Theory of IR Part 2 – Flashcards

the theory that a dominant state is needed to support an integrated world economy; the hegemon is willing to bear the costs of maintaining the system A The hegemonic power is both willing and able to establish and maintain the norms and rules of a liberal economic order. B Three prerequisites must exist for the emergence and expansion of the liberal market system: 1. Hegemony 2. Liberal ideology 3. Common interests C These three prerequisites are expressed in the common idea that an international open market system is a public good. The theory that the international system is more likely to remain stable when there is a single dominant nation-state. Gilpin, a classical realist, argues that a liberal international order requires the hegemony of a single power (e.g., Britain and US). Gilpin (1987) ". . . posits that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed. The decline of hegemonic structure of power can be expected to presage a decline in the strength of corresponding international economic regimes." (Keohane 1980). The hegemonic power is both willing and able to establish and maintain the norms and rules of a liberal economic order. Three prerequisites must exist for the emergence and expansion of the liberal market system, including hegemony, liberal ideology, and common interests. These three prerequisites are expressed in the common idea that an international open market system is a public good. (see public goods, common pool resources, non-excludable goods, and indivisible goods)

The central idea of this theory is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the system. For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests upon the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable system will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair.

Public goods are distinguished from private goods by the two characteristics of indivisibility (sometimes referred to as jointness of supply) and non-excludability Ex) Roads, Parks, Public Radio or TV, Lobbying Public goods are distinguished from private goods by the two characteristics of indivisibility (sometimes referred to as jointness of supply) and non-excludability. Public goods are prone to two problems of supply: 1. Because they are non-excludable, public goods are subject to free-riding. Free riding occurs when individuals who use the good do not contribute to the cost of its supply. Instead, they "free-ride" on the supply that others provide. 2. Because public goods are prone to free-riding, they are typically under-supplied. That is, the total supply of the good is less than the demand for the good. (see hegemonic stability theory, common pool resources, non-excludable goods, and indivisible goods)

Because they are non-excludable, public goods are subject to free-riding. Free riding occurs when individuals who use the good do not contribute to the cost of its supply. They "free-ride" on the supply that others provide. Why pay for a good if you can use it without paying for it? Because public goods are prone to free-riding, they are typically under-supplied. That is, the total supply of the good is less than the demand for the good.

natural resources that do not fall under any state's sovereign jurisdiction and are therefore available to all. A resource is "common pool" if it is divisible and non-excludable. This includes clean air, ocean fisheries, and common pasture lands. (see public goods, hegemonic stability theory, non-excludable goods, and indivisible goods)

A good is non-excludable if, once it is produced, it is available to all members of a collective, regardless of whether or not they individually contributed to the production of the good. (see public goods, common pool resources, hegemonic stability theroy, and indivisible goods)

A good is indivisible if it cannot be divided up and consumed individually. That is, it is impossible to "use up" the good through consumption. One actor's consumption of the good does not reduce the overall supply of the good. (see public goods, common pool resources, non-excludable goods, and hegemonic stability theory)

Regime theory, closely associated with liberalism and neoliberalism, holds that international institutions or "regimes" can affect state behavior, and that cooperation is possible even in the anarchic world system (as the existence of regimes itself indicates). "International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area. [185] Principles: beliefs of fact, causation, rectitude Norms: Standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations Rules: specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action Decision making procedures: prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. Keohane and Nye (1977)- "sets of governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects" Regimes are sets of formal and informal rules that conform state behavior in specific areas of international life. They can be informal - such as the arrangement between banks about how to transfer funds and exchange currency They can be formal -- such as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement that set import quotas for clothing in a managed trade regime from 1974 to 2004. Regimes can be formalized in organizations or informal in the form of implicit or explicit agreements. Low - regime has few or no written rules . It mostly exists as a set of informal understandings. Moderate - regime is based on treaties or clearly understood canons of international law but it has no specific organization that oversees its implementation High - regime is implemented and overseen by a formal international organization Strength - how effectively does the regime adjust state behavior? Strong regimes have effective enforcement mechanisms that are highly institutionalized and that cause states to take notice of the regime's rules and states regularly align their behavior with that indicated by the rules of the regime. Moderate regimes have effective enforcement regimes that may not be institutionalized. States generally follow the regime's rules because it is in their best interest to do so. Weak regimes may have enforcement mechanisms, but , while states do follow the rules of the regime, they are more likely to break the regime rules when it suits their interests. (see collaboration and coordination)

