Hurricane Katrina Evacuation Risk Communication Influences Essay Example

the event. Katrina Evacuation Influences 2 Risk communication is a scientifically based discipline that deals with the dilemma between the risk that can kill people and the risk that alarms or causes outrage to them are often completely different.

Risk communication became a formal study to overcome hurdles such as inconsistent, overly complex, confusing or incomplete risk messages; the lack of trust in information sources; selective reporting by the media; and psychological and social factors that affect how information is processed (Covello & Sandman 2001). Risk communication informs, persuades or warns people about health and environmental risks, and it analyzes problems and circulates findings on new knowledge (Reluca 2006). A well developed risk communication message and/or plan serves several purposes before, during and after a disaster.

First, “prior to the event, it can serve to manage the expectations of the public regarding the capabilities and potential assistance provided at all levels of government; second it provides public information prior to and during the event to facilitate the safety and security of U. S. citizens; and finally, it can, if proactively and effectively used in conjunction with visible ongoing relief efforts, serve to increase the credibility of government and serve as a calming influence to the citizenry” (Murphy 2007).

Risk communications that were used to influence people to evacuate before and during Hurricane Katrina are textbook examples of what not to do. Inconsistent, confusing and misinterpreted risk messages result in people making decisions based on rumor and unsubstantiated “facts”. It can also result in the decision to take no action at all. It is extremely important that all levels of government be consistent in their message

of the risk and the level of hazard associated with the risk. They should be provided complete information while presenting three separate scenarios for impacted and surrounding areas of impact.

The scenarios should be framed in a least affected, moderately affected and worst case Katrina Evacuation Influences 3 scenarios providing actions to be taken by the people in each circumstance. This empowers people to become responsible for their own decisions to some degree. Hurricanes are notoriously difficult in determining exact land fall location, intensity at land fall and the magnitude of destruction that will ensue. Hurricane Katrina was no exception. Information can change momentarily and much of it is open to interpretation and opinion. Meteorologists are often reluctant to make these types of forecasts for fear of looking foolish if the forecast does not pan out. Meteorology has enough credibility problems without this” (Smith 2005). As Katrina progressed toward the coast, the National Weather Service issued literally hundreds of warnings and other information. There were so many, it was often difficult to keep up with all of them. Prior to Hurricane Katrina the basic message of whether or not people should evacuate the area was confusing, the city and state government were at odds with each other in the decision making process putting out very inconsistent messages.

Louisiana Governor, Kathleen Blanco, and the Mayor of New Orleans were at odds on the need to call for a mandatory evacuation of the city. “As early as Saturday, August 27, 2005 New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin tells local WWLTV that, “Come the first break of light in the morning, you may have the first mandatory

evacuation of New Orleans. Nagin states that that his legal staff is researching whether he can order a mandatory evacuation of the city, a step he’s been hesitant to do because of potential liability on the part of the city for closing hotels and other businesses”.

At 9:30 am on August 28, 2005 Mayor Nagin announces mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. Shortly after 9:30 am the Governor urges New Orleans area residents to evacuate” (Blackmax, T). The message is clearly not consistent. The two levels of government are in conflict within. The citizens are now Katrina Evacuation Influences 4 very confused and begin to distrust the information that is being broadcast. Is there a mandatory evacuation or not becomes the question.

The people in the lower Ninth Ward, who were so severely affected by the storm, believed that they had to look out for themselves and could survive the storm as they had done for many years. "Evacuees also said that there was confusion about the severity of the hurricane because of conflicting evacuation orders from the mayor and the governor. When evacuation orders came, it was too late for many people to leave” (AJPH 2007). Federal, state and local government conflicts in risk communications allowed rumors to prevail because of erroneous and misunderstood information. Clearly this is not effective risk communication.

The lack of trust in the sources of information is a critical obstacle in effective risk communication. “Sources of distrust include disagreements among experts; lack of coordination among risk management organizations; inadequate training of experts and spokespersons in risk communication skills; insensitivity to the requirements for effective communication, public participation, dialogue and

community outreach; mismanagement and neglect; and a history of frequent distortion, exaggeration, secrecy, or worse on the part of many risk information providers” (Covello and Sandman 2001).

Response efforts were greatly hindered in both pre and post event situations because of the lack of continuity in information and cooperation among all levels of government. A study conducted by UCLA researchers uncovered a deep level of distrust in a large majority of hurricane victims towards public health officials. “In the May issue of the Journal of Health Care the researchers write that this distrust likely played a role in residents’ response to evacuation warnings and advice” (Rivero 2007).

