question

Weber (1999)

answer

By giving center stage to popular films rather than to IR theory, this article examines the processes of political evacuation and disciplinary incorporation as they occur to postmodernism and feminism in relation to the discipline of IR, and particularly in relation to Wendtian constructivism and Jonesian gender. Overview of the Field

question

Caporaso (1992)

answer

Why has the concept of multilateralism not played a more prominent role in theories of international relations? Overview of the Field

question

Gaddis (1996)

answer

"History, Science, and the Study of International Relations" Overview of the Field

question

Jervis (1998)

answer

Continuing relevance of realism. Overview of the Field

question

Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998)

answer

Creation and evolution of IPE as a field. Overview of the Field

question

Kahler (1997)

answer

"Inventing International Relations" Overview of the Field

question

Singer (1961)

answer

System v. sub-system level of analysis. Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Waltz (1979)

answer

"Theory of International Politics" Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis, Realism

question

Wendt (1992)

answer

Anarchy is what states make of it. Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Krasner (1999)

answer

The term sovereignty has been used in four different ways—international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Jervis (1978)

answer

Given anarchy, efforts states take to make themselves more secure may actually result in less security. o Ability to distinguish offense from defensive weapons o Offense or defense advantage (technology and geography) Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Glaser (1997)

answer

The most important gaps concern whether and how the security dilemma operates between rational actors. Consequently, I explore three ways in which a state's efforts to increase its security when facing a security dilemma can, without states suffering misperceptions, generate undesirable outcomes. Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Waltz (1959)

answer

"Man, The State, and War" Anarchy and the Levels of Analysis

question

Carr (1939/46)

answer

"The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939" Realism

question

Morgenthau (1951)

answer

"Politics Among Nations" Realism

question

Gilpin (1986)

answer

"The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" Realism

question

Mearsheimer (2001)

answer

"The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" Realism

question

Bull (1977)

answer

"The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics" Realism

question

Keohane and Nye (1977)

answer

"Power and Interdependence" Liberalism

question

Keohane (1984)

answer

"After Hegemony" Liberalism

question

Doyle (1986)

answer

"Liberalism and World Politics" Liberalism

question

Oye (1985)

answer

"Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies" Liberalism

question

Moravcsik (1997)

answer

State-society relations—the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics—not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists)maintain, the configuration of information and institutions. Liberalism

question

Dudney and Ikenberry (1999)

answer

Distinctive features mark postwar liberal order: co-binding security institutions, penetrated American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, economic openness, and civic identity. It is these multifaceted and interlocking features of Western liberal order that give it a durability and significance. Liberalism

question

Ikenberry (2003)

answer

the United States is not doomed to shed its multilateral orientation. Unipolar power provides new opportunities for the United States to act unilaterally, but the incentives are actually quite complex and cross-cutting; and these incentives arguably make multilateralism more rather than less desirable for Washington in many policy areas. Liberalism

question

Nye (1988)

answer

"Neorealism and Neoliberalism" Liberalism

question

Jervis (1976)

answer

Deterrence (states must display the ability and willingness to wage war, if not they risk great dangers of an aggressor believing that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve; a retreat by the status quo powers encourages the aggressor to press harder) and Spiral models (most means of self-protection by the state can menace other states - when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little - too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security.) Psychology. Constructivism, Causes of War

question

Goldstein and Keohane (1993)

answer

"Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change" Constructivism

question

Katzenstein (1996)

answer

"The Culture of National Security" Constructivism

question

Finnemore (1996)

answer

"National Interests in International Society" Constructivism

question

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)

answer

"International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" Constructivism

question

Wendt (1999)

answer

"Social Theory of International Relations" Constuctivism

question

Reus-Smit (1997)

answer

Constitutional structures are ensembles of a shared belief about the moral purpose of centralized political organization, an organizing principle of sovereignty, and a norm of pure procedural justice. Why do states create certain sorts of institutions, and how do these institutions affect state behavior? Constructivism

question

Gourevitch (1978)

answer

Two aspects of the international system have powerful effects upon the character of domestic regimes: the distribution of power among states, or the international state system; and the distribution of economic activity and wealth, or the international economy. Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Frieden and Rogowski (1996)

answer

"The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies" Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Allison (1969)

answer

Cuban Missile Crisis. Bureaucratic politics. Rational, organizational, and bureaucratic conceptual models. Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Bendor and Hammond (1992)

answer

Allison's models don't work... Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Evangelista (1997)

answer

"Domestic Structures and International Change" Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Putnam (1988)

answer

The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Christensen (1996)

answer

"Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58) Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Walt (1992)