At one extreme - regimes are defined so broadly that they encompass all international interactions within an issue-area. At other extreme regimes are defined as international institutions - equal to formal rules of behavior - study of regimes becomes study of international organization. Systematic interactions that emerge from states making independent, autonomous decisions that are a function of their interests and preferences are not regimes. Regimes only emerge in situations where states' decision-making is constrained by the structure of the international system, thus: If states' behaviors become regularized in an unconstrained decision environment, the result is NOT a regime, If states' behaviors become regularized in an constrained decision environment, the result IS a regime (see regime theory& game theory- on slides)

A Common interests means there is one Pareto optimal outcome that is non equilibrium B Collaboration is needed to define strict patterns of behavior an insure that no one cheats C Because each player requires assurance, such regimes require a degree of formalization D Regime must also specify what behaviors constitute cheating and each player must be able to observe cheating ] E Examples • Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) • Oligopolistic markets Tragedy of the commons & common pool resources (Garrett Hardin)

A Common aversion means there are multiple equilibria B Regimes must assure neither a particular outcome nor compliance with a particular course of action - only that certain outcomes be avoided. C Such coordination is difficult to achieve when players prefer different outcomes D The greater this conflict of interest, the harder it is to coordinate actions E Once established, the regime makes expectations converge F Any actor that diverges from the regime outcome hurts only itself - so policing is not necessary G Defections do not represent cheating H An actor will threaten to cheat before it cheats - in an attempt to get to other equilibrium I Conventions alone are all that is needed - institutions are not required J Examples Common rail gauge in Europe Air traffic conventions (ICAO) Rules of the Road at Sea

The Kantian Triangle expresses relationships between international organizations, democracy, and economic interdependence, which all are simultaneously critical to and dependent of peace and each other. He shows the positive correlations between each of these. This is a visual extension of his pacific federalism. Kantian liberal theory indicates that democracy, international trade, and IGO membership constrain states from going to war. (see democratic peace theory, normative & structural models of democratic peace, hegemonic stability theory, and regime theory) These three factors lead to peace 1. democracy 2. economic interdependence 3. international organizations Relationships: As democracy increases, membership in international organization increases As democracy increases, economic interdependence increases As democracy increases, peace increases As international organizations increase, democracies increase As international organizations increase, economic interdependence increases As international organizations increase, peace increases As economic interdependence increases, democracy increases As economic interdependence increases, membership in international organization increases As economic interdependence increases, peace increases As peace increases, democracy increases As peace increases, membership in international organizations increases As peace increases, economic interdependence increases

Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. Recognition of the democratic-peace result is probably one of the most significant nontrivial products of the scientific study of world politics. Democratic states are in general about as conflict (and war-prone) as non-democracies; and over the last two centuries, democracies have rarely clashed with one another. There is something in the internal makeup of democratic states that prevents them from fighting one another despite the fact that they are not less conflict-prone than non-democracies. (see Kantian triangle, normative and structural models of democratic peace) Advocates of democratic peace explain war and peace in the international system with reference to domestic-level variables. Their basic claim is that regime types (defined by institutional features, e.g. elections, decision-making structures, and culture) shape foreign-policy inclinations of national decision-makers and their interactions on the international level. Democratic peace theorists, following Kant, argue that democratic domestic institutions are conducive to producing peace on the international level, especially among democracies. Recognition of the democratic-peace result is probably one of the most significant nontrivial products of the scientific study of world politics. This result consists of two parts of equal importance: A- democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as non-democracies; and B- over the last two centuries, democracies have rarely clashed with one another.

