Ethics Abortion Test Essays + Multiple Choise – Flashcards

• Rights-based defense of abortion • A fetus is NOT a person at any stage in its development • Concludes that abortion is morally wrong • Starts out by asking how are we supposed to define the moral community (the set of beings with full and equal moral rights)? And how can we decide if a fetus is a member of the moral community? • Explores the definition of human. It has two senses: moral sense of human and genetic sense of human • People say it is wrong to kill innocent human beings, fetuses are innocent human beings, so it is wrong to kill fetuses. • First definition in that statement is only acceptable when using moral definition of human, two only makes sense if it is intended in the genetic sense • Warren thinks that the moral community consists of all and only PEOPLE rather than all or only human beings • So, what makes somebody a person? We have no right to assume that genetic humanity is necessary for personhood. • Warren suggests that the traits that are most central to the concept of personhood are: consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness • A being doesn't need all of these to be a human, and one and two MAY be sufficient enough for personhood • If a being satisfies none of the above 5, then they are not a person, and a fetus satisfies none.

• "An argument against abortion, mainly Natural Law Theory" • Argue that abortion is never morally permissible except in self-defense. And even then abortion is not morally required. (Incidentally, this is the standard Catholic position on abortion). • Human embryos are complete human beings for three reasons: • 1) It is not a cell of the mother or father, because it is growing in its own distinct direction • 2) It is genetically human • 3) It is a complete organism • Ova, sperm, and somatic cells are NOT human beings

• Warren has an dualist approach to argue that human embryos are not persons (you began to exist at conception, but you didn't start out as a person. You became a person once you had certain abilities and characteristics, being a person is having certain status) • Lee & George's reply:When does one draw the line between those who are the subjects of rights and those who are not? If the answer is at being a person, then that argument is based off a false premise. • Warren that the human organism comes to be at conception, but the human person comes much later (like when self-awareness develops). • But if this human organism came to be at one time, but I came to be at a later time, it follows that I am one thing and this human organism with which I am associated with is another thing... but this is false. We are not consciousness that possess or inhabit bodies. Rather, we are living bodily entities. Since you and I are essentially physical organisms, we came to be when these physical organisms came to be. • Lee & George's reply: Human beings have the right to life throughout their existence • Some rights vary with respect to place, circumstances, maturity, ability, and other factors while other rights do not. • We recognize one's right to life does not vary with place, as does one's right to vote. • Moreover, some rights accrue to individuals only at certain times, but to have the right to life is to moral status AT ALL, in other words to have the right to life is to be the sort of entity that can have rights or entitlements to begin with. And so it is to be expected that this right would differ • Doesn't your argument yield the conclusion that infanticide is morally permissible?

• Here is the main difference why this doesn't say abortion is wrong. So long as the fetus is UNBORN, its preservation, contrary to the wishes of the pregnant woman, violated her right to freedom, happiness, and self-determination. Her rights override the rights of those who would like the fetus preserves. • HOWEVER, the minute an infant is born, its preservation no longer violates any of its mother's rights, even if she wants it destroyed, because she can put it up for adoption. So the child being born doesn't mark any change in personhood of the infant, but marks the end of its mother's right to determine its fate. • Also, Infanticide is wrong cuz there are other people who would want the baby and would be deprived of pleasure by the baby's destruction. Also, most people value infants and would rather send infants to orphanages than to destroy them. SO as long as there are people who want an infant preserved and are willing to care for it, it is wrong to destroy it.