The statements of distrust were not solicited Katrina Evacuation Influences 5 they were all spontaneous statements, said lead researcher Dr. Kristina Cordasco, a Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholar in the department of medicine at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA. As we prepare for future disasters, I believe we have to account for this distrust in the shaping of the public health message. 58 English-speaking New Orleans residents were interviewed. These were evacuees who had been living shelters in Houston.

Researchers surveyed the residents about their evacuation experiences, including how they had been evacuated and who had helped them. They were surprised as to the unsolicited information that the evacuees offered. Because our semi-qualitative interviews did not include specific queries about trust and distrust, we were struck by the frequency, breadth and depth of distrust reflected in the spontaneous statements of the evacuees we interviewed, the researchers wrote.

This distrust may be rooted in the experiences of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, when authorities performed

controlled breaks along the levee to selectively flood poor areas in order to preserve the downtown financial district. Some of the categories of distrust most often mentioned by evacuees involved the competency of authorities in handling the emergency; perceived equity that is, whether authorities treated the hurricane victims the same regardless of class, race and gender” (Rivero 2007). “The choice of messengers is often as important as the message itself.

Trustworthiness and perceptions of a source's knowledge on a topic can greatly influence the way a message is perceived. Additionally, a messenger can influence the perceived scope of the message. For example, the use of individual children and families in communicating about an issue can imply that the issue is personal, rather than general or societal” (Reluca 2006). Katrina Evacuation Influences 6 The primary responsibility to provide critical information to the public is the state and local governments.

However when these two entities are overwhelmed the federal government must step in to assist. During Katrina it is clear that all three levels of government failed in this regard. “The extent to which the public is willing to respond to an evacuation order depends on their view of governmental competence” (Burton & Silver 2006). “The media plays an essential role in the public’s perception of a given risk. They are the mediator between people and the decision factors. They are the gatekeepers. They can construct, amplify, dramatize or minimize risks” (Reluca 2006). The images conveyed by the media during that turbulent period left indelible impressions on the public and also provided the justification for official actions that were undertaken to manage the disaster. Moreover, the

media vigorously promoted those images even though media organizations themselves had little ability to verify what was actually happening in many parts of the impact region” (Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski 2006). News media can also help inform the public by reporting on rumors and soliciting evidence and comment on their plausibility, if any.

They may inadvertently do damage by reporting on rumors without seeking context or confirmation, or by presenting them as established facts (Critical Infrastructure). “Most risks cannot be known directly. People get information about reality from the press and sometimes fail to grasp its significance and impact on their lives. Risk communication therefore presents some risks itself. Ignorant or cynical readers are just as dangerous as paranoid or panicking audiences” (Reluca 2006). “Disaster reporting is also linked to what is judged to be newsworthy about particular events.

Decisions about what and how much to cover with respect to specific disaster events are often Katrina Evacuation Influences 7 rooted in judgments about the social value of disaster victims and on conceptions of social distance and difference” (Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski 2006). “The impact of rumors – sharks swimming in downtown New Orleans, dead babies in trash cans, and stacks of bodies at the Superdome and the Convention Center – was compounded by misinformation from officials” (Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski 2006).

Timely and accurate reporting of information concerning a crisis situation is essential. The timely issue is easy because of modern technology from cell phone cameras to the use of satellite air cards for personal computers. However this positive is also a negative when it comes to the need for accurate information. Because nearly

everyone has access to this technology there is a huge amount of information that bombards the public and officials.

Deciphering what is accurate versus what is rumor can be very difficult. Unfortunately rumors tend to be more dramatic and news worthy. The need for accurate information before, during and after a crisis is essential for public safety. Federal, state, and local governments are responsible for presenting united messages. Rumors are prevalent in all crisis events whether intentional or unintentional. These rumors very quickly become the “truth” and spread with amazing speed through the public information waves. The public suffers when federal, state, and local governments tasked with disseminating public health, safety, and security information fail to do their jobs as envisioned by emergency-response planning” (Critical Infrastructure). It is the responsibility of the government officials to provide the media with timely and accurate information to distribute to the public. “A challenge of the current in¬formation environment is the U. S. government’s ability to shape it. News comes from many sources, from mainstream broadcast and print journalists, to someone Katrina Evacuation Influences 8 n the street with a camera cell phone and text messaging, or a blogger with a laptop and internet service. Images and stories (both accurate and inaccurate, rumor and innuendo) can be transmitted inexpensively and in real-time” (Murphy 2007). People are many times influenced with this media versus what is supposed to be “official” information. Psychological and social factors were the most prevailing influence as to the decision made by many to stay and “ride out” the storm. If it wasn't harsh economic reality, it was about harsh family responsibilities.