democratic norms make it less likely that democratic states will fight each other but they also enable the conflicts between normative systems that generates conflict between democracies and other modes of government. Assumptions: 1. States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions. Assumption 1 suggests that different norms of domestic political conduct will be expressed in terms of different patterns of international behavior. Democratic regimes are based on political norms that emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful means. Political competition in nondemocratic regimes is likely to be more zero-sum in terms of the conception of the parties and in its consequences. 2. The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and non-democratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former. Assumption 2 deals with the limits of the ability to apply certain norms in an anarchic international system. (see Kantian triangle, democratic peace theory, structural model of democratic peace)

the structure of the decision-making process within a democracy creates barriers to going to war. When both countries face these barriers, war is both harder to conduct and the time that it takes for the decisions to happen gives more life to the peacemaking process. These barriers are, by necessity, set aside when a democracy is threatened by a non-democracy. Assumptions: 1. International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action. 2. Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies. (see Kantian triangle, democratic peace theory, normative model of democratic peace)

-Emerged after World War II as response to E.H. Carr and the realists. -Explicitly pursued interpretive approach and rejected positivist approach - embraced a synthesis of theory, history, morality, power, agency, and structure. -Not accepted as "legitimate" theory in the USA. -IR should not be about interstate relations or other unit of analysis. -IR should establish a body of general propositions about the global political system - including states, regions, institutions, NGOs, transnational groups, subnational groups, and individuals. -IR must have historical depth. -Institutions must be understood in historical context. -One must be aware of one's values and subject them to critical scrutiny. -IR is fundamentally a normative enterprise. -Values are central to the subject of IR. -Central problem of world politics is - how to form an international society that is both orderly and just. -The English School accepts the agency of the state but recognizes that the state only acts through its agents (diplomats, leaders, etc.) (see interpretive turn in ir theory, fourth debate in ir theory, international society, minimal order society, pluralist society, solidarist society, the domestic analogy)

The English School shares many of Constructivism's critiques of rationalist theories of international relations. It also emphasizes the centrality of international society and social meanings to the study of world politics (Bull). Fundamentally, however, it does not seek to create testable hypotheses about State behaviour as the other theories do. Instead, its goals are more similar to those of a historian. Detailed observation and rich interpretation is favored over general explanatory models. Hedley Bull, for instance, a leading English School scholar, argued that international law was one of five central institutions mediating the impact of international anarchy and instead creating 'an anarchical society'. Given their emphasis on context and interpretive methods, it is no surprise that English School writers hold historical understandings to be critical to the study of world politics. It is not enough simply to know the balance of power in the international system, as the Realists would have it. We must also know what preceded that system, how the States involved came to be where they are today, and what might threaten or motivate them in the future. Domestic politics are also important, as are norms and ideologies.

Closely associated with the English school, international society describes an institutional arrangement for promoting order. It can be said to exist when there are criteria for membership, and when those belonging to international society have shared values and believe themselves to be bound by the agreed rules. The values that are shared could be minimal (toleration) or maximal (highly interventionist to promote universal values). "international society comes into being when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 1977, 13). (see the English school, minimal order society, pluralist society, solidarist society, the domestic analogy) A key concept in English School theory, an association of member states interacting across international orders, sharing common purposes,organizations and standards of conduct; also referring to a global social framework of shared norms and values based on state sovereignty as political independence is a corevalue of an international society.

Systemic order = actions impact upon one another but there is no mutual recognition or acceptance of a common framework of rules and institutions Society = members explicitly recognize common interests and create rules and institutions to enhance and manage them. The existence of an international society presupposes existence of an international system - systems set the material and environmental conditions for the emergence of a society

The only mutually agreed upon values is the need for order Not a harmonious order, but a tolerable order- better than a realist could expect but less than a cosmopolitan or liberal order. (see the English school, international society, pluralist society, solidarist society, the domestic analogy)

Institutional framework is geared toward independence of states and maintenance of order between them. Rules are followed because of minimal costs and maximal collective benefits. (see the English school, international society, minimal order society, solidarist society, the domestic analogy) Concept of international society where sovereign states are the basic units cultivating their own values and interests; states coexist and interact on a basis of self-interest, expediency, out of mutual recognition and regard for common norms and practices as well as political and commercial reciprocity; a current of thought within the English School