• You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious (famous) violinist • He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help • Therefore, they have kidnapped you and last night the violin's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own • To unplug you would be to kill the violinist, but it's only for 9 months • Is it morally incumbent on you to consent to this situation? • Sure it would be very nice, but do you have to? • All persons have the right to life, and the violinist is a person • Granted you have a right to decide what happens to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body, so you cannot ever be unplugged from him • Thomson imagines you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that SOMETHING REALLY IS WORNG WITH THAT PLAUSICLE SOUNDING ARGUMENT THAT "Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body, but surely a person's right to life is stronger than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it." • However, in certain circumstances, abortion is not morally WRONG, but one ought to not do it. • People may be greedy, stingy, and callous in certain circumstances for having an abortion, so they ought to not do it, but that doesn't make it morally wrong • Example: Thomson can't survive without the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on her fevered brow • Even though she needs it to save her life, she has no right to Henry Fonda's cool tough • Let's say Henry Fonda is next door and it would not be a problem, well then he ought to do it and it would be selfish not to, but does that give her the right to his touch? No. It makes no sense that she has a right to it when it is easy for him to provide it but no right when it is hard. It's a rather shocking idea that anyone's rights should fade away and disappear as it gets harder and harder to accord them to him.

• The fact that Thomson imagines you would regard the idea that a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body, so you cannot ever be unplugged from the unconscious violinist, suggests that SOMETHING REALLY IS WORNG WITH THAT PLAUSICLE SOUNDING ARGUMENT THAT "Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body, but surely a person's right to life is stronger than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it." • This case shows that there is a distinction between having a right to life and having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life • The point of this distinction: (A) "a fetus has a right to life" does not entail (B) "a fetus has a right to use it's mother's body for survival", so one cannot argue directly from A to B • In other words, even if the fetus is an innocent person, like the unconscious violinist, it doesn't automatically get to B (having a right to use its mother's body for survival) • The "unconscious violinist" example also shows that abortion is morally permissible in the case of pregnancy due to rape or incest. (So the Catholic position is wrong.)

• The "unconscious violinist example" cannot deal with all pregnancies that were not the consequence of rape or incest • It is not intended to be analogous to all, or even most pregnancies • So Thomson offers other examples • Suppose it were like this: • People-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery • You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, they very best you can buy. • On very rare occasions, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes root • Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to your house? • Surely NOT despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew the screens were sometimes defective • Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you COULD have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. • But this won't do for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving the home without a reliable army • At most there are SOME cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother's body, and therefore SOME cases in which abortion is unjust killing.

• A prima facie duty based argument against abortion • Marquis intentionally avoids the question of whether the fetus is an actual person. • Marquis argues that "abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being." • To determine whether abortion is wrong, Marquis claims we must first determine what makes killing adult humans generally wrong. • He thinks that what makes killing wrong is not that the one who kills becomes a brute or the great loss others would experience due to our absence, but it is that the person being killed is deprived of a valuable future • "When I am killed, I am deprived...of what I now value [and] also what I would come to value...Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future." • So, this answer "rests on the intuition that what makes killing a particular human or animal wrong is what it does to that particular human or animal." • For Marquis, what matters is that a being has a "future-like-ours." This answer explains why it is wrong to kill Martians as well as humans. It might even explain the wrongness of killing some animals. • The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of abortion • The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of young children • Since the reason that is sufficient enough to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is also a reason that applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie SERIOUSLY MORALLY WRONG • However, this value of a future-like-ours argument does not show that abortion is wrong and any and all circumstances, but abortion could only be justified by the most compelling reasons • Abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life • Also, Marquis' answer does not show that active euthanasia is wrong, for the value of one's future can be seriously diminished if sick and dying. • His conclusion is that "Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus is at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons." • In other words, he concludes that abortion is "seriously presumptively wrong." • So, not all potential people are future people (like a baby who you know is going to die very shortly after death), but ALL future people are potential people (all people with futures are potential people). Also, NOT all future people are actual people (like fetuses, they are not actual people but they are future people) and ALL actual people are not future people (like someone who is dying and about to die).

