Federalist Papers Summaries – Flashcards

Summary: Those that signed the drafted Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, agreed that only after being ratified by nine of thirteen states would the document take affect. Fearing that their hard work would be wasted by the disapproval of the powerful states, Virginia and New York, actions were taken to get the Constitution approved. Alexander Hamilton of New York asked James Madison of Virginia and John Jay to help him persuade the New York convention to ratify the Constitution. Together, they wrote a series of letters, under the name "Publius", to New York newspapers, defending the Constitution. Having just won the American Revolution against the unjust English monarchy, the former American colonists were cautious to replace it with another centralized, unrestrained power. It is for this reason that Hamilton creates a new definition of Federalism. He eliminates the importance of nationalism and emphasizes how federalism allows the states to be distinct and independent. He suggests a "concurrency" of powers in which the identity and autonomy of the separate states remain, however, the national government still holds the highest power. Hamilton stresses the importance of checks and balances as a way of restricting governmental power and preventing its abuse. The Federalist Papers depicts The Separation of Powers in which the different branches of government have a specific role in which they develop an expertise and become proud of. Hamilton deems this essential to defend the country against foreign attacks, administer the laws fairly, and protect property and individual liberty. The letters also convey how the difference of needs between the States support the need to place executive authority in the hands of one person, the president.

The Federalist papers divide logically into a number of sections, with each having a central theme developed in a succession of short chapters. Consequently, the material will be dealt with in sections. Chapter breaks are indicated for easier reference. The eight chapters in this section laid down the historical groundwork for the arguments on specific constitutional points and political theories to be discussed in detail later. The opening statement was bold and rather bald, characteristically Hamiltonian in style. The American people, "after an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Federal Government," were not being called on to consider the adoption of an entirely new United States constitution, a subject of paramount importance. It involved "nothing less than the existence of the UNION . . . the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world." A wrong decision here would "deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind." Anticipating sharp criticism of the proposed constitution, and active opposition to it, Hamilton grouped dissidents into several categories. There were those constitutionally opposed to any change, no matter what. There were those who feared that a change might cost them their jobs. There were those who liked to fish in troubled waters. The largest body consisted of men of "upright intentions" whose opposition arose "from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable, the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears." This group was "so numerous indeed and so powerful" that it might give a "false bias to the judgment" that would be fatal, leading to a "torrent of angry and malignant passions" aroused by the loudness of their voices and the bitterness of their invective. The debate on both sides should be conducted with moderation, for "nothing could be more ill judged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at all times, characterised political parties." Hamilton then clearly outlined what was going to be discussed in succeeding essays, particularly the "utility of Union." Analysis The most interesting thing here is Hamilton's analysis of the groups opposing the proposed constitution. There were those congenitally opposed to any change, no matter what. There were those who feared losing status and their jobs under a new arrangement. There were those who always liked to fish in troubled waters, hoping to come up with something. No one denied any of this. But Hamilton was on more questionable and highly dubious ground when he characterized the main opposition as a lot of well-intentioned men, "blameless at least, if not respectable," who had been led astray "by preconceived jealousies and fears." This large group of well intentioned but misguided men included a large number of most highly respected patriots from the days of 1776 and before: Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, Sam Adams, and Governor George Clinton of New York, among others. Having blasted the opposition as ignorant, self-seeking, or wrong-headed, Hamilton urged that the debate be conducted with "moderation." This infuriated Anti-Federalists, who took it to mean, as it was intended, that they should keep quiet while Federalists held the floor. Hamilton's tact often left much to be desired.

Alexander Hamilton In 1787 the newly-drafted US Constitution was sent to the thirteen states for ratification. Soon, however, Anti-Federalists essays disapproving what the document contained began to surface later that month. It is in Federalist No. 1 that Alexander Hamilton expresses his motives to change the Anti-Federalists' opinion and get the document ratified. Though his intentions are not to bash any persons or processes, Hamilton expresses his opposition to the Articles of Confederation, and he does so with bias. Hamilton clearly states in the first letter that opinions will always contain bias when it comes to important matters such as the US Constitution. The essay's main purpose is to force citizens to acknowledge that their current government is not worth keeping compared with the ideas of the Constitution. However, Hamilton knows the difficulty of convincing someone to replace something they are comfortable with. He reminds the people of how they "depend for their political constitutions on accident and force" and presents them with the opportunity to choose the establishment of a "good government". Hamilton even states that if the Constitution was not ratified, the existing Union would be completely destroyed. He tries his hardest to make citizens see how bizarre the Anti-Federalists' views were. At the end of the essay, Hamilton gives an outline of six concepts that he, Madison, and Jay will discuss in the upcoming Federalist Papers.