Collective enforcement of international rules and the guardianship of human rights. Bull feared "premature solidarism" - enforcement of international norms (human rights) before they were universally accepted. (see the English school, international society, minimal order society,pluralist society, the domestic analogy)

problem of the domestic analogy in Bull's words: -"The argument from the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states according to which the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life on this view are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale" Interpretation in normal language: -Hobbes said that people in a state of nature (war of all against all) must create a common power (government) to create peace and the conditions for enterprise. -If states exist in a similar anarchic state of nature, then don't states also have to create a common power (world government) to create peace and the conditions for enterprise? Bull notes two doctrines about international anarchy: -Realist: International anarchy results in a Hobbesian state of nature (or state of war) where each state must be responsible for its own security and self-help. There is an absence of society among states. -Kantian (or liberal): Because of the international anarchy, states must replicate the anti-anarchical institutions that we have in domestic politics - that is they must create or mimic the role of government at the international level - this is the domestic analogy. Bull proposes a third alternative: -International Society: Out of anarchy can emerge "a society of states in which the states are consciously bonded together for certain purposes which modify their conduct in relation to one another. The salient fact is not conflict, as with the Hobbesian view, nor control, as with the Kantian, view but cooperation among sovereigns in a society without government. Bull claims that we must abandon the domestic analogy because: -It is a sign of infancy of our study - the inability to understand our own subject matter& It doesn't apply because international society is different from domestic society (see the English school, interpretive turn in ir theory, the fourth debate in ir theory, international society, minimal order society, pluralist solidarist society, the domestic analogy)

The reemergence of the English School in the late 20th century is part of what is termed "the interpretive turn" in international relations theory. This turn moves us away from the rationalism of realism and liberalism toward the interpretive approaches of constructivism, critical theory, post-structuralism, and feminist international relations theory. Robert Keohane referred to this interpretive in his 1988 speech to the International Studies Association and it became the basis for the so-called "Fourth Debate" in international relations theory. (see rationalism, the fourth debate of ir theory, the English school, constructivism, and feminist ir theory)

Rationalists accept the actors and structures of international relations as received wholes. That is they are as they are and have been forever! The best example of this (and the one that galls the constructivists the most!) is Waltz's claim that all nation states are the same, except for distribution of power resources, because they all share the same problem - how to survive in the structure of anarchy. The reemergence of the English School in the late 20th century is part of what is termed "the interpretive turn" in international relations theory. This turn moves us away from the rationalism of realism and liberalism toward the interpretive approaches of constructivism, critical theory, post-structuralism, and feminist international relations theory. (see interpretive turn in ir theory, the fourth debate of ir theory, the English school, constructivism, and feminist ir theory) In International Relations theory, rationalism refers to two fundamentallydifferent things: for theorists within the international society tradition, rationalism issimply a synonym for their tradition, situated as it is 'middle-of-the-road'-like betweenrealism and revolutionism (i.e. liberalism). These theorists recognize anarchy as thedefining characteristic of the international system yet, significantly, add that aninternational society has developed through centuries and characterized by commonrules and institutions. Second, rationalism refers to rational-choice-like approaches andperspectives, usually imported from economics.

Rationalist vs Reflectivist: This has occurred from the 80s to present. It is focused on science in the history of IR, and seeks to distinguish between explaining and understanding, rationalism and reflectivism, positivism and postpositivism. Explanatory theories seek to emulate natural sciences and explain general causes while understanding approaches aim to account for agents' actions from within through interpreting actors' meanings, beliefs, and reasons for action. Rationalist approaches characterize actors in IR as being substantively rational because they will make choices based upon what they perceive will benefit them the most, whereas the reflectivist approach asserts that actors are constituted by the institutions that actors create. Reflectivists believe that one cannot make blanket assumptions about the preferences or rational behavior of those actors because they are created in different contexts. (see rationalism, interpretive turn in ir theory, the English school, constructivism, and feminist ir theory) The so-called fourth debate has characterized IR since the mid-1980s. It can be characterized in many ways: as a debate between explaining and understanding, between positivism and post-positivism and between rationalism and reflectivism. The rationalist/reflectivist terminology is used to refer to the division in the discipline between those that apply rational choice and positivist methods and those that reject these methods and advocate interpretive and reflective methodologies. In IR approaches such as critical theory, constructivism, poststructuralism and feminism are sometimes referred to as reflectivist.

