contract to sell land on a napkin and when the Plaintiff, Lucy (Plaintiff), tries to enforce it, Defendant claims he was only joking. Rule of Law: If a party to the contract has a reasonable belief that the other party has the requisite intent to enter into the agreement when he does not, the contract is still enforceable. Issue: Does a valid contract exist? Holding: Yes. Reversed.

Facts: Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract and Defendant contended that the promise was not supported by consideration. The Plaintiff was promised by the Defendant that he would be given $5,000 if he refrained from certain actions until the age of 21. Rule of Law: In general, a waiver of any legal right at the request of another party is sufficient consideration for a promise. Issue: Is mere abstention from legal conduct sufficient consideration? Holding: Yes. Judgment reversed. It is sufficient that the Plaintiff restricted his lawful freedom of action within certain prescribed limits upon the faith of the Defendant's agreement.

Facts: A surgeon guaranteed that the plaintiffs hand operation would be 100% successful. The plaintiff sued for breach of warranty when the operation was not successful. Issue: How are damages calculated in a case of breach of contract? Rule of Law: The measure of damages in a breach of contract case is the difference between the plaintiffs actual position and the position he would have been in had the contract not been breached.

Facts: Plaintiff was a customer at Defendant's barber shop and found a pocket-book on the counter which he left with Defendant to attempt to discover the rightful owner. When the rightful owner was not found, Plaintiff demanded return of the pocket-book, which Defendant refused to give back. Rule of Law: When a customer leaves a pocket-book on the counter of a shop, the item is not subject to the historical rules regarding lost property. Issue: Was this property lost in such a manner as to allow the finder of the item to hold a valid claim of ownership against all except the rightful owner? Holding: No. Judgment for Defendant affirmed.

Facts: Four pounds of gold coins dating from 1857 to 1914 were found during the excavation of a driveway. The court awarded the property to the owner of the locus in quo instead of the finder and rejected the distinctions between categories of lost property as anachronistic in situations in which personal property is buried or hidden on privately owned realty. Issue: Do the coins belong to the finder or the owner of the property in which they were discovered? Holding: The coins belong to the owner of the property.

Facts: The District of Columbia has a ban on handguns, and in addition prohibits them from being in the home unless they are disabled. Respondent Heller brings an action claiming that this complete ban violates the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Rule of Law: The 2nd Amendment extends a right to all individuals to keep firearms, and although the 2nd Amendment is not absolute, a complete ban on a class of weapons (handguns), even for a lawful purpose, violates the constitution. Issue: Does the District of Columbia's prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violate the 2nd Amendment? Holding: Yes. A complete ban on handgun possession in the home violates the 2nd Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home inoperable for the purpose of immediate self defense.

Facts: The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person or the reverse. The constitutionality of the statutes was called into question. Rule of Law: Restricting the freedom to marry solely on the basis of race violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Issue: Was rational basis the proper standard of review by which to evaluate the constitutionality of the statutes? Were the Virginia miscegenation statutes constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause? Holding: No and No. The statutes were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions.

Facts: Respondent petitioned the court for a modification of a previous child custody judgment based on changed conditions after the Caucasian mother married an African-American man. The trial court awarded custody to the respondent. Rule of Law: The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the consideration of potential effects do to racial prejudice against mixed-race families in child custody determinations. Issue: Did the court err by divesting a natural mother of the custody of her infant child because of her remarriage to a person of a different race? Holding: Yes. The effects of racial prejudice cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother who was found to be an appropriate person to have such custody.

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Bakke, a white applicant to the University of California, Davis Medical School, sued the University, alleging his denial of admission on racial grounds was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Rule of Law: Although race may be a factor in determining admission to public educational institutions, it may not be a sole determining factor. Issue: Is the special admissions program of the University of California constitutional? Can race be considered as a factor in the admissions process? Holding: The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process.

Facts: Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-sexed school in Virginia. VMI used a highly adversarial method to train (male) leaders of the future. There was no equal educational opportunity to that of VMI in the State for women. Rule of Law: Gender-based classifications of the government can be defended only by exceedingly persuasive justifications. The State must show that its classification serves important governmental objectives and that the means employed are substantially related to those objectives. The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differences between males and females. Issue: Did VMI represent a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: Yes. The Fourth Circuit's initial judgment is affirmed. Virginia has shown no "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding all women.

Facts: Petitioner challenged the state of North Carolina's decision not to provide her counsel in a custody hearing. Rule of Law: The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles a party to the assistance of counsel when there is a danger to their personal freedom, or when the private and government interests and the risk of erroneous decisions would mandate the assistance of counsel. Issue: Whether the state's decision not to provide assistance of counsel to indigent Petitioner violated her rights under the Due Process Clause. Holding: The Due Process Clause guarantees the assistance of counsel when there is a danger that one's personal liberty will be denied.

Facts: The defendants' convictions for distributing leaflets advocating strikes during the Russian Revolution were upheld because their speech was not protected by the United States Constitution based on the "clear and present danger" test. Rule of Law: Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects, which their acts are likely to produce. Issue: Were the Defendants' speech was protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution? Holding: No. The purpose of Defendants' propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection, sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe.