answer

Revolutions cause war by increasing the level of threat between the revolutionary state and its rivals and by encouraging both sides to view the use of force as an effective way to eliminate the threat. By altering the balance of power and making it more difficult for states to measure the balance accurately, revolutions increase the danger of miscalculation. Revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate the other's hostility and their own vulnerability to attack or subversion and to overstate the vulnerability of the other side. Domestic Politics in International Relations

question

Barnett and Finnemore (1999)

answer

Develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of international organizations and their propensity for dysfunctional behavior. Bureaucracy, rational-legal authority. Institutions

question

Ikenberry (1998/99)

answer

The liberal character of American hegemony and the importance of international institutions have facilitated cooperation and overcome fears of domination or exploitation. Strategic restraint. Institutions

question

Abbott and Snidal (2000)

answer

international actors choose to order their relations through international law and design treaties and other legal arrangements to solve specific substantive and political problems.We further argue that international actors choose softer forms of legalized governance when those forms offer superior institutional solutions. Obligation. Delegation. Precision. Institutions

question

Simmons (1998)

answer

Four broad approaches to understanding why governments actually comply with such agreements, given that they can be costly in the short term and are not likely to be centrally enforced: realist theory, rational functionalism, domestic regime based explanations, and normative approaches. Institutions

question

Chayes and Chayes (1993)

answer

Compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of interests. Impossibility of accurately determining true compliance rate - should strive for "acceptable" rate, not perfect compliance. Institutions

question

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996)

answer

The conclusions of the managerial school, represented by Chayes and Chayes, are plagued by endogeneity and selection bias. Enforcement is often necessary for compliance. Institutions

question

Fearon (1995)

answer

Why would rational states go to war when a bargained solution exists? Private information (incentives to misrepresent), commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities (impossibility of bargained solution). Causes of War

question

Kirshner (2000)

answer

Argues against the central premise of Fearon's piece - that private information is the most important cause for war. Kirshner uses a football analogy to make his point: even rational experts can have enormous amounts of information about the teams, rules, and players in a football game, yet come to different conclusions about who will win. The field of IR is even more complicated and ambiguous, and thus experts will disagree on who will win in a war and at what cost. A world of perfect information would not mean the absence of wars. Causes of War

question

Van Evera (2001)

answer

"Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict" Causes of War

question

Levy (1986)

answer

Military routines have an impact on the outbreak of war only in combination with other systemic, organizational, bureaucratic, and psychological variables. Causes of War

question

Bennett and Stam (2003)

answer

No single explanation alone is a dominant predictor of international conflict. Bennett and Stam note the importance of system-level power concentration, the democratic peace and geographic contiguity. Pace Waltz (1979), they argue that the most cogent and convincing explanation of international conflict combines factors from multiple levels of analysis. Causes of War

question

Kirshner (2007)

answer

"Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War" Causes of War

question

Deutsch (1969)

answer

"Nationalism ands Its Alternatives" Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

question

Anderson (1983)

answer

"Imagined Communities" Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

question

Posen (1993)

answer

Posen applies the security dilemma to ethnic, religious, and cultural groups left in the conditions of "emerging anarchy" after imperial collapse. Using the concept of the security dilemma, Posen explains why there is a difference in violent ethnic conflict between his two cases, Croatia and Serbia after the breakdown of Yugoslavia and Russia and Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

question

Fearon and Laitin (2003)

answer

The prevalence of civil war in the 1990s did not result from post-Cold War changes in the international system or ethnic/religious diversity. Instead, they resulted from conditions that favor insurgency, such as central government weakness, low per capita income (which is a proxy measure of state capability), rough terrain, and large populations. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

question

Abdelal (2009)

answer

"Measuring Identity" Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

question

Deutsch (1968)

answer

There is a road to peace via integration and the development of security communities. According to Deutsch, integration is a continuous process. It requires a sense of community or "we-feeling" trust, and is a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, responsiveness, and decision-making. Security Communities

question

Adler and Barnett (1998)

answer

"Security Communities" Security Communities

question

Crawford (1994)

answer

Security regime and perpetual peace in the Iroquois League. Broadening IR. Security Communities

question

Owen (1994)

answer

Owen identifies a possible causal mechanism for the democratic peace: the liberal idea undergirding liberal democracies that give rise to both liberal foreign policy ideology and liberal governmental institutions. For Owen, it is this combination of the normative and structural/institutional elements of liberalism that produces the democratic peace. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Russett (1994)

answer

Russett presents the historical development of the democratic peace as a fact and a theory. He argues that the application of domestic norms in the international space as well as the institutional constraints on leaders in democracies prevent democracies from entering into large-scale wars with other democracies. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Risse-Kappen (1995a)