Scholars committed to an identity position see political actors as acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted. They portray an international society as a community of rule followers and role players with distinctive sociocultural ties, cultural connections, intersubjective understandings, and senses of belonging. Identities and rules are constitutive as well as regulative and are molded by social interaction and experience. Constructivists understand that both the actors and the structures are constructed by rules and social norms. Interests of states (or any actor) are determined by the identities that they have in relation to the system structure. (see the English school, international society, constructivism, rules, structures, norms)

Rationalist have individualist ontology the basic unit of analysis is the individual (person or state). Neorealists present individual states as the prior condition for a structure of anarchy which then constrains individual behavior. Neoliberals treat individual ideas as causal factors that are exchanged by fully formed individuals. Constructivists question methodological individualism in favor of a social ontology. As fundamentally social beings, individuals (people or states) cannot be separated from a context of normative meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them. The concept of sovereignty is first and foremost a social and constitutive category - the condition of recognition requires shared understanding and acceptance. (see socially constructed reality &, constructivism)

-Constructivists focus on norms and shared understandings of legitimate behavior - but material issues play a role -structures not only constrain, they also constitute the identities of actors. -choices are the result of a logic of appropriateness - a rational act is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared value and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely shared individual interests. -"the self becomes social through acquiring and fulfilling an institutional identity." -Logic of Expected Consequences: Those who see actions as driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise. The idea that action by individuals, organizations, or states is driven by calculation of its consequences as measured against prior preferences has been subject to numerous criticisms. The Logic of Appropriateness: Linking action exclusively to a logic of consequences seems to ignore the substantial role of identities, rules, and institutions in shaping human behavior. Within the tradition of a logic of appropriateness, actions are seen as rule-based. (see actor and agent, agent-structure problem, identity, rule-based, social, & norm-based constructivism, rules/rule, structures, practices, institutions, cognitive psychology, attribution error, in- & out-group) An alternative international relations theory that hypothesizes how ideas, norms, and institutions shape state identity and interests

The major theoretical proposition that all constructivists subscribe to is that neither individual, state, nor international community interests are predetermined or fixed. Individuals in collectivities forge, shape, and change culture through ideas and practices. State and national interests are the result of the social identities of these actors. Constructivists eschew the concept of material structures. Constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt argues that political structure explains nothing and tells us little about state behavior. Many constructivists emphasize normative structures. What we need to know its identity, and identities change as a result of cooperative behavior and learning. Constructivists see power in discursive terms—the power of ideas, culture, and language. Power exists in every exchange among actors, and the goal of constructivists is to find the sources of power and how it shapes identity. Constructivists claim there is no objective reality, if "the world is in the eye of the beholder," then there can be no right or wrong answers, only individual perspectives. Thus, they see sovereignty not as an absolute, but as a contested concept.

An actor is an individual who acts. The act is assumed to be based on the interests of the individual. Individual interests are idiosyncratic - that is, they are internal to the individual and external to any theory (i.e., interests and preferences are exogenous). An agent is an individual who acts for something or someone. It is easy to think of a diplomat as an agent for he or she is not acting in his or her own interests, but acting in the interests of the state. (In constructivism all individuals are seen to be agents because they are not acting because of an internal individual interest, they are acting for a set of interests that have been constructed through social norms and rules and histories and experiences. Their interests are constructed by the social structures in which they exist. The English School accepts the agency of the state but recognizes that the state only acts through its agents (diplomats, leaders, etc.).) (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, the English school, etc.)