Facts: The Defendant, O'Brien, was convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found the law constitutional. Rule of Law: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Issue: Is the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected "symbolic speech" within the First Amendment? Are draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed into the waste basket according to the convenience of the registrant? Is the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was intended to "suppress freedom of speech?" Holding: No to all. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. Although the initial purpose of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as well. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be mutilated or destroyed. The purpose of Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.

Facts: Tinker (Petitioner) was suspended from school for showing his support of the anti-war movement. Rule of Law: Student speech may be regulated when such speech would materially and substantially interfere with the discipline and operation of a school. Issue: Is symbolic speech by public school students protected under the First Amendment? Held: Yes. Students are persons worthy of constitutional protections both while in school and out of school. There was no evidence that the wearing of the armbands caused any disruption of any class or school function.

Facts: A student gave a nominating speech in a general school assembly that described another candidate with strong sexual metaphors. Rule of Law: Schools may determine that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject the speech to sanctions. Issue: Is a high school student's lewd speech protected by the First Amendment? Holding: No. The student's First Amendment rights were outweighed by the school's interest in outweighing vulgar and lewd speech.

Facts: The Petitioners, officers and members of the school board, sought to remove "objectionable" books from school shelves. The Respondents, Pico and other students at the high school and junior high school, brought action in the District Court, seeking injunctive relief from the pulling of the books. Rule of Law: The First Amendment of the United States Constitution encompasses a right to receive information. In the school setting, a student's right to receive available viewpoints cannot be suppressed by school officials merely because they politically disagree with the information. Issue: Does the First Amendment of the Constitution limit members of a local school board in their discretion to remove certain books from the school's library? Held. Yes. Affirmed. The Constitution, through the First Amendment, does not permit suppression of ideas. Petitioners had not shown the books were of a vulgar character and could not remove them simply because they disagreed with the political beliefs of the authors.

Facts: The Defendant, Cohen's, conviction, for violating a California law by wearing a jacket that had "f— the draft" on it was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States which held such speech was protected. Rule of Law: Emotive speech that is used to get attention is protected by the constitution. Issue: Whether California can excise, as "offensive conduct," one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory of the court below that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reactions or upon a more general assertion that the states, acting as guardians of the public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary? Holding: No. Judgment of the lower courts reversed. The state lacks power to punish Defendant for the content of his message because he showed no intent to incite disobedience to the draft.

Facts: A school principal censored a student newspaper by removing some of the articles prior to publication. Rule of Law: A school may exercise great control over school-sponsored publications that students and members of the community might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. Issue: Did school officials violate the students' First Amendment rights by deleting two pages of the school paper? Holding: No. The school administration had the right to control the style and content of student speech when it is included in the school's expressive activities.

Brief Fact Summary. Joseph Frederick, the Petitioner, a public school student, was suspended by the principal Deborah Morse, the Defendant, for displaying a banner on which was written "Bong Hits 4 Jesus", bong being slang for marijuana, at a school event which was covered by television. He sued the Principal. Rule of Law: Public schools may lawfully prevent students from promoting the use of illegal drugs by display of banners or other material at any event supervised by the school. Issue: Are public schools permitted under law to prevent students from promoting illegal drug use by the display of messages? Holding: Yes. Students do not enjoy full rights to freedom of speech while at school, as compared to adults, and the standard of student freedom of speech as set forth in Tinker need not be taken as normative.

Facts: Appellants were charged with violating a statute preventing the distribution of advice to married couples regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rule of Law: The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution. Issue: Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples? Holding: Yes. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.

Facts: A male homosexual was criminally charged for committing consensual sodomy with another male adult in the bedroom of his home. Rule of Law: There is no constitutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. Issue: Is the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected under the fundamental right to privacy? Holding: No. There is no precedent to support the Respondent's claimed constitutional right to commit sodomy.

Facts: Police found two men engaged in sexual conduct, in their home, and they were arrested under a Texas statute that prohibited such conduct between two men. Rule of Law: While homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right, intimate sexual relationships between consenting adults are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue: Does a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violate liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: Yes. Intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults, is a liberty protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts: Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother. Rule of Law: Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Issue: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy? Holding: Yes. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

Facts: The defendant, Baker was convicted of murder and burglary. Rule of Law: A document or other piece of evidence need not have been prepared by the witness, or pass any other test of reliability when it is being used solely to refresh recollection. This more demanding standard is only required when the evidence in question is sought to be admitted as past recollection recorded. Issue: Should the defense have been allowed to refresh the recollection of the officer with a police report prepared by other officers? Holding: Yes. The defense had the right to attempt to refresh recollection, as the report was never to be received into evidence, but only used to attempt to refresh the recollection of the witness, who would then testify.

Facts: In Massachusetts, a gay and lesbian support organization (GLAD) sued the state's Department of Health under the equal protection clause for their failure to issue same-sex married couples a marriage license. Rule of Law: It is unconstitutional under Massachusetts law for same-sex couples to be denied marriage licenses. Issue: Does the denial of a marriage license to same sex couples violate the equal protection clause and/or the Massachusetts state constitution? Holding: Yes. The state's arguments for denying marital rights to same sex couples did not supply enough justification in terms of the "governmental interest" sought in their procurement.