In Chapter 40, had the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia been "authorised to frame and propose this mixed Constitution"? Anti-Federalists said No. As expressed in a resolution by the Continental Congress, the convention had been called for the "sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation," and the Articles of Confederation, instead of being revised, had been entirely scrapped. After arguing around this point at considerable length, Madison finally admitted that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention had exceeded their instructions, but were justified in doing so. Seeking to establish a more adequate central government, they had found that no mere revision of the Articles of Confederation would do. The foundation of the American government had to be changed. Even if the drafting of a whole new constitution was unauthorized, said Madison, did it "follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone to be rejected? If . . . it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends" in the form of a new constitution "calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America"? Analysis Very little need be said here. Madison shared Washington and Hamilton's view that the proposed constitution, though not perfect, was the best that could be hoped for under the circumstances, and that provision had been made for means of amending it as faults appeared and necessity required. It was a concession on Madison's part that he finally admitted that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had violated their instructions: that they were merely to revise the Articles of Confederation. Instead, they had entirely scrapped them. Madison justified this in the name of the "higher good."

In Chapter 43, Madison listed nine powers, which he labeled "miscellaneous." The first on Madison's list, and one of the more interesting, was the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right, to their respective writings and discoveries." Madison noted that the copyright of authors had long been judged to be a right under common law in Britain. Such copyrights, or patents, should be extended to protect and encourage inventors. Another of the powers would be the national government's right to exclusive legislation over lands purchased from the states for the erection of forts, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful structures. Similar authority would be exercised over the district, not exceeding ten miles square, which was to be chosen as the seat of government, the national capital (later named the District of Columbia). Other important miscellaneous powers included the right to define and punish treason, to admit new states into the union, to guarantee to every state a republican form of government, and to lay down the rules for amending the Constitution.

In Chapter 39, the first question Madison offers here is whether the new national government would be "strictly republican" in form. No other form would be compatible "with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the revolution." Madison defined a republic as a government deriving all its powers from the great body of the people and administered by persons holding office during the people's pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior. The government under the proposed constitution answered that description. The House of Representatives was to be elected immediately by the people; the Senate and the president, indirectly by the people. Even the judges along with all other important national officers were to be the choice, "though a remote choice," of the people themselves. Many objected that the new government would not be federal in form, based on the sovereignty of the states, but rather a national government based on a "consolidation" of the states. Madison analyzed this objection at length, arguing that the new government would be at once a federal and national government — federal in most respects, but necessarily national in others.

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Summary The two chapters in this section pick up, and in places extend, the arguments made before. Nothing materially new is added in these chapters. For obvious reasons, summary and commentary have been combined here. This essay first takes up the objection that the proposed constitution contained no Bill of Rights. To this Hamilton replied that the constitutions of many states (including his own, New York) contained no specific bill of rights. Hamilton then proceeded to beg the question by citing what rights were guaranteed under the Constitution — judgment in impeachment cases should not involve more than removal from office; all trials, except in cases of impeachment, would be held by jury; the writ of habeas corpus was not to be suspended except in cases of invasion or insurrection where public safety required it; no titles of nobility were to be granted. "Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the comer stone of republican government" said Hamilton. As an argument, this was ridiculous and divertive. What average Americans wanted to know was what constitutional guarantees they would have to enjoy freedom of religion, liberty of the press, freedom of speech, the right of people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for redress of grievances, the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, the right of all people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." These rights were soon stated concretely, and adopted as the first ten amendments to the Constitution. To his credit, let it be said, Madison promised that, if elected to the new Congress, he would use his every effort to see that, as a first order of business, a Bill of Rights was appended to the Constitution, and he carried out his pledge. As noted earlier, it was Madison who largely drafted the amendments and did the political engineering that brought about their adoption. As for Hamilton, he stated explicitly in this essay that a Bill of Rights was not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, "but would even be dangerous" — another reflection of his deep-grained antidemocratic attitudes. The essay next replied to the objection (a minor one) that the seat of the national government, wherever placed, would be far from many parts of the country and the people there would have difficulty in keeping track of what was going on. Well, said Hamilton, if there was to be a national capital, it had to be located somewhere, and the people in more distant parts had ample means of communication and sources of information to enable them to check up on what their representatives were doing in the capital. On another point, it was being argued that the establishment of a national government would entail additional expense and higher taxes. This would not be so, at least not in the beginning. The national government would take over the expense of performing functions and maintaining offices that the states were already supporting by requisitions made upon them under the Articles of Confederation. It would be merely a change of paymasters entailing no additional expense except in one respect. Support of the proposed new national judicial system would entail a small extra expense, but it was well worth it.