answer

Existing theories of the democratic peace do not explain why democracies avoid fighting each other but frequently engage in wars with non-democratic states; rather, these theories provide rationales for why democracies might be more peaceful overall (which they are not). A constructivist understanding of how "friends" and "enemies" are socially constructed over time offers better answers. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Mansfield and Snyder (1995)

answer

States moving towards democracy are more likely to engage in conflict, the same holds true for those states which are receding from democracy. The tendency to engage in conflict will only lessen if the regime is stable irrespective of whether it is autocratic or democratic. The reason is because the domestic political landscape is volatile and different actors are vying to gain power over the other. Military ambitions are used by the elites to garner support and once the support is achieved, war becomes likely. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Walt (1985)

answer

Alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will bo. When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat). Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Christensen and Snyder (1990)

answer

Waltz's (1979) balance-of-power theory predicts two types of alliance behavior under multipolarity, both of which destabilize the system. The first, chain-ganging, results from "the approximate equality of alliance partners" that leads states to feel that their security is intertwined, so that one state going to war inexorably brings its allies into war as well. WWI, perception of offensive advantage. The second, buck-passing, refers to the failure of "balancing alignments" "to form in a timely fashion because some states try to ride free on other states' balancing efforts." WWII, perception of defensive advantage. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Schweller (1994)

answer

The conventional contrast between balancing as a more common phenomenon than bandwagoning is misleading in the sense that they are not necessarily opposite behaviors. Instead, balancing should be associated with (as systemic conditions) with stasis while bandwagoning can be related to change. Democratic Peace and Alliances, KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Weitsman (2003)

answer

Alliances are frequently unreliable; alliances formed during peacetime often dissolve once war begins. Wars will continue without a negotiated end as long as the coalitions fighting them stand together. Threat and cohesion. Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Hui (2004)

answer

Hui critiques realist IR theory for presuming that the international system is structurally one of checks and balances, instead of one that allows for the triumph of universal domination. Hui shows how domination-seekers in ancient China and the modern European system (Qin and Napoleanic France, respectively) differed in their ability to pursue self-strengthening and divide-and-conquer strategies to achieve (or not achieve) universal domination. Regions

question

Herbst (2000)

answer

State-builders in sub-Saharan Africa, whether native or colonial leaders, face the key problem of how to broadcast authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people. Power in historical sub-Saharan Africa depended not on control of land, but on control of people, and sovereignties could overlap, meaning that the system of states differed greatly from that of historical Europe. Regions

question

Lustick (1997)

answer

Lustick takes exception to conventional explanations of the apparent failure of any great power emergence in the Middle East. He finds that the lack of hegemonic power in this region is primarily a function of nothing more or less than the unfortunate sequence of history and the status of the Middle Eastern states as "latecomers" to the game of modern statehood. Regions

question

Kang (2003/04)

answer

There are good reasons to think that Asian states may not function like European states and that the study of Asia must begin with a discussion of some of Asia's empirical anomalies and what might explain them. Hierarchy. Regions

question

Katzenstein (2005)

answer

Katzenstein is making a broad claim about how we should conceive of world politics in the early 21st century. He argues that it is a world of regions, but a particular kind of world of regions where regions are located with an American imperium, differ in their structures, institutions, and identity, and are subject to processes of globalization and internationalization that make the regions porous. Regions

question

Risse-Kappen (1995b)

answer

Risse-Kappen lays out a theoretical framework for transnational relations to set out under what conditions transnational actors and coalitions are able to effect policy change in "target" countries. The claim throughout the book is that domestic structures will determine the extent of policy impact of transnational actors, and international structures can smooth their entry into domestic policy debates. Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Evangelista (1999)

answer

Transnational networks of nuclear disarmament advocates had an important impact on Soviet and American policy, driving a winding down of the Cold War. In the Soviet context, they appealed to shared norms and utilized the centralized power of the state; after the collapse of communism, though, they had to contend with other domestic interest groups—much as they had had to previously in the United States. Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Tarrow (2001)

answer

Mass-based transnational social movements are hard to construct, are difficult to maintain, and have very different relations to states and international institutions than more routinized international NGOs or activist networks. Rather than being the antipodes of transnational contention, international institutions offer resources, opportunities, and incentives for the formation of actors in transnational politics. If transnational social movements form, it will be through a second-stage process of domestication of international conflict. Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Carlson (2005)

answer

"Unifying China, Integrating the World" Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Price (1998)

answer

Price argues that transnational civil society has the ability to craft and generate norms that lead to the reconstruction of state policy. Price analyzes the influence non-state actors have on security policies (AP land mines). Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Kirshner (2008)