Some of

the people who stayed had impaired mobility or were elderly; some didn't have transportation, or they stayed to be with friends or family. However, “the major themes identified related to participants’ decision to not evacuate were as follows: (1) perceived susceptibility, including optimism about the outcome because of riding out past hurricanes at home and religious faith; (2) perceived severity of the hurricane because of inconsistent evacuation orders; (3) barriers because of financial constraints and neighborhood crime; and (4) perceived racism and inequities.

Federal, state, and local government disaster preparedness plans should specify criteria for timely evacuation orders, needed resources, and their allocation (including a decentralized distribution system for cash or vouchers for gas and incidentals during evacuation) and culturally sensitive logistic planning for the evacuation of minority, low-income, and underserved communities. Perceptions of racism and inequities warrant further investigation” (Elder 2007). “As expected, people universally rely on television and radio for information during an emergency.

But surprisingly, say the researchers, half of respondents would go to their clergy for information, highlighting the role that non-traditional communicators play in emergency response” (Bass). “Government warnings did not appear to carry the same authority as the passing of informal knowledge through trusted network members. Katrina Evacuation Influences 9 Second, women were the key to pulling together network ties already embedded in their daily lives. Through those network ties, women had previously been organizing child care and sharing money or job information.

Third, the network recognized personal ties and allowed for expansion to include other individuals. For example, one person would not leave another behind. The importance of respecting and maintaining family and kin ties in disaster response,

something we now see the government had no capacity to do, cannot be overestimated. Any formal disaster planning should take into consideration, in a practical way, not only the existence but the usefulness of these networks. It's the order in the chaos" (Litt 2006). Data from a Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees dated September 2005 highlights the need for better public education and outreach pre-disaster. Survey respondents were 680 adults who were evacuated from the Gulf Coast to Houston to stay in shelters. •73 percent said they heard that an evacuation order had been given before Katrina hit. •66 percent of those who heard an evacuation message/order said it gave clear information about how to evacuate, yet 61 percent did not evacuate before the storm hit. 64 percent of those who did not evacuate before the storm said they did not think the storm and its aftermath would be as bad as it was. •42 percent of those who did not evacuate before the storm said they did not because they waited too long. •55 percent of those who did not evacuate before the storm said they did not have a car or a way to leave. Katrina Evacuation Influences 10 •22 percent of those who did not evacuate before the storm said they were physically unable to leave; about the same number said they had to care for someone who was physically unable to evacuate. 37 percent of those who did not evacuate before the storm said they just didn’t want to leave. The numbers indicate work is needed to get people to think about disaster

ahead of time and to prepare them for decisions that will be needed, the time frames that will be involved, and options that will and will not be available” (Bently 2006). Katrina Evacuation Influences 11 Major hurricanes of the scale of Katrina are infrequent. Without an effective risk communication program, people will gradually forget about the risks.

In doing so, they will unknowingly contribute to the severity of the consequences from the next hurricane that strikes. There have been many times a storm “hit” was predicted and it was either incorrect or the magnitude of the storm appeared to have been exaggerated. From 1900- 2007 there have been 13 hurricanes to hit the coast of Louisiana (Geocites). People also tend to become passive when common or familiar hazards arise. “Authorities' display of competency, fairness, empathy, honesty and openness prior to a disaster like Hurricane Katrina would help in heading off some of these negative perceptions, the researchers wrote.