Statements that tell people what we should do. -the "what" is standard for peoples conduct -the "should" tells us to match our conduct to that standard -if we fail to do what the rule says, then we can expect consequences that some other rule will bring into effect (see constructivism, rule-based constructivism, rule in constructivism, structures in constructivism, practices in constructivism, institutions in constructivism, agent-structure problem)

Regulative rules determine actions that agents should or should not take. They are the rules with which we are most familiar that give agents choices. Ex- in football establish what players can and cannot do during the game (see agent, rules in constructivism, rule-based constructivism, constitutive rules)

Constitutive rules establish practices. They are the rules that give permission to agents to act. Ex- in football establishes the size of the field, the number of downs, and the condition under which scores are recorded (see agent, rules in constructivism, rule-based constructivism, regulative rules)

Rule is a condition in which some agents use rules to exercise control and obtain advantages over others. Rule is stable but not necessarily symmetrical. Rule is not the same as "rules." When constructivists (Onuf) use rule in the singular, it usually means the condition of rule as opposed to an individual rule. Rule refers to a situation in which agents actions are constrained by a set of specific rules. (see constructivism, agent, rules)

A structure is a set of rules that is understood by the agent that substantially guides the agents choices of actions in specific social settings. It is any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences gives society a structure. Agents' interests are constructed by the social structures in which they exist. (see constructivism, rules, agent, institution, socially constructed reality)

All the ways in which people deal with rules - whether we follow the rules or break them, whether we make the rules, change them or get rid of them. Rules are pictured as defining a practice. Practices are set up for many purposes - one is that the act of deciding case by case can lead to confusion. They are: Attempts to coordinate behavior by trying to for see how others will act is bound to fail. As an alternative, one realizes that what is required is the establishment of a practice, the specification of a new form of activity; And from this one sees that a practice necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and prudential grounds. It is the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being instructed in the rules which define it. It is essential to the notion of a practice that the rules publicly known and understood as definitive. Rules must also be able to be taught and can be acted on to define a coherent practice. Rules define a practice and are themselves the subject of the utilitarian principle. (see constructivism, rules)

"Whether by accident or by design, rules and related practices frequently form a stable . . . pattern suiting agents' interests. These patterns are institutions." Institutions make people into agents and constitute an environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally. International relations scholars see that the structure of IR is not institutionalized to any great degree. Countries are highly institutionalized structures called states and their agents conduct relations with each other in an anarchic world. (see constructivism, rules, practices, agents)

in constructivism, the agents create the structures and the structures create the agents. There is no ontological beginning or end. Onuf explains this by claiming that we must start in the middle. That rules are the medium by which agents and structures create each other. Agent-Structure problem has its roots in two truisms about social life: 1.Humans and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform society in which they live. 2.Society is made up of social relationships which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. 2 Types of structures: 1.Internal or organizational structures 2.external or social structures. (agents, structures)

Constructivists have a different problem. Because of the agent-structure problem, they cannot (and would not) treat agents as exogenous "others." They must have an endogenous theory about how agents acquire their identities - including how self acquires its identity, and, that theory has to define identity as a social construction. Social structure by itself cannot serve as the basis for a complete account of identity - Agents and behavior must be considered. Language and identity depend up on one another. Identities exist through the distinguishing function of language. But language - especially directives and commissives - depend on the identities of self and other. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, socially constructed reality, agents, speech acts) Relates to 'Who am I or with whom do I identify?' In International Relationsthe answer is sometimes linked to terms of identification with a nation which may/maynot be associated with a state; thus, identity can be transnational, cf. the examples of religious, gender or class identification. Some theorists focus on state identity, i.e. thekey characteristics a state has or wants to be recognized for

Ordinary functioning of human cognition divides world into "self" and "other" categories of agency. Even when there are no grounds for categorizing, people will create them. Minimal Group Paradigm: 1.Whenever social divisions are salient, people will invent divergent identities 2."one need do little more than divide people into groups for distinct identities to begin to emerge. 3.When groups are in competition, their identities and biases will become more distinct. (see constructivism, identity, agents, socially constructed reality, in-group, out-group, attribution error)

Whenever categories for political groups are salient, group members will perceive strengthened group identities - positive for in-group and negative for out-group). Conflict will strengthen these identities and encourage exaggeration of out-group attributes. People will tend to exaggerate differences between political groups to underestimate differences within these groups. People will tend to attribute the behavior of political out-groups to the intent or desires of those groups; in-group behavior will be attributed to the influence of constraints. (see constructivism, cognitive psychology, identity, agents, socially constructed reality, attribution error)