Summary This section of six chapters deals with the proposed structure of federal courts, their powers and jurisdiction, the method of appointing judges, and related matters. A first important consideration was the manner of appointing federal judges, and the length of their tenure in office. They should be appointed in the same way as other federal officers, which had been discussed before. As to tenure, the Constitution proposed that they should hold office "during good behaviour," a provision to be found in the constitutions of almost all the states. As experience had proved, there was no better way of securing a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the law. To perform its functions well, the judiciary had to remain "truly distinct" from both the legislative and executive branches of the government, and act as a check on both. There had been some question — Hamilton called it a "perplexity," as well he might — about the rights of the courts to declare a legislative act null and void if, in the court's opinion, it violated the Constitution. It was argued that this implied a "superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power." Not at all, Hamilton argued. The courts had to regard the Constitution as fundamental law, and it was, therefore, the responsibility of the courts "to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body." The same should apply to actions taken by the executive. Analysis In this essay Hamilton discussed the question of whether the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare acts of Congress null and void because, in the Court's opinion, they violated the Constitution. Hamilton answered in the affirmative; such a power would tend to curb the "turbulence and follies of democracy." But others have disagreed with Hamilton about this. Among those who have wished to curtail the Supreme Court's power to invalidate acts of Congress have been Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The issue is still a live one, as is evident from the heated debates of recent years.

Summary This group of eleven essays discusses and defends, one by one, the extensive powers to be bestowed on the president under the proposed constitution. No part of the proposed constitution had been more difficult to arrange than that dealing with the executive, and no part was being "inveighed against with less candor, or criticised with less judgment," Hamilton protested. Critics were playing on the "aversion of the people to monarchy." Some were picturing the intended president as having the power to make himself a despot, "with the diadem sparkling on his brow, and the imperial purple flowing in his train. . . . seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses." Some had gone so far in imagination as to equip him with a harem. Critics contended that the Constitution gave the president power to fill vacancies in the United States Senate. That was not true, Hamilton pointed out. The power to fill temporary vacancies in the Senate was expressly" allotted to the executives in the individual states. As to making appointments to vacancies in major government posts while the Senate was in recess, the president would have the power to fill such vacancies by granting temporary commissions, such commissions to run only to the end of the next Senate session. By that time, hopefully, the Senate would have considered and either approved or disapproved of such commissions. There was here no danger of presidential power-grabbing. Analysis Hamilton was right in observing that no part of the proposed constitution was being more severely criticized than the broad strong powers to be exercised by the executive. The popular and fiery Patrick Henry, perhaps the most influential leader of the opposition, spoke for a large number of thoughtful men in saying of the Constitution that, "among other deformities, it has an awful squinting — it squints toward monarchy. And does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American? Your president may easily become King. . . . Where are your checks in this government?" Incidentally, as evidence of widespread monarchical leanings, an organized movement had already proposed that Washington declare himself king, a suggestion that Washington angrily denounced. Hamilton failed to mention another major objection to the Constitution, either here or later. The strong powers of the national government were spelled out at length, but there was not a word about the rights of states and the liberties of individuals. There was no Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious freedom, liberty of the press, the right of popular assembly, trial by jury, and other "sacred rights." Anti-Federalists took a strong stand that the proposed constitution should not be adopted until it had been revised to include a Bill of Rights. It was the possibility that the Philadelphia document might be sent back for revisions that most frightened the Federalists. They had convinced themselves that adoption of the present draft was of vital necessity. Anti-Federalists made a strong case and soon won their point. One of the first acts of the new national government was passage of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, our long (and rightly) celebrated Bill of Rights, increasingly the heart of our democratic society. The amendments were largely drafted and pushed to adoption by Madison, who soon became an Anti-Federalist, joining with Jefferson in putting together varied groups in the first organized opposition, the Republican-Democratic party.