They recommend that in creating disaster plans, public health and emergency response officials include community representatives drawn from churches, social clubs, schools and labor unions. This could be done via community-based participatory research involving partnerships between researchers and communities. Public health authorities should keep matters of trust and distrust in mind when crafting disaster plans and policies” (Rivero 2007). Effective risk communications is ‘timely, relevant and true. Effective communications during a disaster provides for people's doubts and it can also reduce the mental stress that comes with anticipating and coping with disaster" (Bass 2005). Ken Murphy, director of Oregon Emergency Management and chairman of the National Emergency Management Association’s (NEMA) Preparedness Committee stated “You can have

all the toys and tools. You can have an exceptional plan, but if the public doesn’t understand it, it’s just going to fall apart,” “Providing clear and consistent direction to citizens before, during Katrina Evacuation Influences 12 nd following a disaster is key to emergency preparedness and an effective response,” President Bush stated. So it appears that everyone from the President of the United States to the local Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana agrees that risk communication should be a number one priority in our government and personal lives today. What do we do to accomplish this change in behavior and thinking? Training of government and support personnel and education of the public to the ramifications of not being able to communicate risk effectively and efficiently is the best method to accomplish this task.

However, the budget must be appropriated to fund this endeavor. It is interesting to note with a terrorist event such as occurred on September 11, 2001 and a natural disaster like Katrina risk communication still has not been given the front burner priority it deserves. In both unfortunate events the government was not even capable of a minimum level of acceptable reaction to both. Katrina Evacuation Influences 13 Bibliograghy Bass, S. (2005). Temple university survey explores public crisis communications. The Business Continuity Journal.

Retrieved on February 11, 2009 from http://www. continuitycentral. com/news02257. htm Bently, E. (2006 March). Raising public awareness about disaster response. Retrieved on February 10, 2009 retrieved from http://www. csg. org/pubs/Documents/sn0603RaisingPublicAwareness. pdf Blackmax, T. Hurricane katrina evacuation. Retrieved on February 1, 2009 from http://www.

historycommons. org/timeline. jsp? timeline=hurricane_katrina_tmln&katrina_ execution_of_emergency_plans=katrina_evacuationexecution Burton, P & Silver B. 2006 September) The credibility of disaster evacuation warnings: the effects of issue framing and trust in government. Department of Political Science Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. Retrieved on February 14, 2009 from http://www. allacademic. com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/2/4/7/pages152473/ p152473-1. php Covello, V. and Sandman, P. (2001) Risk communication: evolution and revolution”, in Wolbarst A. (ed. ) Solutions to an Environment in Peril. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press: 162-178.

Critical Infrastructure. Protecting infrastructure; public communication; role of the media. Retrieved February 6, 2009 from CriticalInfrastructurehttp://www. gpoaccess. gov/serialset/creports/pdf/sr109-322/ch20. pdf Eisenman, D. (2006, June27) Obstacles and facilitators to evacuation from hurricane katrina Academy of Health. Retrieved on February 1, 2009 from http://www. academyhealth. org/2006/tuesday/612/eisenman. ppt Elder, K. ,Xirasagear, S. Miller, N. , Bowen, S. , Glover, S. & Piper, C. (2007 April 05).

African americans’ decisions not to evacuate new orleans before hurricane katrina: a qualitative study. American Journal of Public Health, April 2007, Vol97, No. Supplement 1, S124-S129. Geocities. Retrieved February 4, 2009 from http://www. geocities. com/hurricanene/gulfcoast. htm Litt, J. (2006). Women's networks critical to survival during hurricane Katrina. University of Missouri Arts and Science.

Retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://rcp. missouri. edu/articles/litt-katrinastudy. html

Katrina Evacuation Influences 14 Murphy, D. (2007). The role of information and communication in disaster response: an overview Warfare Center for Strategic Leadership. Retrieved on February 14, 2009 from http://www. carlisle. army. mil/DIME/documents/Role%20of%20Information%20and %20Communication. pdf Raluca, C. (2006 Summer). Source diversity increases credibility of risk stories Newspaper Research Journal. Retrieved on February 10, 2009 from http://findarticles. com/p/articles/mi_qa3677/is_200607/ai_n19431795 Rivero, E. (2007 May).

Hurricane katrina evacuees had deep distrust of public health authorities. Bio Medicine. Smith, M. (2005 Fall). Case study of hurricane katrina. Retrieved on February 3, 2009 from http://www. weatherdata. com/whitepaper. pdf. Tierney, K. , Bevc, C. & Kuligowski, E. (2006 March). Metaphors matter; disaster myths, media frames, and their consequences in hurricane Katrina. The Annals of the American Academy Annals, 604. Retrieved February 10, 2009 from http://www. colorado. edu/hazards/resources/socy4037/Metaphors%20Matter%20 Annals%20paper%20Tierney%20Bevc%20Kuligowski. pdf