• Rosalind Hursthouse - a virtue based analysis of abortion • Believes in a virtue-based approach, so right action is defined in terms of virtuous agents (one who exercises the virtues), who are defined in terms of virtue (a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well), that is defined in terms of flourishing • When applied to abortion, rights become irrelevant, because one can exercise one's rights virtuously or viciously. • Abortion will be permissible when it expresses virtues like modesty and impermissible when it expresses vices like selfishness. • So, she would not agree with Marquis that abortion is seriously presumptively wrong • She would say that it depends on the circumstances, it depends on if virtues like modesty or selfishness are being expressed when deciding on the abortion • So, basically her response is that the QUALITY of the child's life and future matters, which is why whether an abortion is morally permissible or not varies on the circumstances. For Marquis, only having a future like ours matters, but that does not mean the quality of the future matters, it only matters that the child has a future like ours at all. But for Hursthouse, the quality of the child's life does matter, and that is why whether or not abortion is a virtuous thing to do depends on the circumstances and which virtues are being expressed.

• A woman already has children. She did not intend to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. • Marquis would say this is not a compelling reason to have an abortion because abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life, and in this case it is not. Also, it ONLY matters to Marquis that the child has a future-like-ours, not that the child has a good quality future. • Hursthouse would say disagree. She thinks that a virtuous woman would consider the quality of the life of the child. Socioeconomic status, how old she is, how she got pregnant all matters to Hursthouse but not to Marquis. • A woman in very poor physical health and worn out from childbearing, unexpectedly gets pregnant. • Again, Marquis would say this is not a compelling reason to have an abortion because abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life, and in this case it is not. Also, it ONLY matters to Marquis that the child has a future-like-ours, not that the child has a good quality future. • Hursthouse would disagree and say that a virtuous woman is not necessarily expressing vices such as self-indulgent, callous, irresponsible, or light-minded. Perhaps going through with the pregnancy would be heroic, but people who do not achieve heroism are not necessarily vicious. In this case, the woman is not expressing a lack of serious respect for human life, but it shows that something is terribly amiss in the conditions of their lives, which make it so hard to recognize pregnancy and childbearing as the good they can be. • A woman chooses abortion because it gets in the way of her "having a good time." • Marquis and Hursthouse would agree that this is not a compelling reason to have an abortion, but for different reasons. For Marquis, it is not compelling because abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life, and in this case, having a bad time is not at least as great as the loss of one's life. For Hursthouse, this is not a compelling reason because this is selfish and more viceless than virtuous.

c. embryonic stage

d. a fetus

a. moral standing

c. there is something wrong with arguing directly from the claim that the fetus is a person to the conclusion that abortion is morally impermissible

d. even though you ought to let the violinist use your kidneys for that hour, we should not conclude that he has a right to use your kidneys for that hour

c. It is a liberal view because Warren believes that a woman's right to protect her life, health, happiness, and freedom by terminating her pregnancy will always override whatever right to life a fetus may have.

a. Any being which satisfies none of these traits is certainly not a person.

d. none of the above

a. it is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances

d. all of the above

c. a zygote

b. A human fetus from conception is an innocent human being, and thus has the same right to life as any other person

c. only human beings have moral rights

d. the capacity to reproduce

a. the abortion issue cannot be settled just by determining at what stage the fetus is a person

c. virtue ethics approach

False

false

true

false

true

false

true

false

true

rights-based defense of abortion

An argument against abortion, mainly Natural Law Theory

A mainly rights-based approach to abortion

A prima facie duty based argument against abortion

a virtue based analysis of abortion

Only people have full and equal moral rights, and the traits that are most central to the concept of personhood are consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness. Fetuses have none of those traits, so they are not people, and as a result they do not have full and equal moral rights. So, she argues for the moral permissibility of abortion, at all stages of fetal development.

Argue that abortion is never morally permissible except in self-defense. And even then abortion is not morally required. Human embryos are complete human beings for three reasons: 1) It is not a cell of the mother or father, because it is growing in its own distinct direction, 2) It is genetically human, 3) It is a complete organism. Complete human beings have moral rights.