answer

Kirshner assesses the myriad ways in which globalization impacts upon international conflict in general and American power in particular. In general, globalization appears to reduce state autonomy and affects the balance of power in such a way as to exacerbate power imbalances, thereby strengthening the position of the United States. Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Keohane (2002)

answer

Keohane describes the post 9-11 world within the context of globalization and the means by which it facilitates informal violence. In addition, Keohane criticizes some of the state-centric tendencies associated with International Relations more broadly and suggests more emphasis on world politics. Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Brooks and Wohlforth (2008)

answer

"World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy" Unipolarity

question

Finnemore (2009)

answer

The structure of world politics, however, is social as much as it is material. Material distributions of power alone tell us little about the kind of politics states will construct for themselves. This is particularly true in a unipolar system, where material constraints are small. Much is determined by social factors, notably the identity of the unipole and the social fabric of the system it inhabits. Unipolarity

question

Ikenberry (2011a)

answer

Although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Unipolarity

question

Walt (2009)

answer

"Alliances in a Unipolar World" Unipolarity

question

Jervis (2009)

answer

Realism indicates that the unipole is likely to be difficult to restrain, no matter how benign its intentions or domestic regime. Furthermore, it is far from clear that it should seek to maintain existing arrangements. Both normal ambitions and, in the current context, American values and beliefs may lead the superpower to seek to change the system rather than preserve it. Unipolarity

question

Sil and Katzenstein (2010)

answer

"Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics" KIRSHNER - Introduction

question

Mearsheimer and Walt (2013)

answer

"Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations" KIRSHNER

question

Kirshner (2012)

answer

"Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism/the Rise of China" KIRSHNER - Realism

question

Gilpin (1996)

answer

"No One Loves a Political Realist" KIRSHNER - Realism

question

Martin (1992)

answer

"Interests, Power, and Multilateralism" KIRSHNER - Liberalism

question

Ikenberry (2011b)

answer

"Liberal Leviathan" KIRSHNER - Liberalism

question

Ruggie (1998)

answer

"What Makes the World Hang Together?" KIRSHNER - Constructivism

question

Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons (2010)

answer

"Constructing the International Economy" KIRSHNER - Constructivism

question

Goddard (2008)

answer

"When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power" KIRSHNER - Constructivism

question

Evangelista (2003)

answer

"Rough and Tumble World: Men Writing About Gender and War" KIRSHNER - Constructivism

question

Rosato (2003)

answer

"The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory" KIRSHNER - Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Walt (1987)

answer

"The Origins of Alliances" KIRSHNER - Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Haas (2003)

answer

"Ideology and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 1930s" KIRSHNER - Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth (2007)

answer

"The Balance of Power in World History" KIRSHNER - Democratic Peace and Alliances

question

Fearon and Laitin (1996)

answer

"Explaining Interethnic Cooperation" KIRSHNER - Domestic Politics and International Relations

question

Tversky and Kahneman (1982)

answer

"Judgment under Uncertainty" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Mercer (2005)

answer

"Rationality and Psychology in International Relations" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Lopez, McDermott, and Peterson (2011)

answer

"States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Kupchan (1994)

answer

"The Vulnerability of Empire" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Kirshner (2015)

answer

"The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Mitzen (2006)

answer

"Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Hall (2011)

answer

"We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger" KIRSHNER - How Rational is Rationality

question

Frank (1985)

answer

"Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Wohlforth, Larson, and Paul (2014)

answer

"Status and World Order" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Dafore, Renshon, and Huth (2014)

answer

"Reputation and Status as Motives for War" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Ward (2013)

answer

"Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Murracy (2010)

answer

"Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Kupchan (2014)

answer

"The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana" KIRSHNER - Status and Position

question

Barnett and Duvall (2005)

answer

"Power in International Politics" KIRSHNER - Institutions

question

Reus-Smit (2011)

answer

"Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System" KIRSHNER - Institutions

question

Hehir (2013)

answer

"The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect" KIRSHNER - Institutions

question

Slaughter Burley (1993)

answer

"International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda" KIRSHNER - Institutions

question

Keck and Sikkink (1998)

answer

"Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics" KIRSHNER - Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery (2009)

answer

"Network Analysis for International Relations" KIRSHNER - Transnationalism and Globalization

question

Lake (2013)

answer

"Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of US International Hierarchy" KIRSHNER - Unbalanced Power

question

Nexon and Wright (2007)

answer

"What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" KIRSHNER - Unbalanced Power

question

Monteiro (2011/12)

answer

"Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful" KIRSHNER - Unbalanced Power

International Relations Theory

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