Out-groups are perceived as homogeneous. The behavior of other groups is more readily explained by attributes of group members than to some situational constraint. (see constructivism, cognitive psychology, identity, agents, socially constructed reality, in-group, out-group)

(Onuf & Dr.Roberts) based on the linguistics and definitions of rules and how rules develop systems of rule that guide and constrain actions of agents. Constructivism holds that people make society and society makes people. This is a continuous two-way process. To study it, we must start in the middle by introducing a third element - rules. Rules link people and society (agents and structures) "Social rules ... make the process by which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal. "A rule is a statement that tells people what we should do." the "what" is standard for people's conduct, the "should" tells us to match our conduct to that standard. If we fail to do what the rule says, then we can expect consequences that some other rule will bring into effect. All the ways in which people deal with rules - whether we follow the rules or break them, whether we make the rules, change them or get rid of them - may be called practices." (see constructivism, rule/rules, socially constructed reality, agent-structure problem, speech act, assertive speech act, directive speech act, assertive rules, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc. )

language is used to get someone to do something. The generic form of a speech act is: I (you) hereby (assert, demand, or promise) to anyone hearing me that some state of affairs exists or can be achieved. (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, assertive speech act, directive speech act, assertive rules, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Statement that intends to get the listener to know something. Ex) Duck season has begun (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, directive speech act, commissive speech act, assertive rules, directive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Statement that intends to get the listener to perform an action. Ex) Lets go duck hunting (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, assertive speech act, commissive speech act, assertive rules, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Statement that intends to get listener to agree to a premise or accept a promise. Ex) Ill cook the duck for dinner (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, assertive speech act, directive speech act, assertive rules, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Rule based in the language of assertive speech acts that inform people about the world and about the consequences of actions. 1.General information in an assertive rule may form a principle. 2.Specific information in an assertive rule may form an instruction-rule. (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, assertive speech act, directive speech act, commissive speech act, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Rule based in the language of directive speech acts that tells the listener what to do. 1.Directive-rules are overtly normative- 2.they often provide information about the consequences for disregarding them. Having this information helps rational agents to make the right choice in deciding whether to follow these rules or not. (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, assertive speech act, directive speech act, commissive speech act, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Rule based in the language of commissive speech acts in which the speaker makes promises that the listener accepts 1.Hearers may respond with promises of their own. 2.Once webs of promises become sufficiently generalized, they become commitment-rules. 3.Commitment rules bestow rights and responsibilities. (see constructivism, socially constructed reality, speech act, assertive speech act, directive speech act, commissive speech act, directive rules, commissive rules, constitutive rules, regulative rules, etc.)

Rule through leadership and the control of information characterized primarily by assertive rules.

Rule by command or direction characterized primarily by directive rules.

Unintentional rule by the collective exercise of rights characterized primarily by commissive rules. Informal rule by agreement or commitment. This is rule by the unintended consequences of agents exercising their rights. Autonomous agents act freely while heteronomous agents cannot act freely because they are bound by their commitments.

(Wendt) This is derived largely from the social phenomena of mutual constitution. It has been used to document the effects of social variables on the formation of agents and structures in an attempt to explain or predict international behavior. A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. It is collective meanings that constitute the structures that organize our actions. There is no reason to think that people and states act in only one way toward anarchy . . . Just like everything else, anarchy only has the meaning that the collective society gives it. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, competitive security systems, individualistic security systems, cooperative security systems, etc.)

Competitive security systems in which states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is alter's loss (zero sum). 1.This constitutes power politics: a set of risk averse actors that infer intentions from capabilities and worry about relative gains and losses. 2.At the limit is the Hobbesian war of all against all in which collective action is all but impossible because each actor must constantly fear being stabbed in the back. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, social constructivism, individualistic security systems, cooperative security systems, etc.)