If the fetus is UNBORN, the fetus's rights to preservation (contrary to the wishes of the pregnant woman) violate the pregnant woman's rights, and the pregnant woman's rights override the rights of the unborn fetus. HOWEVER, the minute an infant is born, its preservation no longer violates any of its mother's rights, even if she wants it destroyed, because she can put it up for adoption. So the child being born doesn't mark any change in personhood of the infant, but marks the end of its mother's right to determine its fate.

A mainly rights-based approach to abortion. EVEN if a fetus IS a person from conception (and hence has a full moral right to life), a pregnant woman still has a moral right to have an abortion. Thomson is NOT saying it is always morally permissible to have an abortion

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious (famous) violinist. The violinist has fatal kidney ailment, and you alone have the right blood type to save its life. You were kidnapped and they attached you to the unconscious violinist, and if you detach yourself, the violinist will die. If you stay attached for 9 months, the violinist will live. Sure it would be nice to stay attached to the violinist, but of you have to?

All persons have the right to life, and the violinist is a person. You have a right to decide what happens to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in an to your body, so you can't ever be unplugged from him. This is outrageous, and this suggests that SOMETHING REALLY IS WORNG WITH THAT PLAUSIBLE SOUNDING ARGUMENT THAT "Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life." This example shows the distinction between having a right to life and having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. Even if the fetus (like the violinist) is an innocent person, it doesn't automatically get a right to use its mothers body for survival. Also shows that abortion is morally permissible in the case of pregnancy due to rape or incest.

People-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, they very best you can buy. On very rare occasions, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to your house? Surely NOT despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew the screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you COULD have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't do for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving the home without a reliable army

A prima facie duty based argument against abortion. Marquis argues that "abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being." For Marquis, what matters is that a being has a "future-like-ours." The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient enough to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is also a reason that applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie SERIOUSLY MORALLY WRONG BUTTT not under all circumstances.

Abortion will be permissible when it expresses virtues like modesty and impermissible when it expresses vices like selfishness. So, she would not agree with Marquis that abortion is seriously presumptively wrong. She would say that it depends on the circumstances, it depends on if virtues like modesty or selfishness are being expressed when deciding on the abortion. So, basically her response is that the QUALITY of the child's life and future matters, which is why whether an abortion is morally permissible or not varies on the circumstances. For Marquis, only having a future like ours matters, but that does not mean the quality of the future matters, it only matters that the child has a future like ours at all. But for Hursthouse, the quality of the child's life does matter, and that is why whether or not abortion is a virtuous thing to do depends on the circumstances and which virtues are being expressed.

A woman already has children. She did not intend to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. Response:Marquis would say this is not a compelling reason to have an abortion because abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life, and in this case it is not. Also, it ONLY matters to Marquis that the child has a future-like-ours, not that the child has a good quality future. Hursthouse would say disagree. She thinks that a virtuous woman would consider the quality of the life of the child. Socioeconomic status, how old she is, how she got pregnant all matters to Hursthouse but not to Marquis. • A woman in very poor physical health and worn out from childbearing, unexpectedly gets pregnant. • A woman chooses abortion because it gets in the way of her "having a good time." Marquis and Hursthouse would agree that this is not a compelling reason to have an abortion, but for different reasons. For Marquis, it is not compelling because abortion could only be justified only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great as the loss of one's life, and in this case, having a bad time is not at least as great as the loss of one's life. For Hursthouse, this is not a compelling reason because this is selfish and more viceless than virtuous.

So, not all potential people are future people (like a baby who you know is going to die very shortly after death), but ALL future people are potential people (all people with futures are potential people). Also, NOT all future people are actual people (like fetuses, they are not actual people but they are future people) and ALL actual people are not future people (like someone who is dying and about to die).

Warren argues for the moral permissibility of abortion, at all stages of fetal development.

Argue that abortion is never morally permissible except in self-defense. (even then abortion is not morally required)

EVEN if a fetus IS a person from conception (and hence has a full moral right to life), a pregnant woman still has a moral right to have an abortion

abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being

Abortion will be permissible when it expresses virtues like modesty and impermissible when it expresses vices like selfishness.