Summary The way of electing a president, Hamilton noted with relief, was almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure." Rightly, the "sense of the people should operate in the choice" of the chief executive. But this was to be accomplished in a special way. Instead of committing the election of the president to any established body, the choice should be made by men chosen for the special purpose, and meeting at particular times. Such men of distinction would be the most capable of deciding which presidential candidate had the best qualifications for office. Under the plan, each state was to choose a number of electors equal to the state's number of senators and representatives in the national government. The electors would meet in each state and transmit their decision to the national government. A candidate had to obtain a majority of votes in the electoral college to be named president. In case there was not a majority, provision had been made to have the choice determined by the House of Representatives, in which each state was to have only one vote. How each state voted as a unit was to be determined, presumably, by a caucus taken among the state's delegates to the House. A vice president was also to be elected by the electoral college. He was to be the candidate who received the next highest vote after the president-elect. Among his other duties, he was to be ex officio the presiding officer in the United States Senate, entitled to vote only to break a deadlock in the Senate when the vote on a particular measure was tied. Analysis Hamilton's high praise of the electoral college system of electing a president is interesting, particularly in view of the current growing feeling that the electoral college system should be abolished entirely as cumbersome, irrelevant, and potentially dangerous. Most of those who take that view seem to favor a plan whereby the president would be elected by direct popular vote, as in the case of governors, mayors, legislative members, and all other elected officials.

In Chapter 69, the president would be elected for a term of four years; he would be eligible for re-election. He would not have the life tenure of an hereditary monarch. The president would be liable to impeachment, trial, and removal from office upon being found guilty of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. He would be accountable at all times to the country at large. The president was also to be the commander-in-chief of all regular United States military forces and of the state militias when called into national service. The president would have only occasional command of the state militias, and only when authorized by the Congress. In addition, the president would have the power to pardon all offenders except those found guilty in an impeachment trial. He would regulate foreign relations with the advice and consent of the Senate, and have other extensive powers. But since a president was to be elected every four years, he could not possibly become a "perpetual and hereditary prince" like the despised and "tyrannical" King George III of Britain.

In Chapter 70, there were some who argued that a vigorous executive was inconsistent with republican principles. All men of sense agreed, said Hamilton, about the "necessity of an energetic executive." That necessary energy would come from unity, duration, adequate provision for its support, and competent powers. The first need was "due dependence on the people"; the second, due responsibility. As to unity, Hamilton argued (largely to himself), that executive powers should be concentrated in a single chief magistrate, and not in a council or anything of that sort. The history of Rome and the ancient Greek republics proved this, as well as the operations under various state governments. As chief magistrate, the president should bear sole responsibility for his acts. There was no need of a "council to the executive."

In Chapter 71, this is a prolix essay on why the president's term in office should be limited and why a new election to the presidency should be held periodically: every four years, as proposed. Four years would be long enough, but not too long. That period would keep the president responsive to the changing views and interests of the people if he hoped for re-election.

In Chapter 72, the president should be eligible for re-election. Otherwise, the chief magistrate might become irresponsible. Knowing that he would not be called to account by the people for whatever he did, he might do whatever he pleased, making himself a fortune while he could. A man having served four years as president would have more knowledge of statecraft and the inner workings of the government than one who had not. To exclude a president from seeking to succeed himself might well result in the "fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable policy."