(In the Middle) - states are indifferent to the relationship between their own and others' security. 1.Neoliberal 2.Concern is with absolute gains 3.Position in the power distribution is less important and collective action is possible - though subject to free riding because states are still egoists. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, social constructivism, competitive security systems, cooperative security systems, etc.)

states identify positively with one another such that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. 1.Depending on the strength of the collective self, it will produce practices that are from altruistic to pro-social. 2.Collective action is possible and less dependent on the presence of active threats and less prone to free riding. 3.Power politics - efforts to advance one's objectives - are restructured in terms of shared norms rather than relative power. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, social constructivism, individualistic security systems, competitive security systems, etc.)

(Finnemore) Traces the development of international norms Shows how social systems and structures are norm-based systems that then account for the constitution and behavior of agents. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

a single standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. regulative norms order and constrain behavior. constitutive norms create new actors, interests, or categories of action. Norms embody a quality of "oughtness" and shared moral assessment and prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study. Norms channel and regularize behavior; they often limit the range of choice and constrain action. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform) An often used, yet essentially vague, term in perpetual need of specification;comprises legal, moral and sociological norms. Legal norms emerge when states decideto codify or formalize moral or sociological norms, a process that might be triggered orpromoted by norm-entrepreneurs. Sociological norms are associated with custom orhabit and therefore not the direct outcome of intended action. If norms are not sociallyreproduced, they might well erode

Norm influence may be understood as a three-stage process: The first stage is "norm emergence." The second stage involves broad norm acceptance, referred to as "norm cascade" the third stage involves internalization. The first two stages are divided by a threshold or "tipping" point, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

first stage- persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs w/ organizational platforms attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm life cycle, norm, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

After norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms, we can say the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

second stage- characterized more by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. The exact motivation for this second stage where the norm "cascades" through the rest of the population (in this case, of states) may vary, but it requires a combination of pressure for conformity desire to enhance international legitimation and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate. Another powerful and related mechanism contributing to the consolidation and universalization of norms after a norm cascade may be iterated behavior and habit. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm entrepreneurs, organizational platform)

Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them. Efforts to promote a new norm take place within the standards of "appropriateness" defined by prior norms. To challenge existing logics of appropriateness, activists may need to be explicitly "inappropriate" (e.g., protests) (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, organizational platform)

Sometimes these platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting the norm, as are many nongovernmental organizations. IGOs can also be org. platforms. Often, however, entrepreneurs work from standing international organizations that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm. (see constructivism, agent-structure problem, norm-based constructivism, norm, norm life cycle, norm emergence, tipping point, norm cascade, norm internalization, norm entrepreneurs)

If we put on a "gendered lens" (Peterson & Runyon 1999) we get a different view of international relations. "only by introducing gender analysis could the differential impact of the state system and the global economy on the lives of women and men be fully understood." (see gender, first generation feminist theory, second generation feminist theory, myth of protection)

"... set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be." Masculine characteristics include strength, rationality, independence, protector, and public while feminine characteristics include weakness, emotionality, relational, protected and private Male characteristics are ideal type - hegemonic masculinity. Masculine and feminine characteristics are relational - they depend on each other for their meaning. They are unequal, as society assigns more value to male than female. Foreign policies are legitimated in terms of masculine traits such as strength, power, autonomy, protecting its citizens. (see socially constructed reality, gendered lens, first generation feminist theory, second generation feminist theory, myth of protection) A set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be. Feminists, who have pioneered the study of gender, contrast differences ascribed by society (gender variations) with differences that are biologically 'given' (sexual differences).While individual men and women may not embody all the socially ascribed characteristics, expectations about gender roles serve to empower men and disempower women.

concerned with bringing to light and critiquing the gendered foundations of IR theories and practices of IR. (see gendered lens, gender, second generation feminist theory, myth of protection)

develop their own research programs with gender as a category of analysis. (see gender, gendered lens, second generation feminist theory, myth of protection)

Masculinity includes the widespread myth that men fight wars to protect vulnerable people when in fact women and children constitute the majority of casualties in recent wars. War is a cultural construction that depends upon the myths of protection in order to justify its existence (see gendered lens, gender, first generation feminist theory, second generation feminist theory, myth of protection)