Sparta’s Domestic Considerations in Foreign Affairs

them would make it nearly impossible to re-subjugate them due to their sheer numbers. Sparta's military interest was focused on maintaining internal discipline and harmony, so that a united group of Spartiates could dominate their numerous helots and perioikoi ruthlessly. Thucydides notes that Spartans were not quick to enter wars unless necessary. The internal threat of the helots was not only the potential for a class uprising, but also the likelihood that they might support an enemy invasion of Spartan territory. As a result, Sparta needed to further take action against them.

The Peloponnesian league was formed to provide Sparta with the necessary security. The member states agreed to join the league indefinitely, so Sparta would have allies to crush potential helot uprisings. The allies benefited from Sparta's support as it protected them from outside attacks and did not require any financial or military obligations unless there was a league war. Sparta did not seem to impose on the freedom of a state to carry out its own internal affairs, such as selecting magistrates and trying its own citizens. However, de Ste Croix believed that Sparta infringed on the autonomy of its allies by keeping oligarchies that would otherwise fade away. By ensuring they support oligarchies against rising democracy, Sparta encouraged the leading men of these cities/towns to submit indefinitely to its hegemony. As a hegemon, Sparta had a superior position over the league; according to Xenophon, the allies had to have similar friends and enemies as the Spartans and "follow them whithersoever they may lead".

Thucydides concluded that the Peloponnesian war was caused by Sparta's apprehension of Athens' increasing power. Despite this, the immediate reason for

the conflict was related to Corinth, Sparta's primary naval supporter. Following the 445 B.C. peace agreement, Pericles had enhanced Athenian resources and established a supreme navy. In 433 B.C., he concluded further agreements.

C. In order to defend themselves, Corinth formed a protective partnership with Corcyra, their naval rival. This move put the food supply from Sicily to the Peloponnese in peril. Both Corinth and Megara pleaded with Sparta for aid, which should have compelled Sparta to join the war. Sparta delayed until they saw an opening when Athens was momentarily hindered by Potidaea's uprising in Chalcidice during the spring of 432 B.C.

Despite the constant drain upon Athenian military and naval resources, the rebel city held out until the winter of 430 B. C. The only feasible means for Sparta to protect Corinth and Megara was to launch full-scale invasions of Attica via the Peloponnesian League. In the event of these invasions failing, Sparta would be obliged to engage in a lengthy naval war for which it was unsuitable.

Sparta's strategy in Greek warfare was to invade Attica and destroy crops in an effort to either force Athens to sue for peace or engage in a standard set-piece battle. However, Athens was inferior in numbers and combat effectiveness compared to the forces of Sparta and Thebes. This strategy proved flawed as Athens could not be starved into surrender due to their reliance on food trade routes in the Aegean. As a result, Sparta found themselves in a long war, potentially jeopardizing their control over the helots. Despite these challenges, Sparta emerged victorious, ironically contradicting the values that were essential to their society.

The victory of Sparta was

made possible with the help of Persian funding. This allowed them to hire mercenary sailors to substitute for their own citizen and allied hoplites. However, this Persian assistance goes against their claims of promoting pan-Hellenism. Surprisingly, the Spartan triumph was not orchestrated by a king or a member of gerousia, but a man named Lysander with a questionable background. Despite this, these factors played a vital role in their success. Sparta would not have been able to compete with the Athenian navy without the financial backing from Persia or Lysander's unique personality. They also could not afford to send too many troops to Attica as it would have neglected their internal affairs. Lysander's exceptional achievement in defeating Athens and his abilities in setting up oligarchies in various Aegean cities gave him immense personal influence. Additionally, Lysander had ambitions for both personal glory and Spartan domination.

During this period, Sparta was not concerned with maintaining control over the territory it had won from Athens. The Lycourgan system did not account for Spartan possession of extra-Peloponnesian territory. Instead, Sparta's most influential figure advocated for expansion, leading to social and economic issues and alienation from important allies in the Peloponnesian league. When Agesilaos took the throne in 400, Sparta was at its strongest, but under his reign, its power dramatically declined. At his death forty years later, Sparta had lost half its former nuclear territory and no longer held a place among the Greek powers. Cartlege examines the factors behind Sparta's decline through the lens of Agesilaos's career.

Before using Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos as a source to study the decline of Sparta, it is important to evaluate

its usefulness and accuracy. Although it is a necessary source for Cartlege, there are several challenges in considering Plutarch as a historical source. Plutarch's other works, including the Moralia and the Political Advice, reveal his focus in writing. The Parallel Lives were also composed with similar goals, particularly to portray exemplary individuals and present them as moral models.

Thus, it is important to consider how much the author may have influenced the lives in his own interests, and also the extent of his research. Although he cites many varied authors and works, there may still be issues with the accuracy of his work, particularly if it was written to support the belief that Rome was Hellenized. These concerns do not escape Cartlege, though he appreciates having a more objective biography than Xenophon's account. The decline of Sparta is portrayed as a simple narrative, with the appointment of Agesilaos as a general in Asia being the first major factor. However, Cartlege reveals his lack of concern for naval matters as a major failure while he succeeded on land.

The failure of Sparta to build a strong naval force resulted in their inability to expand into Persia. However, they still desired control and continued to pursue military schemes. Sparta embraced imperialism and became a Hellenic policeman while directly controlling and exploiting Greek subjects. The top ranking Spartiates were committed to this policy for both private and public political and economic reasons. This policy led to battles that caused dissatisfaction with Sparta, and they were soon opposed in the Corinthian war. As a result, Sparta had to seek financing from Persia to establish peace.

Despite the restoration of peace, Sparta felt

compelled to intervene in the affairs of other states in order to re-establish oligarchies. Agesilaos believed that Sparta could exploit the peace for its own benefit, but he made a mistake by overestimating Sparta's strength. "For both military and political reasons, Sparta was unable to prevent or reverse the liberation of Thebes." This event marked the end for Sparta, as with such a significant blow to its empire, it was only a matter of time before it suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Leuktra.

Cartlege is cautious of Xenophon's explanation for Sparta's decline, which attributes it to her desire for empire, interference in other states and small population. However, Cartlege believes that Xenophon's narrative essentially proposes the same explanation. Despite claiming that Plutarch's account is superior to Xenophon's, Cartledge asserts that both accounts lead to the same "unicausal" conclusion: Sparta had too few people to manage their imperialistic agenda. While a well-argued decline narrative based on the career of Agesilaos exists, it is insufficient as it narrows the reasons for Sparta's decline to one man. To me, Sparta's decline began when it reached its peak of power.

With the sudden acquisition of an empire, Sparta became overstretched. It was previously discussed that the city-state did not have the capability to suppress helots without the assistance of her allies. As a result, managing an extra-Peloponnesian empire was impossible due to the lack of means. Moreover, Sparta's newfound power fostered greed and ambition that led to a breakdown in alliances with her closest companions - key players in times of war. Ultimately, Sparta experienced failure due to the success of the Peloponnesian War, which necessitated a shift

towards foreign affairs and neglected domestic issues.