In Chapter 73, the vigor of the executive branch depended on adequate provision for its support, to be determined by Congress. It was possible that Congress might decide to "starve" an unpopular president by reducing or abolishing his salary, or "tempt him by largesses" to surrender his judgment and discretion. No provision in the proposed constitution was more "judicious" than this, said Hamilton: The president would receive for his services a compensation "which shall neither be increased nor diminished, during the period for which he shall have been elected, . . . and shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States or any of them." This would make the president financially independent and free to move as his judgment dictated. The president should have the power to exercise a qualified negative over the acts of the two legislative bodies. He could return all bills he objected to so that they could not become laws unless subsequently passed again, this time by a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. This would protect the president from having his powers whittled away by the legislature, and be a safeguard against hasty and ill-considered legislation. This would tend toward greater stability in government. To avoid a clash with the legislature, the president would be inclined to use his qualified veto cautiously.

In Chapter 77, cooperation of the Senate in the matter of appointments would add to the stability of the administration. As the consent of the Senate would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint, a change of president would not occasion "so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government . . . if he were the sole disposer of offices." If a man had proved his fitness in any particular high office, a new president would hesitate to displace him and bring in someone "more agreeable to him" from fear of getting a rebuff in the Senate which would "bring some degree of discredit upon himself." After arguing at some length (and more than a bit tediously) on the point that such an arrangement would not give the president "improper influence" over the Senate, nor the Senate over the president, Hamilton enumerated the remaining powers of the president, the chief being these: giving information to Congress on the state of the union, recommending to Congress what measures he judged to be necessary or expedient, and calling Congress into special session on extraordinary occasions. He hoped he had demonstrated, said Publius, that the structure and powers of the executive department combined, "as far as republican principles would admit, all the requisites to energy." There was one more major consideration about the proposed constitution: "Does it also combine the requisites to safety in the republican sense — a due dependence on the people — a due responsibility?" Analysis In these chapters Hamilton does well in elaborating on many great advantages to flow from the constitutional provisions encouraging and facilitating close co-operation between the president and the legislature, especially with the Senate, on such important matters as making treaties, making major appointments, and seating Supreme Court justices, among other things.

In Chapter 76, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the president was to have the power to nominate and appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, justices of the Supreme Court, and all other United States officers. However, Congress could, by law, "vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, or in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments." Hamilton repeated what he had previously. said, that the "true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration." Surely, he said, almost everyone would agree that the proposed plan for making appointments would "produce a judicious choice" of men for filling offices. The president would have the sole responsibility of nominating men for higher office, but there was a check on him. His nominees could be rejected by the Senate, which would greatly tend to prevent the appointment of "unfit characters."

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Summary As to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they should have the authority to overrule state laws contravening the Constitution. They should have the power to enforce uniformity in the interpretation of national laws. They should have jurisdiction in all cases involving citizens of other nations. And most important in assuring domestic order and tranquillity, federal courts should have jurisdiction in conflicts between the states, such as on boundary disputes. They should have jurisdiction in determining causes between one state and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different states. Only federal courts could impartially judge such cases. The national judiciary should also have jurisdiction in maritime cases, for the latter often involved the rights of foreigners, rights assured to them by treaties which were per se part of the supreme law of the land. Analysis This essay on why the United States Supreme Court should have the authority to overrule state laws which in its judgment contravened the Constitution, and to enforce uniformity in the interpretation of national laws, is self-explanatory. Was there to be a national law, or not? If so desired, there was only one way to accomplish this.

James Madison In Federalist Paper No. 10, James Maddison addresses the question of how to guard against "faction", or groups of citizens with interests that oppose the rights of others or the interests of the whole community. Madison argues that a large republic would be a better defense against those dangers than smaller republics, such as individual states. From the beginning, he labels diversity of opinion in political life the most serious of factions as it could lead to fundamental issues such as what religion should be practiced. He saw direct democracy as a danger to individual rights and advocated a representative democracy in order to protect a citizen's liberty from majority control. He then describes the two impracticable methods to removing faction: first, destroying liberty, and the second, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects. Maddison depicts how with pure democracy, every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, citizens vote for an elite of representatives who then vote for laws. He indicates to his readers that the voice of the people pronounced by a body of representatives is more adaptable to the interest of the community.

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